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ABSTRACT
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by Ilja Ponka
Technologies such as Web Services, the Semantic Web and the Grid may give
rise to new electronic service markets, which have so many services, providers
and consumers that software agents need to be employed to search and conﬁgure
the services for their users. To this end, in this thesis, we investigate bilateral
negotiations between agents of service providers and consumers in such markets.
Our main interest is in decommitment policies or rules that govern reneging on a
commitment, which are essential for operating eﬀectively in such dynamic settings.
The work is divided into two main parts. In part I (chapters 3-8), we investigate
how the decommitment policies, through the parties’ behaviour, aﬀect the com-
bined utility of all market participants. As a tool, we use decisions that parties
make during their interaction. These decisions have previously been discussed in
the law and economics literature, but this is the ﬁrst empirical investigation of
them in a dynamic service market setting. We also consider settings (for example,
with incomplete information) that have not been addressed before. In particular,
we take four of these decisions — performance, reliance, contract and selection
— and consider them one by one in a variety of settings. We create a number of
novel decommitment policies and increase the understanding of these decisions in
electronic markets.
In part II (chapters 9-11), we consider a buyer agent that engages in multiple nego-
tiations with diﬀerent seller agents concurrently and consider how decommitment
policies should aﬀect its behaviour. Speciﬁcally, we develop a detailed adaptive
model for concurrent bilateral negotiation by extending the existing work in several
directions. In particular, we pay special attention to choosing the opponents to
negotiate with and choosing the number of negotiations to have concurrently, but
we also address questions such as bilateral negotiation tactics and interconnected
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Introduction
The Internet has grown very big and keeps growing at a very fast pace. No human
can possibly keep up with this much information and if the information is not
in machine-readable format, much of the potentially relevant information may be
impossible to ﬁnd with machines too. This is one of the problems the Semantic
Web (Berners-Lee et al. 2001) is seen to address. Thus, when information is en-
coded in machine-readable format, it becomes possible for machines to do more
sophisticated searches and ﬁnd better, more relevant information for us humans
to use. Similar ideas are also used in the area of Web Services (Curbera et al.
2002), which can encapsulate the implementation details (operating system, pro-
gramming language and so on) and allow existing services to be oﬀered to the
other computer systems, even to outsiders.
On the other hand, nowadays, many types of science, and increasingly also busi-
nesses need to analyse large amounts of data. Computers make it easy to collect
vast amounts of information, but using that information will often need sophis-
ticated analysis tools and when these tools are applied on such vast amounts of
data, large quantities of computing power are also required. Although computers
have become both cheaper and more powerful in the last few decades, the price
of the most powerful computers (nowadays often a cluster of ‘normal’ computers)
remains high and maintaining (and constantly upgrading) these powerful systems
requires specialised know-how and is usually quite expensive. For many companies
and universities the returns for such investment would either be uncertain or too
small to justify the cost. Thus, Grid technologies (Foster and Kesselman 2004)
aim to alleviate this problem by allowing parties to ‘rent’ computing power and
specialised tools and procure all sorts of services from other parties online when
they need them. These services can range from simple infrastructure services such
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as computing power, storage capacity and communication bandwidth, to compli-
cated service packages which involve aggregating many types of information and
simpler services from multiple sources into one comprehensive service. In addi-
tion, these services can allow customisation to each customer’s needs to a varying
degree.1
These technologies have the potential to create huge electronic service markets.
Such markets will be very dynamic and complex environments. With possibly
thousands of services, many of them conﬁgurable in many ways, with hundreds of
diﬀerent providers, and thousands of service consumers,2 from all over the globe,
the market will contain so much information and so many possibilities and change
so rapidly (the service providers and consumers coming and going), that no mere
human will be able to make the necessary informed decisions quickly enough to
fully use their potential. Therefore, in these new markets, it will be machines,
not humans, interacting with other machines. The humans will still decide the
goals of these interactions, but it will be the machines that take care of the details
automatically and mostly behind the scenes.
Since these services will require resources to produce and will be useful to their
users, it is reasonably certain that the providers of these services will be seeking
a renumeration for their eﬀorts.3 On the other hand, since at least some of these
services will be conﬁgurable, the parties will have to negotiate on the details of
the service before they are actually provisioned.
Given all this, the best way to describe such markets is as a multiagent system,
where each human or company is represented by their own agent (an encapsulated
computer system that is situated in some environment and is capable of ﬂexible
and autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design objectives
(Jennings 2001)). These agents then negotiate with each other on behalf of their
masters.
Given this vision, in this work we will concentrate on such negotiations. Obviously
there is a huge number of questions and issues with such negotiations and we can
only hope to make progress in some of them. In the following, we will discuss our
approach and interests and why we chose them over some others. However, we
1Mass customisation (as introduced by Pine (1993)) has been seen as one of the potential key
beneﬁts of electronic commerce (for example in Vulkan (2003)).
2Or even billions in some visions, see for example Kephart et al. (2000).
3Much of the World Wide Web works now with advertising income and is free to the end-
users, but in these markets that strategy is unlikely to work, since there are no guarantees that
their masters would ever see any advertisements that were given to them.Chapter 1 Introduction 3
start this introduction by explaining the background for our work in more detail
(section 1.1). This will be then followed by the aims for our research (section 1.2),
a summary of our contributions (section 1.3) and the outline for the rest of the
thesis (section 1.4).
1.1 Implementing Dynamic Service Markets
We start by discussing some of the key characteristics of the marketplaces we are
interested in in this work. In particular, the key properties are:
• player autonomy: All entities in the market are autonomous, in the sense
that they have their own agendas and interests. This means that there is no
one centre of control, rather diﬀerent entities make their own decisions and
the marketplace is an institution where conﬂicting interests are settled.
• player heterogeneity: The diﬀerent providers oﬀer diﬀerent services, have dif-
ferent costs, resources and situations and diﬀerent consumers need diﬀerent
things from their services, and have diﬀerent goals and plans.
• openness: The population of market players is not limited in advance, but
any party that is technically able to interact with the marketplace and its
parties and that is willing to accept the basic rules of the marketplace, is
allowed to enter. New market players can enter and existing ones can exit
the market at any time without any warning.
• dynamism: The circumstances of the market players can change at any time
and that, in turn, may change their goals and strategy. For example, a person
looking for a two-week trip abroad for a holiday, but a sudden problem with
a boiler in his house means that he suddenly has less ﬁnancial resources
to spend on a holiday and he switches the plan to spend a weekend in a
neighbouring city instead.
These characteristics make it diﬃcult to use traditional approaches to software
development (Huhns and Singh 2005). So, a number of new approaches and tech-
nologies are being developed to operate in such circumstances. We discuss some
of these approaches in section 1.1.1. We then discuss the need for negotiations
between the agents (section 1.1.2) in these markets. We conclude by discussing
the central role of commitments (and decommitments) in section 1.1.3.Chapter 1 Introduction 4
1.1.1 Background
We start by introducing two key technologies for our approach. We ﬁrst discuss
Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) (section 1.1.1.1), which is a popular framework
for describing market situations such as ours. We then go on to describe agent-
based computing as a way of adding autonomy and ﬂexibility to the traditional
view of service-oriented computing (section 1.1.1.2).
1.1.1.1 Service-Oriented Computing
In Service-Oriented Computing, each entity (service provider) oﬀers one or more
services to those who need them (consumers). Each such service comes with a
description which explains what the service will do, how it should be used and
what policies it will follow. In more detail:
• Expected eﬀect: An important characteristic of the eﬀect descriptions is that
they describe only what the service does, but not how (Huhns and Singh
2005).4 From the consumer’s point of view, a service is therefore opaque,
since the implementation details are hidden. The idea is that the consumer
does not need these to decide if he wants to use the service or not.
• Interaction: The interaction description contains all the information needed
for using the service properly in a standardised, machine-readable language
(Huhns and Singh 2005). Also the interface itself uses some implementation
neutral technology (such as Web Services (Curbera et al. 2002)), which al-
lows the provider to implement the service with any programming language,
in any operating system, using any libraries, databases and other tools he
wants.5
• Policies: The policies explain restrictions, constraints and requirements for
the use of the service (Huhns and Singh 2005). These cover issues such as
how the service consumer must be identiﬁed, how his authority to use the
service will be veriﬁed and how the communications between the parties will
be encrypted.6
4Huhns and Singh call this property coarse granularity and according to them its main ad-
vantage is that it reduces dependencies among participating services.
5Huhns and Singh call this property implementation neutrality.
6Many organisations and contexts have implicit policies that govern their processes. Huhns
and Singh see the writing of explicit policies as a useful exercise that makes it easier to implement
and enforce company-wide policies. The explicit policies that contain the relevant rules also make
it possible for automated inter-organisational processes to take place.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
The main design point of service-oriented computing is therefore interoperability.
It should be easy for any consumer to use any service in the market and it should
be easy to combine diﬀerent services into larger service packages. In particular, the
consumers can use the services from the market as a part of their internal processes
or they could combine the services from the market and/or their internal processes
into service packages that they can sell in the market. Another important goal of
service-oriented computing is scalability. Since the services are produced in the
provider’s own information systems and since most of the communication occurs
directly between the parties, the architecture should be able to scale, even to all of
the Internet. The only potential bottleneck is the market itself and especially the
service repositories, from which the the consumers can ﬁnd the service descriptions
and search for the services they need.7 However, there can be multiple separate
repositories and the big repositories can be replicated, so these should not prove
too problematic either.
However, arguably the most interesting characteristic of service-oriented comput-
ing is that of dynamic service selection. This means that due to all the inter-
operability characteristics, the consumer can select the service it wants to use at
run-time. Thus, instead of binding the program to always call the same service (or
a small group of services), the programmers can write their software to dynami-
cally select the service from the service market, whenever the need arises. This
makes it possible to write more ﬂexible and fault-tolerant programs. If one service
fails to respond, the program can automatically locate other similar ones and use
them instead.8
1.1.1.2 Agent-Based Computing
It has been argued that agent-based systems are well-suited for managing large and
complex distributed systems (Jennings 2001) such as these service markets. Here
an agent is viewed as an encapsulated computer system that is situated in some
environment and is capable of ﬂexible and autonomous action in this environment
in order to meet its design objectives (Jennings 2001).
7The service repository is not a required element, but since there must be some way through
which the consumers can learn of the services, it is usually present.
8It also decreases the risk of a lock-in, i.e. a service provider exploiting the consumer’s
dependency on his service, for example by increasing the price of using it. If the binding is
dynamic and automatic, the program would, in such circumstances, just switch to another
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In more detail, the service-oriented computing paradigm we just described can
be applied to agents directly or the service-oriented architecture implemented by
other technologies (such as Web Services, for example) could be complemented
by agent technologies. The direct application would mean that we describe our
service market as a multi-agent system, where each service provider and service
consumer has one or more agents representing their interests. The services would
be provided by agents to other agents.9 The complementary approach would mean
that the services themselves are not agents, but for example Web Services, and
the role of agents is to help their masters to ﬁnd the right services and possibly
combine them to useful packages (Huhns 2002). In both cases, the agents can
also negotiate between themselves on the price, quality and any number of other
properties of the service.10
In this work, we are interested mainly in the negotiation between the provider and
consumer agents, which happens before the actual service provisioning. Therefore
this service provisioning is, to us, of secondary importance. Moreover, since nego-
tiation can be easily incorporated into either of the two models discussed above,
we do not need to choose between them. Thus, it does not matter in the negotia-
tion phase, if the service is going to be provided by the provider agent or through
some other means (such as a Web Service).
In summary, our service markets basically consist of a large number of autonomous
actors, each with their own goals and plans. This is likely to make the market a
very complex and dynamic environment for the agents.11 Speciﬁcally, there will
be agents entering and exiting the market, there will be agents using diﬀerent
tactics and strategies, having diﬀerent parameters and/or agents needing diﬀerent
services. Moreover, since the agents’ owners are human, or companies run by
humans, their goals and plans can change at any time. This means that the
instructions they give to their agents can, in theory, change at any time without
any advance warning and this can radically change how the agents behave. In
9Although the discussion of service-oriented computing often assumes the use of Web Services
and other related technologies, they are by no means a requirement. Any technology that can
provide the properties we described above could be considered to be service-oriented.
10In the complementary approach this would mean that each provider would have a set of
negotiating agents that would negotiate with the consumer agents. The right to access the
service could then be made contingent on the acceptance of one of the provider’s negotiating
agents.
11The division into dynamic and static environments is common in the agent literature (for
example Russell and Norvig (2003) and Wooldridge (2002)). A static environment is one that
can be assumed to remain unchanged except by the agent’s actions. In contrast, in a dynamic
environment there are other processes operating on it and hence the environment changes in
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this uncertain context, each consumer agent must be able to navigate and ﬁnd the
services its owner needs, for reasonable prices, often within a speciﬁed time (i.e.
before a deadline). Thus, the interactions between the agents are central to this
vision and it is there that we explore next.
1.1.2 Interactions in the Market
As already mentioned, the services that are traded in the market are going to be
useful to their consumers and, on the other hand, there may be costs associated
to their production. Given that the market players are independent, they are
likely to be selﬁsh.12 A selﬁsh provider will try to sell its services for proﬁt. It
is therefore highly likely that the services are exchanged for some renumeration.
Here, we will assume that the renumeration will always be money.13 Given this,
the parties must have some way to agree on the terms of exchange. We discuss
here the three main options, namely ﬁxed and dynamic pricing (section 1.1.2.1),
auctions (section 1.1.2.2) and bilateral negotiation (section 1.1.2.3).
1.1.2.1 Dynamic Pricing
The price of a service in dynamic service markets can be set very much like in many
real-life markets of today: the seller posts the price (one price for everybody) and
the buyers either take it or leave it. However, the electronic environment allows
for much more dynamic price-setting than that. It is much easier (cheaper) for
the seller to change the prices from time to time or even customer to customer.
Both types of variation have of course been used for a long time, but an electronic
environment brings new possibilities in both. Because in electronic environments,
the price is nothing more than a value in a database (or something equivalent),
it can easily and at very low cost be changed whenever necessary. In contrast,
in traditional brick-and-mortar shops, the owner might need to print a new menu
or catalogue, change price tags or reprogram cash registers and that is both very
12In the real world, which is dominated by separate agents (humans and companies), altruistic
behaviour is quite rare, especially in the commercial contexts. Even ‘free’ goods and services are
almost always paid for by some one else (for example an advertiser) or the receiver of the ‘gift’
himself later in higher fees (for example in UK, a consumer signing for 12-18 month contract
with a phone operator and getting ‘free’ phones in the process will obviously pay for the phone
in the higher monthly installments).
13We do not consider barter (exchanging services for other services), because that would
introduce an unnecessary complication and would not bring anything essentially new to our
problem. For similar reasons, we are not interested in how the money actually changes hands or
how services are actually delivered.Chapter 1 Introduction 8
time-consuming and expensive. The lower costs may mean smaller and more rapid
price changes. Moreover, in an electronic marketplace, the small pricing changes
can also be left (at least partially) to a computer program that can take into
account things like stock situation and demand in real-time (if this information is
available).
However, electronic environments also allow more data to be collected from each
and every customer. In a small shop of the old times, the shopkeeper knew all his
customers and their needs and preferences, sometimes better than the customer
themselves. However, in the huge supermarkets of today, this is simply not prac-
tical. People shop in more than one place, in many shops self-service is becoming
more and more common (both in product selection and in paying) and they may
meet a diﬀerent clerk at the counter every time.14 Now, computer systems can
track each and every customer even in this sort of environment. A supermarket
chain might use a loyal customer bonus card or something similar to connect cer-
tain purchases to a certain customer and also get information about when they
did their shopping and how they paid for it. This information can then be used
in many diﬀerent ways. In an electronic marketplace, however, the customer can
be tracked even before he buys anything, through the products he wants to see,
searches he makes and everything he has ever bought from this store. And this
information could, in theory, be used to make proﬁles out of customers and even
setting prices to a level that this particular customer (and ones like him) would
ﬁnd acceptable. Naturally, this could be a diﬀerent amount for diﬀerent types of
customers.
So the electronic service markets oﬀer the sellers a possibility to collect information
about the buyers and make it easier (cheaper) to experiment with the pricing.
However, this does not mean that the seller is able to set an optimal price in every
situation and with every customer.
1.1.2.2 Auctions
The possibilities of price-setting go beyond this type of one-sided scheme. Instead
of trying to guess what the customer would be willing to pay for a given service
(given all the information available), a service provider could just ask them. One
simple way for doing that is to organise an auction. For example, Google uses
14And the clerks are too busy and meet too many people to keep track of who is buying what.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
auctions to set prices for the advertisements on its search results page. The adver-
tisers oﬀer Google money to show their ads in searches that have certain words in
them and the highest bidders get the service (i.e. Google puts the highest bidders
on its result page). The price is always what the advertisers are willing to pay.
Auctions do have some desirable properties (such as eﬃciency, neutrality, formal-
ity and simplicity that make them possible to analyse), but they also have some
drawbacks (such as inﬂexibility and diﬃculties in controlling information) and, in
addition, there are some situations, in which they simply do not work properly.
Indeed, many important results of auction theory (see Krishna (2002) for an in-
troduction) are only valid under very narrow assumptions. We discuss these and
other questions in more detail in section 2.3.1.4. At this point, it is suﬃcient to
note that there is a real need also for other approaches.
1.1.2.3 Sequential and Concurrent Bilateral Negotiations
In this work, we concentrate mostly on bilateral negotiation. In a market setting,
where more than one negotiation is possible, the multiple negotiations can occur
either one after the other (sequentially) or at the same time (concurrently).15 We
will investigate both. On one hand, we investigate many-to-many markets where
interaction occurs through repeated one-on-one negotiations (sequential bilateral
negotiation) and, on the other hand, we investigate concurrent bilateral negotia-
tion, which means that each agent takes part in multiple one-on-one negotiations
at the same time for broadly the same service with a goal of entering into just one
contract. In the latter setting, we will concentrate on one-to-many negotiations
because it is the base case.
The main advantage of negotiations is that they oﬀer a possibility for two-sided
interaction during the interaction. In such interactions, both parties can indicate
what they want and what they are willing to give in return. This will allevi-
ate the problem of incomplete information and can lead to better outcomes for
both parties. The provider can get a better understanding of his customers’ needs
and use this information to make his selection more interesting to his potential
customers.16 The consumer gets a service that matches his needs. This eﬀect is
especially strong in multi-attribute situations, where a service has many attributes
that can be conﬁgured interactively. Such conﬁguration clearly requires two-way
15Of course combinations of these two are also possible.
16Through negotiations the provider may also get information on why his oﬀerings are not
competitive. This information may be quite diﬃcult or expensive to obtain by other means.Chapter 1 Introduction 10
interaction between the parties, especially if there are too many possible conﬁgu-
rations to list all the possibilities as separate services. However, also in pure price
negotiations, the parties can learn what the other party is expecting and willing
to pay for a certain service.
Another setting in which bilateral negotiations could prove to be useful, is in-
terconnected negotiations. That is, situations where the agent is after multiple
services and these services have connections to each other. For example, the con-
sumer might either want two diﬀerent services or none at all (complements) or he
might want one of the three services (substitutes). Now, such dependencies can
be managed in speciﬁc type of auctions, but these can become too complicated to
manage if the number of services and dependencies is high. In contrast, if inter-
connectedness is managed with concurrent negotiations, the agent and its master
can ﬂexibly manage the complexity of the task themselves. We will discuss these
issues more closely later, in section 2.3.1.4.
Negotiations are also much more ﬂexible (changes in the environment can quickly
be taken into account), they allow rich and ﬂexible information exchange (in cases
where the service required or options available are not clear for the participants)
and they oﬀer some strategic advantages (e.g. the possibility of diﬀerentiating
strategies between diﬀerent opponents and of changing information between diﬀer-
ent negotiations). The strategic advantages are more apparent when negotiations
are conducted concurrently. On the other hand, concurrent negotiation typically
requires more computation and communication resources than a simple auction.
We will discuss these issues in more detail in section 2.3.1.
At this time, negotiation, especially concurrent bilateral encounters, is probably
not crucial to many contemporary e-commerce systems. However, it is easy to see
that in these service markets it is likely to become so. Since the services are conﬁg-
urable and diﬀerent conﬁgurations are likely to need diﬀerent amounts of resources
and to be of diﬀerent values to the consumer, some form of negotiation is clearly
required to establish the appropriate details of the service, and the renumeration to
be paid. The conﬁgurability would suggest negotiating on the multiple attributes
(diﬀerent characteristics of the service plus price) and it is true that this would be
a setting especially suitable to concurrent bilateral negotiation, since this type of
interaction is diﬃcult to organise in an auction.
On the other hand, the ability to reach agreements through negotiation is a fun-
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et al. 2003). When we consider also the amount of information and time con-
straints involved, it is clear that only a machine, a software agent, can accomplish
the task and therefore automated negotiation conducted by software agents will
be the means of accessing the services these markets oﬀer.
1.1.3 The Role of Commitments and Decommitments
In a multi-agent system there are dozens, sometimes even hundreds of software
agents, each of which may have its own goals. In a competitive setting, like an
electronic market for services, these agents compete against each other for the
providers’ services or the custom of the consumers. Contracts (or commitments
about performing a service at a later time) are an often used tool in such systems
to coordinate the agents’ behaviour and to enable individual agents to make as-
sumptions about the future actions of other agents. In other words, the contracts
provide a degree of predictability to counteract the uncertainty caused by the
distribution of control, and each agent having its own goals and decision-making
facilities (Jennings 1993). On the other hand, in the ﬁeld of real-life commerce, en-
forcable commitments make the exchange of goods or services and money safer in
situations in which the parties perform their part of the bargain at diﬀerent times.
For example, if provision of a certain service would require time and resources
from the provider before it can be delivered and if there are no commitments, the
provider would have to start working on the service and hope that the consumer is
willing to pay for the service when he ﬁnishes. The provider can of course ask for
the price to be paid in advance, but, without commitments, it would then be the
consumer who would have to trust that he will actually get something in return
for his money.
In fast-moving electronic markets, software agents can form hundreds of contracts
in a matter of seconds (He et al. 2003). On the other hand, in dynamic, ever-
changing environments, sometimes the parties of these contracts may live to regret
their choices. A better alternative may surface only seconds after agreeing to
something or the circumstances may change and turn a contract from lucrative
into disastrous. The full commitment contracts (that allow no reneging) can be
very problematic in such systems and force parties to perform contracts that have
become very onerous (because the circumstances have unexpectedly changed). In
some cases, it is also possible that performing according to the contract is simply
not possible anymore, in which case an unexpected failure may occur. So, the
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are cases where they may be counter-productive. We will ﬁrst discuss the main
approach to this problem in agent-based markets, leveled commitment contracts,
and shortly their alternatives (section 1.1.3.1). However, the problem of setting an
optimal decommitment fee (amount to be paid by the decommitter to the victim)
remains open and we hope that more detailed analysis in the law and economics
literature will be able to give us some pointers (section 1.1.3.2). Much of this work
is about investigating these ideas in dynamic service markets.
1.1.3.1 Leveled Commitment Contracts
Diﬀerent approaches to tackle the commitment problem have been suggested. In
contingency contracts (Raiﬀa 1987), for example, the contract itself would (ex
ante) specify the circumstances under which the commitment is no longer binding.
In practise, it may be very diﬃcult to list all possible situations in which this would
be necessary and it is diﬃcult to draw the line in cases where the situation can
become progressively worse. Another approach used in real-world international
commerce is renegotiation (Craswell 1988), which means that after the change in
circumstances (ex post), the parties renegotiate the contract to take the change
into account. Unlike contingency contracts, renegotiation allows parties to react
to unforeseen contigencies. The problem here is that it relies on the other party’s
cooperation: A party can always reject an oﬀer to renegotiate and is under no
obligation to accept any changes to the contract. Both of these approaches share
a problem, which is that it may be diﬃcult to reliably establish that a cause for
re-negotiation or dismissal of the contract actually exists and one party is not just
claiming so to force the other party to accept worse terms. This can be a problem
especially if the change has to do with one party’s internal circumstances. In
multi-agent systems, a third option is often used, namely Sandholm and Lesser’s
(1996) leveled commitment contract, which:
• allows unilateral decommitting for both parties at any time, but
• requires the decommitting party to pay the opponent a monetary fee (called
a decommitment fee) for doing so.
In this mode, the reason for decommitment is not relevant, but any reason will do
and this can be kept private. There is no need to arrange proof that any change
has occurred. This simply allows a party to abandon a contract that has become
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party must pay the penalty in order to decommit, a decommitment occurs only
if the decommitment improves the decommitter’s utility more than the fee to be
paid reduces it.
1.1.3.2 Performance, Contract, Reliance and Selection Decisions
In the literature that discusses leveled-commitment contracts, the decommitment
fee is mostly seen as a deterrent of decommitment. This view, however, overlooks
the eﬀect a decommitment has on the other party (the victim) and on the society
in general. In particular, the decommitment will usually decrease the utility of the
victim, because he will lose the proﬁt he was expecting. Moreover, it is possible
that he has already accrued some costs (preparing for its performance) before
decommitment occurs. When the contract is abandoned, these eﬀorts may become
useless. Now, if these lost proﬁts and accrued costs outweigh the beneﬁt the
decommitter receives from decommitment, the decommitment actually decreases
the sum of utilities of the parties and is, therefore, detrimental to the welfare of
the society as a whole.
In contrast, the law has traditionally taken another view, that of the victims.
In cases of non-performance, the victim (in most legal systems) is entitled to
damages17 and the aim of damages is usually to put the victim ﬁnancially in
the same position as if the contract had been performed appropriately (Treitel
2003). That is, the damages compensate the victim for the loss that the non-
performance causes. The economic eﬃciency of this rule has been investigated
in the law and economics literature in the area of eﬃcient breach theory (Barton
1972). The conclusion of this work is that this is the optimal policy from the
society’s point of view. In particular, by setting the damages (decommitment fee)
equal to the damage caused by the decommitment to the other party, a breach
(decommitment) occurs when and only when the beneﬁt to the decommitter is
greater than the damage to the victim. Therefore decommitment always increases
the total welfare of the society.
However, the economic analysis does not stop there. In the law and economics
literature, the role the damages (decommitment fees) play in parties’ decision-
making (and through those decisions on the welfare of the society) is seen as more
complicated than that. Diﬀerent authors classify these decisions slightly diﬀerently
17There may be other remedies in some situations and in some legal systems, but we concen-
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and identify diﬀerent numbers of them,18 but the fact remains that the damages
do aﬀect the optimal behaviour of the parties in many ways. In this work, we will
investigate the following four decisions (Smith 2004; Craswell 2001; Kornhauser
1986):
• Performance: Whether or not to perform an existing contract. The higher
the level of commitment (the higher the decommitment fee), the more likely
the parties are to perform. Too high or low levels of commitment can be
counterproductive for the common good (as explained above).
• Reliance: How much to rely on the performance of the other contract party.
The less likely the other party is going to perform, the less the performance
should be relied on. Relying on a performance will often cause costs and the
more the performance is relied upon the higher the costs may be. In case of
non-performance, these costs may be wasted.
• Contract: Whether or not to enter a contract at all. Although a contract
may be beneﬁcial now, the circumstances may change later and make a
contract counterproductive. The higher the required level of commitment
(the higher the decommitment fee) and the higher the probability of such
adverse changes in circumstances occuring, the less inclined a rational agent
should be to enter a contract in the ﬁrst place. From the society’s point of
view, very risky, high cost contracts may be inadvisable.
• Selection: Who to transact with. For example, an opponent’s reliability
should be taken into account when choosing transaction partners. Here,
non-performance does not produce any beneﬁt to the society, but only a
performance does. Any costs invested in a service that was never delivered,
are wasted. If the other party’s level of commitment (the decommitment fee)
is too high, the party might be indiﬀerent between performance and non-
performance or it may even prefer non-performance (so either be indiﬀerent
between diﬀerent reliabilities or even prefer less reliable providers).
The problem with these diﬀerent decisions is that the optimal amount of dam-
ages (decommitment fee) they prescribe are diﬀerent. As explained, in the terms
of performance decision, the optimal fee would fully compensate for the loss of
18Craswell (2001) identiﬁes no less than seven diﬀerent decisions and says that even his list
is not exhaustive but that any decision taken by the parties in relation to the transaction is, to
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the opponent. On the other hand, in the terms of selection decision, such a fee
would make a party indiﬀerent between performance and non-performance and
therefore the party could potentially choose very unreliable providers (or at least
not the optimal providers) that would be likely to lead to a suboptimal result for
the society, even overall losses. Of course if the opponent in this case knows that
he is not likely to perform and the decommitment fee is high, he might not enter
a contract in the ﬁrst place (contract decision). All these decisions are therefore
very intertwined and the only way to ﬁnd an optimal decommitment fee for a
given market would be to take into account all the eﬀects the fee has taken into
account. In many real-life markets this might prove to be very diﬃcult, even im-
possible, given the complexities of such systems and the incomplete information
they operate with. Given this, any solution would be highly environment-speciﬁc
and, in any non-trivial environment, ﬁnding an optimal policy might not be pos-
sible analytically and the only way of doing it would be through experimentation.
However, one should be aware of these eﬀects when allowing decommitments and
using decommitment fees. In this work, our aim is to investigate these decisions
and how they aﬀect market behaviour.
There are also two views to each of these decisions. On the one hand, each and
every one of them can be seen as a means of optimising the common good. The
society will be better oﬀ if all beneﬁcial contracts are performed, appropriate
reliance is put on the performances and very high cost contracts that have very
small chance of actually ever happening are avoided. On the other hand, they can
also seen as a guideline for an individual agent for making decisions in dynamic
service markets. These decisions will tell the agent designers what factors he needs
to consider when his agent is making decisions. First, an agent will only perform
its contractual duties, if it is still in its own interest (beneﬁt from performing is
greater (or loss smaller) than from not performing and paying a decommitment
fee). Second, the amount an agent relies on the performance of the contract partner
depends on how likely is the performance, what is the beneﬁt from performance and
what is the beneﬁt/loss from non-performance. Third, whether or not the agent
enters in a certain contract at a certain time depends on whether the expected
beneﬁt is greater from entering or not entering that contract. And ﬁnally who to
negotiate and transact with depends on who of the potential contracting partners
oﬀer the best expected utility, given the value of the service they oﬀer, price likely
to be required to secure the service and reliability of the provider.
As can be seen, the ﬁrst view is about maximising the common good and the
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decisions and they all are interrelated. So are these two views. To be able to
maximise the common good, one needs to know how individual agents behave and
what factors they will consider. The economic analysis of damages (fees) usually
assumes that the agents take decisions that maximise their expected utility (view
2) and fees are set so that this leads to maximisation of common good (view 1).
However, in real-life systems it may simply be too complicated for this approach
to work and it may be impossible to ﬁnd an optimal decommitment policy for a
given setting.19 On the other hand, it might well be possible for a single agent to
make its own decisions in a near-optimal manner (depending on the information
it has available). We therefore use both views. On one hand, we investigate the
eﬀect of diﬀerent decommitment policies and the parties adapting to them on the
common good. On the other hand, we also investigate how consumer agents in
a more complicated setting (concurrent bilateral negotiation) can adapt to their
environment, even if ﬁnding an optimal policy might not be possible. We now
turn to discuss our approach in more detail.
1.2 Research Aims
In this work, we investigate the eﬀect that commitments and decommitments,
especially decommitment policies (the marketplace rules about decommitments),
have on the common good and on individual agents’ strategies in a dynamic service
market, in which the individual circumstances of the agents (or their masters) can
change at any time.
To this end, we will have two diﬀerent settings with clearly separate themes to
investigate:20
• Markets with Subsequent Bilateral Negotiation: In this setting, we will have
a simple marketplace, in which many buyers and sellers of a certain service
meet to exchange services for money. Every buyer is matched to a single
seller at random. The pairs negotiate on the price of the service for a while.
This process is repeated a few times. The buyer and seller agents will be as
simple as possible and the main interest will be how decommitment policies
aﬀect market-level characteristics, especially the total utility of all parties
(the common good). The view here is usually that of a benevolent system
19If direct experimentation is possible, a reasonably good policy may well be possible.
20These two settings mirror the two views on performance, reliance, selection and contract
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designer, one who is implementing the marketplace and trying to maximise
the common good of the participants.
• Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation: In contrast, in concurrent bilateral ne-
gotiation, we will concentrate on one consumer agent and its strategies in
a dynamic and complex market with many sellers. We give our agent the
power to choose the opponents it negotiates with and ask it to choose the
number of opponents it will negotiate with concurrently and conduct the
negotiations while taking into account many variables including the decom-
mitment policy and the probabilities of circumstance change. We will also
shortly discuss strategies to deal with concurrent negotiations on diﬀerent,
but interconnected, services. The view here is that of a designer of an indi-
vidual agent.
Given this context, we will now discuss the key requirements (R1–R6) for our
settings which diﬀerentiate our approach from the others. All of them have to do
with diﬀerent types of decisions that the parties make in relation to a transaction.
R1. Costly and Time-Consuming Service Preparation
In order to provide a service to a consumer at a certain time, the provider
must invest resources and time in its preparation before the delivery. In
more detail, the seller has to start preparations for the delivery at time t > 0
before the actual delivery and he has to pay the cost cs when he starts the
preparations. Once paid, this cost is not recoverable. Such a cost means
that the society and the sellers can be adversely aﬀected by decommitment
(i.e. be in a worse situation than he would have been had he not entered
into the contract in the ﬁrst place). They may have incurred costs that may
turn out to be wasted when the consumer decommits. This has connections,
for example, to the contract and performance decisions.
R2. Changing Circumstances
The circumstances of the parties to a contract can change after the contract
has been entered into. The change can occur to one or both parties at a
random time between the contract and delivery time. The change is always
adverse and decreases the utility of a contract to the party by amount a.
Such a change can transform a lucrative contract into a disastrous one. This
requirement is connected to the contract decision.
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individual characteristics such as quality they produce (or need) and these
can vary from one provider (or consumer) to the next. The utility the parties
to a contract obtain depends on these characteristics and therefore for the
providers or consumers, exactly the same contract can provide a diﬀerent
utility. This requirement helps to make the market slightly more diﬃcult to
analyse and predict, but it also makes considering selection decision a ne-
cessity where there is a large disparity between buyer and seller populations
and not everybody can ﬁnd a transaction partner.
R4. Limited Negotiation Resources
Negotiation, especially concurrent negotiation, can be resource-intensive.
This means a consumer agent in concurrent bilateral negotiation settings to
limit the number of negotiations in which they engage.
R5. Openness
New providers and consumers can enter the market and old providers and
consumers can exit at any time.
R6. Availability of Limited Basic Information
The marketplace has reliable information about all the participants in the
marketplace and it will give this information to all participants for free. We
assume for example that the quality of service and reliability of the provider
are (accurately) known by all consumers. This requirement is made because
we do not plan to investigate how the parties collect this information or
deal with incomplete information in this area. Our task is to understand
how decommitment policies aﬀect welfare of the society and optimal nego-
tiation strategies in many diﬀerent ways and this problem, although inter-
esting, would not help us in addressing that question. On the other hand,
we assume that some information remains private (for example negotiation
deadlines) and some is not know by anyone before the related event happens
(for example, if and when circumstances will change for a given participant).
Obviously we expect our agents to be capable of adapting to these variations that
the ﬁrst ﬁve requirements oﬀer. As explained, the purpose of the sixth requirement
is to restrict certain research problems from this work.Chapter 1 Introduction 19
1.3 Research Contributions
In this section, we summarise our contributions to the state of the art. As per the
rest of this thesis, it is divided into two diﬀerent parts: the market setting (with
subsequent negotiation) and the concurrent negotiation setting.
In the market setting, we will investigate the eﬀect the diﬀerent decommitment
policies have on the common good. We will oﬀer a new and more complete view
on the role, problems and possibilities of decommitment in dynamic service mar-
kets. Speciﬁcally, we will investigate each of the four decisions we discussed earlier
(performance, reliance, contract and selection) in a dynamic service market set-
ting and see how parties will adapt their behaviour to consider these decisions
and then investigate empirically how this adaptation aﬀects the common good in
a market with many buyers and sellers. Although the work in this part builds on
existing models and principles from law and law and economics, these models and
principles have never before been applied empirically to a dynamic service market
setting with subsequent bilateral negotiations, where the parties may need to de-
commit, or consider incomplete information or sub-optimal policies. In the process
of investigating settings with incomplete information and the relative performance
of sub-optimal policies (limits of the optimal policy’s performance superiority), a
number of novel decommitment policies are developed and investigated. In par-
ticular,
C1. with the performance decision, we will consider the eﬀect of one and two-
sided decommitments, re-entries and incomplete information. This involves
discussing each setting in detail and developing new decommitment policies
for each of them, often looking at legal rules for inspiration. Here, usually
compensating for the actual loss of the victim is the key.
C2. with the reliance decision, we consider the boundaries of compensating the
victim’s loss in a setting where the buyer (victim) can decide how much to
rely on the performance. Based on earlier literature, we show in several dif-
ferent settings that compensating for extra-reliance will lead to overreliance
and, subsequently, a loss in common good. We contrast the buyer taking
the reliance decision into account with several simple reliance strategies in
diﬀerent settings. We also investigate several novel decommitment policies
that oﬀer partial restrictions on compensation (inspired by law, again) but
ﬁnd that they are usually not eﬀective compared to the case where the de-
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C3. with the contract decision, we investigate especially the possibility that the
parties can use the contract price as a risk-allocation tool between them-
selves, allowing them to ﬁnd mutually acceptable deals while ensuring non-
negative expected utility for them under any circumstances and under any
decommitment policy. We also investigate the eﬀect of none, one or both
parties taking possible changes into account and the limits of this mechanism
when decommitment policies, settings and available information vary.
C4. with the selection decision, we investigate how the decommitment policy
aﬀects the buyers’ choice between diﬀerent negotiation and contract partners,
which have a varying level of reliance as well as quality, and how these choices
aﬀect the common good. We investigate several near-optimal policies and
compare their performance with the optimal and other policies.
In the concurrent bilateral negotiation setting, we consider a case where we have
one buyer agent and several seller agents and the buyer agent can be negotiating
with many sellers at the same time. Such models have existed in the literature,
but we improve and extend them by:
C5. making the design of the concurrent bilateral negotiation model such that
each diﬀerent question is isolated to a separate and interchangable module
and deﬁning the interaction of these modules in suﬃcient detail that the
operation of the whole is clear in all circumstances. The modular structure
allows new strategies and tactics to be easily added.
C6. allowing the sellers to use several diﬀerent bilateral negotiation tactics, some
of which make it necessary for the buyer to adapt its behaviour to them (even
under complete information) or at least consider that it will be successful
in some negotiations and not so successful in others. The buyer’s tactics
designed to counter these (and other similar tactics) will be novel and aimed
at one or more of the possible opponent tactics and they will take into
account the possibility of decommitments (the contract decision). We will
investigate both cases with full information about opponent tactics and cases
with limited or unreliable information.
C7. considering, for the ﬁrst time, the essential issues of opponent selection (the
selection decision) and concurrency control (choosing the number of oppo-
nents to negotiate concurrently) in concurrent negotiation. We also make
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(choosing what tactic to use in each negotiation) and other parts of the
model. Moreover, we discuss situations where the buyer agent knows as well
as situations where it does not know the negotiation tactics the seller agents
are using.
C8. considering simple interrelated negotations on diﬀerent services simultane-
ously in cases where the diﬀerent services are substitutes (only one needed) or
complements (all of them are needed). All interconnections between services
consist of diﬀerent combinations of these basic cases we investigate.
C9. using empirical data (instead of known distributions) on previous runs to
estimate what sort of oﬀers to expect later in the experiment and whether
or not to accept the oﬀer on the table or wait for a better one later.
In the end, we will have an adaptive concurrent bilateral negotiation model which
will be able to adapt to more variation than anything in the state of the art and
we will have investigated several new tactics and strategies empirically in several
diﬀerent settings.
1.4 Thesis Outline
After this introduction, we will ﬁrst review the relevant literature in relation to
our requirements (Literature Review (Chapter 2)). We identify the models and
parts of models that we can use in our work. In addition, we highlight some
shortcomings of current research that we need to address in our work. After this,
the thesis is divided into two major parts each consisting of several chapters.
In part I (chapters 3–7), we will discuss commitment models. Our focus is on
common good and we try to ﬁnd the eﬀect diﬀerent decommitment policies have
on the combined utility of the market participants. We will discover that the eﬀect
of these policies is very signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, we will describe our model for a
dynamic service market and then investigate the eﬀect each of the four decisions
(performance, reliance, contract and selection) will have on the common good of
the market participants in turn. In more detail:
• The Marketplace Model (Chapter 3): We explain our basic model for a dy-
namic service market and explain the basic decommitment policies.Chapter 1 Introduction 22
• The Performance Decision (Chapter 4): We discuss situations where the
utility of one or both parties may be adversely aﬀected after the contract
has been entered into and the party in question has to decide whether to
perform or decommit and the eﬀect the decommitment policies have on that
decision. We discuss settings with complete and with incomplete information
and with and without a possibility of re-entry.
• The Reliance Decision (Chapter 5): We analyse situations where the buyer
has to decide how much to rely on the seller’s performance in a given contract,
when the seller’s reliability (probability of performance) is known and the
role the decommitment policies have on that decision. We discuss settings
with diﬀerent reliability distributions.
• The Contract Decision (Chapter 6): We detail how the parties can use the
contract price as a means of risk distribution in diﬀerent settings and how
they can, by considering whether or not to enter into a contract, safeguard
their own interest in all circumstances and settings.
• The Selection Decision (Chapter 7): We discuss the buyer’s decision to
choose its negotiation and contract partners and how that decision is in-
ﬂuenced by the decommitment policies. We will again have diﬀerent seller
reliability settings.
In part II (chapters 8–11), we discuss concurrent bilateral negotiation strategies.
We will develop a three-layered model for adaptive, interconnected, concurrent
bilateral negotiations and then discuss each layer in more detail. In other words:
• An Adaptive Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Model (Chapter 8): We will
ﬁrst introduce our model and the environment it needs to work on. The
model is modiﬁed from the marketplace model (chapter 3).
• Negotiation Tactics: the Negotiator Level (Chapter 9): The Negotiators
manage single bilateral negotiations. We discuss diﬀerent negotiation tactics
they face and diﬀerent tactics they can use to tackle them.
• Managing Concurrency: the Controller Level (Chapter 10): The Controllers
manage a set of Negotiators negotiating on a single service. Here, managing
concurrency refers to choosing who to negotiate with, how many negotiations
to have in a given moment in a given setting and what tactics to employ in
each negotiation. We introduce several basic strategies for managing these
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• Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: the Coordinator Level (Chapter
11): the Coordinator manages a group of Controllers that negotiate on
diﬀerent, but interconnected, services. We discuss the two basic cases of
interconnection: subsitututes (where only one service is needed) and com-
plements (where all services are needed) and discuss some basic strategies.
Finally, in Conclusions and Future Work (chapter 12), we will oﬀer our conclusions
and explain some possible directions for future research.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we discuss the relevant literature and pinpoint the state of the
art in the relevant questions. Since we cannot discuss all the literature relating
to (automated) negotiation (simply because there is too much of it), we limit our
discussion to the literature that is especially relevant to our approach. This review
consists of three main parts. First, we discuss decision and game theory, which
are present throughout our work (section 2.1). We then proceed to discuss the
literature that is relevant to each of our two settings in turn. We discuss literature
for the market setting and decommitments in section 2.2 and the literature for
the concurrent bilateral negotiation setting in section 2.3. We then summarise our
ﬁndings in section 2.4.
2.1 Decision and Game Theory
We start this literature review by investigating decision and game theory, which
will be extensively used in this work. In more detail, decision theory oﬀers math-
ematical tools for a single decision-maker to make decisions under uncertainty,
when he is the only one making the decisions or the other decision-makers can be
abstracted away from the situation. When there is more than one autonomous,
often self-interested, party interacting usually game theory (Fudenberg and Tirole
1991) is used instead. Game theory is a branch of microeconomics and can be used
to analyse situations and ﬁnd optimal strategies for all parties involved. Usually
the objective of game theoretic analysis is to ﬁnd an equilibrium where all parties
have their set strategies that they do not want to change. We will make heavy use
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of both decision and game theory and, therefore, we start our literature review by
reviewing some basic concepts.
The starting point for utility theory is a set of possible (mutually exclusive) al-
ternatives from which the individual has to choose (Mas-Colell et al. 1995). The
second requirement is that the decision-maker must be able to rank the outcomes
that follow from his choice. In more detail, there are two properties:
• completeness: given any two outcomes, the decision-maker must be able to
say whether he prefers one or the other or if the outcomes are indiﬀerent to
him.
• transitivity: if the decision-maker prefers A to B and B to C, then he must
prefer A to C.
Now, a utility function assigns a real number (utility) to every possible outcome
such that more preferred outcomes get assigned larger numbers than less preferred
ones. It is worth mentioning that the game-theoretic utility function is ordinal in
the sense that it will rank all the outcomes (A > B > C), but its value (utility)
does not give any information on how much better A is to B.1 Strictly speaking,
this means that summing the utilities of diﬀerent decision-makers is a meaningless
exercise and, therefore, the sum of utilities cannot generally be used as a measure of
the common good or the welfare of everybody in the market or society. Instead, a
concept of pareto-optimality is often used: a solution is pareto optimal, if nobody’s
utility can be increased without decreasing somebody else’s utility. However, in
automated negotiation, the sum of the agents’ beneﬁts or utilities is sometimes
used as a measure of global optimality, usually as a secondary criterion among
pareto optimal solutions (Rosenschein and Zlotkin 1994). Since the parties are
selﬁsh (not interested in the social optimum), this measure can only be used at
design time. In addition, the utility functions of the diﬀerent players have to be
cardinal and therefore give some idea how much better one deal is than another.
In this work, we are mostly interested in price negotiations between two parties.
Fortunately, this is one situation where there is a simple way to create utility
functions that can be considered to be cardinal. For the provider, the utility
function in the literature is often of the form:
Uprovider(pc,q) = pc − c(qs),
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where pc is the ﬁnal price and c(qs) is the cost of producing the service of quality
qs. For the consumer, the utility function is:
Uconsumer(pc,q) = v(qs) − pc,
where v(qs) is the value of the service with quality qs (or the maximum price the
consumer is willing to pay for that service) and pc is the price paid for it. Quite
often, the value function v(q) is very simple, v(q) = q. The utility function then
operates as a measure of success for the diﬀerent players. The higher the utility,
the more the agent has succeeded in the negotiation. It can also be argued that
these utility functions are cardinal.2
Now, we started this discussion on utility by saying that it will help us to make
decisions under uncertainty. So far we have not discussed decision-making. How-
ever, using the utility functions to make decisions is straight-forward. In a simple
case, where each action leads to one outcome, the decision-maker just selects the
action that leads to the most preferred outcome (i.e. the outcome with the highest
utility). However, the power of this approach becomes evident when we consider
situations where there are multiple possible actions, each of which can lead to
many possible outcomes with known probabilities. We can extend this simple
model by replacing the utility function with an expected utility function, which





where U(ok) is the utility of outcome ok, za,k is the probability of outcome k oc-
curring given that action a was taken, and n is the number of possible outcomes.
After the expected utility is calculated for all possible actions, the decision-maker
selects the action that has the highest expected utility. This rather simple tool
(maximising the expected utility) is a very powerful method for making decisions
under uncertainty. The obvious problem with it is that it requires that the proba-
bilities of diﬀerent outcomes given any of the possible actions are known. However,
we assumed that we will have information of this type (requirement R6), so this
approach will be used at least in some form.
2For example, let there be two providers with the cost of 0.1. One of them sells his service for
0.3 and the other for 0.5. Hence the ﬁrst one makes a proﬁt of 0.2 and the second one a proﬁt
of 0.4. It could be argued that the second one has done twice as well as the ﬁrst one. Similar
arguments could be made in the case of consumers. Indeed, Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) use
similar logic in their utility functions and consider them to be cardinal.Chapter 2 Literature Review 27
2.2 Commitment Models in Dynamic Service Mar-
kets
In the ﬁrst part of our work, we will be interested in the common good and how de-
commitment policies can aﬀect it. To investigate this, we will have a marketplace
where many buyers and sellers meet, are matched at random and negotiate bilat-
erally on the price of a service. The mechanisms of the marketplace are not very
important, it is the decisions about entering into contracts, performing contracts
and all related decisions that matter. However, we have to choose some mechanics
and we will therefore shortly discuss automated bilateral negotiation, especially the
three main approaches to it (section 2.2.1). However, our main interest in this part
is the notion of commitments and decommitments: how they aﬀect the common
good in the market and through what mechanisms. We start this discussion by
considering changes in circumstances and three diﬀerent approaches (contingency
contracts, renegotiation and leveled-commitment contracts) that can be used to
manage commitments when the commitment can become very onerous or diﬃcult
to fulﬁl (section 2.2.2). Having found the leveled-commitment contracts to be the
most promising option for us but having found no reasonable guidance on how to
set the level of commitment well in diﬀerent settings, we investigate some decisions
that parties make during their interaction to see if they would be able to provide
us with a useful starting point (section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Bilateral Negotiation: The Main Approaches
We start by discussing automated bilateral negotiation, which has been a popular
research topic over the years and there is a lot of literature on it. We do not
plan to discuss all of the literature here, but we concentrate on the three basic ap-
proaches to automated bilateral negotiation, namely game theoretic, heuristic and
argumentation-based. This trichotomy was introduced by Jennings et al. (2001)
and although it is not conclusive (there are some other approaches), these three
present a clear majority of all papers on autonomous negotiation. We introduce
each and discuss their applicability to our problem in turn. We start with the
game-theoretic approach (section 2.2.1.1) and follow it by the heuristic (section
2.2.1.2) and the argumentation-based approaches (section 2.2.1.3).Chapter 2 Literature Review 28
2.2.1.1 The Game-Theoretic Approach
The game theoretic approach uses game theory (as discussed in the previous sec-
tion) to analyse the negotiation situation and to ﬁnd the optimal strategies for
both negotiators and preferrably an equilibrium where no party wants to change
their strategy. The game theory literature on negotiation is very rich and wide (see
Muthoo (2002) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for an introduction). However,
much of the work builds on Rubinstein’s analysis (1982) of the alternating oﬀers
protocol. In this protocol one party makes the ﬁrst oﬀer for the contract and after
that the recipient of an oﬀer has always three possible actions, it can either:
• accept the oﬀer,
• make a counter-oﬀer or
• quit.
The basic limitation of the model is that after making an oﬀer, a party cannot
make a new oﬀer (or quit or accept), until it has received a counter-oﬀer from
the opponent.3 Negotiation ends with a contract, if any oﬀer is accepted by the
opponent and without a contract if one of the parties quit.
In theory, parties could continue making counter-oﬀers forever. However, there
are many possible ways to introduce pressure to end the negotiation one way or
the other in ﬁnite time. In game-theoretic models, the typical method is discount-
ing: the value of the object of negotiation decreases over time, so the longer the
negotiation, the less there is to divide between the parties.4 Another method that
is sometimes used in economics is ﬁxed negotiation costs. Such costs force the
parties to compare the chance of getting a better deal and the cost of continuing
the negotiation. At some point, the cost will be greater than the expected beneﬁt
and a party will accept whatever is on the table (or walk away).
In the automated negotiation literature, two other sources have also been used:
deadlines and competition. A deadline is the time by which the agreement must
be reached, if it is to be reached at all. Clearly both agents will try to end these
3The model does not include the possibility of cancelling an oﬀer, so a party is bound to his
oﬀer until it has been rejected (the other party has quit or made a counteroﬀer). The other
party can therefore create a contract simply by accepting an oﬀer. We will not consider oﬀer
cancellation in this work.
4Discounting means that the value of the negotiation object is multiplied by a discount factor,
which is a real number between 0 and 1 (typically close to 1) after every turn of negotiation.Chapter 2 Literature Review 29
negotiations successfully before the deadline. The deadline is usually diﬀerent for
diﬀerent players and the parties usually do not know each others’ deadlines. This
causes uncertainty, since the opponent’s deadline can be now and his current oﬀer
may be his ﬁnal one. If, for example, party A makes a counter-oﬀer, his opponent
will either accept it, make a counter-counter-oﬀer or withdraw (if it was his ﬁnal
oﬀer). A will have to balance these possible outcomes with his other option, which
is to accept whatever is on the table. As time goes on, the probability that the
opponent withdraws usually increases while the oﬀer on the table improves. This
means that the temptation to accept what is on the table increases.
Competition can also have a big impact on the strategies. For example, if there
are many providers, but only a few consumers, the providers must impress the
consumers quickly enough, so that the consumers will not go elsewhere. This will
mean that the providers will make reasonable oﬀers very quickly in an eﬀort to
ensure a deal. If the services were identical and information was complete, this
would lead to full price competition, which would drive the prices to marginal
costs.5 However, neither of these assumptions hold in our environment. Our
services are heterogeneous (requirement R3) and the parties’ information about
the market is incomplete (requirement R6).6 Therefore, some providers would be
able to make a proﬁt even in such circumstances, although obviously the providers
would be in diﬃcult position.
Now, Rubinstein’s seminal paper provides unique optimal strategies for the parties
in an alternating-oﬀers negotiation with an inﬁnite number of rounds, discounting
and complete information. When both players play optimally the negotiation
always ends in the ﬁrst round when one party makes an optimal oﬀer, and the
other party accepts it. However, this classic model is not directly applicable to
our problem, since it assumes complete information and the negotiation ends in
acceptance of the ﬁrst oﬀer. Both are problematic. The agents in our problem do
not have complete information (requirement R6) and the optimal oﬀers in the ﬁrst
round would not leave much room for negotiation or later changes (requirement
R2).
5This is the result of the basic price competition model from economics (Varian 2003). With
diﬀerent marginal costs there is a twist, however. If there were k consumers, the k providers
with the lowest marginal costs would set their prices a bit under the costs of the provider with
the (k + 1)th lowest cost.
6The providers do not know each others’ costs and the consumers do not know all prices in the
market due to their limited negotiation resources (requirement R4). Spulber (1995) has shown
that the former is enough to prevent full price competition. On the other hand, Janssen and
Rasmusen (2002) showed that already a non-zero chance of being the only provider the consumer
knows of, will have the same eﬀect. In our setting, some consumers might only negotiate with
one provider, so a chance that a provider would be the only one is positive.Chapter 2 Literature Review 30
Fortunately, it seems that these two problems are linked. In the later literature,
when two-sided incomplete information about the opponent’s reservation price
has been introduced into the model, negotiations do not usually end in the ﬁrst
round. Unfortunately, building and especially analysing these models is a very
diﬃcult task (Cho 1990) and often some unrealistic assumptions have to be made
in order to make the analysis possible at all. It is common, for example, to allow
only one of the sides to make oﬀers (the other can only accept or reject, see for
example Cho (1990), Cramton (1984) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1992)), to allow
parties to withhold their oﬀer (use the delay as a signal of private information, for
example Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992)), to allow only two diﬀerent
reservation prices (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987) or to limit the length of the
negotiation to two rounds (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983). Almost all the models
use discounting as a method of putting pressure on parties and one that uses a
ﬁxed cost for negotiation (Perry 1986) ends up with the negotiation proceeding
at most one round. And in spite of these restrictions, many of these models have
multiple possible outcomes, in which case a sensible outcome must be identiﬁed
(Cho 1990).
In addition, the game theoretic models are not very robust. Even the smallest
change in the environment may require recalculation of the strategies, which can
be quite a demanding task. Moreover, our environment is very dynamic, so the
only constant property of the environment is the change. Therefore, a purely
game-theoretic approach to bilateral negotiation does not seem realistic in our
case. Therefore, we will not use the game-theoretic approach as a basis for our
bilateral negotiation tactics. We will, however, apply game and decision theory in
many other ways.
2.2.1.2 The Heuristic Approach
Agent environments in general are often quite complicated, but still the agents
need be able to make decisions that improve their chances of achieving their goals.
Now, a very typical way to solve this problem in these situations is to use a heuristic
approach (Jennings et al. 2001). Such approaches acknowledge that it is usually
impossible to ﬁnd an optimal solution in such a complex environment, so instead
the goal is try ﬁnd a good enough solution.7 In negotiations, a heuristic approach
7According to Simon (1955), this sort of heuristic behaviour is actually very typical for human
decision making. A more recent overview of this problem is given in Aumann (1997) and one
approach on these ‘satiﬁcing’ games is oﬀered in Stirling (2003).Chapter 2 Literature Review 31
means that the negotiation space (possible deals) is searched in a non-exhaustive
fashion and that the number or type of diﬀerent strategies is limited.
In this vein, Jennings et al. (2001) have listed the key advantages and problems
of the heuristic approach. The advantages are that the models can be based on
more realistic assumptions (such as incomplete information) and also work in more
complex situations, where mathematical analysis is impossible. Moreover, the use
of heuristics allows designers to use less constrained models of rationality. The
problems are that the models tend to generate sub-optimal outcomes and that
there is no guarantees of success. In other words, the heuristic approaches require
extensive empirical analyses and simulations, because it is usually impossible to
predict precisely how the system will behave and the outcomes that will arise in
diﬀerent circumstances.
We will now discuss some of the main heuristic strategies; namely time-dependent,
resource-dependent and behaviour-based in more detail. These three were recog-
nised in Faratin et al. (1998).8 First, in time-dependent tactics the predominant
factor used to decide which value to oﬀer next is time t. The basic idea is to
vary the acceptance value9 depending on the remaining negotiation time. In all
variations, the acceptance value starts at some high value (for the sellers) or low
value (for the buyers) and ends equal to the reservation value at the deadline. The
expressions for the acceptance values using these tactics is for the seller:
xS(t) = max − α(t)(max − min)
and for the buyer:
xB(t) = min + α(t)(max − min).
where max is the maximum oﬀer, min is the minimum oﬀer, t the current time,
and α(...) a function that gives a real number in [0,1], zero at ﬁrst and one at the
deadline. In this case, a wide-range of time dependent strategies can be deﬁned by
varying α. However, usually the monotonic variations are used. In particular, three
monotonic variations are used so often that they have their own names, boulware,
conceder and linear. When using the boulware tactics, the agent tries to hold on
to a high price, but when the deadline gets close, the oﬀer drops rapidly to the
reservation price. In contrast, an agent using conceder tactics concedes quickly
8They explicitly say that their grouping is not exhaustive and neither is the speciﬁcation of
the groups themselves. There are other groups and other possible strategies within each group.
9An acceptance value is an oﬀer that the agent makes on its next turn. It is also a threshold
for accepting any oﬀers made by the other party: any oﬀer that is better than the acceptance
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in the beginning to near its reservation price and then decreases the price slowly.
Linear tactics are in between: the agent makes the same concession at every turn.
In all of these cases, α is an increasing function and is usually described as either:










where t is the current turn and dl the deadline. In addition, both versions have
a parameter β that determines how fast concessions are made and when. The
exponential version also uses parameter κ, which sets the starting level for the
bids.10 These time-dependent strategies are the most used heuristic tactics in the
literature (e.g. Fatima et al. (2004), Li et al. (2005), Mok and Sundarraj (2005)
and Hou (2004) to name but a few).
Second, the resource-dependent tactics are similar to the time-dependent ones.
Indeed, time-dependent tactics can be seen as a type of resource dependent tactic
in which the sole resource considered is time. Whereas time vanishes constantly up
to its end, other resources may have diﬀerent patterns of usage. For this family,
there are two broad approaches. Either making the value of tmax dynamic or
making the function α depend on an estimation of the amount of a particular
resource.
Third, in the behaviour-dependent tactics the agent takes the lead from its oppo-
nent: if the opponent concedes, then it will too. They work best in situations in
which the agent is not under a great deal of pressure to reach an agreement and in
cooperative situations. Three diﬀerent variations were introduced in Faratin et al.
(1998): relative tit-for-tat, random absolute tit-for-tat and averaged tit-for-tat. In
relative tit-for-tat the agent reproduces, in percentage terms, the behaviour that
its opponent performed k rounds ago. If the agent is a seller and the opponent
buyer increased its bid by 25 %, the agent will decrease its own bid by the same
amount. In random absolute tit-for-tat, the agent does the same, but uses the same
absolute amount and in addition, a small random term is added. So, a seller’s de-
crease of £2, would be met with a buyer’s increase of £1.90-2.10, for example. In
averaged tit-for-tat the agent calculates the average of percentages of changes in
a window of size j ≥ 1 of its opponent’s history. So, for example if j = 5 and the
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seller has decreased its price from £2 to £1 in ﬁve turns, the buyer will make a
10% increase for its oﬀer.11
As discussed above, in part I we are not really that interested in the details of the
bilateral negotiation process itself. For us, it is suﬃcient that this process pro-
duces potential and actual contracts and that factors like changing circumstances
(requirement R2) and heterogeneous opponents (requirement R3) can be easily
taken into account. And heuristic negotiation tactics are simple to use and un-
derstand, so we use them in our work as a basis for our bilateral negotiation. As
also discussed above the time-dependent negotiation tactics are possibly the most
used negotiation tactic in the literature and it can provide us with the ﬂexibility
we are after, so we use it in part I on both sides.12
2.2.1.3 The Argumentation-Based Approach
Both game-theoretic and heuristic approaches have two limitations (Jennings et al.
2001). First, the proposals are only single points in the negotiation space. Second,
the only feedback that the agents get from their proposals is a counter-proposal,
which itself is another point in space, an acceptance or withdrawal. This may be
very problematic; especially in multi-issue negotiations, where the space of possible
contracts is huge.
Now, the argumentation-based approach to negotiation aims to remove these lim-
itations (Rahwan et al. 2003). Its basic idea is to allow more information to be
exchanged between the parties. Thus the parties can, for example, oﬀer a critique
of their opponent’s latest proposal, explaining why it is unacceptable or what they
would like to see. This sort of information directs the negotiation to possibilities
that are likely to be acceptable to both parties. The approach also allows the
agents to explain why the other agent should accept their proposal. They can, in
other words, try to persuade their opponent to change their region of acceptabil-
ity. Moreover, it is possible to extend the negotiation to completely new areas,
to change what is negotiated on. For example, if two parties have diﬃculties in
ﬁnding acceptable terms of agreement for the purchase of a certain item, the seller
might oﬀer a free insurance or guarantee to the buyer.
11This is because the seller has decreased its price by 50% in ﬁve turns and therefore, the
average decrease has been 10.
12The requirements for part II of the thesis are more complex and we will discuss them later.
However, also in part II, our main focus will be on other questions and we will again be using
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The downside of an argumentation-based approach is that it is quite complicated.
An argumentation-based agent must be able to assess its opponents’ arguments
and form its own arguments to persuade the opponent. The more sophisticated the
arguments that are allowed, the more complex these tasks become. In this work,
we are interested in many issues in addition or instead of bilateral negotiation and
using an argumentation-based approach would distract us from those other issues.
It also does not bring anything that interesting to our problem because we will
only have price negotiations. Thus, we do not build upon this line of work in the
thesis.
2.2.2 Dealing with Changing Circumstances
We now turn our attention to commitments, decommitments and how they aﬀect
the common good. In most automated negotiation systems, the decommitment
problem is not addressed at all (Sandhom and Lesser 2002).This means that, in
eﬀect, contracts are assumed to be absolutely binding: after one has been made,
neither party can withdraw from it. However, in dynamic markets with incomplete
information, this may not be optimal, since one or both parties may experience:
a. changes in circumstances: if the contract is not performed immediately after
it has been entered into, the circumstances of one or both parties can change
between the time of contract and performance:
• the customer’s requirements may change and aﬀect the value of the
service
• the provider’s circumstances may change and aﬀect the costs of pro-
ducing the service.
b. changes in market situation: if there is a delay between the contract and the
performance, the market situation can change during this time:
• the demand can increase (for example due to a large number of con-
sumers entering) and this can increase the market price for the service
signiﬁcantly.
• the supply can increase (for example due to a large number of providers
entering) and this can decrease the market price for the service signiﬁ-
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c. problems in interconnected negotiations: the value of this contract may be
fundamentally dependent on the outcome of other negotiations:
• the consumer may be expecting to use the service as a part of a larger
service he is planning to sell to other entities, but he may fail to secure
a contract or the price may not be as good as he expected.
• the provider may be planning to buy some parts of the service from
other providers, but he may fail to secure these services or these services
may prove to be more expensive than the provider expected.
d. multiple contracts: either party may be negotiating on the same service with
multiple opponents and many of them can accept his latest oﬀer, leaving
him with multiple contracts even if he needs only one.
For example, consider a situation where agent A is negotiating with agent B on
delivering a service s1. In order to provide s1, A needs a subservice s2. A is unable
to do this service itself, so it is therefore negotiating with C on its provision (case c
above). The problem is now that if he manages to get a result in one negotiation,
the other may still fail: B may buy the service elsewhere or C may sell his service
to elsewhere. In the ﬁrst case (B buys elsewhere), service s2 has no value to him
and in the second case (C sells elsewhere), he is unable to provide s1. If we allow
parties to choose from many contracts, the acceptance alone may not be enough
to form a contract. So, A may accept both B’s and C’s oﬀers and still be left
without one or two of the contracts.
In a dynamic (even remotely realistic) environment, commitments cannot be ab-
solute. Hardware failures, network problems and many other things may mean
that despite the best eﬀorts, the commitment cannot be fulﬁlled. On the other
hand, commitments are useful, since they make it possible to make plans for the
future. Thus, we need to ﬁnd a balance between the two. We will now discuss
shortly two possible ways to cope with the problem: contingency contracts (section
2.2.2.1) and renegotiation (section 2.2.2.2). We will then conclude by discussing
our method of choice, the leveled-commitment contracts (section 2.2.2.3)
2.2.2.1 Contingency Contracts
The simplest solution would be to allow A to make a simple contingency contract
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contract, A would agree with B to provide s1, if and only if he can get s2 or A
would agree with C to buy s2 in case it manages to sell s1. In theory, we could
make our contingency contract explicitly state what we are supposed to do in
every possible situation that might arise after the agreement. The main advantage
of a contingency contract is therefore theoretical. If all possible contingencies
can be covered and easily proved to have occurred, they remove the commitment
(or replace it with another commitment or even another contract) every time a
party fails to perform and, therefore, in case of trouble, the situation is always
clear. In contrast, when a party to a binding contract fails to deliver, the original
commitment still exists despite the failure to perform and the fact the commitment
will never be satisﬁed. This opens potentially diﬃcult questions, for example, on
liability.
Another potential advantage of a contingency contract is that it makes the situa-
tion more transparent for all parties. For example, let us assume that A fails to
secure the service s2 and therefore is unable to provide the service s1. No mat-
ter what the contract is like, B is left without the service s1. The contingency
contract does not change that. However, in case of a contingency contract, B
knows the conditions under which A is not going to perform and can estimate the
probability of them occuring or even notice them occuring (for example the only
provider of service s2 stops operations). This is not the case if B does not know
what circumstances are essential to A’s performance. Of course such transparency
would mean that A would have to give quite a lot of information on its processes
and sources to the outsiders.
However, the main problem of contingency contracts is that listing all possible
contingencies can get very complicated and in any suﬃciently complex system,
there is always a possibility that something that nobody thought of (in advance)
occurs anyway. Moreover, for contingency contracts to work, one must be able
to prove the existence of each contingency (the failure to obtain service s2 was
not due to A’s feeble attempts at securing it, but that there were circumstances
beyond its control in play, for example), which might be diﬃcult.
2.2.2.2 Renegotiation
As already mentioned in section 1.1.3.1, one way to remedy this problem of un-
foreseen events would be to renegotiate the contract, whenever something, which
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the change, so parties know exactly what the new situation is and can possibly ﬁnd
a new balance between them. Renegotiation allows the parties to react to unfore-
seen contingencies when contracts are incomplete. Renegotiation may therefore be
socially useful (Salani´ e 2000). Indeed, renegotiation is a recommended approach
in both the Principles of European Contract Law and the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts in case of changed circumstances or hard-
ship (case a above).13 In both cases, if a change in external circumstances has
signiﬁcantly changed the balance between the parties, renegotiation is one way to
restore it. Thus, if the other party is still interested in the performance, he might,
for example, pay more or accept the delivery later.
However, the problem with renegotiation is that it relies on cooperation. A party
can always reject any oﬀer to renegotiate and is under no obligation to accept any
changes to the contract. It is therefore diﬃcult to ensure that an eﬃcient outcome
is always reached. To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Let
the contract price be 10 and the cost of producing the service 8. Now, due to the
changes in the environment, assume that the value of the service has decreased
from 12 to 9. Thus the contract is no longer in the consumer’s interest (since
9 < 10), but it would still be beneﬁcial to the society, since the beneﬁt is larger
than the cost (9 > 8). The parties could renegotiate the price to anything between
8 and 9 and both parties would be better oﬀ than by letting the contract go.
However, the provider is not under any obligation to accept the lower price and
can insist on the price of 10 instead. Now, in international trade the renegotiation
often works because the parties will want to continue their business relations and
it does not hurt to be fair every now and then, since the next time the roles might
well be reversed.
There are, however, other situations in which a successful renegotiation is simply
not possible. To illustrate this, let the value of the service decrease to 7 instead of
9. Now, the costs outweigh the beneﬁts (8 > 7), so the contract is detrimental to
welfare. Thus there is no price that both parties can agree on, so any renegotiation
will fail. The best outcome would be to walk away from the contract. However,
13Principles of European Contract Law are created by a group of leading legal scholars from
diﬀerent European Union countries and they are intended to be applied as general rules of con-
tract in the European Union (article 1:101). They cover all kinds of contracts. In contrast, the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts are created by United Nations’
International Institute for the Uniﬁcation of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to be used in the inter-
national trade between commercial entitites. They complement the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and other international conventions on
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the provider will be able to make a proﬁt with a price of 10 (10 > 8) and it has
no obligation to withdraw from the contract, so it may well insist on it.
In theory, we could insist that the provider renegotiates in the ﬁrst case and with-
draw in the second case, but the problem is that in practice (with incomplete
information) it may be diﬃcult to say which of the two cases any particular sit-
uation is. In addition, it may be uncertain what the eﬀect of a particular event
actually is to the consumer’s valuation of the service. Thus if the consumer knows
that the provider will decrease its price to 8.5 if his valuation decreases to 9, he
might claim that his valuation has decreased even when it really has not. On the
other hand, it might be very diﬃcult to prove the valuation really has decreased.
Some of the events that cause changes in valuation may be very diﬃcult to prove
reliably with reasonable costs (for example the change in demand or in the buyer’s
preferences or goals). And obviously the consumer never has an incentive to indi-
cate any changes that increase the value. Therefore the provider may not believe
the consumer’s arguments on a changed situation and may still insist on the higher
price.
2.2.2.3 Leveled-Commitment Contracts
Given the analysis above, we believe that neither contingency contracts nor rene-
gotiation are suﬃcient for the problems we are facing. They might oﬀer a workable
solution if we assumed that any change in circumstances would render the contract
otherwise void, but the parties could not negotiate with anyone else on the subject
for a certain duration (lock-out agreement). In this case, the parties might well
have suﬃcient incentives to negotiate seriously with each other. Parties could also
agree to release each other to negotiate with other parties.14 However, this is still
somewhat unsatisfactory. The third option to manage changing circumstances is
to allow parties abandon their commitments, to decommit from them whenever
they want. Now, of course if decommitting a commitment was always completely
unrestricted, there would be no commitment. However, there is a way to make
this work and it is the leveled-commitment contracts (section 1.1.3.1), which:
• allow unilateral decommitting for both parties at any time, but
14Another approach would be to deem the contract as one of risk distribution: each party would
be responsible for any changes that make the contract less favourable to them. In this case, the
contract would be binding unless both parties agree to let it go or in case the performance is
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• require the decommitting party to pay a monetary fee (called a decommitting
penalty) for doing so.
In this mode, the reason for decommitment is not relevant, any reason will do
and the reason can be kept private (Sandhom and Lesser 2002). The name lev-
eled commitment contract comes from the fact that the size of the decommitting
penalty speciﬁes the party’s level of commitment. According to Sandholm and
Lesser, the leveled commitment contract makes it easy to manage interconnected
contracts and distributed search, they save time and computation15 and allow re-
allocation of risk.16 We think that the leveled-commitment contracts are the best
approach to manage changing circumstances (requirement R2) and the necessary
decommitments. However, this leaves us with a question about the optimal size
of decommitment penalty and that is what we will discuss next.
2.2.3 The Decisions the Parties Make
The obvious question on the optimal size of decommitment penalty is not an easy
one to answer. It depends on the circumstances and in ways that may not always
be obvious at ﬁrst glance. Generally speaking, one can say that if the penalty is
very large, the situation is similar to cases where decommitment is not allowed at
all. On the other hand, if the penalty was zero, there would be no commitment
at all.17 It is therefore clear that the optimal level for these penalties is usually
somewhere in between, but the agent literature so far has concentrated on things
that can be considered to be of secondary value. For example, Sandholm et al.
(1999) have considered a problem of strategic decommitment, a situation where
15This may actually be quite problematic. According to Sandholm and Lesser, the ability to
decommit saves computation, because the agents can bid on contracts using only approximations
of contract value and they need not perform feasibility checks. In this case, only the oﬀeror who
actually wins the contract makes these calculations in detail and can decommit, if necessary.
However, it is obvious that this can lead to very ineﬃcient (initial) allocations of tasks. The
winner is not necessarily the best provider, but is the one that underestimated its costs by the
most.
16In market conditions, the contract price itself can be seen as a risk-allocation device. At
the moment of agreement both parties have preferred the contract price to the uncertain market
price of the future and have taken the risk of price changing to the direction that is bad for them.
Allowing parties to decommit just because it later turns out they made a bad bargain changes
this risk allocation. This can be seen as a good thing by some, but there is also a problem. If the
market is very volatile and decommitment penalties small, it is very likely that one of the parties
will decommit before the performance. This means that after the contract has been formed, the
parties need to continue negotiating with other opponents, since the contract they already have
is unlikely to be actually performed. This can be seen as wasteful use of resources.
17In case of a readily available market for the service, even a slightly better deal oﬀered by
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one agent is not decommitting, although the contract is no longer useful to it,
because it expects the other agent to decommit.18 This may lead it to staying in
a contract even when neither party really wants to.19
For us, the real issue is how the level of decommitment penalty aﬀects the be-
haviour of the parties at a much higher and more general level. Now, contracts
are a prevalent form of commitment in the society and they have been investigated
thoroughly in many areas of science, including law, sociology, and economics. For
us, the most interesting areas in this regard are law and game theory. In game
theory, the problem of contracts has been investigated especially in the sub-ﬁeld
of law and economics, which investigates legal rules and economic eﬃciency. Orig-
inally one of the major areas of investigation was so called eﬃcient breach theory,
which investigated circumstances under which it was more eﬃcient (from the so-
ciety’s point of view) to abandon the contract than to fulﬁl it. This was later
named the performance decision. As we will see, it was shown that the legal rules
in many jurisdictions about contract breaches can be seen to follow the approach
this analysis prescribed.
However, this was not the end of the analysis. In the subsequent decades, the work
has expanded and many other decisions were recognised. The level of damages
(in legal terms and decommitment penalties for us) was shown to aﬀect many
decisions that parties make. Diﬀerent authors classify these decisions slightly
diﬀerently and identify diﬀerent numbers of them. For example Craswell (2001)
identiﬁes no less than seven diﬀerent decisions and says that even his list is not
exhaustive but that any decision taken by the parties in relation to the transaction
is, to some extent, aﬀected by the extent of the liability they and their opponent
bear. His examples include, among others, choosing who to enter contracts with
and at what price, how much time to spend on looking for better alternatives
before committing, how much eﬀort to put into performing properly, how much to
rely on the promised performance, how carefully to assess the risks involved and
18If the other agent decommits, the agent not only saves the decommit fee, but gets the
opponent’s decommitment fee.
19Sandholm et al. (1999) show how this can be avoided by calculating the optimal decommit-
ting penalties in the following simple game. The game has two rounds. In the ﬁrst one, the
provider and consumer negotiate a contract and in the end either both accept it or it is rejected.
In the second round, both parties get an outside oﬀer from a known distribution (diﬀerent for
diﬀerent parties). They then decide whether or not to decommit from the ﬁrst contract (if it was
made). The game itself is somewhat simplistic and assumes quite a lot. In particular, the only
change comes from the counteroﬀers, thus both parties know the distributions the counter-oﬀers
are drawn from, that the values are statistically independent and that the distributions and other
information are assumed to stay the same for the duration of the game. The game is obviously
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how much information to give to the other party. In other words the damages do
aﬀect the optimal behaviour of the parties in many ways, some of which may not be
instantly obvious. And the problem is that these diﬀerent decisions may prescribe
very diﬀerent levels of damages (decommitment fees) and in most situations many
of these decisions happen in every transaction. This may mean that an economic
analysis of a real-world situation may be very complicated.
In this section, we review the literature for the following four decisions in more
detail: (Smith 2004; Craswell 2001; Kornhauser 1986):
• the performance decision (whether or not to perform) (section 2.2.3.1),
• the reliance decision (how much to rely on the opponent’s performance)(section
2.2.3.2),
• the contract decision (whether or not to enter the contract at all)(section
2.2.3.3), and
• the selection decision (who to negotiate with)(section 2.2.3.4).
These four decisions were chosen because they are the most important ones in this
setting. The performance decision is much discussed in the literature and the legal
rules on contracts can be, in many cases, justiﬁed with analysis of this decision.
The reliance decision is the ﬂipside of the performance decision: when one party
makes a decision whether or not to perform, the other one makes a decision whether
or not to rely on the performance. The contract decision is obviously central to
us, since we are interested in the changes of circumstances (requirement R2) and
one way to avoid decommitments is to consider whether or not to enter a contract
in the ﬁrst place. The selection decision is also an obvious choice, given that
we have heterogeneous participant populations (requirement R3). Because many
of these decisions have not been discussed in the context of agent marketplaces
and because it is unclear how big the diﬀerences between diﬀerent policies are in
diﬀerent situations, we will investigate each of the decisions separately.
2.2.3.1 The Performance Decision
In the performance decision, there is an existing contract and the parties to that
contract decide whether or not to perform according to it. The contract party
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contract and paying the decommitment fee. He will choose to decommit only
if the decommitment actually improves his utility more than the fee to be paid
reduces it. In most of the literature, the decommitment fee is therefore mostly
seen as a deterrent of decommitment. This view, however, overlooks the eﬀect a
decommitment has on the other party (the victim) and on the society in general.
In particular, the decommitment will usually decrease the utility of the victim,
because he will lose the proﬁt he was expecting. Moreover, it is possible that he has
already accrued some costs (preparing for its performance) before decommitment
occurs. When the contract is abandoned, these eﬀorts may become useless. Now, if
these lost proﬁts and accrued costs outweigh the beneﬁt the decommitter receives
from decommitment, the decommitment actually decreases the sum of utilities of
the parties and is, therefore, detrimental to the welfare of the society as a whole.
In general, the computer science literature has not discussed these issues at all.
However, Andersson and Sandholm (2001) have recognised the possibility of using
the price of the contract as a basis of the decommitment penalty, but instead of
full compensation they suggest that the penalty should be selected as a percent-
age (or a more complex function) of the price. Another way they suggest is to
make the penalties compensate the victim of the breach for its lost proﬁt. If com-
bined with the compensation of useless work, this is essentially the expectation
damages.20 In this vein, Nguyen and Jennings (2004) have suggested a dynamic
decommitment fee, which is calculated as a percentage of the (buyer’s) utility of
the deal.21 Attaching the decommitment penalty of both parties this way only to
the buyer’s utility may be problematic, since obviously the fee is not connected in
any way to the seller’s utility22 and it does require the buyer to reveal his utility
20Andersson and Sandholm point out that because the victim has an incentive to lie about its
proﬁt, some sort of mechanism would be required to calculate the loss. The state of both agents
might have changed since the contract was made, so the expected lost proﬁt may have changed
between contracting and breaching time. In the extreme, the lost proﬁt for the victim can be
negative at breaching time, that is, also the victim of the breach beneﬁts from being freed from
the contract obligations.
21They experiment with diﬀerent starting and ending levels and seem to get a result that the
higher decommitment fees mean lower utilities. However, it seems that their services cost only
at the time of performance, so the problems discussed here are not presented in their case. In
addition, the starting and ending levels of their tests are quite close to each other (0-0, 5-10, 10-
10, 10-20, 25-25, 25-50, 50-50, 50-100, 75-75 and 100-100) and the formula they use to calculate
the costs is linear in time. The sellers in their model also do not necessarily make their decisions
on decommitment rationally, but they may be loyal (never decommit) or partially so (decommit
with probability of 0.5, if a better contract is found).
22The decommitment fee therefore depends on how well the buyer has succeeded in negotia-
tions. If he did badly and his utility is low, the decommitment fee is also low. On the other hand,
the utility of the seller is probably relatively high, so the decommitment fee is not compensatory
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to the seller.23
Also Excelente-Toledo et al. (2001) have suggested variable penalty contracts as
an extension of levelled commitment contracts, that make a connection between
the actual costs and the decommitment costs. They oﬀer two penalty schemes that
are especially interesting to us, partially sanctioned and sunk costs. In the former,
the actual fee depends on the state of the coordination activity, its participants
and the estimate of the proﬁt. However, the amount paid is agreed in the contract
and the compensation may therefore be only partial. The latter compensates the
eﬀort that parties have invested so far but not the expected proﬁt.
All schemes discussed in the last two paragraphs aim to compensate the damage
the decommitment causes to the opponent, at least to some degree, which we
think is the right approach. However, none of them is entirely consistent (i.e.
they do not consider diﬀerent relevant factors, such as actual costs and proﬁts)
and we think that they do not go far enough (full expectation damages). We will
now discuss the issue of decommitment in terms of contract law, to see if it could
provide us some ideas how to proceed with decommitment fees.
In the law of contract, the contracts are binding (pacta sunt servanda) and any
kind of non-performance is a breach of contract. When there is a breach, the law
of contracts gives certain remedies for the opponent. There are two main ones:
• A speciﬁc performance means that the obligations laid down in the contract
are enforced. If a person promised to give something, the court will order
that something to be given. A court order can be enforced by other oﬃcials
and, in extreme cases, even force could be used. The aim is to make the
parties perform as they had agreed to do in the contract.
• The damages, on the other hand, are a monetary sum that aims to com-
pensate for the lack of performance. The expectation damages are usually
awarded.
The diﬀerent legal systems diﬀer as to which remedy is dominant. In some coun-
tries, the speciﬁc performance is the main remedy and the damages are usually
used only if the speciﬁc performance is not possible. Other countries allow the
other party to choose which remedy to invoke. In common law countries (roughly
23Such information may weaken its negotiation position in the next negotiation between the
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the same countries that have English as an oﬃcial language24), however, the dam-
ages are preferred and the speciﬁc performance is used only in speciﬁc situations,
where damages are deemed to be very diﬃcult to assess.
Now, in a common law system, a party to a contract can get out of most contracts
simply by paying these damages. This idea is not unlike the decommitment penalty
discussed before, but there is one big diﬀerence: the damages are compensatory.
That is, they try to compensate the opponent for the damage he suﬀers due to de-
commitment, where the decommitment penalty usually is not.25 This means that
if non-compensatory decommitment penalties are used, the selﬁsh parties worry
only about their own welfare and can decommit in situations where the beneﬁts
they get from decommitting are smaller than the losses suﬀered by the opponent
(Sandhom and Lesser 2002). This is usually detrimental to the welfare of the so-
ciety. The solution oﬀered by the law and economics literature is easy enough: set
the decommitment penalty (damages) equal to the value of performance. In this
way, the opponent’s losses are internalised to the parties’ decommitment decision
and the decommitment occurs only if a party expects that the beneﬁts are larger
than the losses (i.e. only when decommitment increases welfare).26 This is exactly
what the contract law rule on damages can be seen to be doing.
Generally the goal of contract law is to facilitate contracting in situations where
the agreement and performance or the performance of diﬀerent parties do not occur
at the same time. This is exactly what we have in our setting: We have costly
and time-consuming service preparation (requirement R1). The seller must begin
preparation of its performance (the service) before the buyer make its performance
(the payment). The seller may have to, for example, buy the necessary materials,
compile the data and start the analysis. If these actions cost money and are useless
if the service contract is decommitted before the performance, it is clear that a
24However, this classiﬁcation is not precise and should not be taken as such. For example,
Scotland’s legal system is not based on common law.
25According to Sandhom and Lesser (2001, p. 216): ‘...explicitly allowing decommitting from
the contract for a predetermined price is used as an active method for utilizing the potential
provided by uncertain future.’ This means that the decommitment penalties are often very low
and too low to be compensatory. As we explained earlier, there are some papers that suggest a
more compensatory approach (e.g. Anderson & Sandholm and Excelente-Toledo et al. discussed
in section 2.2.3), but, in our view, they do not go far enough.
26However, Sandholm and Lesser think that the results of law and economics cannot be used,
because they discuss the level of damages after there is a breach. However, this is a misunder-
standing of sorts. Any one-sided decommitment before the time of performance is dealt with
under the rules concerning anticipatory breach of contract. Thus the contract is binding and
cannot be unilaterally terminated. If a party to a contract informs the other that he is not
going to perform the contract, this decommitment is not usually eﬀective unless the other party
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reasonable decommitment penalty should compensate for these losses. Moreover,
the prospect of such compensation in case of trouble allows people to take these
actions without needing to worry about the costs (they will be compensated in
any case as long as the buyer is solvent) and other legal rules allow people to pay
in advance, since in case of non-performance, they can usually get their money
back. And this allows parties to trade even in the face of uncertainties about the
future and the other party.
Also one could also consider that legal rules have also evolved during hundreds
of years of trading, and therefore one could argue that they should represent a
reasonable starting point for the rules of any trading system. Any situation that
can happen in a trading context has happened countless times before and legal
rules are likely to cover it. Of course the diﬀerent legal systems do vary in details,
but the big picture is usually surprisingly similar in most legal systems in the
world.
Since our setting is just what the legal rules are about and the rules themselves
seem to facilitate eﬃcient trading between the parties, it seems a very promising
approach to see how the law manages more complicated situations and how the
legal rules can be used to adjust decommitment policies in these more complex
settings. That is exactly what we will do later in chapter 4. Since most of the
literature and other work on these decisions, is on the performance decision, that
will be our main focus too. We will discuss many diﬀerent settings and develop
decommitment policies for them and investigate also settings with incomplete
information.
The law and leveled-commitment contracts are not a perfect ﬁt, however. As
discussed above, with the leveled-commitment contracts, the reason the party
wants to decommit is not relevant: the party can decommit at any time for any
reason, but on the other hand, it needs always to pay the fee. The law, however, has
traditionally in most countries seen diﬀerences in the situations: Some reasons are
considered to be better than others and there is usually good explanation for such
exceptions. The biggest diﬀerence here is that in law, there are special situations
where it might be possible that the party’s duties end without any payments or
can end for less than full damages. These, obviously exceptional, situations are
handled in English law under the doctrine of frustration. It deals with situations in
which the circumstances change between the time of agreement and performance,
in such a manner that the performance, as agreed, is impossible (for example a
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the seller can provide the buyer with one) or has changed to something completely
diﬀerent (a trip to an area that has become a war zone). In addition, frustration
requires that the problem could not have been foreseen or won with reasonable
costs. If frustration is permanent, the contract is void. This means that the
obligations of the parties no longer exist and any performances (or at least the
equivalent value) already made should be returned.27 In an agent-based market an
impossibility to perform could mean for example power outage, network or other
hardware malfunction or something similar.
However, since these situations are (by deﬁnition) exceptional, the way they are
handled may not have a huge impact on the whole. The fairness aspect (if there
was nothing a party could have done better, having to pay a fee may seem unfair)
might justify using these exceptions also in agent systems. However, there are
potential problems. On one hand, if these types of exceptions are allowed, it
could create incentives to make fraudulent claims and to counter that one would
need a process for evaluating the claims that the exceptional circumstances are
at hand and that may be tricky in some situations, especially the ‘could not
have been anticipated or avoided’ part. This would make the system much more
complicated than ‘you fail, you pay’. And on the other hand, in diﬀerent legal
systems, these exceptions are deﬁned in diﬀerent ways and they are somewhat
diﬀerent in extent and applicability. In an international marketplace, one would
need to clearly explain what the rules in this particular market are and exactly
when would exceptions be granted. In this regard ‘you fail, you pay’ or ‘no fees’
would be much simpler. Due to these reasons, we will not consider these exceptions
in this work.
2.2.3.2 The Reliance Decision
If the performace decision was the only relevant decision, things would be easy.
To maximise common good, one would set the decommitment fee equal to the
opponent’s losses and it would only be a problem of getting that fee close enough
27The applicability of this doctrine is very limited under English law. In many other ju-
risdictions there is a similar but usually a wider doctrine of force majeure, which allows non-
performance without damages in case of war, strike or other similar circumstances that could
not be foreseen, won or bypassed with reasonable costs. Once the problem is removed, the per-
formance must be made. However, the opponent is usually in these situations given a right to
withdraw from the contract without any damages. Another doctrine of (economic) hardship may
allow a free decommitment or one with partial damages, if the cost of performance has increased
signiﬁcantly. This usually requires a very signiﬁcant change that could not be anticipated or
avoided. As explained earlier (in the beginning of section 2.2.2.2), renegotiation is usually a
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to the actual losses under incomplete information. However, that is not the whole
story. As mentioned, there are other decisions to consider.
The optimality of the full expectation damages decommitment policy assumes that
there is already a contract (the price is set), that the losses of the other party are
ﬁxed and that this party is unable to inﬂuence these costs. However, in many
situations this may not be the case, but on the contrary, the party may have a
strong impact on its costs and expected proﬁts. To see this, let us consider the
situation from the other side: When a party makes a performance decision on
whether or not it will perform itself, the other party makes a reliance decision to
decide how much to rely on the other party’s performance.
In more detail, the party shows its reliance on the opponent’s performance by
taking actions that enhance the value of this future performance. Such preparation
might involve, for example, getting complementary services, such as booking a
coach ticket to the airport in anticipation of an airline providing a trip somewhere
nice or getting a good bottle of wine to accompany a nice meal that somebody has
oﬀered. The preparation could also mean making changes to or conﬁguring one’s
equipment to best take advantage of the performance, like getting a manufacturing
plant ready to make product A as soon as the raw material B arrrives. Also in a
more abstract form, preparation might mean turning down alternative plans like
not taking a job A because one is expecting to work on a job B at that time,
and so on. Also the seller makes a reliance decision and can have plans for the
renumeration he is expecting from the buyer.
Now, in many cases such preparations can be useful (beneﬁcial reliance (Goetz and
Scott 1980)).28 For example, it is good to have a coach ticket in advance, so that
one can be relatively certain to make it on time to the airport (no need to worry, if
there is room on the coach). It can also mean that one can avoid more expensive
last-minute options, like taking a taxi to the airport. A meal can be enhanced
with a good wine increasing the value of the meal itself. Making the changes to
one’s own equipment in advance might save time and resources, because one can
then set to work the second the required resources arrive, and so on. Reliance on
the future performance is therefore often useful, to the relying party but also to
the society in general. For example, it’s good for the society that the expensive
resources are in eﬀective use, or that the services are combined with other services
28The detailed reliance model in (Goetz and Scott 1980) considers a non-reciprocal gift and
is therefore not directly applicable to our problem. They do consider many relevant issues and
other decisions, also in a reciprocal context and that is what we base much of the discussion
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to enhance their value and sometimes the best way to make these improvements
is to anticipate a future performance.
Of course the ﬂipside of this coin is that if the other party fails to perform, the
relying party might be worse oﬀ than if he had not relied on the performance at all
(detrimental reliance (Goetz and Scott 1980)). Thus, he might have a coach ticket
or a bottle of wine that he has very little use for (and may not be able to refund).
Conﬁguration or other changes might turn out to be useless and conﬁguration or
changes have to be redone (or even just revert to the earlier settings). He might
not be able to get any work to the suddenly open slot in his schedule and so on.
Now, it’s easy to see that the decommitment policy has a profound eﬀect on the
reliance decision. The higher the decommitment fee in case the opponent does not
perform, the more the performance can be relied on. However, there is a level of
reliance that is better for the society than some other levels (the optimal level of
reliance) and it is not necessarily always the highest possible reliance. It can be
counter-productive for the society, for an invidividual to to make extensive and
expensive preparations for a performance that is unlikely to happen, because such
non-performance only means costs to somebody from the society’s point of view.
The party that must shoulder the cost in the end depends on the decommitment
policy.
In the performance decision, the trick was to internalise the opponent’s losses to the
decision-maker’s (decommitter’s) decision by making him liable for the opponent’s
losses. This made him decommit only when it beneﬁts the society. The approach
here is the same, but the prescription is decidedly diﬀerent. The only way to
make the party making the reliance decision to choose the socially optimal level
of reliance is to make his compensation in case of non-performance independent
of the reliance level chosen. This is because compensating for additional reliance
would encourage the party to rely over-optimally on the other party’s performance.
To see why this is so consider the following situation (from Goetz and Scott (1980)).
A party to a contract knows that the opponent’s performance is less than certain
(probability of performance ws less than 1) and let Uperformance(ρ) denote the util-
ity in case the other party performs according to the contract (beneﬁcial reliance)
and Udecommitment(ρ) denote the utility if the other party decommits instead (detri-
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is increasing and Udecommitment is decreasing in ρ to the maximum level of ρmax.29
This means that by increasing reliance, a party can increase Uperformance but pays
for that with a decrease of Udecommitment. Now, the expected utility in the situation
is
EU = wsUperformance(ρ) + (1 − ws)(Udecommitment(ρ) + f).
An interesting point to make here is that the optimal reliance level (ρ∗) is inde-
pendent of the fee f as long as f does not depend on ρ. This follows because
the ﬁrst derivative of EU in relation to ρ does not contain f at all. In contrast,
it is equally clear that compensating for the (extra) reliance would be a very
bad policy. For example, the full Expectation Damages policy where all reliance
would be compensated for would always lead to the maximum possible reliance
(ρ = ρmax).30 So, to make an extreme example in a contract of certain type of
bolt, it would make sense for the buyer to keep a hugely expensive machine, like a
paper mill, running although it might be completely destroyed if an order of one
bolt does not arrive in time, because the buyer of the bolt is indiﬀerent between
the bolt arriving and the machine continuing to make paper and the bolt failing
to appear and the machine getting destroyed, because the bolt seller would cover
the diﬀerence. Of course such a result would be non-sensical and no court would
ever order such compensation to be made. The law has its own mechanisms for
limiting compensation.
However, a problem remains. Usually in the literature the optimal policy in case
of non-performance is said to be ‘zero’ compensation (Smith 2004; Kornhauser
1986) and the model above seems to indicate that any reliance-independent fee
(also non-zero) will do equally well. There is no conﬂict here: zero simply refers
to the reliance that should be covered. This can perhaps be better illustrated
by considering the seller. His costs come from reliance: by undertaking costly
and time-consuming preparation he relies on the performance that the buyer has
promised, because only through that will he be able to cover his costs and get
a proﬁt. If he does not start preparations, he will not incur any costs but then
he will not be able to reap any beneﬁts later either (Uperformance − Udecommitment).
Now, the analysis on the reliance decision prescribes that none of this reliance
29For values ρ > ρmax, we could say that both Uperformance and Udecommitment are decreasing.
The level ρmax therefore denotes the highest possible reliance that makes sense, i.e. the increase
in value is greater than the cost. After this value, the costs are greater than the increase in value
and even if performance was certain, it was not rational to rely that much.
30This is because the fee f would be equal to Uperformance − Udecommitment and therefore the
party would get Uperformance with probability of 1. From the above discussion it follows that
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should be covered by the decommitment fee, because if it is covered, the seller
has no incentives to consider trust-worthiness of his opponent and if his costs and
proﬁts are always covered, he can start working even if he knows the buyer is very
likely to decommit at some point.31 Only a performance will beneﬁt the society.
Decommitments will only bring costs and possibly re-distribution of wealth. This
of course contrasts with what we learnt in the performance decision, where the
parties covering for each other’s costs and proﬁts were essential. We will (in chapter
5) build on this model and investigate how diﬀerent decommitment policies (rules
on decommitment fees) will aﬀect the common good.
2.2.3.3 The Contract Decision
The party to a potential contract makes a contract decision when it decides
whether or not to enter into a proprosed contract now. An oﬀer that seems lucra-
tive now might lead to a counterproductive, even disastrous, contract if the party’s
circumstances or the market situation adversely change before the contract is to
be performed. The higher the required level of commitment (the higher the de-
commitment fee) and the higher the probability of such adverse changes occuring,
the less inclined a rational agent should be to enter into a contract in the ﬁrst
place. From the society’s point of view, very risky, high cost contracts may well
be inadvisable.32
To this end, Smith (2004) has argued that in relation to the contract decision
the expectation damages are sometimes too high. Instead, reliance damages that
include the foregone proﬁts of other possible contracts (the proﬁt that could have
been achieved outside this particular contract) would cover the other party suf-
ﬁciently (ensuring non-negative proﬁt) and sometimes facilitate contracts that
31In case the Expectation Damages policy is used, he is even indiﬀerent between the case in
which the buyer wants the service and the case where he does not.
32Of course in some cases such contracts or projects might be in the society’s interest, if the
payoﬀs for success are suﬃcently large. For example, trying to build the world’s ﬁrst fusion
reactor is going to take a long time and cost a huge amount of money and other resources even
in the most optimistic scenarios. And still, the success is far from certain. But, on the other
hand, a clean, almost unlimited source of energy would obviously be very useful for any society.
Given the costs and risks involved, some major governments (including European Union, USA
and Russia) have decided to cooperate in a joint project in this area, see http://www.iter.org/.Chapter 2 Literature Review 51
would not be possible if full expectation damages were oﬀered (Fuller and Pur-
due 1936).33However, in an eﬃcient market, the diﬀerence between the two is
very small or even non-existent because in such a setting, there would be many
providers selling a similar product for a similar price. Therefore by taking on one
provider, the buyer has in eﬀect lost an opportunity to make a very similar proﬁt
with some other provider. Therefore the loss is roughly equal to cost + proﬁt (i.e.
the expectation damages). However, in a situation with fewer outside opportuni-
ties, the second-best option can be much worse, in the extreme case, it might be
zero (if there are no viable alternatives). This might happen, for example, if the
provider has a lot of spare capacity that he would not have any use for outside this
one particular contract.34 Compensating the expectation damages automatically
does keep the seller’s risk to a minimum (any contract that will have a positive
utility in case of success will have that also in case of the buyer failure) but it will
also mean that sometimes the buyers will not enter into a contract even if it was
in the seller’s and in the society’s interest. In other words, a potential buyer might
in some cases be dissuaded from using the service if, in case of decommitment, he
would have to pay for the seller’s proﬁts that the seller would never have had a
chance to get without the buyer in question.
A numerical example might better illustrate Smith’s idea. So, assume that the
cost of providing a service, which has to be paid immediately, is 5, the price of the
service is 7 (due to the low season) and the value of the service to the buyer is 13,
and the probability of the buyer needing to decommit is 50%. Now, the buyer’s
expected utility in the cases with reliance and expectation damages would be:
EUb(contract | reliance damages) = 0.5(13 − 7) + 0.5(−5) = 0.5
EUb(contract | expectation damages) = 0.5(13 − 7) + 0.5(−7) = −0.5
and for the seller:
33Smith’s proposition means compensating so called opportunity cost (or best alternative to
negotiation agreement, BATNA) instead of expectation damages where the proﬁt compensated
is the one the victim expected to make from the existing contract. The legal rules are mostly
interested in the performance decision and ignore these other decisions. Legally, entering into
a contract means accepting a liability for the opponent’s reasonable proﬁts from the contract
also in case of non-performance. This holds also when substitute contracts are used. This has
nothing to do with the opportunity cost.
34This might be for example because his business is very seasonal and outside the season there
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EUs(contract | reliance damages) = 0.5(7 − 5) + 0.5 ∗ 0 = 1.0
EUs(contract | expectation damages) = 0.5(7 − 5) + 0.5 ∗ 2 = 2.0
So the seller would want this contract to happen. If we assume that the value of
the buyer’s outside option is zero, he will choose to enter the contract when the
reliance damages policy is used, but not enter into a contract when the expectation
damages policy is used.35 For the society, the beneﬁt of the contract would be in
both cases 0.5(v − c) + 0.5(−c) = 0.5(13 − 5) + 0.5(−5) = 1.5 and therefore the
contract would be also in the society’s interest.
However, this is not the whole story. It misses the important point that the
contract price is a major risk allocation tool and if the decommitment policy is
clear and all the relevant risks are known by both parties in advance, the parties
can use the price to ﬁnd a mutually acceptable balance of proﬁts and risks with
almost any policy (Goetz and Scott (1980)). To see how this works in practice
consider the buyer in the numerical case above. In cases where the expectation
damages policy is in use, he is unwilling to enter into a contract because the
risk of decommitment and the fee are too high. Now, for the seller the high
decommitment cost is a good thing: It increases his expected utility from 1.0 to
2.0 and, therefore, he may well be willing to oﬀer a lower price. This lower price, in
turn, increases the utility of the potential contract to the buyer and makes it more
lucrative. So, in the numerical example above, under the expectation damages
policy, the seller might oﬀer a price 6 for a buyer that is unwilling to go for it
with the price of 7. This would make the expected utility for the buyer equal to
0.5 · (13 − 6) + 0.5 · (−6) = 0.5, which would be enough to persuade the buyer to
enter into the contract. The contract price can be used very eﬃciently in this way.
However, sometimes this mechanism is unable to ﬁnd a good balance and sub-
optimal contracts might be entered into or parties might not be able to agree on a
price although a mutually acceptable price exists. For the price mechanism to work
properly, the parties must be able to assess relatively accurately the probabilities
that they or their opponent will perform. If no such information is available,
35Of course the buyer would be even more willing to get into these contracts if, for example,
the fee would be zero and also the society might be better served in some lower level of damages,
because there might be cases where a contract could be reached with a lower level of compensation
when it is not possible with reliance damages. For example, if the probability of failure is 60%
instead of 50, the buyer would not enter under reliance damages (expected utility −0.6) but a
compensation level of four would make the buyer indiﬀerent between entering into the contract
or not and the society would still beneﬁt, its beneﬁt from this would be 0.2. However, here,
Smith seems to think that covering the ‘victim’s’ costs (ensuring him non-negative utility) is fair
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it may be impossible to ﬁnd an optimal contract price. Also the probability of
performance in many situations depends on the fee (the higher the fee the more
probable the performance), which may make this assessment more diﬃcult if the
fee varies. We will investigate this price adjustion mechanism and what it means
when we have none, one or both parties using it in diﬀerent settings.
We will concentrate our eﬀorts in this work (in chapter 6) in investigating this
price adaptation to diﬀerent decommitment policies. We will use diﬀerent decom-
mitment policies and allow none, one or both parties to take the risks of later
decommitments into account and see how that aﬀects the common good.
2.2.3.4 The Selection Decision
Before a party even starts a single negotiation, it needs to make a selection decision.
That is, decide who to negotiate and potentially transact with. The selection
decision is often mentioned as one of the relevant decisions, but it is rarely discussed
in detail or if it is the models are often quite simple. This may be because it is
often quite simple. For example, the selection decision might have to do with
the opponent’s reliance or quality of service. From the society’s point of view, the
situation is simple: A non-performance does not beneﬁt the society but only causes
costs that are (in part) away from everybody (for example, extra hassle caused by
non-performance does not beneﬁt anybody, also eﬀort or materials may be wasted
and so on). The performance, however, is usually beneﬁcial to the society. This
is why performance should be encouraged. This does not necessarily mean that
the most reliable opponent should always be selected, but sometimes a small risk
of non-performance may be acceptable if the beneﬁts are high enough. In other
words, from the society’s point of view, the parties should select their contracting
partners so that this:
EU = wUb+s(performance) + (1 − w)Ub+s(decommitment),
is maximised. This may seem very similar to the reliance decision, but here we do
not have a contract. Rather we are only deciding who we should negotiate with in
the ﬁrst place. In contrast, in the reliance decision, we had a contract and decided
how much to rely on it.
The interesting observation here is that awarding the victim full expectation dam-
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utility in both cases36) and this may not allow a party to make a decision that max-
imises the common good. And what is even worse, if we have an over-compensatory
fee (a fee that awards the victim with more than expectation damages) it means
that the victim will actually prefer non-performance and choose its contracting
partners accordingly. Interestingly, here the common-good-maximising fee would
be zero or even slightly negative (decommitment bonus).
We will investigate (in chapter 7), how diﬀerent decommitment policies aﬀect the
choices of the buyer that is considering only its own good and the impact these
choices will have on the common good.
2.3 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Strategies
In the part II of the thesis, we will be interested in concurrent bilateral negotiation,
and especially tactics and strategies needed to succeed in such environments. As
we discussed in the introduction, in this part, we are interested only in the welfare
of one of the parties, the buyer, and we do not generally consider common or the
seller’s good.
Here, in this literature review, we ﬁrst discuss our reasons for choosing concurrent
bilateral negotiation for our interaction model (section 2.3.1). We then proceed
to discuss three levels that any concurrent bilateral negotiation model meant to
negotiate on interconnected services needs to address. First, we discuss bilateral
negotiation (section 2.3.2). We discussed the basic bilateral negotiation models
already in section 2.2.1 and here, we will focus on how a bilateral negotiation
model can be used to better manage negotiations in dynamic and open markets
that have heterogenous players in them. Our second stop is the concurrent bilateral
negotiation itself (section 2.3.3). We focus on the key issues of managing more than
one negotiation on the same service. The third topic is managing interconnected
negotiations, negotiations on diﬀerent services that are somehow connected to each
other (section 2.3.4). In such cases, the progress and results of a negotiation on
one service can have impact on the negotiations on some other service.
36This assumes of course that the compensation in case of non-performance is perfectly reliable,
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2.3.1 The Case for Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation
In modern day commerce, negotiations are used rarely, especially when the service
or product to be traded is of small value. The dominant way of making business,
especially in the business-to-consumer relations, is that each service provider has
its set of standard terms and it oﬀers its services for one ﬁxed price (ﬁxed posted
pricing). In these situations, the consumer’s choice is limited to ‘taking’ or ‘leav-
ing’ the oﬀer as it stands (Atiyah 1995). Any attempt to modify these terms in a
one-oﬀ transaction is usually turned down.
However, these ﬁxed term contracts are not the perfect tool for either party. If
the customer is not willing or able to accept the oﬀered standard terms, he cannot
use the service at all. For the provider, these customers are lost sales. He could
obviously oﬀer more than one set of prices and terms, but there might still be
customers that cannot accept any of the options, but with whom the provider
might be able to reach a mutually acceptable agreement in negotiation. The
standard form agreement is essentially a way of saving the time, trouble and
expense of making a contract (Atiyah 1995). The terms have to prepared only
once and then they can be used in many thousands or even millions of transactions
over time.37
Now, as already mentioned in section 1.1.2, information technology can decrease
both of these costs dramatically. First, in online stores the price information is
usually stored in a database and changing the price of any item or a group of
items is very easy. In addition, the store owners can let a group of software agents
(called pricebots by Kephart et al. (2000)) control the prices on their behalf.
Another change caused by the rise of information technology is the possibility
of collecting a signiﬁcant amount of information from the consumers (Ancarani
2002). Together these two changes have made it possible for the providers to use
dynamic posted prices, a modern-day variation of ﬁxed posted prices. Basically
this refers to take-it-or-leave-it pricing, in which the seller can change the price
at any time (Kephart et al. 2000). The goal of dynamic pricing is to optimise
the seller’s proﬁts by adjusting its prices to correspond to a customer’s willingness
to pay (Weiss and Mehrotra 2001). In its extreme form, the providers could use
37Although writing a good standard form agreement may (arguably) be more diﬃcult (expen-
sive) than writing a good individual contract, the cost per transaction is much smaller, when the
number of transactions is high. Therefore the ﬁxed price standard term contracts are usually the
cheapest option in these circumstances (Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). Using the same terms with
all customers also makes it easier (cheaper) to manage hundreds of contracts. The businesses
do not have to spend time remembering (or the cost of recording and ﬁnding) what was agreed
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the pricebots to customise the price for each market situation and even for each
customer given the customer’s earlier purchases, his estimated future value and
price consciousness, prices of the competitors and other information. On the other
hand, the consumers can also use information technology to automatically compare
the providers, so the full implications of these changes are still uncertain.
Second, automated negotiating agents have the potential to radically reduce the
costs related to negotiation. The agent only needs a computer to run on, a net-
work connection to communicate with other agents and some electricity for the
computer. One modern computer can easily run hundreds of agents, a reason-
able Internet connection is relatively cheap (especially per negotiation) and the
computer uses only very limited amounts of electricity. Automated negotiation is
also often very fast. Even the most complicated automated negotiation is usually
over in a matter of seconds. Thus transaction costs per negotiation are typically
very low. These advantages make automated negotiation a viable option in many
situations, where any human negotiation would be too expensive.38
Our case for using concurrent bilateral negotiation is four-fold. First, we will
explain why the dynamic posted pricing we just discussed is not enough in many
settings and why some form of negotiation is needed (section 2.3.1.1). Second, we
will discuss why it is useful to negotiate with more than one opponent (section
2.3.1.2). Third, we will explain why we think these negotiations should occur (at
least partially) concurrently (section 2.3.1.3). Finally, we will explain why we do
not use auctions, although many people think that auctions are going to be a very
important method in these electronic service markets (section 2.3.1.4).
2.3.1.1 Dynamic Posted Pricing versus Negotiation
The main problem of dynamic posted pricing is the fact that in the end of the
day it is the provider who must set the price and other terms of his posted oﬀer.
Even with all the information that can be gathered on the customers, the picture
will be incomplete and there will be situations and consumers that are diﬃcult to
manage even for the most sophisticated algorithms.
Now, negotiations can oﬀer two-sided interaction between the parties. In such
interactions, both parties can indicate what they want and what they are willing
to give in return. This will alleviate the problem of incomplete information and
38Also any bookkeeping activities of parties could be easily (although obviously not without
cost) automated.Chapter 2 Literature Review 57
can lead to better outcomes for both parties. The provider can get a better un-
derstanding of his customers’ needs and use this information to make his selection
more interesting to his potential customers.39 In one-issue (price) negotiations,
the negotiations can be used to ﬁnd out what a given customer is willing to pay
and at what price, a given provider is willing to sell. The importance of two-sided
interaction would obviously be enhanced in multi-attribute situations, where a ser-
vice has many attributes that can be conﬁgured interactively.40 Although we will
not have multi-attribute negotiations in this work, the general plan, of course, is
to investigate concurrent bilateral negotiation in this simple setting so that our re-
sults might later be extended to the multi-attribute settings, where the concurrent
bilateral negotiation can be even more useful.
2.3.1.2 Negotiating with One versus Many Opponents
Once we have decided to negotiate, we are then faced with the decision about
how many opponents to negotiate with. Clearly, if the market has thousands of
providers and we just select one of them more or less at random and negotiate
with it, we run the risk of making a bad choice: the opponent we selected might
not oﬀer a quality level we would like, he may have a very high reservation price,
or he may employ a stubborn negotiation strategy with us. If, on the other hand,
we negotiate with multiple opponents, we get a much better view of the market
and increase the probability that we manage to ﬁnd at least one provider who is
willing to oﬀer us reasonable terms.
Negotiations with more than one opponent might also give the agent ideas on the
market situation, (i.e. whether the current opponent is just being unreasonable
or it is a seller’s market). Since the providers may be able to collect a lot of
information about the consumer population over time and can use that information
to their advantage (Grover and Ramanlal 1999), the consumer must try to correct
the imbalance by collecting more information themselves and, in the process, try
to make the diﬀerent providers compete for their custom. This should encourage
the providers to be more ﬂexible with their demands.
39Through negotiations he may also get information on why his oﬀerings are not competitive.
This information may be quite diﬃcult or expensive to obtain by other means.
40Such conﬁguration clearly requires two-way interaction between the parties, especially if
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In short, it is clear that we should be negotiating with more than one opponent for
each service. On the other hand, due to the limited negotiation resources (require-
ment R4), we may not be able to negotiate with all of the potential opponents
in a large market. We therefore need to choose a subset of providers to negotiate
with.
2.3.1.3 Negotiating Sequentially versus Concurrently
When it comes to negotiating with multiple parties on the same item or service,
there are two main options: we can either negotiate with one of them at a time
(sequentially) or many or all of them at the same time (concurrently). Sequential
negotiations are easier to analyse mathematically and they have been used in
some market models in game theory, usually with a random matching of buyers
and sellers (for example Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Binmore and Herrero
(1988)). Concurrent negotiation, on the other hand, is more diﬃcult to analyse
and there are no general game theoretic models that use concurrent negotiations
as a market mechanism.41
However, in dynamic environments where anything can change at any time, con-
current negotiation has the clear advantage: it can get a good view of the market
situation more rapidly. Sequential negotiating agents learn the possible oﬀers only
one by one and they have to turn down many oﬀers and end many negotiations
to get that view. In dynamic markets, by the time an agent is in a position to
make an informed decision, the best providers might no longer be available or they
may not accept the earlier price. In contrast, in concurrent negotiations, agents
quickly learn the diﬀerent types of oﬀers in the market, can try diﬀerent oﬀer types
with diﬀerent opponents, and can relatively quickly recognise the most promising
candidates and concentrate the negotiation eﬀort on those. Concurrency allows a
negotiator to use information from one negotiation in another negotiation while
both negotiations are still running. This wider view can be particularly useful
if, for example, the agent’s requirements change completely or there is limited
time. Thus concurrent negotiations are much more ﬂexible and since ﬂexibility
is very important in dynamic environments, we prefer concurrent negotiations to
sequential ones.
41The one exception to this is Chatterjee and Dutta (1998) who use only two sellers and
two buyers. However, they assume that parties have complete information on each other’s
parameters, which obviously is not the case in the scenarios we consider (we explicitly assumed
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As is so often the case, this ﬂexibility comes with a price. When there are multiple
negotiations going on at the same time, it is entirely possible that we end up with
an agreement with more than one opponent at the same time. This may be a
problem if we only need or have one item. Thus we must either be able to explic-
itly accept any agreement (our oﬀers are not binding, but a separate acceptance
by us is needed) or to decommit from the contracts we do not need.42 Another
problem is that concurrent negotiation requires more computing power and more
communication bandwidth, both of which we assumed are limited resources (re-
quirement R4). However, we can limit this problem with several methods. First,
each on-going negotiation automatically means a risk of agreement. Given the
decommitment problem, the agents should strive to ﬁnd an appropriate balance
between exploring the marketplace and getting into too many contracts. Second,
we might also charge the agent for the used resources, so that agents would only
open new negotiations when it really is necessary. Third, we might also have an
absolute maximum number of concurrent negotiations that each agent is allowed
to have at any given moment. The ﬁrst option is embedded in the structure of the
problem. We will also use the other two in some of our experiments.
Now, concurrent negotiation seems a possible approach, but to prove that it is
truly useful, we have to explore how it compares to the group of mechanisms that
are very popular in electronic environment, namely auctions.
2.3.1.4 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation versus Auctions
In the wake of success of many auction web sites, such as eBay.com, online auctions
and exchanges are seen as an essential part of e-commerce (Kambil and van Heck
2002). Annual online auction sales exceed already a few years ago $30 billion
(David et al. 2005). This popularity makes auctions a baseline in all types of
electronic markets and any research in a new or less popular mechanism, like
concurrent bilateral negotiation, must justify itself by showing that the mechanism
in question can provide something that auctions can not. This is not necessarily
easy, since the popularity of auctions is not a coincidence: Auctions do have many
desirable properties. In particular:
• Legitimacy: Most auctions have very simple and clear rules. This creates
two major beneﬁts:
42With leveled-commitment contracts (see section 2.2.3), there may be a cost involved in the
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– Publicity: During an auction, the bids can be open or at the very least
the winning bid is usually public.
– Controllability: Every participant can be certain that the rules are fol-
lowed, since any deviation can be noticed. For example, the publication
of the winning bid oﬀers a way for the other participants to control that
they were genuinely outbid.
– Neutrality: In most types of auction, the identity of bidder is not rele-
vant, but only the bid.
• Analysability: The simple and clear rules also make it possible to analyse
auctions mathematically. To this end, auction theory (see Krishna (2002)
for an introduction) is one of the most active research areas in game theory.
• Eﬃciency: Auctions usually allocate the sold item or service to the person
or group that values it most. In economics, it is usually assumed that the
person with the highest valuation knows the best use for the service and
therefore auctions promote eﬃcient use of resources.
• Maximises proﬁt of the auctioneer: When used properly, auctions can pro-
vide the highest possible price for the seller or the lowest possible price for
the buyer.
However, auctions are not a panacea. In particular, in dynamic markets such as
ours, at least in some circumstances, the following properties might be considered
drawbacks:
• Inﬂexibility: Clear and simple rules also mean that there are no exceptions
or room for changes.
– changes diﬃcult: Once the auction has started, it is usually very diﬃ-
cult to change the rules of the auction43 or the details of the auctioned
task.44
43An auction usually has either a ﬁxed deadline or it closes after a certain period of inactivity
(i.e. when nobody increases the standing oﬀer for a speciﬁed time). In a dynamic environment,
where requirements can change at any time, both are problematic. In the case of a deadline,
there can be no agreement before it. The bidder may be bound to his oﬀer for a long time, if
the deadline is distant and he is not outbid. During this time his requirements may change.
On the other hand, if only a period of inactivity closes the auction, the exact end time may be
diﬃcult to estimate (Nguyen and Jennings 2005). Such open-endedness is very problematic for
an auctioneer with a ﬁxed deadline.
44For example, in eBay (http://www.ebay.com) a revision of the listing is only pos-
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– formulaic information dissemination: When buying complicated and
conﬁgurable tasks, the consumer must explain his requirements (winner
determination rule) in detail to all potential providers, so that they can
make meaningful bids. In some cases, companies or people may not
want everybody to know what they need (Bajari et al. 2008) and so
the only way to limit the ﬂow of information, is to limit the number
of bidders. Also the winning bid must usually be revealed, so that
other bidders can ensure that they lost fairly. This may give useful
information to the winner’s competitors.
– one-way information ﬂow: Once the auction starts, the only informa-
tion ﬂowing between the parties is the bids. In some cases, the auction-
eer might notice some error in his call for bids or his prefences when
bids start. At that point, changes are no longer possible.
– heavy planning phase: Since the auction itself is simple and clear, it
often means that a lot of eﬀort must be invested in the preceding phases
(Bajari et al. 2008). For example, in a reverse auction, the consumer
must ﬁnd out what the relevant options and their characteristics are
and what his preferences are, so that the winner determination rule
can be written.
• Neutrality: In some cases, it might matter to the consumer, who the provider
is and he may not want to make his preferences public.45
• Complexity: Although auctions are usually simple, they can become quite
complex, especially computationally. In combinatorial auctions, for exam-
ple, where bids on multiple services are allowed, the winner determination
problem is NP-hard (for an introduction, see Lehmann et al. (2006)).
Concurrent bilateral negotiation, on the other hand, is very ﬂexible, allows two-
sided information exchange and also allows the party to control information dis-
semination and complexity and freely discriminate between diﬀerent opponents.
In addition, it can oﬀer some strategic advantages. We will now discuss each of
these beneﬁts, one at a time.
(http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/edit listing.html). Also cancelling the entire auction
(for any reason) becomes impossible when there is an acceptable oﬀer (i.e. one that exceeds the
reserve price) and there is less than 12 hours until the deadline.
45Neutrality was also mentioned as a beneﬁt of auction mechanisms. Whether it is a beneﬁt
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First, ﬂexibility means that in concurrent bilateral negotiation, the agent can
change its goals easily at any time. Since the deadlines and other negotiation pa-
rameters are private (requirement R6), changing them is always possible. More-
over, the agent always has several options to choose from (the opponents’ last
oﬀers), if it suddenly needs to close the deal (Nguyen and Jennings 2005). In
short, the agent can take into account any new information or change in environ-
ment or requirements very quickly.
Second, the possibility of two-sided information exchange has been recognised
as one of the main advantages of concurrent bilateral negotiation (Nguyen and
Jennings 2005; Rahwan et al. 2002). Another related advantage is the possibility
of controlled information dissemination. Thus, the agent can start from a very
general task description and reveal the details gradually. In addition, he can
handpick the opponents to whom he gives any strategic information. The agent
can also learn something from the opponents’ oﬀers that enable it to re-evaluate
its preferences. For example, the option that the consumer thought to be the best,
can prove to be too expensive or an option that it earlier hardly considered can
prove to be very interesting. The ﬂexibility allows the agent to ‘change its mind’,
since it is not bound by any call for proposals. This is particularly useful when
the agent does not know what the relevant options are or how much they cost.
Third, concurrent bilateral negotiation oﬀers a way to manage complexity in in-
terconnected negotiations. In combinatorial auctions, all parties ﬁrst send bids to
the auctioneer, who then tries to ﬁnd the optimal winners among these bids. In
contrast, in concurrent bilateral negotiation each party manages its own depen-
dencies. This alone reduces a big problem into several small ones and eﬀectively
distributes the problem. In addition, each player can decide how complicated the
dependencies he wants to consider should be and other players’ dependencies do
not have any eﬀect on his problem.46 This could be a major advantage for con-
current bilateral negotiation, which is why we will investigate also interconnected
negotiations. However, the concurrent bilateral negotiation is no silver bullet: it
does not necessarily oﬀer an optimal solution, because suboptimal contracts be-
tween parties are not only possible, but also likely. This means that there is no
guarantee that each service or service combination will go to the consumer who
values them most. Also negotiation strategies and pure luck have an impact on
46Moreover, there is no deadline for bids, but the process is continuous, new parties can enter
and old ones can leave at any time (requirement R5). However, there is a speciﬁc kind of auction
called a continuous double auction that is able to manage this type of dynamism (Krishna 2002).
Variations of this auction are used, for example, at all the major stock exchanges (Das et al.
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the results. Therefore, concurrent bilateral negotiation will oﬀer ‘only’ a solution
that will produce reasonable results and will scale well to markets of any size.
Finally, the strategic advantages in concurrent bilateral negotiation come from
two directions: a possibility to use diﬀerent strategies with diﬀerent opponents
(Nguyen and Jennings 2005; Rahwan et al. 2002) and a possibility to use informa-
tion from one negotiation in others (Nguyen and Jennings 2005). Since we assume
that the providers are heterogeneous (requirement R3), it may well be reasonable
to use diﬀerent tactics against diﬀerent providers. The consumer agent may, for
example, adopt a stubborn stance against a low quality or unreliable provider, but
be more willing to compromise with a high quality or especially reliable provider.
And since the negotiation threads are separate (in the sense that the opponents
do not know what is happening in the other negotiations), the opponents do not
have to know that we consider them to be unreliable or to oﬀer low quality. On
the other hand, we can use information from the other negotiations. Thus, a good
oﬀer in one thread can be taken into account in others. Moreover, in a multi-issue
negotiation, some new promising combination of properties that the agent did not
think of, but an opponent did, can also be used in other negotiations.
Given these facts, it is hardly surprising that in practice private entities prefer ne-
gotiation even in situations where the law requires the public entities to organise
a competitive bidding process (Rothkopf and Harstad 1994).47 Since the private
(unlike public) entities are free to choose, this result would indicate that negotia-
tions are a more eﬃcient means of transferring complicated assets than auctions
and produce no worse results for the sellers (Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). There-
fore we can be conﬁdent that our approach is a valid one. We will then discuss
the details of this approach.
2.3.2 Managing Dynamism in Bilateral Negotiations
We start our discussion about concurrent bilateral negotiation strategies by in-
vestigating the simplest basic component of concurrent bilateral negotiation, the
47For example, Bajari et al. (2008) discovered that in California only about 15 % of the private
building projects were awarded after a competitive bidding process. This was in clear contrast
to public building projects where Californian law (like the law in many parts of Western world)
requires a competitive bidding process for all signiﬁcant projects and an auction was organised for
almost all building projects. Public procurement processes also have other goals than eﬃciency
(such as transparency and equality), so this is probably not as surprising as it may sound at
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bilateral negotiation itself. We discussed the basic approaches to bilateral nego-
tiation earlier (section 2.2.1). As we mentioned then, these basic approaches do
not explicitly (or often even implicitly) take into consideration the changes in the
environment. In game-theoretic and other mathematical approaches the reason
is simple: the possibility of environment changes makes the model more compli-
cated and the possibility of unforeseeable or unexpected changes is very diﬃcult to
model mathematically. However, as dynamic environments are seen as ever more
important, a number of approaches that allow the agents to adapt to changes
have been suggested. We will ﬁrst discuss heuristic approaches (section 2.3.2.1)
and then machine-learning approaches (section 2.3.2.2).
2.3.2.1 Heuristic Approaches
As in static negotiations, the heuristic approaches in dynamic environments try
to translate the complicated reality into relatively simple decision rules that can
be used to achieve good (although probably suboptimal) solutions. Here we will
discuss one example, a market-driven agent (Sim (2002) and later versions of the
model). This is a very interesting approach to negotiation in dynamic environ-
ments, because, as the name suggests, it takes the market situation explicitly
into consideration when it makes decisions on concessions during the negotiation.
When the market situation is tough (a lot of competition, a few opponents, dead-
line nearby or a strong need for the service), the concessions are bigger and when
the market is more favourable, the concessions are smaller. In addition, market-
driven agents consider their reservation prices as being ﬂexible. Thus they are
willing to pay more (accept less) if the market situation is hard and expect to pay
less (get higher prices) when the market situation is better. We now discuss these
two approaches in turn.
First, the concessions the market-driven agents make depend on their view of the
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In more detail, trading opportunity is measured with two factors: the number of
trading partners and the diﬀerences in utilities between the parties’ last oﬀers.
Simple heuristics are used to estimate the probability that an agent will obtain a
certain utility with at least one of its trading partners. They will then try to get the
best possible utility while maintaining a reasonable probability of actually reaching
it. Here competition is measured as a probability that the agent is ranked as the
most preferred trading partner by at least one of the opponent agents. Again
some simple heuristics are used in the estimation (the probability of being the
most preferred partner is simply 1− m
m+1, where m is the number of competitors).
Basically this means that a market-driven agent makes compromises according to
the buyer-seller ratio in the market. For the deadline and eagerness, a simple time-
dependent strategy is used. The eagerness factor ε determines how the concessions
are made.48 Here only two strategies are used: linear (ε = 1) and conservative
(or boulware, 0 < ε < 1), since the conceder strategy was likely to achieve lower
utilities (although the lower risk of losing deals was noticed).
Second, market-driven agents in their newer versions are allowed to change their
expectations of the outcome. Speciﬁcally, an enchanced market-driven agent
(EMDA) (Sim and Wang 2004) can decrease its expectations in very tough mar-
ket situations. To do this, it uses a fuzzy decision controller, which considers the
factors above to guide decision-making. Yet another improvement is to allow the
agent to increase its expectations when the market situation seems very favourable
(EMDA2) (Sim 2004). To do this, it uses two additional fuzzy decision controllers
that allow decision-making about whether or not to postpone reaching an agree-
ment and, if so, for how long. The ﬁrst decision is made by considering both the
eagerness and the competition values; the higher these factors are, the higher is
the number of good oﬀers required to postpone the acceptance. The second de-
cision uses the deadline and the number of opportunities; the further away is the
deadline and the higher the number of opponents, the longer the agent is allowed
to wait.
This approach is clearly very interesting in our context because the market-driven
agents are very ﬂexible and can adapt to many relevant changes in circumstances.
However, it is relatively complicated and it is diﬃcult to see, from this structure,
if its adaptations are good in all relevant circumstances. Thus, it uses very simple
heuristics and combines them into something that is no longer that simple to
follow, because the diﬀerent eﬀects are all considered basically at the same time.
We prefer a solution where diﬀerent decisions are taken clearly in diﬀerent times
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and/or by diﬀerent components, and where the diﬀerent factors are combined
using a much more explicit analysis. This allows us to consider also cases that are
not as clear cut as the cases Sim discusses.
Also the market-driven agents do not consider the opponent’s negotiation tactics
or his parameter values (like reservation price or deadline) and we have a market
full of diﬀent kinds of sellers (requirement R3). Moreover, the approach does not
take into account the possibility that the buyer agent’s circumstances may change
so that it does not need the service any more and should therefore be careful about
entering into contracts (requirement R2). In addition, many of the details of the
market-driven agents seem a bit ad hoc and no reasonable and consistent theory
is oﬀered to explain why these particular heuristics were chosen.
We do not ﬁnd heuristic approaches satisfactory for our purposes, because the
higher levels of our model will need relatively accurate information about the
possible outcomes and success probabilities in all situations and heuristic models
such as Sim’s will not be able to provide such information.
2.3.2.2 Machine Learning Approaches
Since basically everything can change at any time and analysing the situation fully
is simply impossible, we cannot ﬁnd a perfect tactic that would work well in all
circumstances. In addition, the situation may be so problematic that even devising
successful heuristics at design time may be diﬃcult. Therefore learning how to
behave in diﬀerent negotiation and market situations might be useful (Zeng and
Sycara 1998). In addition, our environment, with potentially hundreds of agents,
is probably too large, dynamic and unpredictable to devise heuristics that would
work in every possible contingency. Thus the one possible way to cope with this is
to allow the individual agents to improve their own performance (Sen and Weiss
1999).
In more detail, the literature on learning in negotiations has concentrated on two
main things:
a. recognising the negotiation tactic the opponent uses and
b. ﬁnding a good tactic against it.
These problems are obviously connected. In competitive bilateral negotiations,
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and there is no single best one that does well against all possibilities. Thus,
the best tactic usually depends on the opponent’s choice of tactic. This means
that tactic recognition would seem to be the key. We will assume that once the
opponent’s tactic is known, we know an adequate tactic against it. In other words,
in the following, we will concentrate on the ﬁrst problem only.
So, as just explained, in tactic recognition the goal is to recognise the bargaining
tactic the opponent uses. This can be an easy or very diﬃcult task depending on
what information we have available and what tactics the opponents are allowed to
use. In particular:
• The quality and amount of available information is essential. Obviously
in competitive settings the opponents do not explicitly explain what they
are doing, so their tactic must be deduced from their behaviour (that is
from their previous oﬀers and reactions to our oﬀers (accept, reject or make
a counteroﬀer)). In addition, the environmental variables describing the
market situation may be used (if available). However, some of the factors
that may aﬀect the opponent’s tactic may not be available (for example his
stock situation or the number of negotiations it is currently engaged in).
If these unknown factors dominate the tactic, it may well be impossible to
guess what happens next. On the other hand, if the most important factors
are available to all, tactic recognition may be possible.
• If the opponents are allowed to use only a small number of tactics, which
are easily distinguishable (e.g. if there are only two possible time-dependent
tactics with β = 10 and β = 0.1), tactic recognition is trivial. On the
other hand, in completely open settings (any tactic allowed) the tactic can-
not probably be estimated to a comfortable certainty, before the negotiation
is over, if even then. In this latter case, we might be able to produce an
educated guess as to what will happen next given the history of negotiation,
identity of the opponent, other information we have, and our earlier expe-
riences, but we can never be sure, since the opponent can change its mind
and tactic at any given moment or use a tactic we have never seen before.
In this work, we are somewhere in between the two extremes in terms of both of
these factors. Our consumer agents do not have a lot of information (requirement
R6). We assume that parties do not know each other’s deadline but that they
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Now, there are two broad types of machine learning techniques that can be used
to recognise an opponent’s tactic: classiﬁcation and regression. In classiﬁcation
the opponent’s tactics are classiﬁed to one of a ﬁnite number of categories given
their behaviour so far (and other relevant factors). The opponents in one group
can then also be assumed to behave in a similar manner in the future, so that it
might be possible to learn one tactic that works well against all of them. Obviously
this approach is not optimal in all situations, but it should provide us with some
idea about what will happen next. In the literature, classiﬁcation has not been
used to classify opponent tactics, but it has been used to estimate the opponent’s
utility function in multi-issue negotiations (Bui et al. 1999; Chajewska et al. 2001;
Coehoorn and Jennings 2004)49 or the reservation price of the opponent (Zeng and
Sycara 1998).
In regression, the goal is to estimate a value of some (continuous) variable or
function (for example, the next oﬀer, deadline or reservation price), given the
events so far. It is usually assumed that once the regression yields good estimates,
a good countertactic is also known. Unlike classiﬁcation, regression has been used
in tactic recognition in negotiation contexts. In particular, Mok and Sundarraj
(2005) use regression to estimate the parameters of the time-dependent heuristic
tactic the opponent is assumed to be using. After a reasonable degree of accuracy
has been achieved, the optimal tactic against the estimated tactic is used. Hou
(2004) also uses non-linear regression on the opponent’s previous oﬀers to estimate
the opponent’s deadline and reservation price, and then chooses an appropriate
countertactic. Hou assumes that the opponent is using one of the heuristic tactics
discussed in section 2.2.1.2, but he restricts quite drastically the number of possible
parameter values (for example there are only four diﬀerent deadlines and four
possible reservation prices). The agent tries to ﬁrst classify the tactic the opponent
is using and when it has a good idea of that, it tries to use regression to estimate
the parameters.
However, in any realistic setting, the providers would be using a very wide range
of negotiation tactics, some of which would be new or very rare and some of which
would use information that is not available to us at all. Some of these tactics might
also be very diﬃcult to distinguish from some others. And in a completely open
49Bui et al. (1999) work in a cooperative environment and classiﬁcation is used to predict other
agents’ preferences in an eﬀort to reduce communication. Chajewska et al. (2001) try to elicit
the opponent’s utility function from the observed negotiation. The setting is competitive, so the
estimates are used to increase the learning agent’s own utility. They have existing partial utility
functions that are used as classes. In a similar vein, Coehoorn and Jennings (2004) use kernel
density estimation to estimate the utility function of the opponent to make eﬃcient multi-issue
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environment, there is also nothing to stop our opponent from changing its tactic
completely in the middle of the negotiation or employing random noise or any
number of other methods to make tactic recognition an impossible task. Although
we might be able to extend the work of Mok and Sundarraj and get reasonably
good results in our restricted environment, such ‘perfect’ tactic recognition is not
attainable in the general case.
Therefore, we contend that machine learning techniques would be very problem-
atic in even a remotely realistic setting. We think that a more reasonable ‘coun-
tertactic’ in such environments would be based on estimates of the opponent’s
reservation price and other parameters, not on the oﬀers the opponent makes,
because single oﬀers may not relay that much useful information in practice, only
the fundamentals (the parameters) behind the tactics matter. Also, if we have
enough opponents to choose from, we may not have to succeed in each and ev-
ery negotiation but we may, for example, employ tactics that work against some
opponents and fail miserably with others.
However, we do need some information to use any sophisticated strategies in the
higher levels of our models. One good approach might be to set an oﬀer to a certain
level (based on actual values or estimates of quality or other attributes) and then
use empirical data to estimate success probabilities in a given negotiation. In the
perfect world, the buyer agent would be able to recognise the tactic the seller uses
or even know it in advance (because of many earlier encounters). It would be
interesting to see how well our approach will work in such cases and then we can
remove or limit this information and see what eﬀect that has.
So, in our setting, the sellers will have a small number of heuristic tactics and
we have a countertactic for each of them. This countertactic is based on the
characteristics of the seller (quality), the general structure of the tactic and maybe
used against many types of tactic. However, the tactics will use randomness
and/or behavioural aspects so that the regression models we just discussed are not
applicable. We also will not make any use of any classiﬁcation schemes (although
they might sometimes be useful). Instead, we assume that sometimes the buyer
might just know the tactic the opponent uses in advance (no learning takes place
during the negotiation) or at least it knows the frequencies and types of negotiation
tactics. This can be at least in some circumstances realistic. We hope to show
that although information about opponent tactics may indeed be very useful, we
can get quite good results even without such information. Of course our approach
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their probabilities.50 But we believe, this approach might well oﬀer a reasonable
approach to bilateral negotiations in open environments, although admittedly, we
will be using it in a rather restricted setting.
2.3.3 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation
Our buyer agent can be engaged in several bilateral negotiations in parallel in
order to secure a good deal in dynamic markets. In this section, we discuss the
current literature on such negotiations. However, before we discuss any speciﬁc
issues, we brieﬂy describe the three general models that have been introduced in
the literature (section 2.3.3.1). After that we will discuss the literature on three
questions:
• opponent selection and concurrency control: How many opponents to nego-
tiate with? How to choose the opponents for these negotiations? (section
2.3.3.2)
• relationship between negotiation threads: Who makes decisions on accepting
an oﬀer? (section 2.3.3.3).
• negotiation strategies: What oﬀers to make in each negotiation and at what
level is this decision made? (section 2.3.3.4). The ﬁrst and third questions
are obviously linked. The strategies we use clearly aﬀect the way we should
choose the opponents and vice versa.
2.3.3.1 The Basic Models
We start by introducing the three models of concurrent bilateral negotiation dis-
cussed in the multi-agent system literature. They are similar in many respects,
but there are also some signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Some are also more explicit on the
details we are interested in than others.
In particular, Rahwan et al. (2002) were the ﬁrst to propose a concurrent bi-
lateral negotiation model. They have a number of bilateral negotiating threads
(called sub-negotiators) controlled by one coordinating agent. In this model, each
50As we will discuss in more detail in section 9.1.2, the countertactics we use do not care what
oﬀers the opponent makes during the negotiation but instead they use a distribution for the
lowest oﬀer the opponent is going to make and set their target price accordingly. With many
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sub-negotiator conducts a one-to-one negotiation with a diﬀerent opponent. The
coordinating agent coordinates the eﬀorts of these diﬀerent threads. To facilitate
this, the sub-negotiators report to the coordinating agent after receiving a response
(oﬀer, rejection or acceptance) from their opponent. The coordinating agent then
evaluates the situation and issues instructions to sub-negotiators accordingly. The
most important of these instructions is either an order to continue or stop negoti-
ating, but they can also include a change in the negotiation parameters. However,
Rahwan et al. do not develop this idea very far and the strategies their coordinat-
ing agents use are very simple and somewhat unrealistic.51 Also these strategies
assume a quite one-sided protocol: the oﬀers made during the negotiation are
binding for the sellers, but the buyer is allowed to decommit at any time. This
lack of balance is not discussed in the paper.
Building on this work, in a series of papers Nguyen and Jennings (2003, 2004,
2005) propose a similar model for the buyer agent. They use time-dependent
heuristic strategies (boulware, linear or conceder) in their bilateral negotiations.
Their model is also developed further. In more detail, the architecture consists
of three main components: a coordinator, a number of negotiation threads and a
commitment manager (see ﬁgure 2.1). The roles of the coordinator and negotiation
threads are similar to Rahwan et al, although the interplay between them is deﬁned
in more detail and the coordinator is also given a right to decide the strategy the
negotiation thread uses. The big diﬀerence is the commitment manager, which
makes all centralised decisions on commitment or decommitment for all the threads
(Nguyen and Jennings 2005).52 This became necessary when the bias for the
buyer was removed and both parties were given an equal right to decommit. The
commitment manager, in close cooperation with the coordinator, approves any
acceptance of an oﬀer (ensuring that only one oﬀer gets accepted at a time) and
it also makes the decisions on decommitting in case more than one of the oﬀers
gets accepted by the opponents or when a signiﬁcantly better contract has been
found. We will discuss this in more detail later.
Another relevant set of papers is written by Li et al. (2004, 2005, 2006). Their
approach is somewhat diﬀerent. They do not have an explicit coordinator module
at all, but instead coordination occurs by calculating the expected value of an
outside option for each thread. An outside option is a game theoretic concept
used in bargaining models. It means simply the best available outcome outside
51We will return to these strategies in section 2.3.3.4.
52The commitment manager was introduced in Nguyen and Jennings (2005). The earlier
versions of the model were one-sided in similar way to Rahwan et al. (2002) (i.e. the buyer can














































Figure 2.1: System Architecture in Nguyen & Jennings (2005).
of the current negotiation (should that fail). In concurrent bilateral negotiation,
an outside option is the highest expected utility of all other negotiation threads
and the possible later negotiations. Since in negotiation the outcome is always
uncertain, Li et al. describe several methods for making this estimate. They are
less interested in the details of the coordination and it is, therefore, unclear how
this would deal with a situation in which more than one of their latest oﬀers gets
accepted by the diﬀerent opponents. Again, we discuss these issues later in this
section.
Now, in general, the model introduced by Rahwan et al. and further developed
by Nguyen and Jennings seems to oﬀer the best starting point for our work. A
controller needs to manage a group of negotiators, handle accepting oﬀers and
making decommitments and the negotiators should report about their progress
every turn. This is very good and it can be easily extended to cover other problems.
The work by Li et al. is also interesting, however, and, as we see later, some
of it does ﬁnd its way to our model. It should also be noted that one-to-many
negotiation can easily be changed into many-to-many negotiation by allowing both
parties to use one-to-many negotiations (see ﬁgure 2.2). However, we will stay in
the one-to-many model, since there are many inadequately explored issues in the
one-to-many situation and we wish to concentrate on those.
Having introduced the basic models in concurrent negotiation, we will now turn
to three broad problem areas that, on one hand, are essential to concurrent ne-
gotiation and, on the other hand, are unsatisfactorily dealt with in the current
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Figure 2.2: A many-to-many market in Rahwan et al.(2002).
2.3.3.2 Opponent Selection and Concurrency Control
Concurrency control means selecting the number of negotiations to engage in con-
currently and opponent selection refers to choosing opponents for each of these
negotiations. All the papers discussed in this section assume that the agent can
negotiate with all possible providers. Although this may be possible in some situa-
tions, we do not think that this is generally the case and we assumed that resources
to be used in negotiation are limited (requirement R4). On the other hand, our
sellers are going to be heterogeneous (requirement R3), as probably are the sellers
in most markets. For these reasons, it is therefore necessary to choose the number
of opponents and the actual opponents to negotiate with. Since these issues have
not been addressed in the concurrent bilateral negotiation literature, we have to
look elsewhere.
Unfortunately we could not ﬁnd any literature on concurrency control, nor could
we specify any other problem, which would have been discussed in the literature
and would be similar enough to be useful for our purposes. However, as we ex-
plained, concurrency control is important. Also it matters because of a risk of
getting into too many contracts. In some environments (cheap/free decommit-
ment), it might not be a problem, but where the decommitting is very expensive,Chapter 2 Literature Review 74
a useful buyer agent should be more careful. For this reason, we will develop meth-
ods for concurrency control in our work. Using decision theory seems a reasonable
starting point for that work, because it allows us to consider diﬀerent aspects of
the situation in a uniﬁed way.
We could not locate any literature on opponent selection either, but we were able
to ﬁnd another problem that is close enough and has plenty of literature on it.
This other problem is service selection. In the service selection problem, an agent
has a certain task to be performed and has to choose services that satisfy its
needs optimally. However, there are two diﬀerences between opponent and service
selection:
• Dependencies: Instead of ﬁnding an optimal service to fulﬁl a certain task,
the service selection task is usually performed over several interconnected
tasks and the goal is to ﬁnd the services that are interoperable and produce
the best possible result. Since we assume that our negotiations can have
this type of connections, this might actually be quite useful, although at this
level we are only interested in selecting the best service for the one task at
hand. We will return to the interconnectedness later. However, since it is the
dependencies between services that make the service selection an interesting
problem, the actual selection of one service usually plays a very minor part
in these papers.
• No negotiation: The work of service selection usually assumes that there
is no negotiation on the price or quality, but that these have been set by
the providers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Therefore the price is usually
known in advance exactly and quality is an estimate (because it can vary).
However, for us it is other way around: each provider has a ﬁxed quality
(but in some case may decommit and therefore not perform at all) but the
price is a result of negotiation and therefore, it is uncertain.
With these diﬀerences in mind, we now discuss the literature. Service selection is
usually based on multiple criteria, so the literature uses many standard techniques
for such situations, such as multi-attribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiﬀa 1976)
and decision theory (Raiﬀa 1987). Also some other approaches have been used.
We will now discuss how these could be applied to our problem.
The basic idea of multi-attribute utility theory is that the overall value of a service
consists of the values of its performance on the relevant characteristics, for exampleChapter 2 Literature Review 75
its quality and reliability. Usually, simple additivity is assumed, so that the value





where vi(s) is a normalised value of the characteristic i for service s, k the number
of characteristics, and wi is the relative importance of that characteristic for the
decision-maker. Normalisation means that given any possible value of characteris-
tic i the relevant value function Vi has a value in the interval [0,1]. The better the
attribute, the higher the value; however this relation does not need to be linear
but can take any form. Another common assumption is that
 k
i=1 wi = 1. Now, it
is clear that the critical task in multi-attribute utility theory is to ﬁnd the appro-
priate weights for the overall value function. There are many standard techniques
for deriving these, probably the best-known being the analytic hierarchy process
(Saaty 1980). The service selection papers that use some version of multi-attribute
utility theory include Seo et al. (2004) and Zeng et al. (2003).
However, in situations where the utility is quite clearly not a sum of characteristics,
but something else, multi-attribute utility theory does not work too well. Here,
we deﬁned the consumer’s utility as: U(s) = V (qs) − p, where V (qs) is the value
of service s and p the price (one of the characteristics). Now, if we also consider
the provider’s reliability ws, the probability that it will provide the agreed service
at the agreed time, we get:
Uconsumer(s) = ws[v(qs) − pc] + (1 − ws)fee,
where fee is the decommitment fee the provider has to pay if he fails to deliver
the service. Now, the diﬀerent characteristics are no longer additive, so the basic
form of multiattribute utility theory is not applicable.
In contrast, in the decision theory approach the decision-maker will simply use his
utility function to calculate his expected utility for using each possible service and
then he just chooses the option that provides the highest expected utility (Collins
et al. 2001).53 Here, the expected utility would be calculated using the equation
for utility and replacing ws, qs and pc with the values from the service in question.
53The expected utility is of course very strictly conﬁned to the situation at hand (as discussed
in section 2.2.1.1) and since the situation of Collins et al. is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (they have a
reverse auction and multiple interconnected services), it is not useful to go through their model
in detail. Instead, we will discuss some problems of using this approach in our environment.Chapter 2 Literature Review 76
However, although each provider’s quality of service qs and reliability ws are as-
sumed to be known (requirement R6) and also the decommitment fee fee and
the consumer’s value function v(..) can be assumed to be known by the consumer
agent, the problem is the price pc, which is not usually known at the time of op-
ponent selection by anyone, since it will be determined by a negotiation after the
opponents have been selected. The provider-speciﬁc price distributions are also
likely to be very hard to learn even over considerable time, since they depend on
the negotiation tactics used by the parties and their negotiation parameters (such
as deadlines and reservation prices), which are likely to vary between negotiation
encounters. However, we can make this choice properly when we use negotiation
tactics that make the same oﬀer again and again. Then we know exactly what
the price is going to be if we are successful in the negotiation and a contract is
formed. Of course we need to consider and be able to estimate the probability of
being successful in a negotiation, z, so we get the following:
Uconsumer(s) = z(ws[v(qs) − pc] + (1 − ws)fee).
In order to get a useful estimate to z, we would need to know what negotiation
tactic the opponent is using or at least we need to know the possibilities and
the probability distribution over them. If we have very little or no information
about the opponent tactics, the meaning of this extension will be very small. If
z is roughly the same for the all the opponents, it will make a very small impact
on the selection. Despite these problems, the decision theoretic approach seems
applicable to our problem and so we will adopt it (see section 10.1.2.1 for details).54
We will of course use also other (much simpler) opponent selection techniques, but
we use the decision theoretic approach as a pinnacle of opponent selection, the most
sophisticated technique.
Using a decision theoretic approach in both opponent selection and concurrency
control means that we will need a signiﬁcant amount of information about the
market and the sellers. Our information requirements (requirement R6) have
made it possible for us to consider and choose decision theoretic approaches to
some issues, although such information may not always be readily available. We,
54There are also other approaches to service selection, such as the preference ranking organi-
sation method for enrichment evaluations (PROMETHEE) (Brans and Vincke 1985), which was
used for service selection by Seo et al. (2005), and constraint satisfaction/optimisation (used for
service selection in Lin et al. (2005)). They all suﬀer from the same problem: the best goal
function depends on pc, which may be diﬃcult to estimate in advance and they are not directly
applicable to our problem. The PROMETHEE is quite complicated and there are very few
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however, think that it is good approach to see ﬁrst what works when there is
good information and then make the setting more challenging (and realistic) by
taking some of that information away and trying to cope with less information.
We also think that although our information needs are signiﬁcant, they can, with
some additional work, often be relaxed with a limited loss of performance. We
also use less sophisticated methods in some cases to see how they perform. Of
course this work should be continued in future work to settings with less and less
information.55
2.3.3.3 Reaching Agreements
The relationship between the various concurrent negotiation threads is a key issue
in concurrent bilateral negotiation. To this end, we discuss two points:
• how is the decision to accept the opponent’s oﬀer made and
• what happens if one or more of the oﬀers gets accepted?
Now, the solutions to both of these questions vary in the literature. In particular,
Rahwan et al. (2002) use autonomous negotiation threads that each try to reach an
acceptable agreement on their own. It is, therefore, the thread itself that decides
when to accept the oﬀer and when to continue negotiation. The coordinator can
order threads to quit negotiating, but not to accept or reject a particular oﬀer.
The coordination between diﬀerent threads is achieved ex post (after agreement),
as the coordinator uses one of four strategies to select the agreement to be bound
by. Strategies are:
• desperate: as soon as an acceptable oﬀer exists, it is accepted and all other
negotiations are ended. If there is more than one acceptable oﬀer, the one
with the highest utility is selected.
• patient: threads that have an acceptable deal are asked to wait while other
threads ﬁnish their negotiation. Then the result oﬀering the best utility is
selected and others are decommitted or ended.56
55We will discuss this in more detail in section 12.2.2.
56The strategy guarantees the best possible deal, but does not care about time constraints.
One variation is that at the deadline the best oﬀer so far is selected and the others are rejected.Chapter 2 Literature Review 78
• optimised patient: as patient, but the outcomes so far aﬀect the reservation
prices of the remaining negotiations, so that each new agreement is better
than earlier ones. Thus the utility constraint is updated to the highest oﬀer
so far.
• strategy manipulation: the coordinating agent may modify the negotiation
strategies of diﬀerent sub-negotiators at run time.
All but the last one are very one-sided, since they assume that the providers
obediently wait until the consumer makes a decision on which oﬀer to accept and
that negotiator can decommit from any other agreements without any problem at
any time. It seems that the agent does not need to pay anything to decommit and
the possibility that the opponent accepts the agent’s oﬀer is not discussed in the
paper. The most interesting approach for our purposes (strategy manipulation) is
not explained in any detail.57 In the model it has no strategic relevance whether
the consumer agent’s oﬀer was accepted or whether it was the consumer agent that
accepted the provider’s oﬀer, since in either case coordination is done ex post.
A diﬀerent approach is oﬀered by Li et al. (2004), in which all negotiation decisions
are made in the negotiation threads, but the coordinator does inﬂuence the tactics
used in each thread already during the negotiation. The coordinator estimates the
outcomes of diﬀerent threads and uses these estimates to set the reservation utility
for each thread.58 In order to make the estimates several big assumptions are made:
the buyer agent is assumed to know the distribution of the providers’ reservation
prices, the newcomers’ arrival probability and their items’ value distribution. As
Li et al. have done, we assumed that the sellers can exit and more sellers can enter
at any time (requirement R5). Any reasonable negotiation model that works in
the market environment should usually consider this requirement and consider
any good contracts the latecomers might bring with them. It may not be a good
idea to take a mediocre deal if there are good providers probably coming later.
Li et al. use analytic approach and knowledge of many distributions to calculate
their estimate, but we will instead use empirical data collected on previous runs,
57Only one example is given and that is also very one-sided: Once an acceptable oﬀer exists,
all the other threads are ordered to send a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with higher utility than the
one already reached. If none of these oﬀers gets accepted, then the original agreement is selected.
However, if one of these new oﬀers gets accepted, it will get selected and if more than one oﬀer
is accepted, one is selected at random.
58The reservation utility is equal to the expected utility of the outside option (highest expected
utility of all other negotiation threads and negotiation threads starting in the future). They use
a simple time-dependent heuristic strategy to ﬁnd out what oﬀers to make. They also oﬀer
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because we believe that is more realistic. Moreover, it allows us to consider settings
in which such distributions for future expected utilities might be diﬃcult to derive.
A problem with the model by Li et al. is that they do not discuss the coordination
issue any further, so either they assume that once one thread accepts an oﬀer,
others are automatically ordered to quit (and there is enough time to do this) or
that the consumer agent is able to decommit from all extraneous contracts for
free. Since cases where the consumer agent’s oﬀer is accepted and the consumer
agent accepts the oﬀer are not separated, the latter seems more probable. This is
inappropriate for our settings because decommitment policies and how they should
aﬀect the parties behaviour is a central theme to our work and this particular
problem (extra contracts) is an important part of what we investigate. Therefore,
for us, it is obvious that simultaneous contracts are possible and the buyer should
have to pay a decommitment fee for any extra contracts it does not need.
Finally, Nguyen and Jennings (2005) use very explicit coordination mechanisms
and, unlike the other models, all decisions on acceptance are made by the coordi-
nator. This coordinator gets all the opponent oﬀers from the negotiation threads
and then decides whether to accept the best of them or to continue negotiating.
The negotiation thread’s task is then to implement this decision. However, more
diﬃcult situations occur when more than one oﬀer gets accepted by the provider
agents. In such cases, the consumer agent just decommits from these extra con-
tracts and it seems that it can do so by paying a decommitment fee.
We require that our model must have an unbiased protocol. Therefore, a situation
where one party can and the other cannot decommit is not acceptable to us.
On the other hand, we think that, if and when a contract has been made, the
decommitment should usually cost something. Consequently, we think that the
last approach by Nguyen and Jennings is the most appropriate starting point for
our work. Their model is also the most explicit when it comes to the mechanics of
committing and decommitting. The other models seem to have suprisingly little
to say about these topics, although they seem essential to any concurrent bilateral
negotiation model.
2.3.3.4 The Negotiation Strategy
A Negotiation strategy is a collection of negotiation tactics for on-going bilateral
negotiations. We discussed some issues involved in devising such tactics for bilat-
eral negotiation in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.2. Here, however, we will discuss howChapter 2 Literature Review 80
having many concurrent negotiations may aﬀect these tactics. Also here it seems
that state of the art is not very advanced.
In Nguyen and Jennings, both parties to all negotiations use time-dependent
heuristic negotiation tactics. The buyer agent can use three diﬀerent strategies
(conceder, linear and boulware) and there are two diﬀerent types of sellers (one
uses a conceder strategy and the other a boulware strategy). The buyer knows
the share of these types in the market and he also has probabilities of success-
ful negotiations and expected utilities for each combination (conceder/conceder,
conceder/boulware, etc.). The buyer’s negotiation thread then calculates the ex-
pected utility for each possible strategy and chooses the one that maximises it. In
this case, strategy choices in one thread aﬀect the choices in others, since the type
probabilities are updated after a strategy is chosen for each thread using Bayes’
rule (assuming that the opponent in the current negotiation thread is of the type
that has higher probability in the selected strategy). The thread will also try to
guess whether the opponent uses a conceder or a boulware strategy. Since this is
quite an easy distinction to make, the buyer soon knows the type of each seller
and can select the optimal strategy against him. This seems too simple for our
use, although the basic idea of trying to recognise the opponent strategy and then
choosing a good strategy against it, is obviously what we will plan to do in a
bit more complex environment, where distinctions are more diﬃcult to make. In
addition, the role of the decommitment fees in deciding how many negotiations to
use is not discussed.
In Li et al. the estimated outcome of other negotiations aﬀects the negotiation’s
reservation utility. Since diﬀerent negotiations have a diﬀerent set of these other
negotiations to consider, the reservation utilities can vary in diﬀerent negotiations.
In addition, the value of the opponent’s item/service can be diﬀerent. This means
that the reservation prices are diﬀerent in each negotiation. In particular, Li et
al. use a basic time-dependent heuristic strategy with constant β. However, since
reservation prices for each negotiation thread are calculated in every round, the
reservation price can increase or decrease in each recalculation, which means that
an oﬀer can increase or decrease. The idea of adjusting the reservation utility
based on the expected outcome in other negotiations is quite interesting. A nice
property of this approach is that the strategy will be ‘automatically’ harder against
low quality producers and softer against high quality producers.59
59As we learned in section 2.1, the consumer’s utility is the diﬀerence between the value of a
service and its price. With lower value (quality), also the price needs to be lower to achieve a
certain reservation utility. This means that with the low quality providers, the reservation price
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However, we think there is a plenty of room for improvement here. We will use
the idea of using expected outcomes in other negotiations as a basis for reservation
price, but we do not use that directly with on-going negotiations but with future
negotiations. So if the buyer expects to have good oﬀers later, it will use that as
the reservation utility it needs from negotiations it is currently engaged in. Also
the idea of demanding the same (expected) utility from all opponents is going to
be used in our most advanced concurrency strategy. In general, the papers seemed
to have a bit of trouble deciding where the negotiation tactics should be set: at
a controller or at a negotiator and what role each of them have in this process.
For this thesis, this is also an issue that should be addressed. If the model is
designed to be extendable, it needs to have a very clear view on what decision is
made by what component and when. Moreover, these models does not address
the situation where the buyer might change its mind about wanting a service at
all (requirement R2). This is something we feel should be also incorporated into
the buyer agent’s model.
2.3.4 Interconnected Negotiations
In most of the literature, each automated negotiation (or at least a set of negotia-
tions on a single service) is considered in isolation. There are some exceptions such
as Zhang et al. (2005), but none of this work is done in the context of concurrent
bilateral negotiation and within the framework of a concurrent bilateral negotia-
tion model. We believe that managing interrelations on diﬀerent services should
be a signiﬁcant part of any such model. On the other hand, our main interest will
be on improving the management of concurrent negotiation on the same service
and we will therefore not make hugely complicated models here. Instead, we will
just discuss two basic cases of interconnectedness between services: The diﬀer-
ent services can be either substitutes or complements to each other (see section
10.1.2.1). The services A, B and C are substitutes when only one of them is needed
and they are perfect substitutes if the decision-maker is indiﬀerent between the
services, in other words, it does not care if it gets a service A, B or C as long as
it gets one. The same services A, B and C are complements when all three are
needed for the highest utility. We will discuss these two types of interconnections
in our work.Chapter 2 Literature Review 82
2.4 Summary
We have discussed the relevant literature and made our observations on what works
in the state of the art and where there is room for improvement. We will now
summarise our ﬁndings in two parts. First, we discuss the commitment models
(section 2.4.1) and then the concurrent bilateral negotiation strategies (section
2.4.2).
2.4.1 Commitment Models
We have discussed the literature about bilateral negotiation and decommitments.
On bilateral negotiation, we concluded that the heuristic negotiation tactics will
be simple, light (limited negotiation resources, requirement R4) and easy to use
and will allow us to consider all the relevant requirements. They allow us to have
costly and time-consuming service preparation (requirement R1), because we can
easily translate such limits to deadlines and reservation prices.60.
And although we did not discuss it explicitly, our marketplace should also fulﬁl
the requirements of openness (requirement R5), heterogeneity (requirement R3)61
and incomplete information, which does include the availability of some basic
information for all parties (requirement R6). Moreover, the marketplace should
allow for changes in circumstances (requirement R4). These requirements are not
especially relevant to our literature review, because most approaches we discussed
could have ﬁlled these requirements.
We also concluded that the leveled-commitment contracts is the best approach to
manage changing circumstances (requirement R2) and the necessary decommit-
ments. We will investigate the eﬀects of four diﬀerent decisions that the parties
make in our market environment (performance, reliance, contract and selection)
and try to ﬁnd out what eﬀect the diﬀerent decommiment policies (rules on de-
commitment fees) have on the outcome in terms of common good. For the most
part, we use the decisions as they are described in the literature. The literature
on many decisions is limited in the sense that models used (if any) are often quite
simple or even non-existent and the discussion revolves around general principles.
We will use these principles and basic settings and adapt them to our dynamic
service market setting.
60We discuss this process in detail in section 3.2.
61Again, the latter can be achieved by choosing some parameters at random, see section 3.2
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Because the papers are published in the law and economics literature, they often
consider incomplete information as a question of evidence to be settled in a court
of law and do not consider other options or more complicated settings. We will
therefore extend these models to settings where information is incomplete and
create decommitment policies that can address this situation quickly without a
need for third parties or complicated procedures. Moreover, the discussion in the
literature is often brief and limited to identifying the optimal policy in the circum-
stances. Sometimes, this policy may be complicated or depend on information that
is not readily available and it is, therefore, useful to discuss also other policies and
investigate how well simpler or otherwise sub-optimal policies might perform in
diﬀerent settings. We also investigate the role of some other characteristics and
rules of the marketplace such as population sizes or possibility of re-entry, to name
a few.
Our main focus will be on the performance decision, because it is the most es-
tablished of the four decisions and because legal rules may give us pointers for
deciding what to do in special circumstances or under incomplete information.
2.4.2 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Strategies
We have discussed the literature on concurrent bilateral negotiation and have
given an example of how interconnected negotiations may be managed. We have
identiﬁed several methods in the current state of art, which will be useful to us
and there was, for example, models where the openness (requirement R5) was
considered to a reasonable extent, although we considered having distributions of
future opponents a bit excessive and will use empirical data instead. The existing
literature also provided adequate support for our requirement of costly and time-
consuming service preparation (requirement R1). Also, many of the models we
discussed made quite strong assumptions on available information. We have made
our own assumptions (requirement R6) that are, compared to the state of the art,
quite strict in some places and quite generous in others. We believe, however, that
at least some of our assumptions can be relaxed in future work with limited loss
of performance.
However, we have also identiﬁed some quite signiﬁcant gaps in the state of the art.
These are mostly connected to the managing concurrent negotiations:
• concurrency control: there is no discussion of selecting the number of concur-
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a concurrent negotiation, because it directly inﬂuences the number of extra
contracts the buyer agent may have to decommit from and also because the
concurrent negotiation may be computation-intensive and resources that can
be used for negotiation usually have limits (requirement R4),
• opponent selection: there is also no discussion of choosing the best opponents
to have the concurrent negotiations with, although in most markets, the
sellers are highly heterogeneous (requirement R3),
• negotiation tactics: although the literature had some good ideas, there is
some room for improvement. We need to be able to estimate the outcomes
for our negotiations and chances of success and none of the tactics in the
literature oﬀered us that. Also all the concurrent bilateral negotiation models
used very simple negotiation tactics on the opponent side (often simple time-
dependent tactics) and we want the sellers to use more diverse tactics.
• changing circumstances: a case where the buyer (and the seller) have a
probability that they may not want the contract to go through in the end but
want to decommit at some point (requirement R2), has not been considered,
in the literature, especially not in the context of concurrent negotiation,
• interconnected negotiations: interconnected negotiations have not been con-
sidered in the context of concurrent bilateral negotiation
Now, to address these shortcomings we need to develop a concurrent bilateral nego-
tiation model that includes support for interconnected negotiations. We also need
to pay extra care to designing the structure and inner workings of a negotiation-
coordinating controller: how these mostly new functions can be made to work
well together, so that new strategies and methods can be easily added. We also
need to work on the division of labour between the diﬀerent levels of the model.
Each such level should have their own areas of expertise and they should not usu-
ally second-guess each other’s recommendations, except if one level has a wider
view and needs to adjust a recommendation, but even then it should not just do




Now that we have discussed the state of the art and its shortcomings, it is time to
explain in detail how we are going to address some of the issues we have identiﬁed.
In other words, we will now move to discuss our research. As discussed in the in-
troduction, we will explain our work in two major parts each consisting of several
chapters. The common thread through all our work is to consider how the decom-
mitment policies aﬀect the way an intelligent market participant should behave in
a marketplace. In part I, we are going to discuss system-level eﬀects of decom-
mitment policies. If and when the decommitment policies inﬂuence behaviour of
the individuals in the market and if and when the market outcomes (and hence
the welfare eﬀects of a marketplace) follow from the actions of the participants,
it can be said that the decommitment policies inﬂuence the common good the
market can produce. In other words, in part I, we are interested in how the way
the market participants adapt to the diﬀerent decommitment policies aﬀects the
common good or the sum of utilities of all participants.1
Speciﬁcally, in part I, we use a relatively simple market setting and keep the
adaptations the parties use simple and straight-forward and investigate how the
decommitment policies aﬀect the big picture to get a clearer view on the role the
decommitments and decommitment policies can play in an electronic marketplace.
In more detail, we discuss the underlying theory and our results in the market
setting in ﬁve parts. First, in this chapter, we introduce our marketplace model
and its implementation and in the four subsequent chapters we discuss each of
the four major decisions that the parties make to adapt their behaviour to the
1We discuss the other aspect, the individual-level strategies mainly in the part II, although
some basics are discussed also in this part.
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decommitment policy in force (this corresponds to research contributions C1–
C4):
• performance decision (chapter 4, contribution C1),
• reliance decision (chapter 5, contribution C2),
• contract decision (chapter 6, contribution C3), and
• selection decision (chapter 7, contribution C4).
For our marketplace model, we consider a market of buyers and sellers for one
service. We refer with subscript b to a single buyer (consumer) and with subscript
s to a single seller (provider) in this market. We are especially interested in their
utility, Ub and Us, respectively. The time t is discrete and divided into turns.
We assume that all participants expect the delivery of the service to occur at the
same time tdelivery (there can be separate markets for diﬀerent delivery times and
other services but we are only interested in one market). We ﬁrst explain how
the market works (section 3.1), then we discuss how the negotiations proceed and
how the parties get the parameters for the negotiations (section 3.2). We will then
discuss how we make the parties consider issues associated with decommitment on
the contracts that have been formed (section 3.3) and how we implemented this
system (section 3.4).
3.1 Matching and Entries
The buyers and sellers in the market are paired at random by the marketplace.
This means that each provider will be given one consumer to negotiate with (and
vice versa). The pairs then negotiate for 100 turns on the price of the service. Both
parties use simple exponential time-dependent heuristic tactics (section 2.2.1.2),
in which the parameter β is selected at random. Once all negotiations ﬁnish, the
parties remaining in the market are again matched at random. This process (from
the random matching to the end of negotiations) is repeated 10 times. The entries
and exits can occur at any time, but the parties are only matched at turns that
can be divided by 100 without a remainder (i.e. 0,100,200,...). If there is an
unequal number of buyers and sellers in the market, some members of the larger
population will not get an opponent and will have to wait until the next matching.
The contracts are performed when the negotiations end, thus tdelivery = 1000.Chapter 3 The Marketplace Model 88
Size Initial Entry
Size (n0) Intensity (ib)
Tiny 0 0.02




Very Large 250 1.5
Huge 500 4.0
Table 3.1: Population sizes.
In the beginning (t = t0 = 0) there are n0 buyers and n0 sellers in the market.
This is to ensure that negotiations can start from the beginning. Over time, some
buyers and sellers enter and some may exit. The numbers of entries for the parties
are independent variables, but follow the same standard Poisson distribution, with
the parameter λ(t) = i
tlastEntry−t
tlastEntry , where i is the basic entry intensity, tlastEntry the
last turn that entries are possible and t is the current turn. This formulation means
that entries are more probable earlier in the experiment. This is realistic because
the parties are more likely to ﬁnd a contract if they enter early. This is especially
true for the providers, because we assume that the provision of the service takes
time and they cannot wait until the last moment to ﬁnd a consumer. In the
experiments we discuss in this thesis, we have tdelivery = 1000, tlastEntry,s = 800
and tlastEntry,b = 900 and we use diﬀerent population sizes as described in table
3.1.
3.2 The Negotiation Parameters
We assume that the provisioning costs money (requirement R1). Speciﬁcally, in
order to provide the service at the delivery time, the provider s has to invest a
cost cs at time tc,s(< tdelivery). In the experiments we discuss in this thesis, tc,s is
selected at random from either:
• Any: Uniform(max(0,te,s + 1),1000),
• Last Half : Uniform(max(500,te,s + 1),1000),
• Turns 700-800: Uniform(max(700,te,s + 1),800), or
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where te,s is the time of entry for provider s. The time tc,s is selected independently
for each provider using the same interval. Each provider has a quality qs, which




0, if t < tc,s,
cs = 0.5qs, if t ≥ tc,s.
These provider characteristics are mapped into typical bilateral negotiation pa-
rameters by setting the reservation price rs equal to the provider’s preparation
cost cs and the deadline to tc,s. This means that the provider will never accept a
price that is less than its costs and that if the provider does not have a contract
when it should start preparing for service, it will exit the market. The provider’s
utility for a contract is: Us(p,cs) = p − cs, where p is the contract price.
The consumers do not have costs, but each consumer b has a deadline tx,b, which
is selected at random from Uniform(te,b+1,tdelivery), where te,b is the time that b
entered the market. The consumer’s utility for the contract is Ub(q,p) = Vb(q)−p,





0, if q < qmin
b ,
v(q), if qmin
b ≤ q ≤ qmax
b ,
v(qmax
b ), if q > qmax
b ,
where v(q) is the consumers’ common value function and qmin
b and qmax
b are con-
sumer speciﬁc parameters of that function. Here we assume simply that v(q) = q.
This means that each consumer has a minimum useful quality qmin
b and any ser-
vice that does not oﬀer at least this is worthless (Vb = 0). On the other hand,
the consumer also has a maximum useful quality, qmax
b , which gives him his full
utility. Any improvement above this level does not increase the value of the service
to the consumer in question. The parameters qmin
b and qmax
b are selected for each
consumer independently at random from Uniform(0,0.5) and Uniform(0.5,1.0)
respectively. The consumer’s reservation price for a given service is then equal to
its value.
3.3 Decommitment
Since the original contract is always beneﬁcial to both parties (Us > 0 and Ub > 0)
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introduce a possibility of an adverse impact that decreases the value of the contract
to the party in question. This decrease may make the contract counter-productive
to the aﬀected party or parties and he or they may want to decommit. We use
ab and as to denote the probability that the buyer or seller (respectively) will be
aﬀected.
For the provider, the decrease means that the cost of providing the service increases
by amount Ls and this will decrease its utility by the same amount. He will then
need to make a decision on whether or not to decommit from the contract in this
new situation. The decision is inﬂuenced by the decommitment fee fs. We assume
that the provider s will decommit at turn t if and only if:
Us(contract|Ls = l) < Us(tdecommit = t)
p − cs − l < −fs − Cs(qs,t).
where Us(tdecommit = t) is the seller’s utility, when he decommits at turn t and
l is the amount the utility decreases. Here we use the following ten values l ∈
{0.1,0.2,...,1.0}. So, the seller decommits if the decreased utility is lower than
the cost it has already paid and the decommitment fee it has to pay to get out of
the contract. The seller learns of the loss at some point tl (selected at random)
between the time the contract was formed tcontract and the time it was due to be
performed (tdelivery) excluding both of the extremes. However, we assume that this
loss itself is always avoidable, if the contract is abandoned before it is delivered.
This means that the additional cost has to be paid just before the delivery. It is
not possible that this additional cost is paid if there is no delivery.2 There can
only be one eﬀect per party and the eﬀect is always ﬁnal. All possible moments for
learning of the eﬀect are equally likely, i.e. tl ∼ Uniform(tcontract+1,tdelivery−1).
If tcontract + 1 > tdelivery − 1 we assume that there can be no loss.
The same applies to the buyer, except for two important diﬀerences. For the
buyer, the impact l decreases the value of the contract (Vb(q)). The fact that the
eﬀect can be avoided also here by decommitting at any time before the deadline
is clear. However, because the buyer can, in many types of service, just ignore the
service delivered, the value cannot be enormously negative. We therefore assume
that the impacted value cannot be lower than −0.05 (Vb(q) ≥ −0.05). This small
negative value would then come from accepting the service and disposing of the
results. This means that the utility of the buyer can never go below −0.05−p. We
2However, it is possible that the seller has to pay the original cost even without a delivery
as explained earlier. Only the extra cost is tied to the actual performance and will always be
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do not make a similar assumption with the seller, because the cost of producing
the service can (in theory) increase without any limit (hardware failures, resource
shortages and strikes can make the service very expensive to perform). The second
diﬀerence is that for the buyer, always Cb = 0 (for the seller Cs ≥ 0).
Since, in this chapter, we are interested in the system-level performance and com-
mon good, we use the sum of utilities of all buyers and sellers in the market as a
performance measure. We chose the sum of utilities because it is the simplest way
to measure common good. In addition, it is also the measure used in the law and
economics literature.3
The total utility for a buyer and seller pair in the case the seller decommits from
the contract at turn t is:
Ub+s(ts decommits = t)
= Ub(ts decommits = t) + Us(ts decommits = t)
= fs + (−fs − Cs(qs,t)) = −Cs(qs,t).
Similarly, the case where the buyer decommits Ub+s(tb decommits = t) = −Cs(qs,t).
In case both parties decide to decommit at the same turn, we assume that fs =
fb = 0. It is clear that the total utility is equal to Cs(qs,t) here as well. The
aﬀected parties avoid the utility decrease of the contract, because there is no
contract any more, but the decommitter will have to pay the fee (fs or fb) to the
victim.4
If the parties decide to perform the contract despite the utility decreases, the total
utility is:
Ub+s(contract|Ls = ls&Lb = lb)
= Ub(contract|Lb = lb) + Us(contract|Ls = ls)
= (Vb(qs) − p − lb) + (p − cs − ls) = Vb(qs) − cs − lb − ls.
A decommitment policy is a set of rules that speciﬁes the amount the decommitter
(the party decommitting) should pay to the victim (the decommitter’s opponent)
in case of decommitment. We will discuss several decommitment policies in this
3In our earlier work (Ponka and Jennings 2007), we used an expected utility of all contracts
as a performance measure. However, in the more complicated situations we investigate in this
thesis, calculating the expected utility would be much more diﬃcult and we have instead selected
the time for adverse impact (potential decommitment time) at random.
4Note that the fee does not change the total utility, just the distribution of wealth in the
society. However, as explained earlier, the fee can aﬀect when and if contracts are decommitted
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work, some of which are only to be used in a certain settings for a certain reason,
but we will start by discussing shortly some basic policies that have been used in
the literature (or can be easily derived from such policies). The common factor for
all these policies is that they are not environment- or issue-speciﬁc. These policies
are simple and usually they are used when an option of decommitment is needed,
but the role of the decommitment policies and fees are not considered in detail.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the following:
• Not Allowed: The contracts are absolutely binding and decommitment is
not possible.
• Constant: The decommitment penalty f is constant; here we investigate
cases where f ∈ {0.00,0.25,...,1.00}.
• Increasing: The decommitment starts with min at tmin and increases linearly
to max at time tmax. We investigate cases where min = {0.00,0.25,0.50}
and max = {0.25,0.50,...,1.00,1.50,2.00,2.50} and min < max. There are
three variations (all with tmax = tdelivery):
– Contract Time Only: tmin = t0 and t = tcontract.
– Decommitment Time Only: tmin = t0, and t = tdecommit.
– Both: tmin = tcontract and t = tdecommit.
• Constant Price (Andersson and Sandholm 2001): The decommitment fee is a
fraction of the price (p). Here we investigate cases where f = {0.5p,1.0p,...,2.5p}.
• Increasing Price: This has the same variations as the increasing policy (con-
tract time only and decommitment time only variations were used in (An-
dersson and Sandholm 2001)), but the minimum and maximum are fractions
of the contract price. We investigate cases where min = {0,0.25p,0.5p} and
max = {0.5p,1.0p,...,2.5p} and in all cases min < max.
In total, this means that there are 107 variations. Nevertheless, there is still a
large number of possible policies and an inﬁnite number of parameter values that
we do not investigate. We have tried to choose a reasonable sized selection of the
most obvious policies that have been used in literature or that are quite straight-
forward variations of those policies. All of these policies are non-compensatory,
which means that they do not try to compensate for the losses of the opponent.
We will also introduce two simple compensatory policies that explicitly try to
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• Expectation Damages: The fee is the opponent’s expected proﬁt (his utility
if the contract is performed properly) plus his costs at decommitment time.
• Reliance Damages: The fee is equal to the opponent’s costs at decommitment
time.
We will also discuss some situation-speciﬁc variations of these policies. These
basic policies rely on complete information about the opponent’s losses but in
some cases, we will also discuss some other policies that try to mimic the eﬀect
these policies have, but under incomplete information. We will now turn our
attention to the speciﬁc settings and decisions.
3.4 Implementation
The agents and the marketplace were implemented in Java (Sun Microsystems’
J2SE 5.0) using Eclipse 3.2.1 as a development environment.5 No agent frame-
works were used. The only external Java library used is Apache’s log4j (version
1.2.13)6, which allows management of log ﬁles. Our marketplace software uses a
conﬁguration (text) ﬁle that speciﬁes the setting to be run in great detail and the
software conﬁgures itself accordingly at run-time (before the experiments start).
Around 200 values are calculated for each and every run and these values are
printed into a text ﬁle along side with the conﬁguration used to generate the
results and a timestamp. The experiments were run mostly on the university’s
Beowulf cluster Iridis, 7 although some experiments were also run in a desktop
and a laptop running Windows XP SP2.
After an experiment, the text ﬁle generated by the software was analysed in two
stages. First, a simple Perl program (utilising an external Statistics::Descriptive
module8) is used to calculate averages and standard deviations for each value.
Then the actual statistical analysis is done using these values with Microsoft Excel.




8http://search.cpan.org/dist/Statistics-Descriptive/, version 2.6.Chapter 4
The Performance Decision
In the performance decision, the party has to decide whether or not to perform
according to a contract that it has entered earlier. The alternative is to decommit
from the contract and pay the other party a decommitment fee and all parties are
expected to take the alternative that maximises their personal utility. As discussed
in the literature review (section 2.2.3.1), the optimal policy for the society is
to set the decommitment fee equal to the losses of the victim. That way the
decommitment occurs if and only if it beneﬁts the society. However, the situation
is not as simple as that. There is a question of how the opponent’s loss is deﬁned
in diﬀerent situations and a question of how this can be made to work under
incomplete information, when the losses are not known exactly and the victim
cannot be trusted to give an honest estimate of them. We will discuss these issues
in this section. The work described in this chapter corresponds to our research
contribution C1.
We will ﬁrst discuss the changes to the basic model to better investigate perfor-
mance decision and to try our ideas about it (section 4.1). This includes four
diﬀerent settings and the compensatory decommitment policies that we have de-
vised for them (section 4.2). We will then discuss the empirical evaluation of
our ideas and policies. Finally we will conclude with a summary of our ﬁndings
(section 4.3).
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4.1 The Problem and the Modiﬁed Models
In this work, we will focus on situations in which the parties always exit the market
after they have found a contract. However, we investigate four diﬀerent settings by
varying two parameters: possibility of re-entry and the number of possibly aﬀected
parties. The ﬁrst one, possibility of re-entry, determines whether, after the contract
has been decommitted from, the victim is allowed to re-enter the market to ﬁnd
a substitute contract for the one it lost. This is typically possible in the case of
simple and standardised services that can be provided or consumed by many other
parties. In case of standardised services, it makes sense for the buyer to try to
ﬁnd another provider for his service or the seller to try to ﬁnd another consumer,
who would be interested in exactly the same service. In more customised service
settings, re-entry is deemed to be a waste of time and other resources, because
other consumers cannot readily use the service or other providers cannot provide
it.
The second factor that we will use to vary our settings is the number of potentially
aﬀected parties. This means that the adverse eﬀect mentioned can potentially
inﬂuence either one or both of the parties. When only one of the parties can be
aﬀected (either ab = 0 or as = 0), the possibility that the potential victim will be
aﬀected as well need not be considered. However, when it is possible that both
parties are aﬀected, the parties should take this into account. Nonetheless, we
will assume that the parties will always decommit as soon as the need arises and
therefore do not engage in any type of strategic behavior in this regard. Strategic
behaviour could occur when there is a reasonable chance that the opponent would
want to decommit, and it would mean that a party would wait for the opponent to
decommit ﬁrst to avoid paying the decommitment fee (and actually receiving one
from the opponent). This problem was discussed in Sandhom and Lesser (2001),
but will not be addressed in our work. We will, therefore, discuss four diﬀerent
settings in turn:
• one party potentially aﬀected, no re-entry (section 4.1.1)
• one party potentially aﬀected, re-entry possible (section 4.1.2)
• both parties potentially aﬀected, no re-entry (section 4.1.3)and
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4.1.1 Compensatory Policies in Markets with One-Sided
Decommitments and No Re-Entry
As discussed in the literature review (section 2.2.3.1), an important aspect of com-
pensatory policies is how the victim’s loss is measured. In law, the compensation
usually aims to put the victim in the same ﬁnancial position as when the contract
had been performed as agreed. In a basic case, this means compensating not only
for the victim’s costs, but also for his expected proﬁt. A counterbalance of this
quite extensive liability is the victim’s duty to mitigate his loss. We will discuss
compensatory policies in two parts: (i) those that have access to complete informa-
tion about the opponent’s proﬁts and costs and (ii) those where this information
is incomplete.
In the complete information case, we can use the decommitment policy that is
optimal according to eﬃcient breach theory:
• Expectation Damages: The fee is the opponent’s expected proﬁt (his utility
if the contract is performed properly) plus his costs at decommitment time.
The compensation of costs is important. If the costs of the opponent are not
compensated, the opponent would either have to take a risk that his costs could
be wasted in case of decommitment or not to enter a contract at all. If he was
willing to take a risk, he would sometimes incur losses. On the other hand, if
he was to stop providing a service that is useful to the society, the society would
suﬀer. Compensation of costs can therefore be seen as essential to contracting in
situations where there is a delay between agreement and performance. In many
situations the cost can be a signiﬁcant portion of the contract price.
However, the costs should only be compensated when they could not have been
avoided. The relevant legal principle here is duty to mitigate. Once the breach
(or decommitment) is a fact, the victim is expected to take reasonable action to
mitigate his losses. This duty is enforced by allowing damages only for losses
that he could not have avoided this way (Treitel 2003). In this simplest setting,
the duty to mitigate means that if there is no reason for the seller to ﬁnish the
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do so but if he does, he should not be compensated for it.1 The provider should
therefore exit the market before his costs are due.
On the other hand, compensating for the costs is not enough, because each contract
also means proﬁt for its parties and these proﬁts increase the total utility. If the
expected proﬁt is not compensated for, it is possible that decommitment occurs
when the increase of the decommitter’s utility is lower than the expected proﬁt
that the victim loses. To investigate this, we use a decommitment policy that
compensates only for the costs. This is typical in tort law and is called reliance
damages:
• Reliance Damages: The fee is equal to the opponent’s costs at decommitment
time.2
In the incomplete information case, the situation is more complicated. There are
many possible ways to create a compensatory decommitment policy that works
under incomplete information, but that aims to compensate for the loss the de-
commitment causes. Here, we introduce the most obvious one: the analytic com-
pensatory. In this policy, the victim’s loss is estimated analytically using available
information. In other words, the policy uses estimates of the cost and value func-
tions, the distributions for the deadlines, and so on, to analytically estimate the
loss. The accuracy of these estimates can vary, but here we will only consider the
most accurate setting. In our earlier work (Ponka and Jennings 2007) we showed
how the quality of information aﬀects the performance of this policy.3
• Analytic Compensatory: The fee is equal to the expected loss for the victims
in similar circumstances.
In more detail, the decommitment fee for the buyer is:
fb(p,q,t) = D(t)p + (1 − D(t))(p − EC(q)),
1The actual legal situation is usually a bit trickier and requires that the seller has accepted
that the buyer doesn’t want the service. This is handled under the doctrine of anticipatory
breach and will be ignored here. Since the parties are in the market where leveled decommitment
contracts are used, we assume that they always accept decommitments. Such acceptance might,
for instance, therefore be a requirement for entry to the market.
2This policy was used in Excelente-Toledo et al. (2001), but it was called sunk costs.
3In that work, we also used another compensatory policy, the Expected Loss, which used
empirical data instead of analytical estimates. We showed there that the better (more accurate)
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where q is the quality, EC(q) the estimated cost function and D(t) a probability
that the seller has paid the cost at turn t. In a similar fashion, the fee for the
seller is:
fs(p,q) = EV (q) − p
= [Fmid(q) · V (q) + Fmax(q) · qmax(q)] − p
where EV (q) is the estimated value function, Fmid(q) is the probability that the
quality q is between the buyer’s minimum and maximum value, Fmax(q) is the
probability that quality q is above the maximum quality, and qmax(q) is the esti-
mated value for qmax
b for the opponent b in the latter case. In case this is negative,
the fee is zero.
In the other compensatory policy, average loss, we use use the notion of ‘normal’ or
typical loss. In law, the unusually large losses (even if real) are not compensated if
they were not foreseeable to the other party.4 In law, this limits the maximum for
damages, but here we use it as the measure of loss. We compensate the typical loss
for the opponent in the same circumstances. The circumstances are determined by
information that is available to both parties, such as the turn the agreement was
reached (tcontract), the decommitment turn (tdecommit), the quality of the service
(qs) and the contract price of the decommitted contract (p). As the measure of
typical loss we use the average:
• Average Loss: The fee is equal to the average loss for the victims in similar
circumstances.
Here, we investigate the variation in which the similarity of the situation is assessed
by the contract price, quality, contract turn and decommitment turn, and in which
each of the ﬁrst three factors are divided into k categories and we have accurate
information of all possible decommitment turns; that is, we have 1001k3 diﬀerent
categories. For our experiments, we establish the typical loss simply by running
the market 1000 times in advance and by calculating the average losses experienced
by the parties in diﬀerent situations (from each contract we get the information on
losses of all possible decommitment situations). In the calculation of the fee, the
situation is ﬁrst categorised in terms of all three factors and the similar situations
are those that belong to the same categories in all three factors.
We assume that the decommitment fees are established by the marketplace and
the fee for any set of circumstances is always known by all parties. This policy
4The actual rule is that the loss must either be directly or naturally following from the breach
or the other party knew or should have known of this loss at time of signing of the contract (Treitel
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gives the victim incentives to minimise his loss, because the compensation is set
in advance and hence all the savings the victim can make are going to beneﬁt him
(and the society).
4.1.2 Compensatory Policies in Markets with One-Sided
Decommitments and Re-Entries
When the victim can re-enter the market and try to get a new contract to replace
the lost one, it is clear that there are two possible outcomes. On one hand, the
victim may be able to ﬁnd a reasonable substitute, or on the other hand, he might
fail to do so. The latter is relatively easy as it is the same as the case with no
re-entry. However, it may be much more diﬃcult to estimate the probability of
ﬁnding a new contract and what such a contract will be.
In law, the duty to mitigate damage means that if it is possible and reasonable, the
victim is expected to make a substitute transaction in the market. In other words,
a buyer that does not get the product from one source is expected to acquire it
from another and a seller that is unable to sell the product to one buyer is often
expected to try to sell the product to another customer. If the victim is successful,
his loss is then the price diﬀerence between the new and original contract.5
Accordingly, the prima facie rule on contract law damages, market price rule, says
that, if there is a market in which a victim can make a substitute transaction, the
damages are limited to the diﬀerence between the contract price and the market
price (Atiyah et al. 2005). In theory, the actual contract price for the substitute
transaction is irrelevant and only the market price matters. However, in many
settings it may be diﬃcult or even impossible to determine one market price in
a given market at a given time. In such situations, if the victim can show that
he has acted reasonably, the market price will probably be held to be equal to
the actual contract price. Unlike in the previous setting, here it is possible that
in case of a substitute contract, the loss of the victim may actually be negative
(i.e., he may actually beneﬁt from decommitment). This occurs if he is able to
ﬁnd a better contract than the one that he had. In law, this situation is managed
by awarding no damages. Accordingly, we require the decommitment fee to be
non-negative and in case the victim beneﬁts from the decommitment, the fee will
be zero.
5Stricly speaking also reasonable costs that are related to securing a substitute contract should
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In our setting there is no one market price at any given time, since diﬀerent nego-
tiations on the same service can end in a diﬀerent result, even at the same instant.
Therefore, in our market, the actual price of a substitute contract should be the
starting point for loss assessment. However, the market price rule assumes that
the substitute purchase is of similar (preferably identical) quality and therefore
the loss is directly the price diﬀerence. Since in our setting, the quality of the
providers and value function of the consumers vary and the matching occurs at
random, this is not directly applicable to our setting. We therefore modify this
principle to also take into account the diﬀerences in quality (value). The loss is
then the diﬀerence between the utilities of the new and the old contracts.6
What makes this variation very diﬀerent from the case without re-entry is that
outside certain clear cases (where there are many consumers/providers with very
similar tastes/prices and therefore the probability of a replacement contract is
close to one and the price is known), the outcome is genuinely uncertain. Nobody,
not the decommitter or even the victim, will know for certain what will happen
before the decommitment occurs (ex ante) and the victim is forced to ﬁnd out.
On the other hand, after the dust settles (ex post), it is possible to assess what
the loss actually is and therefore what the decommitment fee should have been.
This uncertainty holds even for the market rule in law. If the market is not fully
developed and the availability of substitute contracts and the possible prices/qual-
ities is not known, nobody knew what was going to happen. The non-performance
(decommitment) occurred because one of the parties (the decommitter) estimated
that he is better oﬀ not performing and paying up whatever the court ﬁnds him
to be liable for. This means that even the legal rules for damages can lead to
ineﬃcient non-performances or performances under incomplete information: the
decommitter’s estimate could be wrong. It might underestimate the loss, in which
case he might not perform even when it would be in his (and the society’s) interest,
or it might overestimate the loss, in which case he might perform even if it would
have been better for him and for the society to abandon the contract.
The problem is that in cases of genuine uncertainty, the ineﬃcient (adverse) non-
performances and/or performances cannot be completely avoided. The decommit-
ter has to make his decision based on the information he has and even if he had
very good estimates for the two cases (success or failure in ﬁnding the substitute
contract) and even for the probability of success, but in any given case, he still does
not know which one is going to happen. Now, the legal rule puts the risk of making
6Unless the new contract provides better utility and, as explained, the loss would be considered
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the wrong decision on the decommitter. The victim will always be fully compen-
sated for whatever loss he incurs. The fee (actual loss) can therefore be higher or
lower than the estimated loss (actual loss model). Another approach would be to
use average losses or some other ﬁxed values as damages or decommitment fees.
In this case, the decommitter would always know what his ﬁnal liability will be
(estimated loss), but the victim does not know his actual loss until he is forced
to ﬁnd out (estimated loss model). Here, the victim can be overcompensated but
also undercompensated, so he takes some of the risk.
The common good is not directly aﬀected by the choice between these two alterna-
tives, since in both cases the potential decommitter uses the estimate and after the
decision to decommit has been made, the diﬀerence only aﬀects the distribution
of utility between the parties. However, as explained, the choice does aﬀect the
distribution of risk between the parties. On the other hand, the actual loss model
suﬀers from the problems with incentives. Namely, it may be diﬃcult to ensure
that the victim who has been unable to ﬁnd a good substitute contract has failed
despite his best eﬀorts and not because he preferred to take the full expectation
damages instead. This diﬀerence can be limited somewhat if the actions taken by
the victim can be reviewed7, but a potential problem still remains. The expected
loss model does not have this problem because ﬁnding the best possible substitute
contract is in the victim’s interest. However, the problem here is that sometimes
even the best substitute available with the decommitment fee may not be enough
to secure the victim the same utility as the performance of the original contract
would have produced.
As discussed in the introduction, in part I, we will be interested in total utility, not
the individual parties’ utilities. We use the estimated loss approach, so that our
agents always try to ﬁnd the best possible replacement contract after decommit-
ment. However, given the discussion above, our results would not be that diﬀerent
if the actual loss approach was used (assuming the incentivisation problem could
be avoided). On the other hand, we do not expect the victim to try to ﬁnd as
good a contract as the one that was decommitted. Instead, we assume that the
reasonable course of action is to re-enter the market and try to ﬁnd a contract as
if there was no earlier contract at all and that all players will always do so. This is
7This means that an unhappy decommitter could get some trusted third party (market ar-
bitrator) to review the actions that the victim took after the decommitment and assess if they
were reasonable in the circumstances. If the arbitrator believes that the victim did not negotiate
properly or turned down perfectly reasonable oﬀers, it could decrease the fee accordingly. This is
similar to court review of the damages, but could probably be done in relatively simple manner,
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a reasonable assumption, because in our market, the victim has a limited number
of chances for getting a substitute contract and the contract may not be possible
at all in some matches, so the prudent (risk-averse) course of action is usually to
take whatever is on oﬀer. Thus, any contract that provides positive utility for the
victim is better than no contract.
As in the previous case, we consider ﬁrst the complete information case and then
the incomplete information one. Complete information in this setting means that
the outcome of each and every decommitment of any contract at any given moment
is known at the potential decommitment time. In other words, the parties know if
the victim is going to ﬁnd a new contract and what that contract (if any) is going
to be like:
• Optimal Market Rule: If the victim ﬁnds a substitute contract, the com-
pensation will be the utility diﬀerence between the two contracts (or zero,
if the substitute contract is at least as good as the decommitted contract).
If the victim does not ﬁnd a substitute contract, full expectation damages
(expected proﬁt + costs) are rewarded.
The Optimal Market Rule policy will therefore always reward the actual losses (ex
post). As just explained, in most realistic settings (in which the outcome for the
victim is not known in advance), we have to settle for estimating the losses ex ante.8
As just discussed, even the contract law does not assume such information and a
more indirect reasonableness test for the victim’s actions is used. However, there
are situations in which we can get very close to the Optimal Market Rule. This
can occur, for example, when there is an eﬃcient market (when there are many
other providers/consumers and quite similar prices). In such cases, the outcome
of decommitment is known to a very high degree of accuracy. This can occur in
some real-life markets, although it must be considered more of an exception than
a rule.
In practise, to simulate the Optimal Market Rule we run the market and take note
of all the losses, run the market again setting the decommitment fees equal to
those losses for the turns that decommitment occurred in the previous run. We
repeat this procedure until the fees match the actual losses exactly. We also use
some simple heuristics to minimise the number of iterations we have to do. For
8And as also explained, once such estimates are used, in theory, it matters not if the fee is set
according to the actual or estimated losses, because the decommitment decision is always based
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example in many cases it matters little if the decommitment occurs in turn 192 or
193 if the parties will be aﬀected at turn 349 and 493 respectively and the seller’s
cost will be paid in turn 483.
Creating a compensatory decommitment policy for the markets where re-entries
are possible and information is incomplete, is more challenging than for the case
without re-entry. As explained earlier, this is because the victim’s re-entry can
either end in him ﬁnding a replacement contract or him failing to do so (see
ﬁgure 4.1). In addition, the case where no substitute is found is divided into two
subcases according to whether or not the opponent has accrued costs before the
decommitment occurs. In order to have eﬀective estimates of the overall loss, the
following information is needed:
• the probability that the victim will ﬁnd a substitute contract (branch a),
• the probability that the victim has paid its cost (branch b),
• the expected utility in case the victim ﬁnds a substitute contract and
• the expected utility in case the victim does not ﬁnd a substitute contract
If the cost has not been payed, the victim should exit the market before he has to
pay the cost to mitigate his loss. On the other hand, if he has paid the cost already
when the decommitment occurs, the victim should stay in the market until the
time of performance trying to ﬁnd a new contract. For this case, we use:
• Semi-Analytic Market Rule: The fee is equal to the diﬀerence between the
estimated current utility and the expected utility given the decommitment.
The latter is calculated by empirically estimating the probability that a re-
placement contract can be found (given the decommitment time and quality
of the contract, branch a) and the utility of any such contract (again given
quality). The utility for the failure is calculated analytically as in the Ana-
lytic Compensatory policy.
The Semi-Analytic Market Rule uses information about the current contract to
estimate the opponent’s loss and considers the structure of the problem (successes
and failures) to assess the expected loss. To determine the success probability
and the expected utility of success, it relies on empirical results that were gath-
ered by running the market with exactly the same parameters for 1000 times and








Figure 4.1: Possible outcomes of decommitment for the victim.
4.1.3 Compensatory Policies in Markets with Potentially
Two-Sided Decommitments
In addition to the possibility of re-entry, the other factor that we vary here is
whose utility can be adversely aﬀected after the contract has been formed. Here
we discuss the case where the eﬀect can decrease the utility of both parties. This
means that it is now possible that the potential victim has also been aﬀected. This
will change the situation in two ways. First, it is possible that both parties will
want to abandon the contract as soon as the eﬀect occurs. We will therefore adjust
all our policies so that in case both parties want to decommit at the same time, the
fees are cancelled and therefore nobody pays anybody anything. Second, this will
mean that the possible utility loss of the opponent might have to be considered
when assessing his loss.9
So, the possibility of the opponents’ utility losses should be taken into account in
the decommitment fees. To see why this is so, consider a simple example. Let
Vb(contract) = 0.75,p = 0.50 and cs = 0.25. Now, let both parties be aﬀected by
a utility loss of 0.3 and using decommitment policy Expectation Damages. This
means that:
Us(stay|ls = 0.3) = 0.50 − 0.25 − 0.30 = −0.05
Us(decommit) = −Ub(stay) = −0.25
Ub(stay|lb = 0.3) = 0.75 − 0.50 − 0.30 = −0.05
Ub(decommit) = −Us(stay) = −0.25
9As mentioned earlier, the chance that the opponent might want to decommit as well, might
lead to strategic considerations or waiting for the opponent to decommit ﬁrst. We do not consider
this problem in this work, although by taking the opponent’s utility loss into account, we think
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In both cases, the utility of staying in the contract is higher than decommitting,
although both parties and the society are worse oﬀ because of the contract. The
key would be to take the utility loss into account. That will decrease the decom-
mitment fee to zero10 and both parties would decommit, which was the eﬃcient
result here.
Also this adjustment and principle behind it can be found in contract law. Because
the aim of damages is to compensate for the loss and to put the party into the
ﬁnancial position he would have ended up in if the contract had been performed
as agreed, his overall position is taken into account (Treitel 2003). The relevant
factors include any beneﬁts which he may have obtained under the broken contract,
and his release from obligations under it. In this setting, it would mean that the
seller is released from having to pay whatever costs he has not paid yet. This
will always include the seller’s last-minute costs (adverse eﬀect) if applicable. On
the other hand, the fact that the buyer’s valuation of the service has decreased
should also be taken into account, because it diminishes his proﬁt. The courts
will not generally order the defendant to pay an amount which will actually make
the claimant’s position better than it would have been if the contract had been
performed.
In the complete information case, we simply add the opponent’s eﬀect to Expec-
tation Damages and Optimal Market Rule policies:
• Expectation Damages (with Opponent Eﬀect): The fee is the opponent’s
expected proﬁt (his utility if the contract is performed properly) plus his
costs minus any adverse eﬀect at decommitment time.
• Optimal Market Rule (with Opponent Eﬀect): If the victim ﬁnds a substi-
tute contract, the compensation will be the utility diﬀerence between the
two contracts (or zero, if the substitute contract is at least as good as the
decommitted contract). If the victim does not ﬁnd a substitute contract, full
expectation damages (expected proﬁt + costs − eﬀect) are rewarded.
In both cases, the adverse eﬀect is simply subtracted from the decommitment
fee.11 This is because the adverse eﬀect always decreases the victim’s proﬁt and
because the eﬀect can always be avoided in full by decommitting a contract any
time before the delivery.
10Ub(stay|lb = 0.3) = Us(stay|ls = 0.3) = −0.05 and since the fee cannot be negative, it would
be zero.
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A very similar adjustment is required to all the policies under incomplete infor-
mation that were discussed earlier. We investigate three cases:
• Opponent Eﬀect Not Considered: The possible decrease in the opponent’s
proﬁts are not taken into account at all,
• Opponent Eﬀect Partially Known: The amount of potential utility loss and
its probability are known, but it is unclear if the loss has been incured by a
speciﬁc opponent and, if so, when it becomes known to the opponent.
• Opponent Eﬀect Fully Known: The actual amount of utility loss for a given
opponent is known exactly.
The ﬁrst case is the same as the Semi-Analytic policy that was discussed in section
4.1.2.
The eﬀect occurs to the seller with probability as and to the buyer with probability
ab. In the partial information case, we assume that these probabilities are known,
but the fact if a certain participant has been aﬀected is only known to himself.
All points of time between the contract time (tcontract) and delivery time (tdelivery)
are equally likely, so the probability that the eﬀect has become known at turn t is:
P(eﬀect occurred at turn t) = as
t − tcontract
tdelivery − tcontract
This is then multiplied by the eﬀect to get the estimated eﬀect. This estimated
eﬀect is then subtracted from the fee from those given by the Semi-Analytic Mar-
ket Rule policies. To separate this policy from the other variations, we call it a
Semi-Analytic Market Rule (with Estimated Opponent Eﬀect). The case where
the opponent eﬀect is fully known (as in the full information case) is called Semi-
Analytic/Simple Market Rule (with Opponent Eﬀect).
4.2 Empirical Evaluation
Having introduced the various decommitment policies, we now compare their per-
formance in the various settings of our base model. This section consists of three
parts. First, we discuss our hypotheses (section 4.2.1). Second, we explain our
experimental set-up and how the analysis was conducted (section 4.2.2). Finally,
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4.2.1 Hypotheses
The ﬁrst hypothesis considers the circumstances in which allowing the victims to
re-enter the market after decommitment can be useful. If there is no possibility of
re-entry, the parties are always left without a contract in case of decommitment.
This means no beneﬁt to the society (the total utility of parties is −Cs(t), the
seller’s cost at decommitment time). In contrast, if a re-entry is allowed and the
victim has many opportunities to ﬁnd a replacement contract, such a contract
is likely and will contribute towards the welfare of the society. However, if the
probability of decommitment in the replacement contract is also very high, the
re-entry might be useless or even harmful. This is because instead of one loss
−c(t), there may be several of them. On the other hand, when the probability
of decommitment is very low, the diﬀerences are less likely to be statistically
signiﬁcant. Given all this, we contend:
Hypothesis 1. In cases where there is a good chance of ﬁnding a
replacement contract and decommitments occur frequently, but not all
the time, allowing re-entry for the victim improves total utility.
Our second hypothesis considers the potential utility loss of the opponent in de-
commitment fees. We expect that taking this loss into account is useful, because
the utility loss of the opponent will decrease the utility of the contract to the
society and the fee should reﬂect that. Thus we contend:
Hypothesis 2. When both parties can decommit, taking the possible
utility loss of the opponent into account improves the total utility.
The next two hypotheses deal with the performance of compensatory policies com-
pared to their non-compensatory counterparts. In all four settings we discuss in
this thesis, we ﬁrst introduced the compensatory policies under complete infor-
mation. In doing so, we explained that the basic idea of these policies is to put
the decommitment fee to a level in which the parties decommit only when it is in
the society’s best interest and that this occurs when fees are equal to the victim’s
losses. The optimal policies use complete information to do this and therefore
they should be better than any other policy in most circumstances. Of course
when the utility loss is small, the best policy is often to stay in the contract and
many non-compensatory policies (with high decommitment fees) achieve that as
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when the utility loss is very large, it is often useful to abandon (almost) all con-
tracts and some non-compensatory policies (those with low decommitment fees)
will achive this as well.12 Therefore, the optimal policies are likely to work best
when the utility losses are intermediate and some, but not all, contracts become
counterproductive.
However, there can be settings in which some usually non-compensatory policy can
achieve a very good performance and, in some cases, the optimal policy and such
non-compensatory policies yield a similar performance (no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence). This is often because the non-compensatory policy happens to produce
fees that are close to those of the optimal policy. The more complicated the
setting, the less likely such a coincidence is, but when it occurs it can be very
useful since speciﬁc non-compensatory policies are often much simpler than general
compensatory ones. One extreme example of this would be Constant Price (100 %)
policy for the buyer when the seller has no costs. Although it does not, in general,
try to compensate for the loss, it is the same as the optimal strategy in cases where
there is no re-entry or a possibility of two-sided decommitment. However, it will
be sub-optimal if there are costs or if re-entries are allowed. Even in these cases,
though, the optimal policy will not be worse than any non-compensatory policy.
We therefore contend:
Hypothesis 3. The optimal complete-information policy for each set-
ting will yield at least as good a total utility as any of the non-
compensatory alternatives and there are situations in which it will
be better with intermediate utility losses.
Now, in most settings, complete information about the parties’ losses may be
diﬃcult to obtain. We therefore have to consider policies that operate under
incomplete information. Since the total utility is maximised when the losses are
always perfectly compensated, we assert that in situations in which the losses can
be more accurately estimated, and therefore the decommitment fees can be set
closer to the optimal ones, we expect to see higher total utilities. To see why this
is the case, we need to consider two ways in which the eﬀect the policy has on
individuals can diﬀer from the optimal policy. First, the policy may force the party
to stay in a contract even if the socially optimal action would be to abandon it
12However, typically the decommitment policies that achieve these two diﬀerent goals are not
the same ones. The policies with very high fees, which force parties to stay in contracts, are
very usefully when the losses are small, but they perform very badly when the losses are large.
And the policies that allow decommitment when the losses are medium or high may also allow
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(adverse commitment). Second, the policy may allow the party to decommit from
a contract even though it is still socially valuable (adverse decommitment). In the
ﬁrst case, the policy overestimates the loss and in the latter case it underestimates
the loss. Both cases decrease total utility. Now, the closer the estimates are to
the actual values, the fewer of these mistakes occur. The fewer mistakes, the less
total utility is decreased and, hence, the higher it is. So, when the compensatory
policies have access to relatively accurate information, the fees they set are likely
to be closer to the optimal decommitment fees and therefore the society is likely
to do better. Given this, we contend:
Hypothesis 4. The best incomplete information policy for each set-
ting will yield at least as good a total utility as any of the non-
compensatory alternatives and with some intermediate utility losses
it will be better.
Now, the whole point of using the compensatory policies is that they can improve
the total utility of the market participants. The logic is that when these poli-
cies manage to more accurately compensate for the actual losses, the performance
should be closer to the full information case. However, they do need suﬃcient
information about the opponent’s losses to achieve this. Speaking more generally,
we believe that there is a clear relation between the accuracy of loss estimates and
the performance (in terms of total utility). As a measure of performance, we use
the average total utility over diﬀerent utility loss cases. And as a measure of aver-
age compensation error, we take the average distance between the decommitment
fee and the actual loss. For the full information optimal policies, such as Expec-
tation Damages (in case with no re-entry) and Optimal Market Rule (in case with
re-entry), this measure is zero, because the fees are always exactly actual losses.
For other policies, this is a positive number. A similar calculation is performed
to obtain the error for the buyer. Because of the method used to calculate the
average compensation error, we cannot consider policies that do not allow decom-
mitments at all. And because we use average utility over all possible utility loss
cases, we cannot consider any policy that does not allow decommitments in any of
the utility loss cases. Although this may sound something of a limitation, many
policies do allow decommitments at all loss levels.
Hypothesis 5. The smaller the average compensation error, the better
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4.2.2 Experimental Setup
We ran the market with 10 diﬀerent loss levels by setting ls and/or lb (depending
on the setting) to each value of the set {0.1,0.2,...,1.0} in turn for each case and
policy we investigated. In each case, we therefore had diﬀerent contracts. We
used 0.5 as the probability of adverse eﬀect for the aﬀected party (ab = 0.5 and/or
as = 0.5 depending on the setting) and we used the Last Half deadline setting
for the providers unless otherwise stated. The population size for both parties is
Medium (as explained in section 3.2) for the cases where both parties are aﬀected.
In cases where only one of the parties is aﬀected, the aﬀected population is Large
in order to ensure that there are many opportunities for the victims if they are
allowed to return to the market. Otherwise it might be that the victim returning
to the market would be unable to ﬁnd a negotiation partner and the return would
often be unsuccessful.
We ran the market with the same setup 100 times and calculated the average total
utility (and its variance) for all cases we investigated (diﬀerent policies and diﬀer-
ent loss situations). We then conducted a simple two-sample t test to see if the two
averages from the runs with diﬀerent parameters were statistically diﬀerent. Since
we usually expect the compensatory policy to outperform the non-compensatory
one, we performed one-tailed tests at each data point. We made the test between
the compensatory policy in question and all non-compensatory policies separately.
When we say that a compensatory policy outperforms non-compensatory policies,
it means that it beats each and every one of them. In our graphs, we use the
Best of Non-Compensatory line to indicate the best result that any of the 107
non-compensatory policies achieved in that data point. This line usually consists
of several diﬀerent policies.
Here and in all the experiments later in this work, we either compare two separate
policies (tactics, strategies) or we compare one policy (tactic, strategy) to many
others. In the latter case, this means that we compare the performance of this
one policy to all the other policies in turn and we claim that the one policy is
better than the rest if and only if it is able to beat all the other policies in these
pairwise comparisons. This means that our one policy has multiple possibilities to
fail to show a diﬀerence to the other policies and, therefore, we may underestimate
the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in our experiments. In other words, we run some-
what increased risk of Type II error (accepting a null hypothesis when it should
have been rejected). Assuming we had no diﬀerences between one policy and ten
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diﬀerence in a single test could be for example 5%. Now, in ten such tests, the
probability that all ten tests show such a diﬀerence is only around 9.8 · 10−14 and
we are therefore less likely to make Type I error (rejecting a null hypothesis when
it should have been accepted) but somewhat more prone to make a Type II error.
For example, say the one policy is better than others, but with the probability of
5% our test fails to show it. The probability that we fail to show the diﬀerence at
least in one of our tests is around 40% (= 1 − 0.9510).13
However, the risk of the Type II error is decreased by the fact that often only a
handful of competing policies is anywhere close to the one policy we compare them
to and, therefore, the risk of a Type II error is very remote in most comparisons.
It may still exist in some situations, though, and what all this means is that
because we do not explicitly take this into account in our analysis, we are likely
to underestimate the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in some cases and there might be
diﬀerences sometimes when our tests show there are none. However, we usually
get quite clear results and are able to draw our conclusions, so more complicated
statistical analysis was deemed unnecessary in our work.
4.2.3 Results
We will now discuss the results in four parts. First, we will discuss the eﬀect of
allowing re-entry. Second, we will discuss the eﬀect of taking into account the fact
that also the opponent may have been adversely aﬀected. Third, we investigate
how our compensatory policies (under both complete and incomplete information)
perform against the non-compensatory policies. And ﬁnally, we see if the average
compensation error has any eﬀect on the average total utility.
We start by investigating the eﬀect of allowing victims to re-enter the market and
to try to minimise their loss by ﬁnding a substitute contract. To this end, ﬁgure
4.2 shows the case where the adverse eﬀect can decrease the utility of one or both
parties at probability of 0.4. We can clearly see the diﬀerence between the two
settings. The same policies do signiﬁcantly better when re-entry is allowed and
they settle clearly on diﬀerent levels of performance when the loss is high. For
both the Expectation Damages policy and Best of Non-Compensatory policies,
13This situation is then very diﬀerent from the situation where we are interested in whether or
not there is any diﬀerences between n policies and we have to do n(n−1) tests to investigate. In
this alternative setting, we do more tests and any positive result will mean a diﬀerence, which is
why additional statistical methods are used in such situations to ensure the probability of Type
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the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant with utility loss levels 0.2 and above (at
p < 0.001 level). The same eﬀect can be seen in all policies that allow a signiﬁcant
number of decommitments. Similar results can also be achieved in cases where





















Optimal Market Rule (with Re−Entry)
Expectation Damages (with Re−Entry)
Best of Non−Compensatory (with Re−Entry)
Expectation Damages (no Re−Entry)
Best of Non−Compensatory (no Re−Entry)
Figure 4.2: Eﬀect of Re-Entry (Hypothesis 1).
As explained, this is because the victims can ﬁnd a new contract that contributes
towards the common good. In some cases, they can even do this several times
before they ﬁnd an opponent that will eventually perform it. So the re-entry is
clearly useful. However, in hypothesis 1 we thought that re-entry is only useful
when the probability of utility loss is not too large. To test this part of the
hypothesis, we varied the utility loss probability 0.1,...1.0 and kept the loss itself
at 0.5. The result of this experiment for the Expectation Damages policy with
and without re-entry is shown in ﬁgure 4.3. As can be seen, the policy with
re-entry dominates the policy without re-entry with low eﬀect probabilities, but
when the probability of utility loss increases above a certain level (0.6 in this
case), the situation changes and the case where re-entries are not allowed starts
to outperform the case where re-entry is allowed. Because we did not know whereChapter 4 The Performance Decision 113
the switch occurs we did two-tailed t-tests for all data points. The policy with
re-entry is better between loss levels 0.1 − 0.4 (at p < 0.001 level) and at 0.5 (at
p < 0.01 level). The change occurs at 0.6 where the policy without re-entry is






















Probability of Utility Loss
Expectation Damages (No Re−Entry)
Expectation Damages (with Re−Entry)
Figure 4.3: Eﬀect of Utility Loss Probability on the Usefulness of Re-Entry
(Hypothesis 1).
This is because even the successful re-entries (ones that ﬁnd new contracts) are
likely just to end in a new decommitment and in all decommitments, there is a
chance that decommitment occurs after the provider has paid its cost and therefore
re-entry actually ends up doing more harm than good. So, allowing re-entries is
useful if the probability of utility loss is not too high, but can be harmful if the
probability is very high. This is consistent with hypothesis 1 and we can therefore
accept it.
We now turn to situations in which both parties can encounter an adverse eﬀect
that decreases their utility. Speciﬁcally, we try to determine if we should take
the possible adverse eﬀect of the opponent into consideration when we are setting
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re-entries and by trying two diﬀerent complete information policies: Expectation
Damages and Expectation Damages (with Opponent Eﬀect). The former does
not consider the possible adverse eﬀects of the opponent, whereas the latter does.
Otherwise the policies are identical. From ﬁgure 4.4, the diﬀerence between the two
is clear. There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence with very low and very high
loss levels. This is because in these cases, almost all the contracts are abandoned
(high losses) or almost none of them are (low losses). But in the intermediate cases
(the loss levels of 0.2 − 0.7), the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (at p < 0.001
level). This is because taking into account the opponent’s decreased utility will
make the decommitment fees compensate for the actual loss of the opponent at
the time of decommitment and this allows parties to abandon contracts that are
no longer useful for the society. In contrast, when the utility loss of the opponent
is not considered, the fees are often set too high and the parties stay in contracts
that have become detrimental to the common good. This of course only occurs
in cases where both parties are actually aﬀected. When there is only one-sided






















Expectation Damages (with Opponent Effect)
Expectation Damages
Max Non−Compensatory
Figure 4.4: Eﬀect of Opponent’s Utility Losses (Hypothesis 2).Chapter 4 The Performance Decision 115
A similar eﬀect can also be seen in cases where re-entries are allowed when there
is incomplete information. In ﬁgure 4.5, we have three variations of the Semi-
Analytic Market Rule policy with diﬀerent stances and knowledge on opponent
eﬀects. We can see that the Semi-Analytic Market Rule (with Opponent Eﬀect)
(the one with the best information) outperforms the other Semi-Analytic Market
Rule policies with utility loss levels 0.5 − 0.6 (at level p < 0.001). Also the
Semi-Analytic Market Rule (with Estimated Opponent Eﬀect) policy is able to
outperform the pure Semi-Analytic Market Rule (that does not take opponent
eﬀect into account at all) with loss level of 0.4 (p < 0.01 level). This shows that
taking into account the utility loss of the victim is useful and that the better is the
information about the loss, the better the performance in terms of total utility.
As in the previous case, this is because taking into account the victim’s loss of
utility gives a more accurate estimate of the actual loss suﬀered by the victim and
therefore it decreases the number of adverse commitments. When the loss has to
be estimated, it can be overestimated or underestimated which is why the Semi-
Analytic Market Rule (with Estimated Opponent Eﬀect) performs worse than the
policy that has full information about the loss. As in all other cases discussed so
far, with extreme utility loss levels, the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent policies
are small, because either almost all contracts are decommitted from (high losses)
or almost none of them are (low losses).
From these experiments, we can see that taking the possibility of opponent eﬀect
into account is therefore useful and the more accurate the information about that
eﬀect is, the better the outcome. All ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 2 and
we can therefore accept it.
We will now discuss how compensatory policies perform against non-compensatory
ones. We start by discussing the most complicated and also the clearest case where
both parties can be aﬀected and re-entries are allowed. Speciﬁcally, we can use
ﬁgure 4.5 that was discussed in the previous subsection. Here, we can see that
the Optimal Market Rule outperforms all non-compensatory policies at loss levels
of 0.2 − 0.5 (at p < 0.001 level) and in addition, with losses of 0.1 and 0.6 (at
p < 0.01 level). Also the variations of the Semi-Analytic Market Rule will be able
to outperform all the non-compensatory policies at least in one data point. For the
basic Semi-Analytic Market Rule, this occurs at the loss levels of 0.3 (at p < 0.05
level) and 0.4 (at p < 0.01 level). When the information about the victim’s losses
are taken into account the diﬀerence becomes clearer; the Semi-Analytic Market
Rule (with Estimated Opponent Eﬀect) beats all non-compensatory policies at
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Figure 4.5: Eﬀect of Opponent’s Utility Losses (Hypotheses 2 and 3).
losses are complete, as in the Semi-Analytic Market Rule (with Opponent Eﬀect),
the compensatory policy will outperform all non-compensatory policies at loss
levels of 0.2−0.5 (at p < 0.001). Compensatory policies are therefore clearly better,
although it is equally clear that their performance depends on the accuracy of the
information they have. The better the information, the better the performance.
Also in the case where only the buyer can be aﬀected but re-entries are possible
(ﬁgure 4.6), we can see that the Semi-Analytic Market Rule outperforms the best
of the non-compensatory policies between the loss levels of 0.2 − 0.5 (at least at
p < 0.01 level). In addition, the Optimal Market Rule policy is better than any
non-compensatory policy with loss levels of 0.2 − 0.6 (at p < 0.001 level).
Also in all the other cases, the optimal policies (Optimal Market Rule, Expec-
tation Damages and Expectation Damages (with Opponent Eﬀect)) are able to
outperform the best of the non-compensatory policies at least in one loss level
(at p < 0.01 level). As explained in section 4.2.1, this is because when the fees


























Figure 4.6: Semi-Analytic Market Rule vs. Best of Non-Compensatory when
the buyer can be aﬀected (Hypotheses 3 and 4).
and decommitments, but decommitments are always optimal (only occur when
the contract has become detrimental for the common good).
However, incomplete information policies do not perform this well, because they
cannot help causing some detrimental commitments and/or decommitments. In
the case where no re-entries are allowed but both parties can be aﬀected, only
the Analytic Compensatory (with Opponent Eﬀect) policy will be able to beat all
non-compensatory policies at loss levels of 0.2 and 0.4 (at p < 0.01) and in cases
where re-entries are not allowed and only one of the parties is aﬀected, the Analytic
Compensatory policies fail to outperform the best non-compensatory policies. This
is because the Last Half deadline setting means that the estimates used by the
Analytic Compensatory policy are not very accurate. For an explanation, see
ﬁgure 4.7(a). Here, the loss for the seller is either p − c (his proﬁt) if he has not
paid his costs or p (proﬁt + cost) if he has. Now, the seller pays his cost at some
point between turns 500 and 1000. Since all turns are equally likely the estimated
loss (the fee) increases linearly from p − c to p over this time. However, becauseChapter 4 The Performance Decision 118
the actual cost is paid at one point in time, this estimate overestimates the loss
until the cost actually is paid and underestimates it after that until the time of
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Figure 4.7: Analytic Compensatory policy estimates on the seller’s loss.
The situation clearly changes when the deadline setting is changed to Turns 700-
800 (see ﬁgure 4.7(b)). In his case, the triangles showing the error are clearly
smaller and therefore, on average, the estimates used by the Analytic Compen-
satory policy are more accurate. Now, in the case where both parties can be
aﬀected, even the basic Analytic Compensatory policy is able to beat the best non-
compensatory policies at a loss level of 0.4 (at p < 0.01 level), Analytic Compen-
satory (with Estimated Opponent Eﬀect) does the same more clearly (at p < 0.001
level) and Analytic Compensatory (with Opponent Eﬀect) outperforms all the non-
compensatory policies at loss levels between 0.2 and 0.5 (at least at the p < 0.01
level, in most cases at the p < 0.001 level). The results improve clearly on the
case where the buyer is aﬀected. Here the Analytic Compensatory policy is able to
outperfom all the non-compensatory policies at the loss level of 0.4 (at p < 0.001
level) and also at loss levels of 0.3 and 0.5 (at p < 0.05 level). This improvement in
performance occurs because the Analytic Compensatory policies have much more
accurate information about the losses of the opponent and therefore the number
of both adverse decommitments and commitments decreases.
Making it easier to estimate the providers’ costs more accurately does little to help
in the case in which the seller is aﬀected, because the seller’s costs do not aﬀect the
buyer’s losses. However, we can still show that compensatory policies are useful
also under incomplete information when the seller is aﬀected. Speciﬁcally, when
we set the eﬀect probability to 1.0 (eﬀect is certain), the Analytic Compensatory
policy is able to outperform all non-compensatory policies at loss levels of 0.4−0.6
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for the cases in which the eﬀect occurs, but when the diﬀerence is so small that
when there are many cases where utility losses do not occur, the diﬀerence may
not be statistically signiﬁcant. This is due to the fact that the value of a service
can vary considerably in our set-up and the estimates the Analytic Compensatory
policy uses are therefore not very good. For example, for quality 0.49, the value
can be anything from 0 to 0.49 and for quality 0.99 it can be anything from 0.5
to 0.99. In a setting, in which we could estimate the value more accurately, the
results would be better.
In summary, the compensatory policies can perform better than their non-compensatory
counterparts, both under complete and incomplete information in all of our set-
tings. This ﬁnding is consistent with hypotheses 3 and 4 and we can therefore
accept them both.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between the average compensation error
and the average total utility. As explained in section 4.2.1, we expect the average
compensation error and the average total utility to be inversely related (hypothesis
5).
We ran the experiments as described earlier and for each decommitment for each
run, we calculated the compensation error (the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between the fee and the actual loss). For each experiment we then calculated
the average compensation error and the total utility achieved. To investigate the
eﬀect on overall performance, we calculated the averages of both the total utility
and the compensation error over all 10 loss levels (0.1 − 1.0). Due to our set-up
and methodology, we could only calculate the compensation errors for the cases
where decommitment actually occurred and, therefore, the cases where the fee
did not allow any decommitments are not included. Out of 107 non-compensatory
decommitment policies, 46 allowed commitments at all loss levels and are therefore
included.
The results for the case where both parties can be aﬀected and re-entries are
allowed are in ﬁgure 4.8. Other cases are very similar and there is no reason to
show them here. From the ﬁgure, it is clear that the average loss and compensation
error are correlated. The correlation for this case is −0.89, which is diﬀerent from
zero in a statistically signiﬁcant way (at p < 0.001 level). Also it can be noted
that when the average compensation error becomes small (under 0.1 or so) the
diﬀerences in terms of total utility are small. This is because these policies are able
to handle most situations correctly and the diﬀerence occurs in a very small subset
of cases. However, when the error is bigger, the diﬀerence is quite stark, becauseChapter 4 The Performance Decision 120
the bigger the error, the more cases are aﬀected and adverse decommitments and
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Figure 4.8: The eﬀect of average compensation error on average total utility
when re-entries are possible and the buyer can be aﬀected (Hypothesis 5).
There is clearly an inverse relation between the average compensation error and
total utility, which was what hypothesis 5 suggested. We therefore accept it.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed performance decision in many diﬀerent settings that
included settings with one and two-sided decommitments, re-entries and incom-
plete information (our contribution C1). We showed that compensatory decom-
mitment policies for contracts in electronic marketplaces can improve the welfare
of the society in many settings and that ideas from contract law can be successfully
used to provide useful new compensatory decommitment policies. It is also worth
mentioning that the compensatory policies perform especially well in more com-
plicated settings where both parties can be aﬀected and/or re-entries are allowed.Chapter 4 The Performance Decision 121
This is because simple non-compensatory policies are much less accurate in such
environments and, as we also showed, there is a clear inverse relation between the
compensation accuracy and performance.
In more detail, we established that the compensatory policies have to be adapted to
the environment in which they are to be used and they need reasonably accurate
information about the losses to be useful. This means that they may not be
suitable to all environments and situations, but where they are suitable they can
be used to improve the total utility of the market participants. We showed that
allowing parties to re-enter the market to ﬁnd a substitute contract in the case of
decommitment can improve the total utility, but only if the chances of ﬁnding a
useful replacement (one that does not get abandoned later) are at least reasonable.
Moreover, we showed that the opponent’s possible utility loss should be taken into
account where applicable.
We will now move on to the reliance decision, where a contract also already exists,
but a party needs to decide how much to rely on the promised performance.Chapter 5
The Reliance Decision
The reliance decision is about how much to rely on the promised performance.
In our setting, it is more naturally a decision for the consumers, because for the
sellers, the transaction is about money as is the compensation.1 However, the
buyers can get other services and use other resources to increase the value of the
service the seller has promised to deliver and the level of this spending is a much
more interesting problem.
To illustrate the issues in reliance decision, we therefore discuss a situation where
the buyer has to decide how much to rely on the seller’s promised performance.
Speciﬁcally, the reliance means that the buyer takes (costly) preparatory actions
that enhance the value of the seller’s performance but which may turn out to be
useless if the seller doesn’t perform its part of the bargain. The more the buyer
relies on the seller’s performance, the higher these (potentially useless) costs and
the higher the combined value of the seller’s performance and these preparatory
actions are. We assume that these reliance costs have to paid immediately after
the contract in full and whether or not the service is later performed makes no
diﬀerence to these costs. In case of non-performance, it is assumed (for simplic-
ity’s sake) that these costs are wasted and no beneﬁt can be obtained from the
preparatory actions without the actual service. The work here is associated with
our research contribution C2.
We will ﬁrst discuss the problem in more detail and explain how we have enhanced
the basic model in order to investigate the reliance decision (section 5.1). We will
1Of course the sellers will have to pay their costs and if it is very likely that the buyer will
not want the service in the end, the cost might not be worth spending if it is not covered by the
decommitment policy.
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then investigate these ideas empirically (section 5.2) and conclude by summarising
our ﬁndings (section 5.3).
5.1 The Problem and the Modiﬁed Model
Unlike the basic model, we allow the consumer to increase the value of the service
the provider is expected to deliver by acquiring complementary services or making
other similar adjustments to his behaviour. The drawback of making these ad-
justments is of course that they take resources that could have been allocated to
other tasks, they for example cost money. Thus, if the provider does not perform
the service as agreed, these resources are wasted, because we assume that they
oﬀer only neglible value on their own and can only be used to enhance the service
that never materialised. As more and more of these complementary services are
purchased, both the value of the combined service and the cost of these additional
services increase. We assume that the value of the service always increases more
than the cost the buyer has to put in, because otherwise no seller would put in
the extra eﬀort. On the other hand, this means that if the buyer could be certain
that the seller will perform its promised service, the buyer would therefore always
rely on the performance fully. But when the performance is uncertain, the buyer
may be better oﬀ getting only some of the complementary services or even none
at all, if the performance is unlikely.
To make things simpler we introduce separate and discrete reliance levels. In
particular, we limit the possible levels of reliance to ﬁve (see table 5.1). The
lowest level (minimal) is the same as in the basic model, so the value is at most
equal to q and the (reliance) cost for the buyer is equal to zero.2 The other levels
(limited, moderate, heavy and full in order of increasing investments) require more
investments and deliver better value if the provider does indeed deliver the service.
To investigate diﬀerent types of situations, we have three settings described in the
table below. Now, all settings have exactly the same characteristics at the lowest
and highest reliance level, but they vary in between.3 In more detail, in setting
1, the cost increases at a constant pace. In setting 2, the cost increases slowly at
ﬁrst, but faster and faster with every reliance level. And in setting 3, we have the
reverse case, where the cost increases rapidly at low levels of reliance and more
2The value is exactly q when qmin
b ≤ q ≤ qmax
b , otherwise the value is lower.
3Also the value in the case of performance is always the same, 1q,1.5q,2q,2.5q and 3q at
diﬀerent levels of reliance. Only the cost that has to be paid for the reliance varies and with
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Reliance Level Setting #1 Setting #2 Setting #3
Vb,1(e,q) Cb,1(e,q) Vb,2(e,q) Cb,2(e,q) Vb,3(e,q) Cb,3(e,q)
Minimal 1q 0 1q 0q 1q 0q
Limited 1.25q 0.25q 1.4q 0.1q 1.1q 0.4q
Moderate 1.5q 0.5q 1.7q 0.3q 1.3q 0.7q
Heavy 1.75q 0.75q 1.9q 0.6q 1.6q 0.9q
Full 2q 1q 2q 1q 2q 1q
Table 5.1: Reliance Settings.
slowly in the high levels. In all cases the reliance cost depends on the quality of
the original service reﬂecting the fact that higher quality services need also higher
quality (more expensive) complementary services.
The sellers are heterogeneous both in quality (as in the basic model) and in reli-
ability. The seller’s reliability, ρs, denotes a probability that it will perform the
service as agreed. The reliability is selected independently at random from the
same distribution. We use four diﬀerent well-known distributions: Uniform, Nor-
mal, Exponential and a derivative of the last one that we call Reverse Exponential.
We use the Normal distribution with an average of 0.5 and a standard deviation
of 0.2 and we have λ = 5 for the Exponential distribution.4 The Reverse Expo-
nential distribution is the distribution of 1 − X, where X ∼ Exponential(5) and
X ∈ [0,1]. We choose these four distributions because they oﬀer diﬀerent settings
where all reliabilities are equally likely (Uniform), where reliabilities around are 0.5
(Normal) and where reliabilities are more likely to be at the low end (Exponential)
or at the high end (Reverse Exponential). To illustrate the distributions, consider
the probability density functions in ﬁgure 5.1. When a seller enters a contract, a
variable is selected at random from the interval [0,1] and if this variable is greater
than the seller’s reliability, it will have to decommit at some point before the de-
livery time. The decommitment time is selected at random from the distribution
Uniform(tcontract + 1,tdelivery − 1). This mechanism replaces the adverse eﬀects
used in the basic model. As with quality, the seller’s reliance is assumed to be
known in the market by all parties.
With the three reliance settings, these four reliability distributions give us a total
of 12 settings. The decision-making for the buyer is exactly the same for all of
4Of course since both the Normal and Exponential distributions are continuous and un-
bounded and the reliability is bounded to the interval [0,1], we have made relatively straight-
forward changes. And quite simply, we use these distributions repeatedly until we get a value
that is in the required interval [0,1]. The probability of that occuring at the ﬁrst attempt is



















Figure 5.1: Reliability Distributions.
them. The buyer tries to maximise its expected utility. The utility for the buyer
is:
Ub(p,e,q) = ρsVb,∗(e,q) + (1 − ρs)(f − Cb,∗(e,q))
where e is the level of reliance and ∗ marks the setting. The reliance decision
occurs after the contract has been entered into and we assume that it is not taken
into account when the consumer is negotiating with the providers. The consumer
will not therefore oﬀer a higher price to ensure a deal with a highly reliable seller
that provides excellent quality services, because that would take us to the realm
of another decision, namely the contract decision that is to be discussed later,
in section 6. So here we simply assume that the consumer gets a set of contracts
(gained through negotiations as per the basic model) and decides his reliance given
the contract and the characteristics (quality, reliability) of the service provider.
Of course an intelligent strategy is to choose the level of reliance so that it max-
imises the buyer’s expected utility given the quality of the provider and the con-
tract price. If the decommitment fee f does not depend on the reliance level (as
is the case in all non-compensatory policies and also in partially compensatory
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reliance level is), it will be the same no matter what reliance level the consumer
chooses. Now, let us assume that the consumer has an existing contract (p and q
are ﬁxed) with a certain provider (ρs ﬁxed) and it is making a choice between two
reliance levels e1 and e2. The consumer b will choose the reliance level e1 over e2
if and only if:
Ub(p,e1,q) ≥ Ub(p,e2,q)
If we put in the equation for Ub(p,e,q) (above) and rearrange we get:
ρs(Vb,∗(e1,q) − Vb,∗(e2,q)) + (1 − ρs)(Cb,∗(e2,q) − Cb,∗(e1,q)) ≥ 0
In other words, both p and f are irrelevant in the decision-making at this stage. A
higher (but reliance-independent) decommitment fee does not therefore increase a
consumer’s reliance. A higher fee will obviously be better for the buyers, though,
but this only changes the wealth distribution between the buyers and the sellers.
The situation changes, if the decommitment fee depends on the reliance level,
because instead of one f we would get two diﬀerent fees (f1 and f2) and they stay
in the equations. In other words, the decommitment policy does have an impact
on the level of reliance, if it compensates for the reliance costs or expected reliance
proﬁts. Given this, we investigate the eﬀect of two policies:
• Expectation Damages (X% of Reliance Covered): The seller compensates
for the buyer’s proﬁt and possible costs. In all cases, the buyer’s proﬁt with
reliance level Minimal will be fully covered, but only X% of his reliance costs
and extra proﬁt with higher levels of reliance, where X ∈ {0,25,50,75,100}.
• Reliance Damages (X% of Reliance Covered): The seller compensates for
some of the buyer’s possible costs. This means X% of the reliance costs,
where X ∈ {0,25,50,75,100}.
It is easy to see that at X = 100% both policies encourage full reliance in all our
settings. This is because the Expectation Damages (100% of Reliance Covered)
ensure in the case of non-performance that the buyer obtains the same utility he
would get in case the service is delivered and this utility is, in all three settings,
at its highest (up to 2q) when the reliance is full. In the case of Reliance Damages
(100% of Reliance Covered), the costs are always fully covered, so the buyer will
always get zero proﬁt in case of non-performance. However, the utility for per-
formance is at its highest at Full reliance, so the expected utility will also be at
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parties choose the reliance level optimally (taking into account the losses in case
of non-performance and, critically, the reliability of the provider).
In law, the problem of over-reliance is partially solved by compensating only for
the losses (and proﬁts) that are ‘normal’ for the service in question. This means
that very unusual or unforeseeable (from the opponent’s point of view) costs and
expected proﬁts are not compensated, even if real. If a party to a contract wants
a wider protection to his interests, he needs to inform his opponent of his speciﬁc
risks and possible losses before the contract is agreed on, so that they can be taken
into account in price and other terms of the contract.5 Diﬀerent levels of reliance
might be considered ‘normal’ in diﬀerent situations and with diﬀerent services.
Here, however, we will investigate two policies:
• Expectation Damages (Reliance Cover Capped at Y ): The seller compensates
for the buyer’s proﬁt and reliance costs, but only up to a reliance level
Y ∈ {Minimal,Restricted,Moderate,Heavy,Full}. Any reliance above
this ‘normal’ level will be completely uncovered.
• Reliance Damages (Reliance Cover Capped at Y ): The seller compensates for
the buyer’s reliance costs in full up to a reliance level Y ∈ {Minimal,Restricted,
Moderate,Heavy,Full}, but any reliance above this ‘normal’ level will be
completely uncovered.
In both of these policies, the cover will therefore increase to the maximum covered
level and after that the compensation will only cover that maximum amount even
if the actual reliance was higher. On the other hand, if the actual reliance was
lower, the cover will be lower too. In our setting, the buyer will always select the
reliability level that is at least the maximum covered by these policies. This follows
from the same logic that was explained with the other two policies: the expected
utility is always bigger with bigger reliance when the cover is complete. However,
when it comes to reliances over this minimum level, the buyer will optimise his
reliance appropriately. This policy will also lead to over-reliance and the higher
the covered level, the higher the over-reliance will be.
We also use cases where the level of reliance is either selected at random or set
as one of the ﬁve reliance levels in all contracts to illustrate the usefulness of the
optimisation approach.
5Often parties also protect themselves by using liability limitation clauses in the contract.
This means that a party’s liability in case of non-performance is limited to a certain amount
and if this is held to be reasonable limitation, the courts will not order damages that exceed this
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5.2 Empirical Evaluation
We will now investigate our ideas empirically. We explain what we did in three
parts. First, we will discuss our hypotheses (section 5.2.1). We will then shortly
explain how the experiments and statistical analysis to test the hypotheses were
conducted (section 5.2.2) before, ﬁnally, discussing the results (section 5.2.3).
5.2.1 Hypotheses
There are a number of simple reliance strategies that the buyers are able to use.
We investigate the following:
• Random: The consumer chooses a reliance level at random. All levels are
equally likely.
• Constant (Y): The consumer always chooses the same reliance level. There
are ﬁve diﬀerent variations, one for each level: Y ∈ {Minimal,
Restricted,Moderate,Heavy,Full}.
None of these minimal policies should of course be able to beat our optimising
policy that uses more information and more sophisticated mathematics in choosing
the reliance level. However, sometimes the setting can be such that the optimal
reliance policy is dominated by one of the reliance levels and then one of the simple
Constant strategies may come to close in the terms of performance. Speciﬁcally,
we contend:
Hypothesis 6. The reliance optimisation strategy is always at least
as good as any simple reliance strategy (random/constant) and if the
optimal strategy is not dominated by one of the reliance levels, it will
be better.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the full compensation for the consumer’s
reliance costs (and proﬁts) will lead to full reliance always and with every contract.
This may often mean that the consumer will over-rely on the service, especially if
the reliance of the provider is low and he is unlikely to perform the task in the end.
The more of the buyer’s reliance is covered by the seller’s decommitment policy,
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Hypothesis 7. In both Expectation Damages (X% of Reliance Cov-
ered) and Reliance Damages (X% of Reliance Covered), the policies
with higher X are never signiﬁcantly better than those with lower X
and X = 100 is always worse than X = 0, especially if the optimal
reliance strategy is not dominantly Full (there is more than a handful
of unreliable providers).
The other type of reliance-dependent decommitment policy has a threshold re-
liance level up to which the reliance is fully covered and after which there is no
cover. As explained, this means that the buyers will rely at least to the threshold
level and in many cases this means over-reliance. The higher the threshold level,
the less worried the buyer becomes about over-reliance and, therefore, over-reliance
becomes more and more common and the performance should accordingly suﬀer
in most settings. Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 8. In both Expectation Damages (Reliance Cover Capped
at Y) and Reliance Damages (Reliance Cover Capped at Y), the policies
with higher threshold reliance levels are never signiﬁcantly better than
those with lower levels. Moreover, the case where the cover is full
(up to Full) is always worse than cases where the cover is only up
to the Minimal reliance level, if the optimal reliance strategy is not
dominantly Full (there is more than a handful unreliable providers).
5.2.2 Experimental Setup
We ran the market in all 12 settings (four provider reliability distributions and
three reliability cost settings) with various decommitment policies (all variations
of Expectation Damages and Reliance Damages (X% of Reliance Covered and Re-
liance Cover Capped at Y )) with optimised reliance strategy and various reliance
strategies (Random and all variations of Constant) with Constant 0.00 decommit-
ment policy (this policy has no eﬀect on the agent behaviour). The Expectation
Damages (0% Reliance Covered) and Reliance Damages (0% Reliance Covered)
were used as an example of reliance-independent decommitment policies. Since
the policy does not have an eﬀect on the optimal reliance level, no other reliance-
independent policies were tried. In simple reliance strategies the decommitment
policy does not matter (to the total utility), so no other policies were needed there
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In each setting and decommitment policy or reliance strategy, we ran the simula-
tion 100 times. We then did a one-sided t-test to the two averages compared.
5.2.3 Results
In ﬁgure 5.2, we have the two optimised cases compared to the Random and
Constant (minimal, limited, moderate, heavy and full) reliance strategies. In the
majority of the cases, it is clear that the two cases using the optimised reliance
strategies produce superior results to the cases using other strategies (at p < 0.0001
level). However, there are a couple of exceptions. First of all, the cases where
reliance is very high (Reverse Exponential distribution), one of the ﬁxed reliance
strategies, Full, is almost as good as the two cases using the optimised strategy.
And actually in setting 3, the optimised policies are better, but only at the p < 0.05
level and in setting 1 at the p < 0.01 level. Another interesting case is setting 2
when the reliances come from the normal distribution. Here, the Moderate ﬁxed
reliance strategy is statistically indiﬀerent from the optimised version.
In all these cases, the optimised strategy fails to make a clearer diﬀerence because
the optimal strategy heavily uses a certain reliance level. In the negative expo-
nential distribution cases, the provider reliability levels are often very high, so the
optimal strategy is to rely considerably on the performance and, in many cases,
this means Full reliance. In settings 1 and 3, the optimised strategy opts for the
Full reliance in over 90% of the cases.6 In a similar fashion, the normal distri-
bution case in setting 2 has the optimal strategy taking Moderate reliance almost
70% of the time. This is simply because the mediocre reliability level prevalent in
the normal distribution calls for Moderate reliance in this setting and what is even
more remarkable is that in almost all cases (over 99%), the optimal reliance level
is either Moderate or one of its neighbours (Limited or Heavy). This means that
the diﬀerences in expectated utility between the optimal and Moderate reliance
are very small even if they are not exactly the same and the total diﬀerence, is
actually small enough to be statistically insigniﬁcant (the diﬀerence drowns in the
noise). In the Reverse Exponential distribution cases (settings 1 and 3), the opti-
mal reliance policy in the remaining 10% of cases is almost always Minimal, which
produces quite diﬀerent results from the Full reliance and therefore a relatively
small number of cases is suﬃcient to show some diﬀerence. All our observations
are consistent with hypothesis 6 and we can therefore accept it.
6In setting 2, the same proportion is slightly over 60% (which is why the optimised strategy
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Figure 5.2: Optimised reliance vs. simple reliance (Hypothesis 6).
The second part was to investigate how compensating for the seller’s reliance costs
aﬀects the utility. The results for all 12 settings are shown in ﬁgure 5.3. The down-
ward trend when reliance compensation increases from zero to 100 percent is very
clear in most cases and none of the occational increases are statistically signiﬁcant
(variances are quite signiﬁcant). In the ﬁrst three reliability distribution cases,
both in Expectation Damages and Reliance Damages, the diﬀerence between no
reliance compensation (0%) and full reliance compensation (100%) is statistically
signiﬁcant at the p < 0.0001 level. The diﬀerences in Reverse Exponential casesChapter 5 The Reliance Decision 132
are, as expected, less clear. In most of the cases they are signiﬁcant only at the
p < 0.01 level and in one case, Reliance Damages in setting 3, no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence can be found (it is very near though with p = 0.0543). The
optimal strategy here is dominated by the Full Reliance, however, some 93% of
the 176 average contracts use full reliance also in the optimal strategy. These are
similar numbers to all cases in settings 1 and 3. In all cases, the average reliability
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Figure 5.3: Eﬀect of Partial Reliance Compensation (Hypothesis 7).Chapter 5 The Reliance Decision 133
The ﬁnal part has to do with capped reliance compensation, the results for which
are shown in ﬁgure 5.4. As can be seen, when the compensation is restricted to
the Minimal level, the situation is identical to the case where it was 0% and when
compensation is full (up to Full) it will be equivalent to 100% reliance. Therefore
it is hardly surprising that the results concerning the diﬀerence between minimal
and full are similar to the previous case and we do not discuss them here again.
The downward trend in the levels in between is even more clear than it was in
the previous case. This is of course due to the fact that compensation up to
a certain reliance level means that the buyer always relies at least to that level
and, therefore, the increasing cover means that the buyer eﬀectively has fewer
reliance levels to choose from (because he has no incentive to select lower than the
maximum covered reliance level). So, if an optimal policy with no reliance cover
would use Minimal reliance level in some cases, under these policies, the buyer
will always choose the lowest fully covered case and that means over-reliance from
the society’s point of view. There is no statistically signicifant increases and we
can therefore accept hypothesis 8.
One additional observation from the last two ﬁgures is that when the reliances
are very low on average (Exponential distribution), the total utility is negative
even in the best cases. This of course is because most of the contract will not be
performed, but a decommitment occurs at some point and that point may well be
after the seller has paid its cost, making the total utility negative. The buyers will
just get a set of contracts and will optimise their reliance on them. The optimal
reliance strategy often calls for low levels of reliance in these cases and although
that limits the damage considerably (compare the 0% and the 100% reliance cover
cases when reliances come from the Exponential distribution), it is unable to stop
it altogether. The one way to do that would be to let the sellers consider their
reliability while negotiating on the price. In other words they would ask for a price
that would keep the expected utility positive. In the next chapter, we will turn to
these situations (although in a slightly diﬀerent setting) when we investigate the
contract decision.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the reliance decision and we showed that when the
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Figure 5.4: Eﬀect of Limited Reliance Compensation (Hypothesis 8).
acquisitions, a decommitment policy that compensates for these extra costs (re-
liance costs) and/or proﬁts will lead to over-reliance on the consumer’s part. This
over-reliance will lead to a decrease in total utility, the extra investments on the
service that never comes are wasted. That is, they do not produce any beneﬁt
for the society, only costs. We also showed that limited or partial recovery of all
reliance costs (and proﬁts) is usually not a solution (contribution C2). A par-
tial cover or cover that only comes to a certain point will decrease the amount of
over-reliance, but it will not remove the problem completely.Chapter 5 The Reliance Decision 135
From the society’s point of view, the best policy is one that is reliance-independent
(i.e. the fee does not depend on the level of reliance), so that it does not encourage
over-reliance. Any such policy will be equally good in terms of the reliance decision,
because no matter what the fee is, it will always be the same with all reliance levels
and therefore won’t aﬀect the choice between these levels.Chapter 6
The Contract Decision
In the ﬁrst two decisions, the parties had a set of contracts and had to decide
how to maximise their expected utility given these contracts. In the contract
decision, however, the parties decide whether or not they should enter into those
contracts in the ﬁrst place. A contract can look beneﬁcial, even lucrative, but
if the circumstances can later change for the worse, it may turn into a disaster.
As with the other decisions, the decommitment policies play an important role
in the contract decision. Speciﬁcally, how an agent approaches a negotiation in
a dynamic environment should clearly be very diﬀerent, if the contracts can be
decommitted from for free or if the decommitment fee is very high. And it is
also crucial to know which of the parties might be aﬀected in the future and how.
A high decommitment fee is good news for an agent that is very reliable itself
(needs to decommit very rarely), but whose opponent is very unreliable (likely to
decommit), whereas a low fee would be beneﬁcial in the opposite circumstances.
Here we will investigate how these concerns aﬀect the behaviour of the agents and
how that behaviour, in turn, aﬀects the welfare of the society. This work relates to
the research contribution C3. We will ﬁrst discuss the issues in contract decision
in more detail, as well as the changes we have made to our basic market model
(section 6.1). We will then test our ideas empirically (section 6.2). Finally, we will
conclude with the summary of the results (section 6.3).
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6.1 The Problem and the Modiﬁed Model
The approach in this section is somewhat diﬀerent from the others in this part
of the thesis. Here, we do not aim to ﬁnd the best decommitment policy and
we do not use a large number of diﬀerent policies. Instead, we investigate the
basic forces in play. This is because otherwise it might be diﬃcult to see what
really is going on. For the same reason, our agents, when considering the contract
decision, do not try to maximise their expected utility, but instead their aim is to
achieve positive expected utility and any positive utility will do. By keeping the
setting simple and by investigating only a few settings, we should be able to see
the fundamental factors more clearly and we can then build more complex things
on these basics in the next chapter, where the contract decision is one of the main
problems we investigate.
The contract decision is diﬀerent from the other decisions because it is much more
ﬂexible than the other decisions. This is because here the parties can use a contract
price to re-distribute the risk between them. Here higher price means that the risk
of getting negative utility in the end is lower for the seller and, similarly, a lower
price means the lower risk for the buyer. This means that if the risk of negative
utility is too high for one party (its expected utility is negative), the other party
can, by oﬀering a more advantageous price to that party and therefore by moving
some of the risk to itself, encourage a party to enter in a contract. This means
that the original liability rule, decommitment policy, is less important than in the
other decisions. This can work in the society’s favour in some cases, especially if
both parties are taking the contract decision into account and parties can ﬁnd a
good balance between them by setting the price at suitable level. On the other
hand, sometimes this can be problematic, especially in cases where only one party
takes the contract decision into account and the other party will be able to transfer
much of its risk to that other party without it even noticing. Sometimes this can
be even detrimental to the common good.
However, this adaptation is also not always possible in full. This is more likely to
be the case when the decommitment fee is very high and the contract price has set
limits it cannot cross, for example if the price must be non-negative. We restrict
the contract prices to the interval [0,1]. This restriction has a practical purpose:
Otherwise the prices could go very high or very low and it would be diﬃcult to
decide where to start the oﬀers in a negotiation. On the other hand, it allows us to
investigate the limits of the adaptation we just discussed. Even with such limits,
the parties can do some adapting, the limitation just removes some of the moreChapter 6 The Contract Decision 138
extreme versions of this behaviour (that again could hide the basic phenomena we
seek to explore in this work).
We use four diﬀerent decommitment policies:
• Expectation Damages: the decommitter compensates for the expected proﬁt
and the actual costs of the victim.
• Reliance Damages: the decommitter compensates for the costs of the victim.
• Constant 0.0: decommitment is free.
• Constant 1.0: decommitment is very costly.
These policies represent a wide spectrum of diﬀerent types of decommitment poli-
cies. In the ﬁrst one, Expectation Damages, the full cover means that the victim is
not worried about decommitments. It is indiﬀerent between performance and non-
performance, because it is guaranteed the same utility in either case. Since it will
only accept contracts with positive utility in the success case, it will get a positive
utility in any such contract even in the case where the opponent decommits. The
Reliance Damages case is similar. The cost coverage means that in cases where
only one of the parties may decommit, the opponent is always guaranteed at least
a zero proﬁt, so it is unlikely to care too much about the risk of decommitment
(given that any positive utility will do and if there is any possibility of success,
the expected utility will always be positive). In these cases, the adaptation of
the possible decommitter is therefore essential. The main diﬀerence between these
two cases is the situation where both parties can be aﬀected and are forced to
decommit. The parties will then have to worry also about the possibility that
they will have to cover for the opponent’s proﬁts and/or costs. However, only one
party (the seller) has costs, so that will lead to some asymmetries in strategy.
In more detail, the Constant 0.0 policy means that there is no compensation for
the victim’s loss. For the buyer, this is no problem, because it has no costs and
therefore it will be guaranteed zero proﬁt in case of decommitment, but the seller
has to consider its possible costs. This means that the seller usually has to do the
adapting in these cases, because the buyer will usually not. Whereas Constant 0.0
often means under-compensation for the seller, the Constant 1.0 policy will always
mean over-compensation for both parties as victims. However, for the (potential)
decommitters, it will mean trouble for both of them, because the fee will certainly
make their utility seriously negative in case they have to decommit. Now, sinceChapter 6 The Contract Decision 139
they want to have their expected utility positive, this means that they need to
ask for a higher (the sellers) or lower (the buyers) price. This case is interesting,
because it forces both parties to take the fee into account and because it also
makes the potential victim actually prefer non-performance (the utility of non-
performance is higher than the utility of performance for the potential victim),
so it may have an incentive to encourage the potential decommitters to take on
contracts they would not otherwise do by giving them a higher or lower price.
However, because the price is limited to the interval [0,1] and because the fee is
so high, the adaptation using the price may not always be possible in full.
Because we are interested in whether or not the parties should enter a contract
at all and because our evaluation would otherwise be mixed with the performance
decision, we use a variation of the model where the negative impact is always so
big that it will mean that the parties decommit. We also remove the limitation
for the value that the buyers can get. The value can therefore be very negative,
also for the buyers.1 This means that the aﬀected parties always decommit no
matter what their decommitment policy is and, therefore, decommitment policies
will have no eﬀect after the contract is entered into. The eﬀect will therefore all
be whether or not the policy and its eﬀect on the parties’ decision making before
entering a contract will improve the common good. In this context, it is obvious
that if the parties take their own good (contract decision) into consideration, and
avoid contracts that lead to negative expected utility, their utility will remain non-
negative also when a probability of diastrous adverse eﬀects is very high. When
the eﬀect probability is very high, the best course of action may be not to enter
contracts at all, but take a zero proﬁt instead. Otherwise the utility will be positive
in expectation. In a single case, even careful parties may sometimes get a negative
utility, because they want to avoid negative utility on expectation, not entirely,
but in the long run and over many experiments, the average utility should always
be non-negative. The more interesting question, however, is whether or not, this
consideration can improve the common good and could this adaptation through
price even be detrimental to the common good in some cases.
In the basic model, the possible eﬀect always takes place between the contract
and delivery times and all times in that range are equally likely (Uniform distri-
bution). However, the problem with that approach here would be that the parties
do not get new information about the possibility of the adverse eﬀect before they
have to decide whether or not to enter a contract. Therefore, the risk of decom-
mitment would remain the same through the experiment. To facilitate improving
1In the basic model, the buyers’ value was always at least −0.05 (see section 3.3).Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 140
information, we use an alternative pattern for the eﬀects, namely Uniform from
Start. This means that the adverse eﬀect (that decreases the utility of any possible
contract) can occur at any time during the experiment (between t0 and tdelivery)
and all possible times are equally likely. The eﬀect occurs independently of any
contract, so if a party is aﬀected but has no contract, he will exit the market
and if he is negotiating with somebody, he will withdraw from that negotiation
immediately. If he is in a contract, he will decommit. However, if a party is still
in the market at turn t, this must mean that he is either not going to be aﬀected
at all or he just hasn’t been aﬀected yet. The probability for the latter decreases
as the time progresses:




Now, to calculate the probability that the eﬀect is going to take place later, we
get (by Bayes’ theorem):
P(eﬀect | no eﬀect so far)
=
P(no eﬀect so far | eﬀect)P(eﬀect)
P(no eﬀect so far)
=
P(no eﬀect so far | eﬀect)P(eﬀect)








where abase is the eﬀect probability at turn 0. So when abase = 0, P(eﬀect | no eﬀect so far) =
0 and if abase = 1, P(eﬀect | no eﬀect so far) = 1∀t < tdelivery.2 Otherwise, the
probability is decreasing in t as can be seen from ﬁgure 6.1. This means that every
turn that a party stays on and does not withdraw, exit or decommit, the proba-
bility that he will be aﬀected later decreases. At delivery time (t = tdelivery), the
probability is always zero (when abase < 1). So the later the parties enter into a
contract, the better are the chances that the contract will actually be performed as
agreed. However, if they wait too long, they might not have negotiation partners
or their own deadline might arrive.
If only one of the parties can be aﬀected, there are only two possible outcomes. Ei-
ther the aﬀected party will decommit later leaving the other party utility U(decommitment)
or he will not (utility U(contract)). The calculation for expected utility is therefore
2Obviously if abase = 1 and t = tdelivery, this would be 0/0 which is undeﬁned, but that will
never happen, because if the eﬀect takes place certainly (abase = 1), it will do so before the



















































Figure 6.1: The eﬀect probabilities over time a ∈ [0.1,0.9].
straight-forward:
EU = (1 − P(eﬀect | no eﬀect so far))U(contract)
+P(eﬀect | no eﬀect so far)U(decommitment)
Of course if both parties can be aﬀected, there are four possible outcomes: neither,




+P(both can decommit)U(both can decommit)
where the probabilities are
• P(success) = (1 − P(buyer eﬀect))(1 − P(seller eﬀect))
• P(buyer decommits) = P(buyer eﬀect)(1 − P(seller eﬀect))
• P(seller decommits) = (1 − P(buyer eﬀect))P(seller eﬀect)
• P(both may decommit) = P(buyer eﬀect)P(seller eﬀect)Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 142
The only case worth further discussion is the one where both can decommit. In
theory, the parties could decommit at exactly the same time and therefore would
either get or pay no fees or would get and pay the fees as allocated by the applicable
decommitment policy. However, in our case, decommitments cannot occur at
exactly the same time because we only allow one party to a contract to decommit
at any given time.3 So in our setting, one party always decommits before the other.
Since the eﬀect at a random time for both parties (the same distribution) and
parties do not try to outwait each other but decommit as soon as the eﬀect occurs,4
the parties consider it equally likely that they will in this case decommit ﬁrst (and
pay the decommitment fee) and be aﬀected later (and be paid the decommitment
fee). Should concurrent decommitment be possible, the parties would of course
just estimate the probability of that and factor it in their calculation. For us, it
would just add an unnecessary complication and, as mentioned, the possibility is
omitted.
As explained, our agents will take any contract that gives them positive expected
utility. They ensure positive expected utility by setting their reservation price so
that this goal is always fulﬁlled if an agreement on price is reached. The reserva-
tion price is calculated again for each negotiator on each turn of the negotiation.
We will now shortly discuss how the agents calculate the reservation price. This
is reasonably straight-forward. We use the equation for EU above and write it
on an inequality where we require it to be positive. In the case of a constant
decommitment policy, we get for the seller:
EUs(q,p) = P(success)(p − Cs(q)) + P(buyer decommits)f+
P(seller decommits)(−f − Ec(q))+
P(both may decommit)(1
2(f − f − Ec(q)))
≥ Utarget
where Utarget is the minimum acceptable utility (we used 0.00001 in our experi-
ments). We then solve this inequation in relation to p and get:
p ≥ Cs(q) + 1
P(success)(Utarget − P(buyer decommits)f−
P(seller decommits)(−f − Ec(q))−
P(both may decommit)(1
2(−Ec(q)))
and this, of course, is the reservation price for the seller. It can be simpliﬁed in dif-
ferent ways in diﬀerent settings. For example, if only the buyer can be aﬀected we
3Both parties get their turn to decommit at every turn as if they were still negotiating.
4Such strategic decommitment was also ignored in the performance decision (chapter 4).Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 143
get P(buyer decommits) = P(both may decommit) = 0 and even if both can de-
commit, we investigate settings where P(buyer decommits) = P(seller decommits)
and so on. The compensatory policies work in a similar way. For example, the
reservation price for the buyer when the Reliance Damages policy is used becomes:





and for the seller when the Expectation Damages policy is used:
EUs(q,p) = P(success)(p − Cs(q)) + P(buyer decommits)(p − Cs(q))+
P(seller decommits)(−(Vb(q) − p) − Ec)+
P(both may decommit)(p − 1
2(Ec + Vb(q) + Cs(q)))
≥ Utarget
The other cases go in a similar way. We are now ready to start discussing our
results. The restriction is enforced simply by not allowing negative reservation
prices for the seller (any negative reservation price is changed to zero) or reservation
prices greater than one for the buyer (any such reservation price is changed to one).
This means that if the seller’s reservation price is above 1 or the buyer’s reservation
price is below 0, no contract can be achieved.
6.2 Empirical Evaluation
We will now discuss our empirical results. First, we will present our hypotheses
(section 6.2.1). We will then explain how the experiments and the statistical
analysis were conducted (section 6.2.2) before we ﬁnally, discuss the results (section
6.2.3).
6.2.1 Hypotheses
As always, only the performance of a task can increase the total utility (by Vb(q)−
Cs(q)), non-performance leads only to the payment of decommitment fee (which
does not increase welfare in the society, it merely moves it from one party to
another) and possibly also the seller’s costs (Ec = D(t)Cs(q)). The latter isChapter 6 The Contract Decision 144
a waste for the society, because it produces no beneﬁt. So, the problem is to
maximise the performances and to minimise the decommitments. Of course these
two goals are contradictory: the decommitments would be minimised by having
no contracts (no risk of decommitments), but the maximisation of performances
might lead to a large number of contracts. With no contracts, the total utility
in the market is zero. Taking some contracts, the utility might be positive and
taking too many contracts, the total utility may even be negative (the costs of
decommitments outweighing the beneﬁts from the performances).
The basic idea is then to ﬁnd a balance between the two and instead of getting
just some contracts, getting contracts that are more likely to be performed. In our
setting, where the buyers and sellers are homogeneous in terms of their reliability,
the only way to improve the chances of success is to wait longer before entering
into a contract. However, as explained, there are risks involved in waiting: if
agents wait too long, they might not get contracts at all. Therefore the risk of
decommitment has to be considered with a chance of getting a contract in the ﬁrst
place. When the risk of later decommitment is small, it may be more important
to secure a contract whenever an opportunity arises. But when a decommitment
is very likely, waiting is often more prudent.
As explained, the parties can use the contract price very eﬀectively as a means of
ensuring positive expected utility for themselves no matter what the decommit-
ment policy is (within reason5) and if both parties are doing that then the expected
utility for the society is always non-negative (positive if there are any contracts)
in any setting in the long run. Sometimes it is even possible that one party alone,
by taking the contract decision into account, can ensure positive expected utility.
This requires that the only source of negative total utility, the seller’s possible
costs, is clearly in one party’s responsibility and that party takes the contract
decision into account. Other cases will not adapt correctly and will perform badly
when the eﬀect probability is high, because they will enter into contracts that are
never going to be performed causing costs to the sellers. Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 9. When only one of the parties can be aﬀected and the
decommitment fee is either compensatory or Constant 0.0, the case
where both parties take contract decision into account is no worse
than any other policy and it will be better than the case where neither
5For example, Not Allowed or policies with very high decommitment fees, strict limits on
the price or similar factors, can make this adjustation impossible and mean that society suﬀers
(i.e. no mutually agreeable contracts can be found, although with less strict commitments such
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party considers the contract decision or the case where only one party
does so, if the party in question is not liable for the provider’s possible
costs according to the decommitment policy. The diﬀerence is clearest
with high eﬀect probabilities.
As also explained earlier, serious over-compensation (like Constant 1.0) will make
the decommitment on one hand, a potentially disastrous situation for the potential
decommitter and, on the other hand, very attractive for his opponent. This means
that the aﬀected party that takes the contract decision into account will need to
be very careful. Speciﬁcally, it will want to enter a contract only close to the
deadline (the risk of decommitment is smaller) and/or have a very high utility
(high reservation price for the sellers and low reservation price for the buyers) in
the case it is able to perform to balance things out. In contrast, his opponent may
well be interested in accepting very bad contracts (from its point of view), if that
gives him a chance of getting the high decommitment fee if the opponent fails.
On their own these two tendencies inﬂuence the decisions into opposite directions:
when the aﬀected party alone takes the contract decision into account, it will
want to wait for longer and longer and this leads to less and less contracts when
the eﬀect probabilities increase until with very high eﬀect probabilities there is
(almost) no contracts. The very high fee makes this eﬀect stronger and makes
the potentially aﬀected party go to great lengths to avoid too big a risk of that
fee. So when the fee over-compensates the victim’s loss as badly as the Constant
1.0 policy does, the potentially aﬀected party overdoes this (is too careful to
avoid contracts) and this will aﬀect adversely the total utility when it alone will
consider the contract decision. The total utility is going to be worse than in the
case where neither party takes the contract decision into account in intermediate
eﬀect probabilities. In very low probabilities there are not enough decommitments
to make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence and since staying out of risky contracts will ensure
non-negative expected total utility it will be able to outperfom the case where
neither will take the contract decision into account when the eﬀect probabilities
are very high and the expected total utility becomes negative.
On the other hand, when only the decommitter’s opponent takes the contract
decision into account, the eﬀect is opposite: the opponent will want a contract
as soon as possible. This is because it prefers the non-performance and is willing
even to take a worse contract to secure a chance to get the high fee. The earlier
it manages to lure the potential decommitter into a contract, the more likely the
decommitment will occur. From the total utility’s point of view, this is of course
counter-productive and, therefore, in the case where only the victim takes theChapter 6 The Contract Decision 146
contract decision into account, the results are likely to be even worse than when
no party takes the contract decision into account. This will happen especially with
high eﬀect probabilities when the fee is very likely.
In case the potential decommitter is the seller, there is also its own costs to con-
sider. In case of decommitment, the seller will have to pay not only an overcom-
pensatory fee but also its own possible costs. This makes the seller even more
reluctant to enter into contracts and the eﬀects described above are likely to be
even stronger. Speciﬁcally, we contend:
Hypothesis 10. When only one of the parties can be aﬀected and
the decommitment policy is Constant 1.0, both cases where only one
of the parties takes the contract decision into account will perform
worse than the case where neither takes the contract decision into
account at least with some eﬀect probabilities. For the case where
the decommitter considers the contract decision, this occurs with low
to intermediate eﬀect probabilities and for the case where the victim
considers it, especially with high probabilities. When the seller is the
decommitter, these eﬀects are stronger.
When only one of the parties is aﬀected, the decision-making of a participant
involves either the possibility that they themselves will have to decommit or that
their opponent might have to decommit at some point. When both parties can be
aﬀected, both of these factors need to be considered at the same time. We only
consider cases where the eﬀect probability is the same for both parties. This means
that the probabilities for the player itself or its opponent having to decommit is
the same and in both Constant policy cases, also the decommitment fee is the
same so these things cancel each other out in the case of the buyer and it is not
therefore too worried about possible decommitments. However, for the seller the
situation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent because in addition to the fees, it has to consider
the possibility that it will have to cover its own costs. This can occur both when
it has to decommit itself and when the other party decommits (fees it pays or
receives cancel each other out). This will mean that the seller will do all the
necessary adjustments and the buyer none.
The compensatory cases are more interesting because the parties’ proﬁts and costs
are diﬀerent. Therefore the fees do not cancel each other out, instead they have to
be considered. This means the parties will have to consider their proﬁts and the
costs they would receive as compensation if the other party decommits and theirChapter 6 The Contract Decision 147
Case Ub Us Ub+s
Buyer Decommits −f = −Ecs f − Ecs = 0 −Ecs
Seller Decommits f = 0 f − Ecs = −Ecs −Ecs
Table 6.1: Utilities in the Reliance Damages policy.
opponent’s proﬁts and costs that would have to be compensated for if they are
forced to decommit. In the Reliance Damages policy case, either party considering
the contract decision alone will not be able to cover all cases. This is because both
parties alone consider only one of two cases. The buyer considers the utilities in
the Ub column and the seller the utilities in the Us column in table 6.1. Both of
them ignore the seller’s costs in one of the two cases, because either the buyer
compensates them or ignores them. Only when both parties consider the contract
decision at the same time will the seller’s costs be considered by one party in all
cases and therefore, the case where both consider the contract decision is likely
to outperform other cases with intermediate eﬀect probabilities (when there are
enough decommitments, but there are still enough contracts).
The Expectation Damages case is a bit diﬀerent. The expected utilities for each
case are as shown in table 6.2. Now, under this policy, the buyer will get its full util-
ity with the probability of P(success)+P(seller decommits)+1
2P(both may decommit)
and it will have to pay the seller’s proﬁts and costs with the probability of
P(buyer decommits) + 1
2P(both may decommit). If the buyer’s utility in case of
success is high enough, compared to the compensation the buyer has to pay in case
of its own decommitment, the buyer is willing to negotiate and enter a contract
even when performance is very unlikely. In the extreme case, let P(buyer eﬀect) =
P(seller eﬀect) = 1. This means that P(both may decommit) = 1 and all other




(Vb(q) − p) +
1
2
(−p + C(q) − Ecs).
This will be positive, if Vb(q)−p > −p+C(q)−Ecs, so even if the decommitment
is a certainty, the buyer is willing to enter a contract if the utility in case the seller
decommits ﬁrst (= U(success)) is greater than the fee it has to pay in case it
has to decommit ﬁrst. In other words, if the buyer is able to get a good contract
(low price), it will be willing to take it even if it will know that it will never be
performed. A similar logic applies to the buyer and the logic can also be extended
to less extreme cases. Therefore when either party alone considers the contract
decision, it can enter into contracts even if performance is very unlikely or evenChapter 6 The Contract Decision 148
Case Ub Us Ub+s
Buyer Decommits −f = −p + C(q) − Ecs f − Ecs = p − C(q) −Ecs
Seller Decommits f = Vb(q) − p f − Ecs = p − Vb(q) − Ecs −Ecs
Table 6.2: Utilities in the Expectation Damages policy.
impossible, as long as the utility in case of success is large enough compared to
the fee it has to pay in case of failure. When the other party does not consider the
contract decision, it will be willing to enter into such contracts. But when both
parties take the contract decision into account, no contract can be acceptable to
both of them when P(both may decommit) = 1 (for any given contract, both
parties cannot have higher utility in case of success than in case of failure at the
same time). Also in less extreme situations, the parties will be more careful. We
therefore contend:
Hypothesis 11. When both can be aﬀected and decommitment policy
is compensatory (either Reliance or Expectation Damages), the case
where both parties consider the contract decision will always be at
least as good as any other setting and it will be better at least some
of the time.
The price can be eﬀectively used between the parties to distribute the risks in an
eﬀective way. In this distribution, it makes little diﬀerence what the decommit-
ment policy is, but all policies should perform roughly the same. However, given
that the price is limited to the interval [0,1] it may well be that the parties are
unable to adapt properly in case the fee is heavily overcompensatory and only one
of the parties can be aﬀected. This is because the party not aﬀected is unable to
set the price so that the party aﬀected would be able to ﬁnd that acceptable and
not all parties will be able to wait until the risk would be acceptable (because of
their deadlines and eﬀects). The problem is less pronounced when both parties
can be aﬀected because the risk of an oversized decommitment fee is more evenly
distributed. Thus:
Hypothesis 12. When only one of the parties can be aﬀected, the
Constant 1.0 policy will perform worse than the other policies.
The performance of diﬀerent policies depends of course on the information they
have. We have assumed that both the buyer and the seller will know when theChapter 6 The Contract Decision 149
seller pays its cost and therefore can calculate the expected cost of the seller
accurately. However, already a small change like not knowing the time accurately
will aﬀect the buyer’s ability to estimate his risks in the compensatory policies.
So, if instead of Ec =
tdelivery−tcost
tdelivery−tcontractCs(q), all times after the contract is formed
are equally likely and, then Ec = 1
2Cs(q). This sometimes overestimates and
sometimes underestimates the seller’s expected cost and will mean that the buyer
sets his reservation price on a slightly wrong level. This small error alone is enough
to decrease the total utility in cases where the buyer is aﬀected and the buyer takes
the contract decision into account. We therefore contend:
Hypothesis 13. When the buyer is aﬀected, but does not know the
time the seller has to pay its cost, the performance in terms of total
utility suﬀers in compensatory policies.
6.2.2 Experimental Setup
We ran the marketplace in 36 settings for each of the four decommitment policies.
We used a = {0.0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,0.995,1.0}, for buyers and
sellers alone (the other party had a = 0) and then for both of them at the same
time. We needed to add the case a = 0.995, because in some situations a party’s
behaviour would change radically when the decommitment probability was 1.0.
This is because our agents were after positive utility and if a decommitment pro-
duces zero utility and a performance positive utility then as long as there is any
chance of performance a party will try to get contracts, but when the chances of
performance drop to zero, the expected utility of any contract drops to zero and
this is no longer positive so the party no longer enters into any contracts. The
minimum positive value for utility is 0.00001, so accordingly the probability does
not need to be exactly one, only very close to it. By taking an additional value very
close to one, our graphs show more clearly that the diﬀerence in behaviour occurs
very close to 1 and not gradually from 0.9. We could have of course changed the
rule so that any non-negative utility would have been good enough and we would
not get a break in continuity, but, on the other hand, entering into a contract is
always a risky thing to do in our setting and there should be at least some beneﬁt
for doing so.
Again we ran the marketplace 100 times in each setting, calculated the averages
and variances of various variables and did a one-tailed t-test to test whether or
not the perceived diﬀerences were statistically signiﬁcant.Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 150
6.2.3 Results
In the ﬁrst hypothesis in this chapter, we claimed that when only one party can be
aﬀected and the decommitment policy is either compensatory or Constant 0, the
total utility will be at least as high in cases where both parties take the contract
decision into account than in other cases and that it will be higher than the cases
where neither or only the party that is not responsible for the seller’s possible costs
takes the contract decision into account with high eﬀect probabilities. We have the
total utilities for these cases in ﬁgures 6.2 (buyer aﬀected) and 6.3 (seller aﬀected).
From these, it is clear that when both parties are ‘smart’ (i.e. take the contract
decision into account), the total utility stays non-negative, but when neither party
is smart, the total utility goes negative when the eﬀect probabilities are high.
The diﬀerence between the good and bad policies is statistically signiﬁcant at the
p < 0.0001 from eﬀect probability of 0.7 onwards in all cases and is statistically
signiﬁcant at least at the p < 0.001 level also on with probability of 0.6 and at the
p < 0.05 level in some cases also with probability of 0.5.
In all cases, when only one of the players take the contract decision into account,
one of the cases follows the case where both are smart and one follows the case
where neither is smart (except that in some cases when the eﬀect is certain, all
three cases where at least one party considers the contract decision converge at the
total utility of zero).6 The case that performs better is usually the one where the
seller takes the contract decision into account. However, there are two exceptions:
both compensatory policy cases when the buyer is aﬀected. There it is the buyer
alone that is able to achieve non-negative total utility also at high eﬀect proba-
bilities. This can be explained by considering who is responsible for the seller’s
costs (the only source of negative total utility). In the cases where the buyer can
be aﬀected and the fee is compensatory, the buyer will always compensate for the
seller’s costs and therefore the seller is guaranteed at least zero proﬁt and even if it
takes the contract decision into account it will not aﬀect its decisions because his
expected utility will be automatically positive. The buyer, on the other hand, has
a risk of having to pay the costs (and proﬁts in the case of Expectation Damages),
so when it considers the contract decision, it will be interested in adjusting its
reservation price so that it will get non-negative utility on expectation. In the
other cases, the buyer is not liable for the seller’s costs. This is clear when only
6The last minute adaptations where they occur are because the agents require positive ex-
pected utility and if the utility in case of decommitment is zero but the utility in case of success
is positive, the expected utility remains positive until success is no longer possible at all. When
the decommitment will always happen at some point, a = 1, the expected utility is zero which
is no longer positive and the agent will not enter any negotiations.Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 151
the seller can be aﬀected (the buyer never pays any decommitment fees) and is
also true when the buyer can be aﬀected but decommitment is free (the Constant
0.00 policy). Here the roles are therefore reversed, the buyer will not be inter-
ested in doing any useful adaptations whereas the seller is. This is consistent with





















































































Figure 6.2: Contract Decision when the Buyer Can Be Aﬀected (Hypothesis
9).
Our second hypothesis in this section considered the total utility in diﬀerent cases





















































































Figure 6.3: Contract Decision when the Seller Can Be Aﬀected (Hypothesis
9).
are in ﬁgure 6.4. Let us start from the case where the buyer is aﬀected (ﬁgure
6.4.a). Here, the case where the buyer takes the contract decision into account
performs worse than the three other cases between the eﬀect probabilities of 0.2
and 0.6 at the p < 0.0001 level except at the probability of 0.2 where it is at
least at the p < 0.01 level. This is because the very high fee makes the buyer too
cautious and the number of contracts decreases heavily. For example, when the
eﬀect probability is 0.4, the number of contracts is around 109.7 on average whenChapter 6 The Contract Decision 153
the buyer alone considers the contract decision, but it is over 160 in cases where
it does not and 150.9 even in the case where the seller is compensating for this
attitude (both parties take the contract decision into account). The buyer’s over-
carefulness turns into appropriate prudence when the eﬀect probabilities are very
high and the case where only the buyer takes the contract decision into account
will outperform the case where neither or only the seller will do so with eﬀect
probabilities 0.8 or greater (at the p < 0.0001 level). The seller’s over-zealousness,
on the other hand, will mean that the policy where only it will be smart, will
be outperformed by the case where neither party considers the contract decision
when the eﬀect probability is 0.7 or higher. This is because the high fee gives the
seller incentives to lower its reservation price so that it can get the unsuspecting
buyer to enter into contracts that will very likely end in a decommitment. This
will mean contracts are formed earlier and because of this there will be more of
them. For example, in the case where the eﬀect probability is 0.8, the average
contract time decreases from 301.6 (in the case where neither party is smart) to
288.4 (when only the seller is smart) and the average number of contracts increases
from 108.1 to 115.0 (all diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the p < 0.001 level).
The case where the seller is aﬀected follows the same patterns, but more strongly.
This is because the seller has to consider its costs in addition to the very high fee.
The case where the potential decommitter (the seller) takes the contract decision
into account performs very badly compared to the other cases with intermediate
eﬀect probabilities. It is worse than all the other three with eﬀect probabilities 0.4
and 0.5 (at the p < 0.0001 level) and worse than either case where both or neither
take the contract decision into account between 0.2 and 0.6 (at the p < 0.0001
level). This is of course because the high fee and the possible costs make the seller
very careful indeed. For example, in the case where the eﬀect probability is 0.5,
there are only 4.1 contracts in the case where the seller alone is smart, but 58.2
when neither is smart and 33.9 when both parties take the contract decision into
account. Of course with high eﬀect probabilities, the very careful seller strategy
works better, beating the case where the contract decision is not considered by
either party when the eﬀect probability is 0.8 or above. The case where only the
victim (the buyer) is smart is also much stronger here than it was when the buyer
was aﬀected. This again has to do with the seller’s costs: the buyer does not
consider them but the seller does. The buyer is interested in getting into contracts
as soon as possible, which is often not in the seller’s interest. This is evidenced
by the fact that the total utility in the case where only the buyer considers the






















































































Figure 6.4: Contract Decision with the Constant 1.0 Decommitment Policy
(Hypothesis 10).
all eﬀect probabilities of at least 0.2 (at the p < 0.0001 level). For example, when
the eﬀect probability is 0.7, the average contract time is 285.9, as compared to
320.9 when neither party is smart and the number of contracts are 108.3 and
80.9 respectively. One interesting point to notice here is that the seller’s aversion
to contracts is so strong that even in the case where both parties are aware of
the contract decision, the seller is unable to compensate and the performance in
terms of total utility is worse than in cases where neither party takes the contractChapter 6 The Contract Decision 155
decision into account when the eﬀect probability is 0.4 or 0.5 (at the p < 0.05 and
p < 0.001 level respectively). All these observations are consistent with hypothesis
10 and we can therefore accept it.
We can also observe that when the risk of having to pay a high fee is more evenly
distributed (as in the case where both parties can be aﬀected with the same prob-
ability), it is easier to ﬁnd a contract price that both parties can agree on and
none of the peculiarities we just described occur.
The next hypothesis deals with compensatory policies when both parties can be
aﬀected. They and the Constant 0.0 policy are shown in ﬁgure 6.5. Our claim
was that the case where both parties take the contract decision into account will
outperform the other cases at least in some situations. From ﬁgures 6.5.a-b we
can see that this really is the case. The situations where only one of the parties
considers the contract decision do better than the case where neither of them
does, but there are still some cases where both of them are needed to get the best
utility. Now, for Reliance Damages the case where both consider the contract
decision beats the cases where only one of them does with eﬀect probabilities
between 0.4 and 0.8 (at the p < 0.0001 level between 0.4 and 0.5, at least at the
p < 0.001 in 0.6 and at least p < 0.05 level in 0.7 − 0.8). The diﬀerence here is
due to the fact that both parties take the seller’s costs into account only in one of
the two cases and it therefore takes both of them to take them into account in all
cases (as explained when we discussed hypothesis 11). Thus, there is no diﬀerence
in the low eﬀect probabilities because the risk of decommitments is too small to
make a diﬀerence and in very high eﬀect probabilities, all the best policies will
negotiate very little and therefore the diﬀerence is too small to be signiﬁcant.
With Expectation Damages, the case where both parties consider the contract
decision outperforms all the other cases when the eﬀect probability is 0.4 or above
(at the p < 0.0001 level). This is because when only one party takes the contract
decision into account, it will enter into contracts if the utility in case of success
(either performance or the other party decommitting, the utility is the same) is
(much) higher than the fee it has to be in case it has to decommit. The contracts
will therefore be formed if the unsuspecting opponent is willing to give the smart
party a contract that gives it high enough utility in case of success. This is not
always possible and therefore the performance is slightly better than in the case
where no one takes the contract decision into account (with eﬀect probabilities





















































































Figure 6.5: Contract Decision when the Both Parties Can Be Aﬀected (Hy-
pothesis 11).
p < 0.0001 level with probabilities 0.6 and above).7 These ﬁndings are consistent
with hypothesis 11 and we can therefore accept it.
Next, we are interested in the total utility under diﬀerent decommitment policies.
In ﬁgure 6.6 we have the four diﬀerent policies in the three diﬀerent settings we
have (buyer aﬀected, seller aﬀected and both aﬀected). The Constant 1.0 policy
7Also this was discussed in more detail when hypothesis 11 was discussed in section 6.2.1.Chapter 6 The Contract Decision 157
does fare clearly worse than the other policies in the settings where only one of
the parties can be aﬀected (in the setting where only the buyer can be aﬀected,
the diﬀerence to all other policies is statistically signiﬁcant at the p < 0.0001 level
between eﬀect probabilities 0.6−0.9 and in the case where the seller can be aﬀected
the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the p < 0.0001 level between eﬀect probabilities
0.5 − 0.9). With higher probabilities, all policies get very few contracts, so the
diﬀerence is very small. On the other hand, when the probabilities are lower,
the contract price can still be used to achieve a reasonable risk distribution. The
performance of the other policies is broadly speaking the same. This is what we
expected in hypothesis 12, so we can accept it.
Our last hypothesis contended that a relatively small inaccuracy, like the buyer
not knowing the time the seller has to pay its cost, will decrease the total utility
when the buyer can be aﬀected and its decommitment policy is compensatory
(either Expectation Damages or Reliance Damages). To this end, ﬁgure 6.7 shows
the total utilities with accurate and inaccurate expected cost in the case where
both parties can be aﬀected and only the buyer takes the contract decision into
account. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant between the eﬀect probabilities
of 0.5−0.9 (at the p < 0.05 with 0.5 and 0.9 and at the p < 0.0001 with 0.6−0.8).
There is similar pattern in all the other cases. This is what the hypothesis 13
suggested, so we accept it.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the contract decision and especially how the parties
taking it into account can use the contract price as a risk-allocation tool, allowing
them to ﬁnd mutually acceptable contracts while ensuring non-negative expected
utility for themselves and the society (contribution C3). In more detail, this
means that both parties take possible adverse future utility changes into account
by setting their reservation price so that it ensures a positive expected utility to
them and through them to the society. In some situations, it is enough that only
one of the parties takes the contract decision into account (when only one party
is aﬀected or when the decommitment fee is constant), but in other situations it
takes both parties (compensatory policies when both can be aﬀected) and, in some
situations, one-sided consideration of the contract decision can even be harmful















































































Figure 6.6: The performance under diﬀerent decommitment policies (Hypoth-
esis 12).
The mechanism the parties use to get these eﬀects is to use the contract price as a
means of distributing the risks between them. A high price shifts some of the risk
from the buyer to the seller and a low price does the opposite. This works very well
in most cases and the performance is roughly the same in all settings and under
most policies. However, we found out that the Constant 1.0 performed worse than
other policies when only one of the parties could be aﬀected. This was because we
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Figure 6.7: The Eﬀect of Information Accurancy (Hypothesis 13).
are unable to do this tuning process in full. With less restrictive situations and
with less extreme policies, there should be very little diﬀerence between policies.
We also showed that the quality of information plays an important role in this
adaptation. Speciﬁcally, we used the buyer’s information about the time the seller
has to pay its costs as an example and discovered that even small inaccuracies in
the information can lead to deterioration of performance, because it leads to over-
or under-adaptations.
Although we investigated only a few policies, the same lessons would lend them-
selves to any policy. This means that all policies oﬀering overcompensation would
experience similar eﬀects as the Constant 1.0 did to some extent and all policies
undercompensating would fare as the Constant 0.0 policy did to some extent.
So, because a policy oﬀering an Increasing Fee from 100% to 250% of the Price
would probably mean overcompensation for the seller, the buyer would probably
be very cautious to enter into a contract, especially if the price was high. This
would probably mean a lower total utility in the case where only the buyer would
consider the contract decision, for example. On the other hand, from our results
it is usually clear that the best total utility is achieved when both (all) parties
take the contract decision into account to protect their own interests. This might
have some implications on the price. For example, in the case where only theChapter 6 The Contract Decision 160
buyer could be aﬀected and the policy oﬀers undercompensation for the seller, the
seller is likely to protect itself by asking for a higher price. Of course the policies
can be arbitrarily complex: the fees could go from undercompensatory to grossly
overcompensatory over time or they could be either in a single case. So the ef-
fects described might not always be self-evident from the data, but they will be
there. On the other hand, we could easily have heterogeneous buyers and sellers
(in terms of reliability). What it would mean is that the eﬀects described here
would be happening in each negotiation to a varying degree and they might be
diﬃcult to see from the overall data, but they will be there in each negotiation.
Next we will discuss the decision that takes place even before negotiations are even
started, the selection decision.Chapter 7
The Selection Decision
The selection decision takes place even before the negotiations start. It means that
the party decides who to negotiate with from a number of potential opponents.
For the selection decision to have an eﬀect on common good, the opponents must,
of course, be heterogeneous, because choosing between identical opponents obvi-
ously makes little diﬀerence. Often it is also beneﬁcial, if the number of selectors
is smaller than the number of the potential opponents, because if the numbers are
roughly the same or if there are more selectors than selectees, then (almost) ev-
erybody will be selected anyway, so the selection is likely to make little diﬀerence,
although as we will see this may not always be the case (if most selectees are bad
and should not be selected at all and only some selection strategies take this into
account).
In more detail, we investigate a setting in which the buyer chooses the sellers he
wants to negotiate with and the heterogeneity of the sellers comes from two sources:
they have diﬀerent qualities and reliabilities. Here, as in the reliance decision
(chapter 5), reliability is a probability that the seller will perform the service as
agreed. The work in this chapter relates to research contribution C4. We will ﬁrst
discuss the issues raised by the selection decision and the changes we have made
to the basic market model to investigate these issues (section 7.1). We will then
investigate our ideas empirically (section 7.2) and conclude by summarising our
results (section 7.3).
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7.1 The Problem and the Modiﬁed Model
In order to investigate the selection decision, we again have made some changes
to the basic market model. The biggest change is that the parties are no longer
matched at random, but instead, the buyers are asked which provider they would
like to negotiate with. The order in which the buyers are asked to give their choice
is selected at random. When choosing negotiation partners, the obvious thing to
do is to calculate the expected utility of each remaining opponent and then choose
the one that has the highest expected utility. A possible contract with an opponent
o has two possible outcomes: either the opponent o will perform according to the
contract or o will decommit and pay the decommitment fee. The buyer utilities
for these cases are as follows:
Ub(performance) = V (q) − p
Ub(decommitment) = f
And of course each and every provider has to have a reliability, ρs. We have
the same reliability distributions as in reliance decision, namely Uniform (all val-
ues equally likely), Normal (average values more likely), Exponential (low values
more likely) and Reverse Exponential (high values more likely). The reliability
will be drawn at random from the distribution separately for each provider s (re-
liabilities are independent from each other). When the contract has been entered
into, the parties exit the market and a random variable (from the distribution
Uniform(0,1)) is drawn and if this value is greater than the seller’s reliability,
the seller will have to decommit at some point and this point is selected at random
from Uniform(tcontract+1,tdelivery−1). This means that unlike in the basic model,
the probability of the eﬀect is diﬀerent for each seller (as = ρs varies). This is done
to enhance the meaning of opponent selection. On the other hand, here any eﬀect
will always lead to decommitment. We ensured this by setting the eﬀect ls = 5.0.
This change eﬀectively removes the performance decision from the model.1
Since each seller’s reliability, ρs, gives the probability that the provider is going to
perform, the expected utility for the buyer b to negotiate with the seller s is:
Ub = ρsUb(performance) + (1 − ρs)Ub(decommitment)
= ρs(V (q) − p) + (1 − ρs)f
1If in some cases, the parties would not decommit in case of eﬀect, they would make a
performance decision (whether or not to perform). When we always decommit in case of an
adverse eﬀect, there is no performance decision to speak of.Chapter 7 The Selection Decision 163
Of course the problem in terms of this calculation is that the negotiation outcome
(negotiation price p) is uncertain before the negotiation has started and since we
assume that here, as in the basic model, the parties’ β parameters are selected
at random (see section 3.2) it can vary signiﬁcantly. However, it is clear that
the contract price will be in the range [C(q),V (q)] because nothing else would be
accepted by both parties at the same time.2 On the other hand, since the β will
be selected at random and independently for both parties, it seems that the most
reasonable assumption for the average or expected outcome is the average of these
two ﬁgures, so the expected price is:
Ep =
V (q) + C(q)
2
We therefore get:
Ub = ρs(V (q) − Ep) + (1 − ρs)Ef
= ρs(V (q) −
V (q)+C(q)
2 ) + (1 − ρs)Ef
= ρs
V (q)−C(q)
2 + (1 − ρs)Ef,
where Ef is the expected fee, which of course depends on the decommitment policy
in use. Here, we use very simplistic estimates (for convenience). For example, in
all types of increasing fee policies, we use an average of fee in the next round
(assuming the contract was formed at the time of selection) and the full fee just
before the tdelivery.3 Therefore we do not use any information about when the
possible loss is going to take place and the actual fee can be larger or smaller
depending on when the decommitment takes place and what the actual contract
price is. What matters at this stage is only the expectation. We will use the 106
of the 107 policies described in section 3.3. We do not use the Reliance Damages
policy here, because given that the buyer does not have any costs, it will be equal
to the Constant 0.0 policy and so, we use that instead.
There is a set of cases where no price that both parties would agree on can be
found in the basic model. That occurs when the quality of the service is lower than
the buyer’s minimum quality, qmin
b . This means that Vb(q) = 0, but Cs(q) > 0.
Therefore negotiating with opponents that do not provide at least the minimum
2Since the negotiation after the selection uses the basic model, the buyer will not accept any
oﬀers in the negotiation that would be higher than the value of the service, V (q), and on the
other hand, the seller will not accept oﬀers that are lower than their costs, C(q). This means
that the price, an average of the two, must be between C(q) and V (q).
3For the Constant policy variations, the expected fee is obvious. In the Expectation Damages
policy, the estimated fee will be
V (q)−C(q)
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utility for the buyer is a waste of resources and all buyers ignore these sellers.4 Of
course the minimum quality varies from one buyer to the next and the provider
that is ignored by one buyer might not be by another. However, it is clear that
the providers with very low quality will have trouble ﬁnding buyers to negotiate
with (no matter what the decommitment policy is). The decommitment policy
does not aﬀect this restriction.
Another restriction we have in the selection is that the expected utility has to
be positive for a buyer to consider an opponent at all. This is always the case
when V (q) ≥ C(q) and the fee f is non-negative, so with any policy that has non-
negative fees, this restriction never plays any role. In the basic model (and the
106 policies we got from it), the fees f are always non-negative, but here we also
allow negative fees. In this context, a negative fee means that instead of a seller
paying the buyer in case of decommitment, it will be the buyer paying the seller
(even if the decision to decommit was seller’s). The reason for allowing negative
fees is that the expected utility above is only the expected utility of the buyer and
it does not take into account the seller’s or the society’s welfare. From the seller
point of view, only a performance will be able to bring positive utility to it. In the
case of decommitment, it will have to pay the fee and possibly also the preparation
costs it has paid at the time of decommitment. For the society, the fees do not
have an eﬀect on the total welfare: No matter what the decommitment fee is, it
will only be moving from one party to another and it will not generate any new
welfare. However, decommitment may lead to losses to the society, since the seller
might have (with probability D(t)) paid its cost (cs). So the total utilities are:
Ub+s(performance) = Ub(performance) + Us(performance)
= (V (q) −
V (q)+C(q)
2 ) + (
V (q)+C(q)
2 − C(q))
= V (q) − C(q)
Ub+s(decommitment at turn t) = Ub(decommitment) + Us(decommitment)
= f + (−f − D(t)cs) = −D(t)cs
4Of course if the buyers would consider contract decision during the negotiation, it might be
possible to ﬁnd a contract even in these cases, since the buyer could oﬀer a positive price for
the service in hope of non-performance and a (hugely positive) decommitment fee. They would
then choose very unreliable providers to negotiate with. However, if the sellers take the contract
decision into account too, the very unreliable providers might not show up in the marketplace
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And the expected total utility is:
Ub+s = ρs(V (q) − C(q)) + (1 − ρs)(−D(t)cs)
From society’s point of view, it would therefore be useful, if the buyers selected
more reliable providers. However, this does not necessarily mean the most reliable
providers, because also the utility of the contract (both when performed and when
decommitted from) matter. It may well be that a buyer (and indeed the society)
prefer some less-than-perfectly reliable provider that can oﬀer excellent utility in
the case of performance to a perfectly reliable seller that can only provide a meagre
utility. And although higher quality providers usually provide better utility when
they perform, they might also suﬀer bigger losses if they fail. It is therefore the
combination of these factors that should be optimised.
When the buyer decides which seller to negotiate with, it will only consider its
own utility and choose an opponent that will provide the best expected utility for
it. The main diﬀerence between the buyer’s and total utility is that in the case
of decommitment, the buyer gets a decommitment fee of f, but the society faces
a loss (D(t)cs), because the seller has to provide the fee in question plus pay its
possible costs. As in the case of the performance decision, the optimal decision
from the society’s point of view would be the one that internalises the costs of
the opponent to the buyer’s decision-making. Here, it would mean paying for the
seller’s possible costs. However, there is another diﬀerence between the buyer’s
and the society’s utility. In the case of performance, the buyer expects a utility
of
Vb(q)−Cs(q)
2 . That is, a half of the society’s beneﬁt (the other half was assumed
to belong to the opponent and the buyer does not consider that). So, we get the
following two decommitment policies:
• Reverse Reliance Damages policy, where the buyer would, instead of getting
a fee, have to compensate the seller for its costs, although it is the seller that
decommits. In other words, the fee would be −D(t)cs.
• Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages policy, where the buyer would, instead
of getting a fee, have to compensate the seller for its costs, although it is the
seller that decommits. In addition, the ‘seller’s’ utility in the case of success





The latter makes the buyer’s utility converge to that of the society’s. Therefore
each buyer will make an optimal choice for the society on its own turn. However,Chapter 7 The Selection Decision 166
there are two main concerns with this policy. The ﬁrst is that although it ensures
that each player at its turn will choose the best opponent for itself from the
society’s point of view, the order in which the buyers will make this choice is still
selected at random and it may well lead to sub-optimal matchings. This is, for
example, because the same seller may be the best opponent for many buyers and
only one of them (selected at random) will be able to negotiate with it. On the
other hand, the restrictions (q > qmin
b and Ub > 0) may mean that sometimes
all the sellers that could be chosen are chosen. To see why this is, consider a
case where there are three buyers and three sellers. The sellers have qualities 0.2,
0.3 and 0.4 and the buyers have minimum qualities of 0.15, 0.25 and 0.35. Now,
in the optimal ordering the buyers would be given a choice in the reverse order:
0.35, 0.25 and 0.15. This would mean that the ﬁrst one would choose the seller
with qs = 0.4, the next one the seller with qs = 0.3 and the last one the seller
with qs = 0.2. Everybody would be able to ﬁnd a negotiating partner and, given
that V (q) > C(q) is guaranteed to hold, a contract. However, if the order was
reversed, then the buyer with qmin
b = 0.15 would choose ﬁrst and he could take
any of the three opponents because they all have qualities above his minimum,
but if he chooses something other than the ﬁrst one then either buyer 2 or 3 will
be left without a suitable negotiation partner.
The only way around this problem would be to choose the order in some more
sophisticated way or let the marketplace optimise the match-up. However, most
of these problems apply to all policies and over many repetitions. Given this, the
diﬀerent possible orders average out leaving the parties with something between
the best and worst case on expectation. Therefore, on expectation, the (Enhanced)
Reverse Reliance Damages policies should, however, do better than any policy
with non-negative fees, especially when there are plenty of providers to choose
from and many of the providers are relatively unreliable. Of course also getting
those actual costs might be diﬃcult in any non-trivial setting (as we discussed in
the context of the performance decision). Another problem with these policies is
more fundamental: They would mean that the victim would have to compensate
the decommitter’s costs and that might be quite problematic, not least because it
might give the wrong incentives to the seller. We will discuss this problem further
in the summary of our results (section 7.3).
When a policy allows negative fees (the victim paying for the decommitter for his
decommitment), the expected utility for a given opponent might be negative and
since only opponents with positive expected utility are negotiated with, this may
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the number of sellers is bigger than that of buyers. When negative fees make the
buyer’s utility reﬂect the total utility, as in the case of Enhanced Reverse Reliance
Damages policy, the buyers will choose only the sellers that will provide them and
the society with positive expected utility. However, in other cases, the negative
utility may mean that some potentially useful opponents are not negotiated with,
which may be problematic. To investigate this, we will also introduce the following
policies:
• Reverse Expectation Damages policy, where the buyer would, instead of get-
ting a fee, have to compensate the seller for its loss (proﬁt + costs), although
it is the seller that decommits.
• Constant policy, where the buyer would, instead of getting a fee, pay the
seller (the decommitter) a constant fee fee. We use fees -0.25, -0.50, -0.75
and -1.00.
These policies will make decommitment a very unattractive option for the seller
and therefore increase the importance of reliance to the buyer. This means that the
buyers prefer reliable opponents even if the utility they provide in case of success is
very modest and if no reliable providers are available, these policies encourage the
buyers not to negotiate at all. This means that they will ignore some negotiations
that could lead to positive utility for the society and therefore these policies are
likely to do worse than the (Enhanced) Reverse Reliance Damages policies.
A policy that would be easier to implement is one that would make decommitment
free for the seller (the Constant 0.0 policy). This is because any positive fee would
mean that the buyer would be less interested in negotiating with more reliable
providers. In one special case, the Expectation Damages policy, the buyer would be
indiﬀerent between performances and non-performances (he gets the same utility
anyway) and therefore he would select the opponents that can provide the best
expected utility in case of success, no matter what their reliability is. In addition,
if the fee is actually bigger than the buyer’s utility for the performance, the buyer
actually prefers non-performance and chooses more unreliable providers. Both
of these strategies are problematic from the society’s point of view, because as
explained, only a performance can improve the total utility (i.e. the common
good). On the other hand, the zero decommitment fee of course means that the
buyer will not take the costs of the seller into account when choosing the sellers.
This is problematic because the providers that provide the best value (best quality)
also usually have the highest costs. But this may not be critical, especially ifChapter 7 The Selection Decision 168
the reliability of those chosen sellers is reasonably high (and, therefore, so is the
probability that they would have to pay their costs without getting anything in
return). The fact that the buyer only considers his half of the common good in
case of success is less problematic because a half of any number is bigger than a
half of any other number only if the latter number is bigger and its relation to the
utility in the non-performance case (=zero) will always be the same.
Now, the relative sizes of buyer and seller populations are likely to have a strong
impact on the total utility. When the number of providers is signiﬁcantly higher
than that of the consumers, the providers the consumers choose has a bigger
impact on the total utility, because many providers will not be selected at all and
therefore the ones you do choose make an impact.5 To investigate the eﬀect of
population size diﬀerences, we will use the Medium population size for the buyers
and the full range of population sizes (from Tiny to Huge) for the sellers. The
Medium population size for the buyers was chosen so that we can observe how
the total utility behaves in all three situations: the number of buyers is smaller,
the same or larger than the number of sellers. In addition, the Medium size also
gives us a large enough number of contracts to clearly see the diﬀerences between
diﬀerent situations.
7.2 Empirical Evaluation
Now, we have described the theory, but we still need to show that the theory
works in practise. We will ﬁrst derive some hypotheses from the discussion above
(section 7.2.1). Then we will discuss some details of how our experiments are run
(section 7.2.2). And then we will discuss our results (section 7.2.3).
7.2.1 Hypotheses
From our discussion above, it is clear that the Enhanced Reverse Reliance Cost and
Reverse Reliance Cost policies should be very useful in terms of total utility. The
Enhanced version makes the buyers choose the best seller for the common good and
the basic version is not far from that since it takes the losses the decommitment
5If the populations are roughly the same size or if there are more sellers than buyers, (al-
most) all providers will usually be chosen and so, the selection itself would have a limited eﬀect
(especially since the order the consumers are allowed to choose is selected at random, so if the
populations would be of the same size, the diﬀerence to random matching would be relatively
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causes to the seller (and society) into account. The only diﬀerence between the
two is the fact that the seller’s utility is also considered in the case of successful
performance in the enhanced version. This diﬀerence was ρs
Vb(q)−Cs(q)
2 and this
is clearly increasing in reliability ρs. However, this ‘correction term’ has very
limited meaning if the ρs is very high, because then the meaning of the non-
performance utility is very small and it matters little if the expected utility in
the success for case is Vb(q) − CS(q) or
Vb(q)−Cs(q)
2 . The diﬀerence only matters
when the non-performance is clearly possible. On the other hand, if ρs is very low,
then the diﬀerence between Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages and Reverse
Reliance Damages policies is very small. This seems to indicate that these policies
choose diﬀerent opponents only if ρs is somewhere in the middle or around 0.5.
This means that there is a diﬀerence only if the consumers have to or are able
to (depending on the circumstances) choose (also) providers with intermediate
reliabilities. This occurs when either the average reliability of the sellers is low
(Exponential distribution), when the number of more reliable providers is limited
compared to the number of sellers (Normal distribution) or when the reliability
varies and the seller population is not that much larger than the buyer population
(Uniform distribution). In other words:
Hypothesis 14. The Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages is no worse
than Reverse Reliance Damages and in cases, where a signiﬁcant num-
ber of providers with moderate reliability (around 0.5) are chosen, it
will be better.
In a similar fashion, we can reason about the (Enhanced) Reverse Reliance Cost
policy’s performance against Constant 0.0 and all other policies with non-negative
decommitment fees. These policies do not take the costs of the seller into account.
This means that when the probability of this cost increases (the reliability de-
creases), they will perform worse. We therefore contend:
Hypothesis 15. The (Enhanced) Reverse Reliance Damages is no
worse than any other policy and in cases, where also relatively unreli-
able sellers have to be selected, it will be better.
Now, when it comes to the Constant 0.0 policy and the policies with positive
decommitment fees, none of them take the sellers’ costs into account, so the only
source of diﬀerence (if any) comes from the set of providers they choose and
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all sellers have the same reliability. In this case, the expected utility of all sellers
would have a term (1−ρs)f and given that ρs = ρ for all sellers, this would mean
that this term is constant given a decommitment policy, assuming that the fee
does not depend on the price. In such a case, the opponents would always be
selected based on the performance utility, 1
2(Vb(q) − Cs(q)), alone. And if the fee
depends on the price, one should notice that the higher the quality, the higher
the expected price and therefore the expected fee. Since the fee will be positive
from the buyer’s point of view, that makes the high quality providers even more
interesting for the buyer.6
Therefore the main source of diﬀerence between these policies is mainly in the
reliability of the selected opponents. And the higher the fee awarded in case of non-
performance, the less worried the buyer is about non-performance. Up until the fee
reaches the success utility, the buyer will be more and more interested in choosing
opponents that produce good results in case of success. When f = Ub(q,p|success)
(Expectation Damages policy), only the success utility of the opponent matters,
because that is the utility also in case of non-performance. When the fee exceeds
the utility in case of performance, the buyer starts to prefer less reliable providers
more and more. Now this latter behaviour is especially devastating to the common
good, because the probability of non-performance increases and non-performance
cannot improve common good but instead it often decreases it (due to the seller’s
costs).
This means that the Constant 0.0 policy should be the best among the policies that
have non-negative fees and it should clearly beat all policies that in a signiﬁcant
number of cases choose less reliable providers (the fee is higher than the success
utility for the buyer). This includes all policies that have fees that are signiﬁcantly
higher than zero. However, when the fees are close to zero, the diﬀerence to the
Constant 0.0 policy is going to be relatively small. Of all the policies that we will
try here, we consider Increasing 0.00-0.25, Increasing Contract Time 0.00-0.25,
Increasing Decommitment Time 0.00-0.25, Increasing Price 0-50% and Increasing
Contract Time Price 0-50% and Increasing Decommitment Time Price 0-50% to
have relatively low fees. The opponents chosen are only slightly (if at all) diﬀerent.
This means that Constant 0.0 policy may not always be able to beat such policies
with low fees in a statistically signiﬁcant way. This is because in those cases,
the diﬀerences in fees and expected utilities (and therefore probably also in the
opponents the agent ends up choosing) between Constant 0.00 and other policies
6On the other hand, with the quality also the expected cost is likely to rise, so that may not
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are relatively small. However, this depends on the reliability distribution. If the
reliabilities can be widely diﬀerent or there is a signiﬁcant number of low reliability
providers, some less reliable providers may have quite high expected utilities if they
provide good utility in case of success and some positive utility (a positive fee)
also in case of decommitment. This follows from the fact that the lower reliance is
compensated for to some degree by the positive fee in the case of non-performance
and therefore choosing less reliable providers is less risky. The diﬀerences are larger
when the reliabilities overall are low (like in Exponential distribution) or there is
a signiﬁcant proportion of low reliabilities (as in the Uniform distribution). The
eﬀect is less likely when the majority of reliabilities are broadly similar (like in
the Normal distribution) or when the reliabilities tend to be high (in the Reverse
Exponential distribution). When the fees are signiﬁcant (clearly larger than zero),
the diﬀerence should be clear in all of our settings. Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 16. The Constant 0.00 policy is no worse than any policy
that uses non-negative decommitment fees and it will be able to beat
all policies that use high decommitment fees in all our settings and it
will also beat policies with relatively low decommitment fees in some
settings.
Our ﬁnal hypothesis deals with other policies with negative fees. These are Re-
verse Expectation Damages and the Constant policies with negative fees. These
policies will of course be no better than the Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages
policy and will be beaten by the optimal policy in many situations. However, we
will be more interested how these policies fare against the Constant 0.0 decom-
mitment policy. All these policies are likely to over-compensate for the seller’s
losses and especially his costs. Of course the costs may be over 0.25 in which case
Constant -0.25 will under-compensate for the costs, but often even that policy
will overcompensate. This means that the buyer is very worried about possible
decommitments and will try to choose more reliable providers and if there are not
reliable enough providers in the market, it will prefer not to negotiate at all. This
will mean that these policies will negotiate less than other policies and they will
also pass on the opponents that could bring positive utility for the society. On the
other hand, since these policies usually overcompensate, the sellers usually have
positive utility in the end no matter what happens, unlike under the Constant
0.0 policy where the sellers may often be liable for their wasted preparation costs.
When the Constant 0.0 policy chooses a large number of relatively low reliability
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very careful policies with negative fees may outperform the Constant 0.0 policy
in terms of total utility. However, when sellers with more intermediate reliability
are chosen, the best policies with negative fees are likely to be too careful and
therefore fare worse than Constant 0.0. When reliabilities are high all around,
there is likely to be little diﬀerence between the two.7 Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 17. The Constant 0.00 policy will do well against the
Reverse Expectation Damages and Constant policies with negative fees
when many sellers with moderate or high (not very high) reliability are
chosen, but less well when very bad providers have to be chosen. When
reliabilities are very high, the diﬀerence (if any) is likely to be small
(decommitments are rare).
7.2.2 Experimental Setup
In all our experiments we had a Medium-sized buyer population. We then ran the
experiments in four diﬀerent reliability distribution settings (Uniform, Normal,
Exponential and Reverse Exponential) and with seven diﬀerent seller population
sizes (tiny, very small, small, medium, large, very large, huge). That is 28 settings
in total. In each setting, we ran the market using (Enhanced) Reverse Reliance
Damages and all 107 basic decommitment policies. Each run was repeated 100
times and averages of total utility were calculated. A statistical analysis was then
conducted usually using one-sided t-test to compare the averages. However, in the
testing of the ﬁnal hypothesis, we use two-sided tests, because it would be diﬃcult
from our theory to know exactly where the changes described occur.
7.2.3 Results
The performance of diﬀerent policies with diﬀerent sizes of seller populations and
diﬀerent seller reliability distributions is shown in ﬁgure 7.1. It is clear in all four
reliability distribution cases that the Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages policy
is practically always on the top and the Best of the Rest, the best of all policies
that do not have low fees (all 101 of them) is the worst when the seller population
7All of these claims require that the negative fees are reasonably large and that is why −0.25
is the smallest negative fee in the Constant policies. If the negative fees could be very small, the
situation would be analogical to the situation where there is small positive fees: the diﬀerences
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size exceeds the buyer population size and the selection starts to have an eﬀect on
the performance. It is also easy to see that in all cases when the seller population
is Medium or of smaller size, the performance of all policies except the (Enhanced)
Reverse Reliance Damages is broadly similar.
The reason why the (Enhanced) Reverse Reliance Damages policies are better than
the rest, even when the seller population is smaller than the buyer population, is
that they only start negotiations that will lead to positive expected utility for the
society. This is because they also take into consideration the seller’s costs. The
other policies do not and therefore they may start negotiations that would not be in
the society’s interest, although they are in the buyer’s. The diﬀerence is especially
clear when the reliabilities are low (reliabilities Exponentially distributed, see ﬁgure
7.1.c). Here, due to the low reliabilities, many contracts are detrimental to the
common good and the total utility in most policies actually decreases when the
population size and the number of contracts formed increases. This trend only
changes when the opponent selection starts to kick in (the seller population is
larger than the buyer population) and only more reliable providers are selected.
As for our hypotheses, we claimed that the Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages
policy will be able to beat all the other policies (including the Reverse Reliance
Damages policy) when a large number of moderately reliable providers are among
the selected. There is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in performance of these
policies with:
• Uniform reliability distribution when the seller population is Medium (at
the p < 0.01 level),
• Normal reliability distribution when the seller population is Medium, Large
or Very Large (all at the p < 0.01 level) and
• Exponential reliability distribution when the seller population is Large or
Very Large (all at the p < 0.05 and p < 0.001 level respectively).
In all other cases, their performance is statistically inseparable. With the Uniform
distribution, there is a large number of providers with moderate reliances chosen
when pretty much all providers are chosen (Medium). When the seller popula-
tion size increases, both policies discussed here ﬁnd more and more very reliable
providers and the diﬀerence vanishes. The same eﬀect can be seen in other cases.
In the Normal distribution cases, most of the providers will be in the reliability
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Figure 7.1: Selection Decision (Hypothesis 14).
slowly when the number of sellers increases. Therefore, the diﬀerence is clear up
until Very Large population size.8 In the Exponential distribution case, there are
too many very unreliable providers chosen in the Medium population size case.
But when the population size increases further, there are more moderately reli-
able providers in the market, they are chosen and the diﬀerence is clear until the
number of relatively reliable providers increases in the Huge population to such
8And actually the p-value also in case of Huge population is 0.0504, so making it very close
to being signiﬁcant.Chapter 7 The Selection Decision 175
an extent that the diﬀerence vanishes again. In the Reverse Exponential reliabil-
ity distribution cases, there are simply too many very reliable providers to show
any diﬀerence. These ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 14 and we therefore
accept it.
The next hypothesis argues that the diﬀerence between the Reverse Reliance Dam-
ages and Constant 0.0 policy is at its largest when there is a large number of
relatively unreliable providers in the seller population and the buyers are forced to
choose them. There is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Enhanced
Reverse Reliance Damages and Constant 0.0 policies in the following cases:
• Uniform reliability distribution, all seller population sizes except Huge (Tiny
at the p < 0.01 and Very Large at the p < 0.05 level, otherwise at the
p < 0.0001 level),
• Normal reliability distribution, all seller population sizes (from Large up-
wards at the p < 0.001 level, Very Small at the p < 0.001 level and in other
cases at the p < 0.05 level),
• Exponential reliability distribution, all seller population sizes (at the p <
0.0001 level).
There is no diﬀerence in the other cases. In cases where the seller population is at
most Medium, the diﬀerences are largely explained by the fact that the Enhanced
Reverse Reliance Damages policy only chooses opponents that will produce posi-
tive expected utility for the society. The Constant 0.0 does not take the seller’s
costs into account, so it will be less careful and that will decrease its total utility.
In the Uniform distribution, the Constant 0.0 policy will choose some relatively
unreliable providers until there are so many reliable providers to choose from (the
seller population is Huge) that it manages to choose enough very reliable ones
that there is no diﬀerence. In the Normal and Exponential distributions, there is
never enough of these very reliable sellers, so the diﬀerence remains in all cases. In
contrast, in the Negative Exponential case, there is always so many very reliable
providers that there is no diﬀerence between the policies. The diﬀerence between
the Constant 0.0 and Enhanced Reverse Reliance Damages policy is much larger
than between the Reverse Reliance Damages and Enhanced Reverse Reliance Dam-
ages, so the diﬀerences are also clearer in the other cases and the diﬀerences are
especially clear in the Exponential distribution case where the reliabilities are in
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From ﬁgures 7.1.a-d, it is clear that the Constant 0.0 policy beats all policies with
high fees easily when the opponent selection aﬀects the outcome (when there are
more sellers than buyers). This diﬀerence is at the p < 0.0001 level in all cases
except in the Normal distribution and Large seller population size where it is at
the p < 0.001 level. When it comes to the policies with low fees, the diﬀerences
are much smaller. The cases where there is a diﬀerence are as follows:
• Uniform reliability distribution, from seller population size of Large onwards
(at the p < 0.01 level in Huge population case and at the p < 0.0001 in the
two other cases),
• Exponential reliability distribution, from seller population size of Large on-
wards (all at the p < 0.0001),
• Reverse Exponential reliability distribution, the seller population size of
Large (at the p < 0.001).
In the Normal distribution there was no diﬀerence and in cases where the seller
population was smaller, all policies with non-negative fees were producing broadly
similar results. In Uniform, there is a wide range of diﬀerent reliabilities among the
sellers and some sellers will be relatively unreliable but oﬀer a large utility in case
of performance. This tempts the buyers to choose them more when the policy gives
them positive utility even in case of non-performance. In the Exponential case,
there is a large number of unreliable providers and the buyers are less worried about
choosing them if they get some positive utility also in case of non-performance.
On the other hand, with the policy Constant 0.0 there is no beneﬁt for the buyers
in non-performance, so they will tend to choose more reliable providers.9 In the
Reverse Exponential case, there is still not so many providers that have both a
very good quality (value) and are very reliable when the seller population is Large
and therefore the policies with positive fees tend to choose some providers with
lower reliability. However, when the population size increases, there is enough high
quality and high reliability providers to choose from such that the diﬀerence will
not be statistically signiﬁcant. The reason why there is no diﬀerence in the Normal
distribution is that in this case the vast majority of providers have relatively similar
reliability (around 0.5) and therefore the policies with low positive fees are less
tempted to choose very unreliable providers.
9Of course, the Constant 0.0 policy will not choose the most reliable providers because
ρs
Vb(q)−Cs(q)
2 still has two factors and if the
Vb(q)−Cs(q)
2 is large enough a slightly lower ρs will
do. But with a positive fee also a term (1−ρs)f will compensate for the lower ρs and therefore
the buyers will under these policies choose even more unreliable providers.Chapter 7 The Selection Decision 177
The performance of policies with negative fees are shown in ﬁgure 7.2. As expected,
the clearest cut case is the Normal distribution, where there are very few very
reliable providers and many others mediocre reliabilities. In these circumstances,
the negative policies that try to avoid decommitments by selecting very reliable
providers and if they fail that not negotiate at all, do not perform well and they
are clearly worse than the best policies. With very high negative fees (Constant
-0.5 or Constant -1.0), there is barely any negotiations at all. The Constant
0.0 policy is able to beat Reverse Expectation Damages and all Constant policies
with negative fees in all cases except Tiny (with Very Small population at the
p < 0.001 level and in other cases at the p < 0.0001 level10). Another clear-cut
case is the Exponential distribution, where there are many unreliable providers
and many of the providers are actually counterproductive to the common good.
All discussed policies with negative fees get non-negative values in all situations,
though, because they only negotiate with opponents that can give them positive
expected utility and their fees are likely to cover the seller’s costs in any case. This
means that the expected utility is non-negative for the society too. However, the
buyers are negotiating very little especially when the negative fees are very high.
This careful attitude pays in this setting and the best policies are able to beat the
Constant 0.0 policy in all seller population cases except Huge. In the Huge seller
population, the Constant 0.0 policy manages to select so many good providers
that it is no longer worse, but it will not be able to beat the Reverse Expectation
Damages here in a statistically signiﬁcant way (p = 0.0694).11
The remaining two cases are less clear, although the story is similar. In the
Uniform distribution, there is a reasonable number of providers with very good
reliabilities and therefore most of the policies with negative fees will be able to
perform well (the ones with very high fees obviously will perform less well). Here,
the Constant 0.0 policy overtakes the negative fee policies already when the seller
population is Large. This is because the opponents it chooses start to have high
reliabilities and therefore mostly positive expected utility for the society too and
because it is less careful, it gets more contracts. The best negative fee policies
remain close to the Constant 0.0 policies, but the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between them remains with the Very Large and Huge seller populations (at the
p < 0.05 level in Very Large, at the p < 0.001 level in Huge and at the p <
0.0001 level in Large seller population). In the Reverse Exponential distribution,
most opponents will have very high reliabilities and therefore all the best policies
10Here and in other cases we used two-sided tests, because we might get diﬀerences in both
directions.


























































































































Figure 7.2: Policies with negative fees vs. Best policies (Hypothesis 15).
will perform quite well (no diﬀerence statistically). Only the policies with the
largest negative fees are still too careful when choosing who to negotiate with and
consequently they fare less well. Here, the Constant 0.0 policy is not able to beat
the best of the negative policies at all and it actually loses to it in Small and
Medium seller populations (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 respectively). This may be
because even in the Reverse Exponential policy some providers with mediocre or
even low reliability exist in a Small or Medium seller populations (not necessarilyChapter 7 The Selection Decision 179
in the smaller ones) and when the policy is Constant 0.0, the agent will negotiate
with these bad providers and that hurts the common good. In contrast, when
the best policies with negative fees are used, such providers will often be ignored.
When the Constant 0.0 policy is able to choose more reliable providers from a
bigger population, the diﬀerence between the policies vanishes.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed selection decision and investigated how the decom-
mitment policy aﬀects the buyers’ choice between diﬀerent contract partners, who
have a verying level of reliance as well as quality and how these choices aﬀect the
common good in a variety of settings. We investigated several near-optimal policies
and compared their performance with the optimal and other policies (contribution
C4).
In more detail, compensating for the buyer’s losses to any extent in a case where
the buyer chooses between heterogeneously reliable sellers, is problematic from
the society’s point of view. This is because any compensation in case of non-
performance, makes that possibility less worrying and encourages the buyer to
choose less reliable providers and, with fees higher than the expected utility, even
targetting especially the unreliable sellers. The best decommitment policy from
the selection decision’s point of view would be to make the buyer pay the seller’s
costs in case of non-performance, even though it is the seller that is forced to
decommit. However, this policy is not without its problems, and some of them
are quite devastating. First of all, the both Reverse Reliance Damages policies
assume that the buyer is the only one making the decisions and that the seller’s
reliability is ﬁxed. Now, let us assume that we use the Enhanced Reverse Reliance
Damages policy, have selected an opponent, negotiated with it and reached an
agreement. Now the seller has to make a decision about whether or not to stay in
the contract (performance decision). Its utilities are:
Us(q | performance) = p − Cs(q)
Us(q | decommitment) = −f − D(t)Cs(q)Chapter 7 The Selection Decision 180
The fee covers the possible cost D(t)Cs(q) and the ‘seller’s half’ of the proﬁt or
1
2(Vb(q) − Cs(q)), so we get:
Us(q | performance) = p − Cs(q)
Us(q | decommitment) = 1
2(Vb(q) − Cs(q)).
This means that if the ﬁnal price is lower than its average proﬁt, the seller will
actually prefer decommitment even without any adverse eﬀects! A similar situation
could also arise with all the Constant policies with negative fees.12 And these
contracts would still be beneﬁcial for the society, so this is hardly the situation we
were hoping for. In the experiments described in this section, the sellers were only
allowed to decommit if they experienced an adverse eﬀect (i.e. because of their
reliability) and not for this reason. The performance of the Enhanced Reverse
Reliance Damages policy would not be anywhere near as good as it is now if
this restriction was not in place. However, here we were interested in the selection
decision and the selection decision alone and in that setting, it is the optimal policy.
The Reverse Reliance Damages or Constant 0.0 policies would be better in this
respect, because the former would give Us(q | decommitment) = 0 and the latter
Us(q | decommitment) = −D(t)Cs(q), both of which are less than p − Cs(q) > 0.
Therefore these policies would never mean decommitment without some sort of
adverse eﬀect.
12When the fee in the Constant policy is very high, this is almost a certainty. The seller’s
proﬁt can be at most 0.5 and that would require a price of 1.0, which is not very likely. Only
a buyer with qmax
b = 1 would be willing to pay that and such buyers are not very probable.
So, basically, if the fee is −0.50, −0.75 or −1.00, the seller would always choose to decommit.
The only thing stopping it might be that decommitting always would eventually decrease the







After discussing the market setting and the common good in the previous part, we
will now here (in part II) discuss a rather more complicated setting and concen-
trate on the buyer agent’s strategies and welfare alone. This allows us to try more
complicated strategies and tactics and see more clearly the eﬀect they will have
on the individual’s performance. We will do so in a somewhat more complicated
setting, namely concurrent bilateral negotiation, where one buyer agent can nego-
tiate with many provider agents at the same time. Nevertheless, the results and
ideas from the previous part are still very much in use here. In particular, we still
have decommitments and decommitment policies and we see how the buyer agent
should adapt to the possibility of changing circumstances. Here, the changing
circumstances may force buyers and/or sellers to decommit and the buyer agent
should take this into account when deciding what to do.
In more detail, concurrent bilateral negotiation is a more complicated form of
interaction than the market setting we discussed in the ﬁrst part. Thus, more
factors need to be considered. Of the decisions discussed in the ﬁrst part, we will
concentrate here on the contract and selection decisions, deciding when and if to
enter into a contract and who to negotiate with. We focus on these two because
we want to have only a couple of decisions and given this, we want to discuss the
decommitment policies’ eﬀect before and during the negotiation.1 This is because
after the contract has been formed the environment loses most of its signiﬁcance2
1The other two decisions (performance and reliance) occur after the contract has been formed.
2Obviously the possibility of re-entry and the probability of a replacement contract do matter
as we discussed in chapter 4.
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and only the contract and its possible decommitment matter. Also these decisions
have not been discussed together in the literature.
In addition, we also consider issues like choosing a good tactic in a single negoti-
ation and coordinating negotiations over the same and even diﬀerent services. To
this end, this chapter provides an overview of our adaptive concurrent bilateral
negotiation model and the remaining chapters of this part (chapters 9 − 11) will
discuss the details and our experimental results. The work in this part is related
to the research contributions C5–C9. This chapter is concerned with the contri-
bution C5, designing a model for concurrent bilateral nexgotiation, the rest of the
contributions will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
We start the introduction of our model by explaining the environment the buyer
agent needs to be able to work in (section 8.1). We will then discuss the model
itself (section 8.2) and its implementation (section 8.3). Finally, we will summarise
the main points (section 8.4).
8.1 The Marketplace
We start by discussing the environment or the marketplace. In most respects, the
marketplace is just a variation of the basic market model of the previous part.
However, we have also made some changes for the reasons we will discuss here and
later.
So, we have a marketplace where buyers and sellers meet to negotiate on the price
of services. Unlike in the market setting, however, we can also have multiple sepa-
rate markets oﬀering diﬀerent services, although in most cases we only investigate
one market at the time. We also only have one buyer (subscript b) and many
sellers (subscript s) in each market,3 although the buyer may negotiate with more
than one seller concurrently in any or all of these markets. Since in this chapter we
are developing the buyer agent for such a setting, we are interested mostly in the
buyer’s utility, Ub. Otherwise the basics are the same as in the market model (see
chapter 3). As before, the time t is discrete and divided into turns. We assume
that all participants expect the delivery of the service to occur at the same time
tdelivery.
We will now explain how the marketplace works (section 8.1.1), then we discuss
how the negotiations proceed and how the parties get the parameters for the
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negotiations (section 8.1.2). Finally, we will discuss how we make the parties
consider the issues associated with decommitment on the contracts that have been
formed (section 8.1.3).
8.1.1 Matching and Entries
We still have the matching occuring every 100 turns and parties still negotiate for
100 turns on the price of the service. However, unlike in the market setting, we
allow the buyer agent to choose the speciﬁc sellers it wants to negotiate with (op-
ponent selection). In particular, we will experiment with several diﬀerent types of
opponent selection methods. The simplest one is, of course, the random selection,
where the buyer chooses its negotiation partners among the sellers in the market
at random. However, we will also discuss more sophisticated ways to make this
choice.
Another signiﬁcant change we have introduced is that we have diversiﬁed the ne-
gotiation tactics that the parties employ. In the market setting, we used only the
simple Exponential Time-Dependent negotiation tactic. However, ﬁnding a good
countertactic to that is relatively simple (especially if and when you have good
information about the opponent’s valuation and/or costs and hence, their reser-
vation price or their deadline), because it would simply be a matter of waiting for
the best oﬀer. Thus, we will assume that the parties know each other’s reserva-
tion prices, but not the deadlines. This assumption, although quite bold, is not
unreasonable in many markets where the production technology and markets are
well-known.4 This means the sellers must be able to use other negotiation tactics
as well (otherwise they would be left with almost no utility).
As discussed above, we want to be able to make interesting decisions already
in a single negotiation, so the opponent will have to have diﬀerent and more
challenging negotiation tactics than was the case in Part I. However, on the other
hand, we want the number of tactics to remain relatively small to keep the bilateral
negotiation part manageable. To balance this tradeoﬀ, recall that our main interest
in this work is on the higher levels, so we endow the sellers with four diﬀerent
tactics:
4We could have introduced uncertainty about the opponent’s reservation price but that is not
likely to signiﬁcantly change the situation and would be an additional complexity to our model.
This means the performance we get from our model may be slightly too high for some settings,
but such uncertainty would be easy to add to our model. We will discuss this aspect further in
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• Exponential Time-Dependent: as in the market setting, the β parameter is
still chosen at random,
• Random tactic: the oﬀer is selected at random between the seller’s reserva-
tion price and one (from a Uniform distribution). This makes it very hard
to guess what a single oﬀer might look like and it is unlikely that an actual
reservation oﬀer will be made. This means that simply waiting it out does
not work.
• Pure Behavioural: the seller’s oﬀer mirrors the oﬀer the buyer makes. If
the buyer oﬀers the seller’s reservation price, the seller will oﬀer the buyer’s
reservation price (if higher than its reservation price) and any improvement
on that on the buyer’s behalf will be met with equal improvement on the
seller’s behalf. This basically means that the best contract for the buyer is
the midway point between the reservation oﬀers leaving half of the utility to
the seller.
• Random Behavioural: the seller’s oﬀer mirrors the oﬀer the buyer makes,
but not accurately. Instead a random oﬀer is chosen between one that would
represent double the concession the buyer has made (between the seller’s
and buyer’s reservation prices) and one. This combines the two previous
approaches and means that one needs to consider carefully what oﬀer to
make.
The three new tactics mean that waiting it out making insigniﬁcant oﬀers is no
longer a viable tactic. With the Random tactic, the seller’s oﬀers go up and down
and the buyer needs to choose when to accept one of them. With the behavioural
tactics (the last two), it is no longer viable to keep making oﬀers that will never
get accepted until the seller makes a good oﬀer. Rather the buyer is forced to
make oﬀers that the seller might accept to lure it to make a good oﬀer. Now,
as it turns out, there is an optimal counter tactic for each of these but they are,
of course, quite diﬀerent from each other. We will discuss these tactics and their
counter-tactics in detail later (see section 9.1.2.2).
In more detail, the tactic (θs) is selected for each individual seller at random, all
four usually being equally likely (so the probability of each is 0.25). The buyer
agent has an a priori (without entering into negotiation) guess what the chosen
tactic of a given opponent is with probability χ, otherwise it will have no informa-
tion. Such guesses could be based, for example, on the previous encounters. The
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known by the buyer. The guesses may be a result of observations about the seller’s
preferences in earlier negotiations between the parties or they can be derived from
some other information. If it always has a guess and its guess is always right
(χ = 1.0 and γ = 1.0), it will always know the opponent’s tactic accurately, but
this will not always be the case. Given this, we will investigate a range of possible
values for both parameters and their eﬀect on the buyer’s performance.
We assume that the sellers take a failed negotiation as a sign that the buyer will
not want their service and because there are no other buyers in the market, they
always exit the market. Therefore, the buyer will never be able to negotiate with
the same provider more than once. Instead, the buyer chooses new opponents to
negotiate with from the remaining providers. If the buyer gets a contract, it will
exit the market and there will be no further negotiations. Otherwise, the matching
process is repeated 9 more times. This means that we will have 10 matchings in
total like we did in the market setting. Also the entries and exits occur in the
seller population as they did in the market setting. The contracts are performed
when the negotiations end, tdelivery = 1000.
In the beginning (t = t0 = 0), there are n0 sellers in the market. Over time,
some sellers enter and some may exit. As in the market setting, the numbers of
entries for the parties are independent variables and follow the standard Poisson
distribution, with the parameter λ(t) = i
tlastEntry−t
tlastEntry , where i is the basic entry
intensity, tlastEntry the last turn that entries are possible and t is the current turn.5
Here, we only use Medium population because it gives us a reasonable amount
of sellers (around 250) and trying diﬀerent population sizes was not considered
a priority in this work (much of the results discussed would not be aﬀected by
population sizes) so, n0 = 50 and i = 0.4.
8.1.2 The Negotiation Parameters
As in the market setting (section 3.2), we still assume that the provisioning of the
service costs money for the buyer. Speciﬁcally, in order to provide the service at
the delivery time, the provider s has to invest a cost cs at time tc,s(< tdelivery).
Here we only use the simplest setting:
5As explained earlier, this formulation means that entries are more probable earlier in the
experiment. This is realistic because the parties are more likely to ﬁnd a contract if they enter
early. This is especially true for the providers, because we assume that the provision of the
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• Any: Uniform(max(0,te,s + 1),1000),
where te,s is the time of entry for provider s. The time tc,s is selected independently
for each provider using the same interval. Each provider has a quality qs, which




0, if t < tc,s,
cs = 0.5qs, if t ≥ tc,s.
These provider characteristics are mapped into typical bilateral negotiation pa-
rameters by setting the reservation price rs equal to the provider’s preparation
cost cs and the deadline to tc,s. This means that the provider will never accept a
price that is less than its costs and that if the provider does not have a contract
when it should start preparing for service, it will exit the market. The provider’s
utility for a contract is: Us(p,cs) = p − cs, where p is the contract price. The
sellers do not consider decommitments when they make their decisions and they
are, therefore, vulnerable to the buyer exploitation. By using simple sellers, we
can see the eﬀect of buyer strategies and tactics more clearly. In a more realistic
setting, we might not be able to see the diﬀerences the buyer strategies make or
at least they would be obscured by the sellers’ reactions.6
The buyer does not have costs, but it has a deadline tx,b = tdelivery − 1 = 999.
The consumer’s utility for the contract is Ub(q,p) = Vb(q) − p and here we use a
simpliﬁed version of the buyer’s value function, Vb(q) = q. So, eﬀectively we have
removed the minimal acceptable quality which means that the buyer will be able
to beneﬁt from any provider’s service. This change is purely technical and is done
to remove an extra source of variation in our results.
8.1.3 Decommitment
In the market setting, we introduced an adverse impact on the contract utility
that could aﬀect one or both parties. When it occurs, it makes them want to
consider decommitment. We have these impacts in here as well and, as before, we
use ab and as to denote the probability that the buyer or seller (respectively) will
be aﬀected.
For the provider, the decrease means that the cost of providing the service increases
by amount Ls and this will decrease its utility by the same amount. He will then
6See our discussion and results on the contract decision in the market setting, chapter 6.Chapter 8 An Adaptive Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Model 188
need to make a decision on whether or not to decommit from the contract in this
new situation. The decision is inﬂuenced by the decommitment fee fs. We assume
that the provider s will decommit at turn t if and only if:
Us(contract|Ls = l) < Us(tdecommit = t)
p − cs − l < −fs − Cs(qs,t).
where Us(tdecommit = t) is the seller’s utility, when he decommits at turn t and
l is the amount the utility decreases. Here we use the following ten values l ∈
{0.1,0.2,...,1.0}. So, the seller decommits if the decreased utility is lower than
the cost it has already paid and the decommitment fee has to pay to get out of
the contract. The seller learns of the loss at some point tl (selected at random)
between the time the contract was formed tcontract and the time it was due to be
performed (tdelivery) excluding both of the extremes. However, we assume that this
loss itself is always avoidable, if the contract is abandoned before it is delivered.
This means that the additional cost has to be paid just before the delivery. It is
not possible that this additional cost is paid if there is no delivery.7 There can
only be one eﬀect per party and the eﬀect is always ﬁnal. All possible moments for
learning of the eﬀect are equally likely, and unlike in the market setting, the eﬀect
can take place also before the entry, i.e. tl ∼ Uniform(0,tdelivery−1). A seller that
is in the market when the eﬀect occurs will immediately exit (withdrawing from
a negotiation if necessary) and if the eﬀect occurs before the entry, the buyer will
not enter the market at all. This change was made to balance the exits between
the buyer and the sellers. Otherwise there would have been more last minute exits
for the sellers.8
The same applies to the buyer, except for two things. Unlike the seller agents,
which can negotiate only with the buyer agent, the buyer agent can be negotiating
with more than one opponent at the same time. This means that it may end up
with more than one contract. Of course the buyer agent should be able to avoid
accepting more than one contract itself, but if it makes oﬀers to more than one
opponent they may be accepted eﬀectively at the same time. Getting into more
contracts than required can be counter-productive because the buyer will then
have to pay the decommitment fee for these extra contracts and these fees will
usually decrease his utility.9 On the other hand, negotiating with more than one
7However, it is possible that the seller has to pay the original cost even without a delivery as
explained earlier. Only the extra cost is tied to the actual performance.
8This is because the buyer always enters at turn 0, but most sellers join later.
9We will of course also discuss the case where the fee is zero and therefore decommitting from
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opponent at the same time will mean that the buyer agent is able to see a bigger
part of the market and therefore, potentially, it will be able to ﬁnd a better deal.
This trade-oﬀ is of course one of the topics for discussion in this part and we will
discuss various ways of making it (in section 10.1.2.2). Another diﬀerence is the
costs. Like the market setting, we assume that the buyer has no costs associated
with accepting and using the services (or more likely that these costs are built in
its value function), so we always have Cb = 0 (for the seller Cs ≥ 0).
In the market setting, the buyer’s contract utility decrease had an upper limit,
the adversely aﬀected contract value could not be lower than −0.05 (Vb(q) ≥
−0.05), because we assumed that the buyer can ignore the seller’s performance
at a low cost. However, this may not always be the case. The seller may, for
example, need information or some other services from the consumer in order to
produce its service and although this information or corresponding services may
normally be very cheap (even ‘free’) to produce, an adverse impact may make this
very expensive. For example, the buyer’s Internet connection or hardware may
experience a catastrophic failure and although it may be possible to get a new
connection or hardware in time to provide the services the seller needs, this may
be very expensive. In this case, the only way the buyer can avoid paying these
unexpected extra costs is to decommit from the contract and that means paying
the applicable decommitment fee. Here, we also assume that the adverse impact
is always catastrophic or at least bad enough that the agents (both buyers and
sellers) always decommit when it happens (Lb = Ls = 5.0). This assumption is
made to keep the model more manageable and the results more clear.
Since, in this chapter, we are interested in the buyer utility. The buyer utility for
the diﬀerent possible outcomes are:
• success: Ub(success) = Vb(q) − p = q − p − ∆
• the buyer decommits: Ub(b decommits) = −fb − ∆
• the seller decommits: Ub(s decommits) = fs − ∆
∆ denotes the decommitment fees that the buyer has had to pay to decommit from
the extra contracts (those above 1). In theory, it is also possible that both parties
decommit at the same time, but we did not consider that remote possibility in
this work. One of the parties would always decommit ﬁrst, even if both happened
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8.2 Architecture for the Consumer Agent
In this section we discuss the architecture for our consumer agent. The agent’s
task is to ﬁnd a service its master requires for a reasonable price. This basic archi-
tecture is based upon other models on concurrent bilateral negotiation, especially
the model of Nguyen and Jennings (discussed in section 2.3.3.1). However, we
extend and modify their model to also consider diﬀerent negotiation tactics and
interrelated negotiation groups. This makes the distribution of duties on diﬀer-
ent levels more explicit, clear and extendable. So what we have is a hierarchical
model, where the diﬀerent levels have a diﬀerent view of the problem and the
view broadens from the bottom up. The ﬁnal decisions are taken at a high level
so that a wider range of issues can be considered. However, the know-how and
understanding of the lower levels are also utilised and the higher levels do not
second-guess the recommendations from lower levels but adjust them only based
on their wider view and in cooperation with the lower levels. Each level concen-
trates only on certain type of problems and assumes that other levels do their
part. This makes the architecture easier to understand and implement and also
allows more sophisticated solutions to single problems.
The consumer agent architecture consists of three layers or levels (see ﬁgure 8.1),
which are:
• the Negotiator10 level: Each Negotiator is engaged in a negotiation with
a single provider agent over a single service. It only cares about that one
negotiation and is unaware of anything else.
• the Controller level: A Controller manages a group of Negotiators that
negotiate about the provision of the same service. All Negotiators under
it report on their progress every turn. This gives this component an overall
view of all negotiations on the same service, and allows it to manage the
problems that concurrent bilateral negotiation can cause.
• the Coordinator level: The Coordinator manages the diﬀerent Controllers
and gets a report of their progress every turn. This gives it a good overall
view of all the services and negotiations and enables it to manage dependen-
cies between negotiations on diﬀerent services.
10Throughout this thesis, we will use use the typeset text for the diﬀerent levels of the model
(for example the Controller (level)) and typeset text with surrounding inequalities (for example
a <Controller> (component)) to refer to speciﬁc components. In addition, we will use the former
to refer to the instances of a certain component (for example a Controller instance).Chapter 8 An Adaptive Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Model 191
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Figure 8.1: The Concurrent Negotiation Agent Architecture.
In more detail, the Negotiators are trying to ﬁnd the best oﬀer to make in a nego-
tiation with a given opponent. This is the Negotiator’s core competence, so the
other levels will not change the oﬀer to make without consulting the Negotiator
ﬁrst. The Negotiator will also suggest accepting an oﬀer or withdrawing from its
negotiation, but the ﬁnal decisions are usually made at the upper levels.
Since we use concurrent bilateral negotiation as an interaction model, there is more
than one Negotiator negotiating with the diﬀerent providers on the same service
in parallel. They have all the information that is relevant to this task and nothing
more. They know all about possible opponent strategies and good counterstrate-
gies, but know nothing of the other negotiations or the environment around them.
Whatever information is considered necessary for the task at hand will be pro-
vided by the Controller. The Controller will also choose the opponent for the
Negotiator (although it may consult the Negotiator during the selection pro-
cess). The most important piece of information given to the Negotiator is the
expected oﬀers in future negotiations. This will allow the Negotiator to put the
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in the future) is not possible, it will know not to suggest an inferior deal.11
A group of Negotiators is controlled by a Controller, which has two main tasks:
• opponent selection: choose the opponents to negotiate with and
• concurrency strategy: choose the number of negotiations to have at the same
time.
These tasks are of course interrelated. The best number of negotiations may well
depend on the opponents considered. These things may and often do depend on the
negotiation strategies and available information about the opponents and that is
where the Negotiator comes into play. The Negotiator will have the information
about likely outcomes against diﬀerent opponents and the best opponent selection
and concurrency strategies use the information only the Negotiator can provide.
However, the division of responsibilities is clear: the Negotiator can only advise
on likely outcomes in a single negotiation, the Controller’s task is to consider
the eﬀect the multiple negotiations can have. That is, the risk of getting into
more than one contract on one hand and ﬁnding the best providers on the other
hand. Basically, a Controller makes all the decisions that aﬀect more than one
negotiation: it decides when it is time to quit a negotiation, when to accept a
certain oﬀer, when to start new negotiations and who to negotiate with. In the
case where more than one of the agent’s oﬀers gets accepted by its opponents, a
Controller decides which contract to take and which to decommit from.
A group of Controllers is, in turn, controlled by the Coordinator. The Coordi-
nator’s task is to ensure that the interdependencies between the diﬀerent services
are satisﬁed. We will explore two types of interdependencies: substitutes and
complements. Substitutes are services that although diﬀerent essentially provide
the same thing. Therefore, the buyer will only need one of the services. In case
of substitutes, the Coordinator’s task is to manage the risk that the buyer gets
more than one service and will need to decommit from the extra contracts by
paying the decommitment fee. This is essentially very similar to the Controller’s
problem and many of the solutions that work in one problem work in the other.
Complements, on the other hand, are services that complement each other. Thus,
having services A and B is better than having one or none of them. Here, we
11If getting that good a result is not possible in the current negotiation, the Negotiator will
make sure that no contract is formed either by withdrawing or by making oﬀers that it knows
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investigate complements that have a positive value only if all complementary ser-
vices are acquired and zero value if one or more of the services is missing. In such
cases, the Coordinator’s task is to make sure that either it gets all the services
or it gets none of them. This is because we again assume that the buyer will
have to decommit from useless contracts and here, it means all contracts unless
the Coordinator has a contract for all relevant services. This problem is slightly
diﬀerent from the others.
The interaction of these three components is described in ﬁgure 8.2. The basic idea
is that the lower level makes a suggestion for an action (since it is an expert on its
own level), but the decision is made at the higher level, which has a better overall
view of the situation. The higher level usually follows the recommendation of the
lower level, but it will sometimes adjust it (in cooperation with the lower level),
if it knows of some conﬂict on its own level that the lower level was not aware
of. So, when a Negotiator receives an oﬀer from the opponent (step 1), it com-
piles a report of the negotiation so far and recommends an action to be taken to a
Controller (step 2). A Controller waits until it has this information from all its
Negotiators and then devises an overall strategy taking into account the develop-
ments in all the negotiations. This recommended strategy with a status report is
sent to the Coordinator (step 3). The Coordinator then creates an overall strat-
egy over all negotiations taking into account the interdependencies between the
diﬀerent negotiation groups. This can mean starting new Controllers or ending
existing ones. In addition, each Controller is sent its part of the strategy (step
4). The Controller then implements the strategy by starting new Negotiators
or sending existing ones their orders (step 5). Each Negotiator then follows its
orders by taking the prescribed action (step 6).
Due to the layered structure, the Coordinator will not know how many Negotiators
there are in each market or what sort of oﬀers they will be making. It does not
need this information but trusts that the lower level to do their duties. It only
needs to know the probability of success and expected outcome in each market
and this information will be provided by its Controllers.
8.3 Implementation
The implementation was extended and modiﬁed from the marketplace model im-
plementation we used in part I (section 3.4) using the same tools. The structure
















Figure 8.2: The interaction of the consumer agent components.
component is a class of its own and diﬀerent strategies are implemented as classes
with the same interface (that the other parts use to interact with them). Special
care was taken to ensure modularity of the implementation, so that strategies and
tactics can be changed at runtime. As in Part I, a conﬁguration ﬁle contains the
information about the strategies, tactics and other settings to be used and the
system is conﬁgured according to the contents of the ﬁle at runtime. The ﬁle
generated has 250-2500 values for each run depending on the settings used. The
highest number of settings are in cases where the Coordinator and several mar-
kets are used, because events at each market are described in detail. The analysis
is conducted in the same manner as in Part I.
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we described the environment the buyer agent has to work in and
we oﬀered an overview of our model for the consumer agent engaged in concur-
rent bilateral negotiation. Speciﬁcally, we have a layered-model where each layer
or level makes certain types of decisions in the concurrent negotiation. We have
Negotiators that handle single bilateral negotiations, we have Controllers that
manage potentially many bilateral negotiations on the same service through man-
aging a group of Negotiators and a Coordinator that manages negotiations onChapter 8 An Adaptive Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Model 195
diﬀerent services and the interconnections between them. Each diﬀerent question
is isolated to a separate and interchangeable module and we deﬁned the interaction
between these modules in detail (contribution C5). The next step is to discuss
these levels one by one in more detail and test our ideas empirically. This will be
done in the subsequent chapters 9 − 11.Chapter 9
Negotiation Tactics: The
Negotiator Level
As explained in section 8.2, the tasks of a Negotiator include:
• Managing one bilateral negotiation: A Negotiator is responsible for ex-
changing oﬀers with its opponent and reporting results of these exchanges
to the Controller every time something happens.
• Optimising negotiation oﬀers: A Negotiator is responsible for deciding
what oﬀers to make in a negotiation. In order to do this, a Negotiator
will have to consider the instructions from the Controller, the opponent’s
characteristics (especially its quality and the estimate of the negotiation tac-
tic the opponent will use) and the possibility (if any) of one or both parties
needing to decommit.
• Providing estimates on the negotiation outcomes and success probabilities:
To function eﬃciently, the higher level may need an outcome estimate of
any on-going or considered negotiation. This estimate requires both the
expected utility of a successful outcome and the probability of achieving
that result. Providing this information for any opponent at any time (before
or during the negotiation) is the Negotiator’s task.
Starting the negotiations, selecting opponents, considering other negotiations, set-
ting targets and everything else is done by the the higher levels, usually the
Controller. Also the actual negotiation tactic (or the method for ﬁnding the
best oﬀer to make) is given by the user and the Negotiator’s optimisation task
196Chapter 9 Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiator Level 197
is to use the given tactic as eﬀectively as possible in the circumstances. Our aim
in this chapter is to discuss our contributions C6 (bilateral negotiations and the
Negotiator) and, in part, C9 (future oﬀers).
Given this background, we will ﬁrst explain the architecture of the Negotiator
level and its interaction with other parts in more detail (section 9.1). We will then
employ the Negotiator in the series of bilateral negotiations and discuss these
experiments and their results 9.2. We will conclude this chapter with a summary
of our ﬁndings (section 9.3).
9.1 Architecture of the Negotiator
We discuss the architecture in three parts. First, we give an overview of the
architecture and how the Negotiator interacts with its environment (section
9.1.1). Second, we will discuss speciﬁc negotiation tactics that the Negotiator
(and its opponents) use in detail (section 9.1.2). Finally, we will discuss how the
Negotiator can, with the help of a Controller, take into account the oﬀers that
the agent might receive in the later negotiations (section 9.1.3).
9.1.1 Overview
The <Negotiator> component consists of two major parts:
• <NegotiatorBase> module deals with communication with both the <Con-
troller> and the opponent with respect to all associated synchronisation
issues. This functionality is needed no matter what tactic a Negotiator
uses.
• <Tactic> module takes all tactic-speciﬁc decisions. Each tactic or family
of tactics will have its own <Tactic> module, but they all implement the
same simple interface for the <NegotiatorBase> to use. This makes diﬀerent
<Tactic> modules interchangable and allows the selection and conﬁguration
of the appropriate tactic at run-time. In addition, this structure allows a
complete change of tactics, even during an on-going negotiation (although
we do not do that here) simply by changing the Tactic instance to another.1
1Since each such module is also conﬁgurable, smaller changes can be achieved by changing
the conﬁguration of the module. All tactics have three parameters in common: a deadline, a
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The basic operation of a Negotiator is described in ﬁgure 9.1. In particular,
a NegotiatorBase module will get an oﬀer from its opponent (step 1). It will
then ask its Tactic module to provide an analysis of the negotiation status and
recommend a course of action (steps 2 and 3). This information is given to the
Controller (step 4). The Controller makes adjustments that are necessary
due to the overall situation (for example other negotiations) that the Negotiator
is unaware of and returns the action to be taken and possibly some changes to
negotiation parameters (step 5). The NegotiatorBase will then inform its Tactic
of these changes and take the prescribed action (step 6). In the experiments we
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Figure 9.1: The basic operation of a Negotiator.
9.1.2 Negotiation Tactics
We will then take a closer look on the <Tactic> module, since it is clearly the most
interesting part of the <Negotiator>. The tactics are discussed in three parts.
First, we discuss the seller tactics (section 9.1.2.1) and then the tactics the buyerChapter 9 Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiator Level 199
agent will use against them (section 9.1.2.2). We conclude by discussing the most
advanced tactic we employ, the Adaptive Counter tactic (section 9.1.2.3), which
is a combination of all the countertactics.
9.1.2.1 The Seller Tactics
As explained in section 8.1.2, the sellers have four tactics at their disposal:
• Exponential Time-Dependent,
• Random,
• Pure Behavioural, and
• Random Behavioural.
We will now explain the three new tactics in more detail. The Random tactic
does not really need that much more explanation. The seller using the Random
tactic simply makes oﬀers that are selected at random from Uniform(rs,1), so a
uniform distribution between the seller’s reservation price and the highest allowed
price (one). Every oﬀer is drawn from the same distribution and the oﬀers are
independent of each other.
The behavioural tactics need more explanation. They use a concept of concession
to determine their oﬀer. Here, the concession refers to the amount of utility the
buyer is willing to give to the seller with its oﬀer. This is calculated as a proportion







cs , if ob < cs,
ob−cs
Vb(q)−cs, if cs ≤ ob ≤ Vb(q),
1, if ob > Vb(q),
where ob is the oﬀer made by the buyer. In the Pure Behavioural tactic, the seller
will repeat the concession in its own oﬀer os, so it makes an oﬀer of:
os =
 
Vb(q) − αb(Vb(q) − cs), if αb ≥ 0,
Vb(q) − αb(1 − Vb(q)), otherwise,
So, if the buyer makes an oﬀer that fails to exceed the seller’s reservation price,
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buyer’s oﬀer of zero (the minimum oﬀer) will be met with an oﬀer of one (the
maximum oﬀer). As with all other tactics, if the oﬀer the seller would make is
lower or equal to the oﬀer the buyer actually made, it will accept the buyer’s oﬀer.
The Random Behavioural tactic is a combination of the two other new tactics. It
uses the concession as per the Pure Behavioural but selects the oﬀer at random
from Uniform(Vb(q) − 2αb(Vb(q) − cs),1), where concession αb is capped at 0.5,
so any value over 0.5 is considered to be 0.5. And of course if the concession is
negative, a random oﬀer from Uniform(Vb(q),1) is made.
If and when the buyer uses these tactics, they of course work as mirror images of
what was just described. This means that, for example, the Exponential Time-
Dependent Tactic makes increasing oﬀers instead of decreasing ones but the β
parameter is selected at random as it is with the sellers. In the Random Tactic,
the buyer version chooses oﬀers between [0.0,rb] instead of [rs,1.0] and so on.
The problem with these tactics is that it is very diﬃcult to estimate the outcome
with some of them, when they are used against each other. For example, the
outcome of two opponents using the Exponential Time-Dependent Tactic depends
on the β parameters and deadlines and it can be almost anything between cs and
Vb(q). This means that it would be impractical to make the Negotiator use any
of these tactics and still expect it to be able to estimate the outcome and success
probabilities with any reasonable accuracy. So, although the buyer agent can and
in some experiments we will discuss later does use these tactics, something else is
needed for the concurrent bilateral negotiation and that is exactly what we discuss
next.
9.1.2.2 The Simple Counter Tactics
The buyer agent, in most cases, uses a novel counter tactic to each of the four
possible seller tactics. Speciﬁcally, all countertactics calculate an optimal oﬀer to
make and repeat that oﬀer until it is accepted or the negotiation ends. There-
fore the outcome of a successful negotiation is always known in advance and the
problem is only to assess the probability of success.
Although there are only four diﬀerent seller tactics and these counter tactics are
speciﬁcally aimed against one of them at the time, they are more general than
they may seem at ﬁrst glance. They do not care about single oﬀers but only about
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about the buyer’s value and seller’s costs and assumed negotiation tactic.2 Al-
though these counter tactics assume knowledge of the buyer’s value and seller’s
costs, they would probably work reasonably well even if these parameters were
estimated instead of known, although we will not address that possibility in this
work.
So, each seller tactic has its own counter tactic. The Exponential Time-Dependent
Counter tactic is the simplest of the counter tactics. It basically makes an oﬀer
that is equal to the seller’s expected reservation price and keeps making that oﬀer
throughout the negotiation. If (and when in our experiments) the estimate is
correct, an opponent using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic (or any tactic
that will at some point oﬀer the reservation price) will eventually make that oﬀer.
In our setting, this optimal oﬀer is basically Cs(q) + 0.00001, because the seller
will want a positive utility and this oﬀer will give it one (marginally).3
The second easiest counter tactic is the Pure Behavioural Counter tactic. Because
we know that any concession we make over the seller’s costs will be met with a
similar concession under our value, we can easily deduce that the optimal oﬀer to
make is the half-way point. Any lower oﬀer will not be accepted and any higher
oﬀer will give the opponent extra utility (that is away from us4). We make this
oﬀer at every possibility. If the opponent is using a Pure Behavioural tactic and
we have estimated its costs (and it has estimated our value) correctly, we will have
a contract in the ﬁrst round of the negotiation: We make an oﬀer that they will
accept. The useful property of this tactic is that it works against pretty much any
conceivable tactic that does try to get to a reasonable outcome. If the opponent
at any point makes an oﬀer that is lower or equal to the half-way point between
value and cost, we will get a contract. Against some tactics, such as a very bullish
(boulware) Exponential Time-Dependent Tactic, it may take a while (until the
deadline in fact), but even the Random tactic is very likely to make that sort of
oﬀer at some point. The downside of this tactic is naturally that most tactics
would make lower oﬀers at some point and this tactic misses the opportunity to
take such oﬀers.
2When that minimum oﬀer is actually made, is not relevant to these tactics as such, although
Negotiators are sometimes called to estimate the contract time as well and that requires some
idea when that is going to be. We will discuss this later in chapter 10.1.2.2.
3We use oﬀers that are rounded to the ﬁve decimal points so this is the smallest possible
positive utility.
4A price negotiation is a zero-sum game. That is, one party’s gain is always equal to the
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The two remaining counter tactics are more complex. The problem is that in
theory these tactics, especially the Random Tactic, can make any sort of oﬀer and
the trick is to set the oﬀer so that the product of the probability of success (oﬀer
accepted) and the expected utility in case of success are maximised. The lower
oﬀers usually mean a higher utility but a lower probability of success and high
oﬀers mean low utility and a high probability of success. The tradeoﬀ between
the two is central. So basically we want to make an oﬀer that yields us the best
expected utility:
EU = P(contract)EU(contract)
where P(contract) stands for the probability of a contract and EU(contract) for
the expected utility of that contract.
Now, if we only had one oﬀer to make, the situation would be relatively straight-
forward. For example, against a Random Tactic an oﬀer of 1
2(1.0 + Cs(q)) would
have a 50% chance of getting accepted depending on whether or not the seller’s
random counteroﬀer would be higher or lower than that and since all oﬀers are
equally likely we get the mentioned probability. However, if we have a hundred
turns of oﬀers and counteroﬀers to consider, we can do better. The probability
that all hundred oﬀers would be greater than the said oﬀer, is 0.5100 = 7.9 · 10−31
so very small indeed. More generally, the probability of success against a Random
tactic (that makes oﬀers between [c,1]) is:





where o is the oﬀer made, c the cost and t the number of negotiation turns. As
long as the oﬀer is higher than c and lower than the maximum oﬀer 1, the term
1 − o−c
1−c will also be in the interval (0,1)5 which means that it is decreasing in t
and therefore the probability of success increases when the number of negotiation
turns increases. This means that the optimal oﬀer is usually lower, sometimes
even much lower, than what it would be if only one oﬀer was made.
In the other random tactic, the Random Behavioural tactic, things are also more
complicated. First of all, the seller’s oﬀer range depends on the buyer’s oﬀer and
is not very straight-forward to begin with. We can ignore the cases where our oﬀer
is lower than the seller’s costs, because that will never get accepted, and also the
cases where we make a greater oﬀer than 1
2(Vb(q) − Cs(q)) + Cs(q), because this
5If the oﬀer is equal to c or 1, the t will have no eﬀect on the probability, but it will be always
0 or 1, respectively. We do not consider any oﬀers that are higher than 1, because such oﬀers
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oﬀer will give us the maximum concession anyway. We get:
P(contract|random behavioural tactic) = 1 − (1 −
o − v + 2(o − c)
1 − v + 2(o − c)
)
t
We could use these probability functions and formulae to calculate the contract’s
expected utility to determine the optimal oﬀer analytically but this could be quite
complicated, especially if the decommitment fees are compensatory and depend
on the contract price too. Also it would not generalise to cases where the exact
functions are not known but we have enough data to have empirical estimates for
these probabilities. We have therefore decided to use another approach, namely
going through all the relevant options. It basically involves going through possible
oﬀers we could make and calculating the expected utility for each oﬀer and then
choosing the oﬀer that yields the best expected utility. Although this may seem
like a lot of work, there are some very useful ways to optimise this process and
make it quite fast. In addition, this approach has an advantage that it can be
generalised to any situation where the success probabilities for diﬀerent oﬀers are
known and this also includes cases where the probabilities are known empirically
and not analytically6 and when they fail to follow any simple formulae. Also, as
we will shortly see, this approach is readily extendable to cases where there are
more than one possible tactic or even more than one negotiation.
The optimisation is really very simple. Since the probability of success is increasing
and the buyer’s utility is decreasing over oﬀer o, it seems reasonable to assume
that the product of these two (both in the interval [0,1]) reaches a maximum at
some point between cs and Vb. This is perfectly consistent with empirical results.
When the oﬀer is cs, the probability of success is zero but the utility is very high.
On the other end of the spectrum, if the oﬀer is Vs, the chances of success are high
but the utility is zero. When the oﬀer moves from these end points towards the
other end point, the expected utility increases and it peaks somewhere between
the two. Many nearby values may be very close to each other and indeed even
produce the same expected utility but there never is more than one peak. So the
point of the optimisation is to ﬁnd the peak. This is relatively straight-forward.
We start from the lowest possible oﬀer and calculate the expected utility and
increase the oﬀer by 0.0001, calculate the expected utility again and so on until
the expected utility is lower than it was before. That means that the peak is
somewhere between (x−0.0002,x), where x is the last oﬀer we tried. We then go
6This means that we have a good idea what sort of oﬀers the opponent makes or accepts but
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through these options, starting with x − 0.0001 and moving upwards by 0.00001
increments. If the value at x − 0.00009 is higher than at x − 0.00001, we know
that the peak is between [x − 0.00009,x) and proceed until the expected utility
decreases. If the value at x − 0.00009 is smaller than at x − 0.0001 we need to go
in the other direction and proceed until the utility starts to decrease. We choose
the starting points carefully.
In the Random Counter tactic, we start from the seller’s reservation price, because
the optimal oﬀer is usually quite close to that. In the Random Behavioural Counter
tactic, we use a diﬀerent starting value, equal to 1
3(Vb(q) + 2 · Cs(q)) because any
concession we make is met by a random concession that has a minimum at double
the concession we made. The start value means that the buyer makes a 1/3
concession and because the minimum of the seller’s counter oﬀer will be double
that 2/3 concession, they actually refer to the same point. Any lower oﬀer would
mean that there was no overlap and therefore no chance of success. These start
points mean that ﬁnding the peak is usually very quick and takes only a handful
of iterations.
Another point worth making here is that although in all counter tactics, we calcu-
late the optimal oﬀer and keep making that same oﬀer throughout the negotiation,
this may not be an optimal approach in all cases. With non-behavioural tactics
(such as the Exponential Time-Dependent or Random tactics), we could simply
keep making an oﬀer of zero (that the seller will never accept) and use the opti-
mal oﬀer calculated only as a threshold to tell us when we should accept an oﬀer.
This would give the seller two advantages over making reasonable oﬀers. First, it
would always be the seller who decides when a contract is formed. This would be
very useful when we consider having several negotiations concurrently and want
to avoid extra contracts. Second, in the case of the Random tactic we could some-
times get slightly better deals. If the seller is using the Random tactic, it will
accept the buyer’s oﬀer if his next oﬀer would be equal or less than the buyer’s. If
the buyer does not make non-zero oﬀers, the seller would make that oﬀer instead
and sometimes that oﬀer would be lower than the buyer’s threshold oﬀer.
However, this does sound more than slightly one-sided and it would also make
concurrent negotiation too easy for our agent, so we assume that if the buyer does
not ever make oﬀers that are equal to these optimal oﬀers (or higher), the seller
will not make any reasonable oﬀers either. So, even if the tactic in general is
non-behavioural, we assume that there is this small behavioural aspect to it and,
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always do. Of course with the real behavioural tactics (Random Behavioural and
Pure Behavioural tactics) this is not an issue because these tactics do force the
buyer to make reasonable oﬀers if it wants to have any chance of success.
The problem with these tactics is that they work very well against their target
tactic, but may be less eﬃcient against other tactics. This ineﬃciency comes in
two forms:
• Failure to succeed: The negotiation will usually be unsuccessful. The optimal
oﬀer made by the counter tactic is too low to have a reasonable (any) chance
of being accepted.
• Failure to exploit: The negotiation will succeed but the seller is given more
utility than would have been strictly necessary had the right counter tactic
been employed.
The Exponential Time-Dependent Counter tactic does very badly against any tac-
tic except Exponential Time-Dependent, because its oﬀer will not be acceptable to
a seller using any of the other tactics.7 It will therefore usually fail to succeed. On
the other hand, the buyer using the Pure Behavioural Counter tactic can expect
to get into a contract with almost all opponents, because its oﬀer is acceptable to
opponents using other tactics (in the case of Random and Random Behavioural
tactics, this of course means just a very high (but still < 1) success probabil-
ity) and it can take a while against an Exponential Time-Dependent tactic, for
example.
These considerations are very important in a one-shot negotiation. However, if the
same counter tactic is used against more than one opponent, the situation changes.
For example, if there are 10 matchings, the Negotiator will get 10 chances to ﬁnd
an opponent that uses the tactic that is more suitable. Here, 9 failures may not
mean anything, if you get that one success. Even the Exponential Time-Dependent
Counter tactic may therefore work well if it has a reasonable chance of ﬁnding an
opponent that actually uses the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic and the more
there are opponents using that tactic in the population and the more opponents it
tries to negotiate with, the better the chances. For example, in a population where
10% of the sellers use it, the buyer using this counter tactic will fail 90% of the time
in a single negotiation, but if it can try 10 diﬀerent providers, the chance of failure
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decreases to under 35%.8 However, with 25% using this tactic, the probability of
failure in 10 attempts drops to 5.6%. And since the Exponential Time-Dependent
Counter tactic does well on the exploitation part when successful, it may work
very well in such a setting.
Another good thing about these counter tactics is that they can work blind. They
do not have to know what tactic the opponent is using. They can just assume that
the opponent is using the target tactic and calculate the optimal oﬀer accordingly.
If the opponent uses some other tactic, either the negotiation fails or you leave
some utility to the opponent that could have been taken with a more appropriate
tactic. Here, knowing the opponent’s tactic only tells us whether or not there
is any point in negotiating but it does not aﬀect the outcome. So if the buyer
agent doesn’t know what tactic the opponent is using, it can always just try to
negotiate and see if it works out or not. If it is successful, it knows what the
expected utility is going to be because we keep making the same oﬀer over and
over again. If the probability distribution over diﬀerent tactics (or probability that
the opponent is using a tactic that will accept the oﬀer the buyer is making) is
known, the Negotiator can even give an estimate for the probability of success,
if the higher levels need one. If there is a good chance of succeeding in the end,
knowing what tactic a given opponent is using is not overly important. Of course
in some settings, you get a limited number of chances to enter a contract and using
a tactic that works against only some opponents may not be a great idea. We,
therefore, introduce another tactic that can work against any opponent tactic.
9.1.2.3 Adaptive Counter Tactic
The Adaptive Counter tactic is a combination of all four counter tactics discussed
in the previous subsection. There is no reason to limit oneself to these four, but
the Adaptive Counter tactic could, in theory, handle any number of negotiation
tactics. What it does need is the counter tactics, as per those described above,
that can provide the probability of success for any oﬀer made and a probability
distribution over the opponent tactics.
This probability distribution is determined by the Negotiator itself, although the
Controller provides it with two essential pieces of information:
• its best guess on the tactic (and the reliability of this guess),
8This is because (1 − 0.1)10 = 0.3487. We assume that the population is big enough so that
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• the tactic distribution: the probabilities for diﬀerent tactics in the opponent
population
In our experiments, the Controller’s best guess is either one of the four tactics
or unknown, if no guess can be provided. The buyer will be provided with the
reliability estimate γ, which gives the probability that the given guess is correct.
This information can be used to generate the probability distributions over tactics.
For example, let us assume that all tactics are equally probable in the seller pop-
ulation and that the Controller says that a given opponent is using Exponential
Time-Dependent tactic and that we know any guess would be correct 40% of the
time. The probability distribution is as follows:
P(Exponential Time-Dependent Tactic) = γ = 0.4
P(Random Tactic) = P(Random Behavioural Tactic)
= P(Pure Behavioural Tactic) = (1 − γ)0.25/0.75 = 0.2
All the other cases work in the similar way. The Adaptive Counter tactic does not
try to recognise the opponent tactics while the negotiation is on-going but relies
on these a priori probabilities instead.9 Using these probabilities, the Adaptive
Counter tactic calculates the optimal oﬀer to make in a negotiation. If the oppo-
nent tactic is known (with probability 1), it will behave exactly like the appropriate
counter tactic. However, it will be able to adapt also to incomplete information
and probability distributions where more than 1 or even all four tactics have pos-
itive probabilities. It will use the same approach as the Random Counter and
Random Behavioural Counter tactics, namely it tries all the relevant oﬀers and
chooses the one that gets it the highest expected utility. The price in a contract





where t1 = ‘Exponential Time-Dependent tactic’, t2 = ‘Random tactic’, t3 =‘Random
Behavioural tactic’ and t4 =‘Pure Behavioural tactic’ and P(tactic t) the proba-
bility that the opponent is using tactic t. Here the optimisation is slightly more
challenging than in the single counter tactic case, but because the probabilities of
success still increase in one direction and the utility of the contract decreases in
9This is because the four tactics we have would be relatively simple to distinguish from each
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the same direction, it can be managed. We basically do the optimisation for each
of the four tactics and choose the price that gives the highest expected utility.
The Adaptive Counter tactic tries very hard to adapt to the opponent’s tactic,
qualities and costs. This means that, with full information, it typically gets very
high success probabilities against any opponent, unless there is a signiﬁcant risk
of requirement change and a high decommitment fee, in which case the Adaptive
Counter tactic waits until an opponent can provide a positive expected utility
and that may make it impossible to succeed in the early negotiations (because
expected utility is typically negative). On the other hand, this also means that it
does not usually wait for a more suitable opponent. Rather it tries its best to get
a contract with the current opponent, no matter what its charateristics are. The
Adaptive Counter tactic is as happy to reach a contract with a mediocre quality
provider using a Pure Behavioural tactic than it is to enter into a contract with
an excellent quality provider using Exponential Time-Dependent tactic. This is
true even though the expected utility for the latter is much higher than for the
former. This can be very useful if the buyer has a limited number of chances to
ﬁnd a contract, but in some other settings, it might be a problem. We will now
discuss one, quite eﬀective, method for curtailing this behaviour in settings where
it might be harmful.
9.1.3 Considering Oﬀers in the Future Negotiations
So far, the tactics have considered any contract that produces positive expected
utility acceptable. However, this is often not the optimal approach, because we
might later be able to ﬁnd a better deal than what is currently on the table. This
is because the probability of adverse eﬀects decreases over time and because more
options usually lead to better outcomes. We discuss these two reasons now in turn.
First, we consider the fact that the probability of adverse eﬀects decreases over
time. Since we assume that the adverse eﬀects can take place at any time with
the same probability, we can update the probability that we or our opponent will
be aﬀected, since we know that if we and they are still in the market, neither
of us has been aﬀected so far. This means that the expected utility of the same
contract can either increase, decrease or stay the same over time. If an adverse
impact is bad for the buyer (he is the one aﬀected or the seller’s decommitment
policy will not cover the lost proﬁt), the decreasing chance of adverse impact is
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is the stronger the higher the probability of adverse eﬀect and the decommitment
fee are. However, the adverse impact can also be beneﬁcial for the buyer. This
occurs when only the seller is aﬀected and the seller’s decommitment policy is
over-compensatory (for example Constant 1.0). Here, the lower chance of adverse
impact (and seller’s decommitment) actually decreases the buyer’s expected utility
so the buyer’s expected utility decreases over time. If only the seller can be aﬀected
and the decommitment policy is Expectation Damages (fully compensatory), the
expected utility stays unchanged over time.
Second, more options often mean better outcomes. In any given negotiation, the
buyer has a certain chance of getting a contract and it can achieve certain expected
utility if it does. However, the success probability and the expected utility depend
on the opponent’s characteristics. If the buyer negotiates once with one opponent,
all it can do is maximise its expected utility in that one negotiation no matter
how good or bad the opponent is. Any contract giving a positive expected utility
is better than no contract. However, if the buyer agent knows it is going to face,
say, 9 more opponents after the ﬁrst one, it can aﬀord to be a lot pickier. So if
the ﬁrst opponent is abysmal, it can be ignored and maybe the next one will be
better. There is of course a trade oﬀ here. A better opponent may not arrive after
all or it might exit before an agreement can be reached and the current opponent
may be the best one the buyer is going to meet this time in the market. However,
this works also (especially) if there is no adverse impacts.
So the buyer agent has to know when to negotiate seriously and when to wait for a
better opponent or improving circumstances. We will here describe one method for
doing just that. The buyer’s problem is described in ﬁgure 9.2. Basically at each
matching (denoted by numbered boxes 1−10), the buyer can either negotiate with
a given opponent successfully (end up in a contract) or fail to do so (for whatever
reason). In the former case, the buyer exits the market and in the latter, he will
move on to the next matching hoping for better luck there. This is shown as arrows
from each box. Now, if we assume that we know the quality distribution and the
negotiation tactic distribution of the opponents, we can formulate a distribution
for the future opponents and expected utilities they might provide.10 However,
this could become very complicated and would require quite detailed information
that may not be available in a realistic setting. Moreover, our opponents vary
in negotiation tactics, as well as in quality (two dimensional variation among the
10This is a type of optimal stopping problem (Ferguson 2008) where a certain action (negotiat-
ing with diﬀerent opponents) is repeated and the problem is to decide whether the current choice
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sellers). Moreover, we will later have many concurrent negotiations (even varying
numbers), we can use diﬀerent opponent selection methods, there are adverse
impacts, and so on. This would mean that the analytic approach would sooner or
later become very complicated and very diﬃcult. We therefore use an alternative
that uses empirical data gained from a given setting and then uses analytical tools
to calculate the threshold utilities.
Contract ... 10 1 2 8 9
Contract Contract Contract Contract Contract
Contract Contract Contract Contract
No No No No No No
Contract
Figure 9.2: Structure of the Problem.
We basically run the market several (usually 5000) times and calculate the ex-
pected utilities in each matching as we see them. So if we have only one negoti-
ation and we know we are going to negotiate with the ﬁrst opponent on the list
no matter what, we can simulate that by calculating the expected utility of the
ﬁrst opponent (taking note of its id) and then move on to the next matching,
again taking the ﬁrst opponent (but if we have already ‘negotiated’ with it, we
will take the next one that we have not negotiated with) and so on. The best
thing about this data gathering phase is that we do not have to actually start any
negotiations. We can negotiate, of course, but since the counter tactics described
above can provide us with an estimate of the outcome without negotiation, we do
not have to negotiate to get this information. This can be useful, if we can use
some time to observe the market before actually starting to negotiate in it.11 In
the end, we have a list of expected utilities that we encountered at each matching.
However, this alone may not be that useful, especially if the probability of adverse
eﬀect is very low, because these lists will probably look very similar to each other.
So, we do the standard backward induction (from game theory, see, for example
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). We start from the last matching. We store the
average expected utility there and move on to the previous matching. There we
take into account the fact that any opponent that does not provide us with at least
the average utility of matching 10 is not interesting to us because there is a good
chance we might get that utility by waiting until the matching 10.12 We calculate
11This may not always be possible. For example, the opponents may react unfavourably to
such information collecting without negotiations. And to get a picture of negotiation tactics
employed in the market, it may still be necessary to negotiate.
12Of course this is not certain and in fact, in many cases we might be disappointed, but if we
are risk neutral (indiﬀerent about a risk) this is how it goes. A more risk-averse approach would
be to use the minimum of oﬀers, so that we might be relatively certain of the utility we get in
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the average of the expected utilities in the second-to-last matching, replacing any
utilities that are lower than the minimum of the last matching with that minimum
(representing the wait until the next matching). This average is then used as
the same sort of threshold in the third-to-last matching and the average is again
calculated. This average is then used as a threshold in the previous matching and
so on until we have these averages for all matchings.
We can observe that the expected utility threshold typically increases when we
go towards turn 0 (the ﬁrst matching). Since the expected utility of the next
matching works as a minimum expected utility (because we can always go to that
negotiation), it is clear that the expected utility of a matching cannot be worse
than any of the matchings following it (because the buyer could always get that
later utility by waiting until then). Usually some high quality providers using
very buyer-friendly negotiation tactics can provide better utility than the average
expected utility of the next matching so the expected utility of earlier matching
is often higher than that of later matchings. This is also because at the earlier
stages, the buyer still has more opponents to meet and a higher probability of
being matched with someone very good. When the matchings go on and no such
opponent appears, the probability of that happening dwindles.
Exactly how the expected utility develops over matchings depends on two fac-
tors. First, the dwindling possibilities mean (as just explained) that the threshold
expected utility is always non-increasing and usually decreasing over time. This
means that the decrease in the expected utility threshold is stronger in the cases
where the seller can be adversely impacted and the decommitment policy is over-
compensatory and decreases slower in other cases. In the extreme cases, where
the decommitment fee is very high (Constant 1.0) and the probability of adverse
impact very high, the threshold may stay unchanged until the very last matching.
So what we get is an expected utility for each of the matchings 1-10 that usually
decrease over time. These numbers are used to set a minimum expected utility
that any agreement needs to achieve to be considered. Since the counter tactics
usually provide a very accurate estimate for the negotiation’s outcome, the useless
negotiations can be recognised and withdrawn from immediately. The threshold
value in matching m is of course EU(m+1), since if the current negotiation fails,
that is the expected utility. After the ﬁnal matching there is no negotiations and
therefore we deﬁne EU(11) = 0. In the ﬁnal matching, we therefore have no future
oﬀers to be considered.Chapter 9 Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiator Level 212
The future oﬀers are a quite versatile and simple approach that will work basically
in any environment and with any of the counter tactics mentioned.13 So, although
it certainly is eﬀective with the Adaptive Counter tactic, also other counter tactics
can beneﬁt from it. In practise, taking the future oﬀers into account means that
when a simple counter tactic has plenty of negotiation partners, it will try to choose
ones with a slightly higher quality and ignore the bad ones. And of course the
more suitable opponents it will meet, the higher it can set the threshold. Taking
the future oﬀers into account may also make the Negotiator suggest waiting
because higher expected utilities can be achieved later. With the Adaptive Counter
tactic, the future oﬀers can also mean ignoring opponents that use unfavourable
negotiation tactics (such as the Pure Behavioural tactic).
Finally, the Negotiator handles opponents that fail to meet the expected utility
threshold just as opponents with whom no contract can be achieved. It will tell the
Controller that any negotiation with such an opponent has a zero success proba-
bility and if asked to negotiate with such an opponent, it will suggest withdrawing
immediately. The Controller will usually accept withdrawal in such cases.
9.2 Empirical Evaluation
We will now discuss the empirical evaluation of the Negotiator. This discussion
is divided into three parts. First we discuss the hypotheses (section 9.2.1) and
how the experiments were conducted (section 9.2.2). We then discuss our results
(section 9.2.3).
9.2.1 Hypotheses
We start by considering only cases without adverse eﬀects and decommitments,
so ab = as = 0. We will investigate cases with adverse eﬀects later (see section
10.2.1). We created the counter tactics to be used against the four seller tactics and
a ﬁfth tactic, Adaptive Counter tactic, combines all four. We therefore contend:
13There is no reason to think why a similar approach would not also work with the seller
tactics or in fact with any tactic at all. The seller strategies operate on prices and utilities, not
expected utilities so in order to make it work in cases with adverse impacts, some additional
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Hypothesis 18. The four counter tactics work well against their tar-
get tactics. The Adaptive Counter tactic works well against any of the
allowed seller tactics.
This makes the Adaptive Counter tactic quite useful in any single negotiation.
However, we suspected that the Adaptive Counter tactic can sometimes be too
adaptive. It will try to reach an agreement with any opponent using any tactic
and, by default, it does not consider future negotiations but tries its best to reach
an agreement with the current opponent. As explained before, this works well
if there is only a limited number of chances for ﬁnding a suitable opponent, but
if the Negotiator gets plenty of chances, it might be better oﬀ failing in some
negotiations and ﬁnding those opponents it can exploit. This can be achieved by
using an appropriate counter tactic, since they often fail when the opponent is not
using the expected tactic. However, if it is hard for the specialised counter tactics
to ﬁnd suitable opponents, the Adaptive Counter tactic will outperform them.
If the buyer succeeds in getting an excellent result in a negotiation only 10% of the
time, it is unlikely to do better than an opponent that gets a good or decent result
every time. However, if the chance is repeated several times, the situation may
well change. For example, a 10% chance in one negotiation changes to 65% if the
same 10% chance is repeated ten times.14 With a 20% chance in each negotiation,
the success probability in 10 negotiations is already 89.2%. And this may well
start to be useful. Thus we contend:
Hypothesis 19. Other counter tactics can outperform the Adaptive
Counter tactic if they have a good chance of meeting an opponent that
uses the tactic they specialise in.
Even with 10 possibilities, the probability of ﬁnding an opponent using the right
tactic and having a high quality may not be very high. However, the Adaptive
Counter tactic will be able to get a result with any opponent and if we use future
oﬀers to guide it to wait for the good opponents, we should be able to get good
results. Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 20. When future oﬀers are used, the Adapting Counter
tactic will outperform the competition.
14The probability of success at least once in 10 negotiations is: 1 − (1 − 0.1)10 = 0.6513.Chapter 9 Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiator Level 214
However, the peak performance of the Adaptive Counter tactic requires that the
negotiation tactic the opponents employ is known. When this information simply
is not there or is inaccurate, the Adaptive Counter tactic will have trouble adapting
and, as a result, it will perform less well. This is because the Adaptive Counter
tactic will try to do well against any opponent and if there is a good chance that the
opponent in question might be using one of the behavioural tactics, the Adaptive
Counter tactic will gear its tactic towards accommodating this and although this
means a high probability of success, it will also mean less exploitation and therefore
potentially mediocre performance. Because other counter tactics do not care what
tactic the opponent is using, but make an oﬀer assuming the opponent uses the
relevant tactic, they will not be aﬀected and some of them can outperform the
Adaptive Counter tactic when information is poor. Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 21. The performance of Adaptive Counter tactic deterio-
rates as the information about opponent tactics becomes less accurate
or is less available. This means that other counter strategies may out-
perform the Adaptive Counter tactic under incomplete information.
9.2.2 Experimental Setup
We run the marketplace 100 times with diﬀerent settings (diﬀerent tactic distribu-
tions) and with diﬀerent buyer tactics and add the buyer utilities in diﬀerent runs
together. We then repeat this 100 times and calculate the average utility for the
100 runs instead of one run. This is because in a single negotiation, the variation
can be quite large compared to the values. Here the possible outcomes are in
the interval [0.00,0.50] but later when the Constant 1.00 decommitment policy is
used, the interval is [−1.00,0.50] and the variation will make it very diﬃcult to
get any statistically signiﬁcant results and, therefore, we compare the diﬀerences
of negotiation tactics over sets of 100 runs. This will give us a result, which says
that if we were to enter the market 100 times, then there would be a diﬀerence or
that there would not be one. There is a good chance that we would be unable to
make such a call on a single entry.
Given the average results and variations, we then perform a two-sided t-test to
investigate whether or not the diﬀerences we can see are statistically signiﬁcant or
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In some of our experiments, we use simple tactic distributions where all seller
are using the same opponent strategy. This is to show how the diﬀerent tactics
work against a certain tactic. However, in other experiments, we will be interested
in how these diﬀerent tactics work against more heterogeneous seller populations
and how the distribution of the seller population tactics aﬀects the performance
of diﬀerent tactics. Because there are four diﬀerent tactics, changing the relative
proportions of each would require signiﬁcant eﬀort and probably would not produce
that much more useful data. So, instead, we have divided the tactics in to two
groups of two:
• non-behavioural: The Exponential Time-Dependent and Random tactic and
• behavioural: The Random Behavioural and Pure Behavioural tactic
and we will investigate the eﬀect of the seller tactic composition by changing the
proportions these two groups have in the population and divide the group’s pro-
portion equally between its constituents. Therefore if say 30% of the population
uses non-behavioural tactics (0.3 in the ﬁgures), it means that 15% of the popu-
lation uses Exponential Time-Dependent and Random tactics each and 35% uses
Random and Pure Behavioural tactics each.
9.2.3 Results
First, we will consider how our counter tactics and especially the Adaptive Counter
tactic do against diﬀerent seller tactics. To do this, we ran all nine buyer tactics in
a market where the sellers use only one of the four tactics. The results are shown
in ﬁgure 9.3. As can be seen, against all four seller tactics, the appropriate counter
tactic and the Adaptive Counter tactic perform equally well and better than any
other tactics (this is at the p < 0.0001 level in all cases). There is no diﬀerence
between the appropriate counter tactic and the Adaptive Counter tactic in any
of the cases, but the wrong counter tactics perform less well. This is especially
clear in cases where the sellers are using one of the behavioural tactics and both
the Exponential Time-Dependent and Random Counter tactics fail to produce any
contracts (the utility is zero).
The only simple counter tactic that succeeds against any opponent tactic is the
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halfway point between the value and cost) is acceptable to any of the four oppo-
nent tactics at some point.15 Of course the other side of this coin is that it gets
quite mediocre results for those contracts it ﬁnds. This means that the Pure Be-
havioural Counter tactic gets the same result from all four populations although
other tactics’ fortunes vary signiﬁcantly. So it is clear that the simple counter
tactics do well against their target tactics and that the Adaptive Counter tactic
is able to adapt to all four tactics very well when the seller’s tactics are known.
Both the appropriate simple counter tactic and the Adaptive Counter tactic are
able to beat all the competition (at the p < 0.0001 level). This is consistent with































Figure 9.3: All negotiation tactics against the single-tactic populations (Hy-
pothesis 18).
Another point worth making in ﬁgure 9.3 is that the utility achieved by the best
buyer tactic decreases from left to right, so EU(Exponential Time-Dependent tac-
tic) > EU(Random tactic) > EU(Random Behavioural tactic) > EU(Pure Be-
havioural tactic). This holds generally. The behavioural tactics make the sellers
using them more diﬃcult for the buyer to exploit. But if and when the buyer can
choose between the sellers and knows about the tactics the sellers employ, tactics
that are too strong may be counterproductive for the seller. To make any proﬁt,
the seller has to get into contracts and by demanding an equal share of the proﬁt
(Pure Behavioural tactic) the seller may rule itself out of contention, if the buyer
has other providers to choose from.
We will now consider the mixed markets, where the sellers use diﬀerent tactics. As
explained above, this means that we vary the fraction of non-behavioural/behavioural
15Strictly speaking, this is not entirely certain with the Random and Random Behavioural
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tactics and see how that aﬀects the performance of the diﬀerent negotiation tac-
tics, the buyer uses. Speciﬁcally, ﬁgure 9.4 shows how the Adaptive Counter tactic
performs compared to simple counter tactics. We just showed that the Adaptive
Counter tactic does at least as well as any other counter tactic when the sellers
were homogeneous (that is, when all of them used the same negotiation tactic).
However, when the opponents are heterogeneous, the Adaptive Counter tactic loses
to at least one of them in every single setting we investigated (although it beats
all of the simple counter tactics at least twice). This is, as we explained earlier,
because the Adaptive Counter tactic is very conservative and tries to reach a con-
tract with any opponent. Since it is able to adapt to negotiate with any opponent,
it will usually perform very well in any single negotiation. However, the problem is
that diﬀerent opponent tactics yield diﬀerent types of outcomes. Some are better
than others (as was shown in ﬁgure 9.3). So basically the Adaptive Counter tactic
sometimes ﬁrst encounters an opponent that is using, for example, the Pure Be-
havioural tactic and because of the adaption, it will be able to reach an agreement
with that opponent. Another counter tactic might in the same negotiation fail
miserably. But the point is that when there is more than one chance of getting a
contract, the next opponent might be using a more suitable tactic and this other
counter tactic may be able to exploit that next opponent.
The diﬀerence between the Random Counter and the Exponential Time-Dependent
Counter tactics comes from two sources. First, the Random Counter tactic is able
to do well against the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic, but the Exponential
Time-Dependent Counter tactic fails against the Random Tactic. This means
that the probability of success in a given negotiation is double for the Random
Counter to that of the Exponential Time-Dependent Counter Tactic. On the
other hand, when successful, the Exponential Time-Dependent Counter Tactic is
able to squeeze almost all the beneﬁt from the contract to itself at its opponent’s
expense. This explains why the Random Counter tactic’s performance increases
faster and reaches a plateau when the fraction of non-behavioural tactics reaches
0.4. This is because at this point, the probability that the Negotiator will meet
at least one opponent using a non-behavioural tactic is very high, around 99.4%,
and further increases in success rate do not bring signiﬁcant utility improvements.
On the other hand, ﬁnding an opponent using the Exponential-Time Dependent
tactic is not yet completely certain (the probability is 89.3%) and therefore the
Random Counter tactic still has an edge. However, at 0.5 the probability of success
for the Exponential Time-Dependent Counter reaches already 94.4% and this is



























Figure 9.4: Counter tactics against various mixed-tactic populations (Hypoth-
esis 19).
similar fashion. So, when the probability increases even further, the Exponential
Time-Dependent Counter tactic is able to beat all the competition.
The behavioural counter tactics are able to reach a contract against most seller
tactics. In the case of the Random Behavioural Counter tactic, the only tactic
it is hopeless against is the Pure Behavioural one, but the probability of ﬁnding
some other tactic in ten tries is very high in all the cases shown in the graph
(the probability is at its lowest when behavioural tactics make up 100% of the
opponent’s tactic selection, but even then there is a 50% chance that any given
opponent uses the Random Behavioural tactic, so in 10 negotiations that gives the
tactic probability of success of 99.9%). Therefore the seller population composition
has very little eﬀect on the performance of these tactics and of course since the
Random Behavioural Counter actually has a chance of getting more than half
of the beneﬁt in any given negotiation, it will outperform the Pure Behavioural
Counter Tactic in all cases. All these ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 19,
so we can accept it.
However, the above assumed that the buyer agent will take any deal that results
in a positive utility for it and this puts the Adaptive Counter tactic at somewhatChapter 9 Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiator Level 219
of a disadvantage because it wants to succeed in every negotiation and since in
every negotiation, the utility can be positive, it will get itself into contracts that
the other counter tactics would not. So, when this tendency is controlled by
requiring a certain level of utility for a contract, the Adaptive Counter tactic no
longer takes any contract from any opponent but only accepts good deals. As
before, the Adaptive Counter tactic does as well as any counter tactic does in any
homogenous population whereas the other counter tactics only do well in one or






























Figure 9.5: Counter tactics with future oﬀers against the single-tactic popu-
lations.
However, unlike earlier, this advantage translates also to the heterogeneous setting.
This is because the Adaptive Counter tactic is able to beneﬁt from its adaptiveness
and is able to ﬁnd opponents that are good in terms of both their negotiation tactic
and their quality. This is why it is able to beat both behavioural counter tactics,
in all cases (at the p < 0.0001 level) also when only behavioural tactics are used.
The Random Counter can ﬁnd deals but it is unable to exploit them the way
Exponential Time-Dependent Counter or Adaptive Counter can and Exponential
Time-Dependent Counter may not be able to ﬁnd high quality opponents that
would also use the tactic it was designed for. To this end, hypothesis 20 proposed
that the Adaptive Counter tactic would be able to beat the competition when
future oﬀers are taken into account and this clearly is the case. So we can accept
this hypothesis.
Finally, we consider cases with incomplete information. The performance of the
diﬀerent counter strategies are shown in ﬁgure 9.7. The speciﬁc counter tactics
are independent of the tactic information and therefore their performance is a































Figure 9.6: Counter tactics with future oﬀers against various mixed-tactic
populations (Hypothesis 20).
Adaptive Counter tactic degrades as it has less and less information about the
opponent tactics. The deterioration comes from two sources. First, as there is
less information about the opponents, meeting opponents that the buyer knows
the tactic of is gets increasingly less frequent. Second, when the buyer does not
know what tactic the opponent uses, the Adaptive Counter tactic will often play
it safe and make an oﬀer that will be accepted by all opponents. This is because
the Adaptive Counter optimises the expected utility in a given negotiation and
if it makes an oﬀer that is less than what the Pure Behavioural tactic would
ﬁnd acceptable, the chance of success drops to 75% (because it will fail with all
opponents using that tactic and there is a 25% probability that it is dealing with
one right now). Such a drop is usually not compensated for by a 33% increase in
the expected utility because the diﬀerences between what Pure Behavioural and
Random Behavioural would ﬁnd acceptable are not large.16 The best thing to do
16Analytically, we can say that the maximum utility for Random Behavioural is 2/3rds of
the total utility where it is 1/2 for the Pure Behavioural. There is exactly the required 33%
improvement. However, this the upper bound for the improvement and the actual share that
the Random Behavioural is able to get is less than 2/3rds. Empirically, we can say that in the
pure populations (see ﬁgure 9.5), the improvement seems to be around 30%, so very close but
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is get the certain deal. This can be seen in the case where there is no information:
the performance of the Pure Behavioural Counter and Adaptive Counter tactics
are the same.
Now, with future oﬀers, the buyer will know that there may be opponents with
known tactics later and sometimes these might even be something other than Pure
Behavioural tactics. So the better the chance of that happening, the more likely
the buyer will just wait until this happens. If there is no information, the best the
buyer can hope for is to have an opponent with good quality instead and, as the





















































Figure 9.7: Counter tactics with incomplete or incorrect tactic information
(Hypothesis 21).
Now, when there is always information, but it is increasingly inaccurate (b), we can
observe that there is a minimum at 0.25 and the performance actually improves
(quite rapidly) when accuracy gets worse than this.17 This is mostly because even
an incorrect guess gives us more information about the opponent’s tactic when we
know how accurate our guess is. So when we are accurate at 20% of the time, we
know that there is 0.2 chance we are right and the probability that it is one of the
three other tactics is 0.8 (or 0.2667 each), so we know that the probability that
the opponent is using one of the tactics we did not guess is larger than that our
17The exact shape of the curve may not have a sharp point as shown. It is possible, even likely,
that there are some values near 0.25 where the performance is also very bad making the point
somewhat duller. We did not think the exact shape of the performance curve at this point was
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guess is right. This means, for example, that when we guess the opponent is using
a Pure Behavioural tactic, it sometimes may be enough for us to take our chances
and make an oﬀer which will be rejected that 20% of the time. However, if our
guess is correct with 25% probability, we could not get any new information about
the opponent’s tactic, because this probability is exactly what we would get if we
took a guess at random and this is what we have when we have no information.
When we have some information, we can do better. All these results are consistent
with hypothesis 21 and we can therefore accept it.
An important point to note is that the minimum point is not always the same as
the performance of the Pure Behavioural Counter tactic. If the probability of the
opponent using the Pure Behavioural tactic is low enough (it seems the critical
point is between 20 and 25%), the Adaptive Counter tactic would choose to make
oﬀers that would be turned down by the opponents using the Pure Behavioural
tactic. This is why the performance improves very quickly around the minimum
point in ﬁgure 9.7.b.
We have shown that the appropriate counter tactics can be very eﬀective in a
bilateral negotiation and that if there are plenty of opportunities to negotiate,
negotiation tactics that fail often but succeed well may be appropriate when the
best tactic is chosen. We also showed that an Adaptive Counter tactic that adapts
to any opponent tactic, needs to consider future oﬀers and have quite a good idea
of the opponent tactic to be eﬀective. Finally, when information about opponent
tactics is incomplete or incorrect, it can often be better to use one of the simple
counter tactics.
9.3 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the Negotiator level of our model and explained a
number of negotiation tactics for bilateral negotiation, many of them are novel to
at least some degree (contribution C6). The new seller tactics are probably the
least original, although in exactly that form they have not been discussed in the
literature. The simple counter tactics contain some new ideas, like calculating an
optimal oﬀer in advance (taking into account the fact that there are many turns
in a negotiation) and making that one oﬀer throughout the negotiation to keep
the negotiation outcome easy to assess simplifying the problem of giving useful
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We also introduced future oﬀers or taking into account not only this negotiation
but also later negotiations (contribution C9), which proved to be very useful even
in simple bilateral negotiations. It improved the performance of all counter tactics
in many settings, although it of course was not able to make these tactics work
where they did not work before. On the other hand, the Adaptive Counter tactic
was able to beneﬁt most and was able to beat all of the others. The drawback of
the Adaptive Counter tactic is that it needs relatively accurate information about
the opponent tactics to function properly, whereas the simple counter tactics need
no such information. An appropriate simple counter tactic should be able to do
quite well in any conceivable market, where there are suﬃﬁcent negotiation op-
portunities so that an occassional failure is not a problem and where probabilities
of success with diﬀerent oﬀers could be assessed.
We will now move to the next level in our model, the Controller, where we
discuss how many concurrent negotiations on the same service can be controlled.Chapter 10
Concurrency Strategies: The
Controller Level
As explained in chapter 8, the tasks of a Controller are:
• Managing all bilateral negotiations on a single service: A Controller is
responsible for starting and ending Negotiators and following their progress
and reporting this to the Coordinator. A central task is avoiding too many
contracts and decommitting from such contracts if they occur.
• Selecting opponents to negotiate with: Given the service providers in the
market, a Controller selects those it wants to negotiate with.
• Choosing the number of concurrent negotiations: Given the selected oppo-
nents, a Controller chooses the number of negotiations to have.
• Providing estimates on the negotiation outcomes and success probabilities:
To function eﬃciently, the Coordinator may need an outcome estimate of
any on-going or future potential negotiations. This estimate requires both
the expected utility of successful outcome and the probability of achiev-
ing that result and it is a result of combining similar reports from the
Negotiators.1
In the following, we will discuss how these tasks are achieved. The discussion
will relate to our research contributions C7 (concurrent negotiations and the
1This means considering the combined eﬀects of the diﬀerent negotiations such as multiple
contracts (decommitments) and average or worse contracts.
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Controller) and, in part, C9 (future oﬀers). In more detail, we will ﬁrst discuss
the architecture of the Controller (section 10.1). This is followed by discussion
of our experiments and their results (section 10.2). We conclude the chapter by
summarising our ﬁndings (section 10.3).
10.1 Architecture of the Controller
We start the discussion of the Controller’s architecture by giving an overview
of its structure and interaction with its surroundings (section 10.1.1). We then
discuss controller strategies (section 10.1.2). Finally, we discuss how possible oﬀers
in later negotiations should be considered (section 10.1.3).
10.1.1 Overview
A Controller controls a group of Negotiators that negotiate on the same type
of service with diﬀerent providers. This means that the Controller decides who
to negotiate with and when to accept the oﬀer or quit the negotiation.
The <Controller> component consists of three main parts:
• The <ControllerBase> module deals with communication with the <Coor-
dinator> and the <Negotiator> components. It also starts the new Nego-
tiators and ends the old ones according to its instructions.
• The <Strategy> module’s task is to make all the strategic decisions for
the <Controller> in a very similar way to the <Tactic> module in the
<Negotiator> component, although, as we will see, the <Strategy> consists
of multiple strategies, which are all separately interchangable whereas the
<Tactic> module was interchangable as a whole.
• The <MarketAnalyser> oﬀers its analysis of the market situation to the
<Strategy> component. This module stores the consumer agent’s infor-
mation about the market and the potential negotiations for one particular
service.
The interplay between these modules has two diﬀerent modes. The more com-
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notices it has no Negotiators but it would still have time to negotiate and it
asks the Strategy module if it should start new negotiations (and if yes, who
it should negotiate with). This interaction is described in the ﬁgure 10.1. Here,
after getting a request from the StrategyBase (step 1), the Strategy module will
get information about the potential opponents from the MarketAnalyser (steps
2 and 5), who analyses the information it gets from the Marketplace (steps 3
and 4).2 The Strategy then gives the StrategyBase its recommendation for a
negotiation strategy (the opponents and the ﬁrst oﬀer to make to each of them),
including an estimate of the outcome (probability of success and expected utility
in case of success) (step 6). The StrategyBase sends this recommendation to the
Coordinator for approval (step 7) and the Coordinator responds with the ﬁnal
strategy (opponents this Controller should negotiate with and the ﬁrst oﬀers it
should make) (step 8) which the StrategyBase then implements by starting the






















Figure 10.1: The Opponent Selection mode of a Controller.
The other mode, the Negotiation mode, is used during the negotiations (while the
Controller has active Negotiators). As shown in ﬁgure 10.2, the Negotiators
work as a trigger here when they report the progress of their negotiations and
suggest what action should be taken next (step 1). When all Negotiators have
reported in, the ControllerBase gives these reports to the Strategy and asks it
to tell what it should do with the on-going negotiations (step 2). The Strategy
responds with a recommended strategy (step 3), which includes an action (accept,
2Any call for information from the marketplace is returned only when a new matching is
about to begin, because new negotiations can only be started then.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 227
withdraw, counteroﬀer) to take in each negotiation. This recommendation is then
sent to the Coordinator for approval (step 4). The Coordinator returns the
ﬁnal strategy (step 5), which the ControllerBase implements by telling each

















Figure 10.2: The Negotiation mode of a Controller.
10.1.2 Controller Strategies
In the <Negotiator>, the <Tactic> module was just one component that could
be changed to another to get diﬀerent behaviour. In contrast, the <Strategy>
module in the <Controller> is more complicated. It actually consists of four
parts:
• The <StrategyWrapper> oﬀers a standard interface for the <ControllerBase>
to use and controls the basic interactions between the other components. It
is a stable part of the architecture and is therefore not interchangable.3
• The <OpponentSelection> ranks the opponents in order of preference as
negotiation partners.4
3Although if this was useful, it would be a relatively straight-forward task to extend the
architecture to allow diﬀerent <StrategyWrapper> modules. This would make it possible to
introduce other types of interaction between the other three modules. Currently we can see no
need for that, however.
4It could also remove useless opponents and although we implemented this functionality
(Opponent Filtering), we do not use this functionality in the experiments we are going to discuss.
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• The <ConcurrencyControl> decides how many negotiations there will be
concurrently.
• The <NegotiationStrategy> then decides what to do in each on-going or
new negotiation.
All modules except <StrategyWrapper> oﬀer a standard interface and can be
changed, although the <OpponentSelection> and <NegotiationStrategy> mod-
ules actually consist of more than one interchangable part. This structure allows
very ﬂexible selection of strategies and also makes it very easy to add new strate-
gies.
As explained, the Controller has two modes of operation: Opponent Selection
and Negotiation. In the former, all modules are used as shown in ﬁgure 10.3.
Basically, the ControllerBase asks the StrategyWrapper to provide a status
report and a recommendation for the strategy. StrategyWrapper calls in turn:
a. OpponentSelection (step 2): It gets the market information from the Market-
Analyser (steps 3 and 4). Among other things, this information contains
the list of potential opponents. The OpponentSelection sorts the oppo-
nents into order of preference and may remove some opponents from the list
altogether. The sorted list is returned to the StrategyWrapper (step 5).
b. ConcurrencyControl (step 6). It decides how many negotiations to run con-
currently. The list of negotiations (with opponents) is returned to Strategy-
Wrapper (step 7).
c. NegotiationStrategy (step 8): It decides what to do in each of the on-
going negotiations, calculates the expected result of these negotiations and
sends this information to the StrategyWrapper (step 9), who forwards it to
the ControllerBase (step 10).
In the Negotiation mode, the interaction is much simpler and consists only of
the NegotiationStrategy module checking on the progress of the negotiations.
This includes handling any contracts, doing any decommitments necessary and
deciding whether or not to accept an oﬀer, withdraw from a negotiation or what
oﬀer to make.5 The recommended strategy here consists of the next actions to
take in each negotiation, expected outcome (success probability and utility) and
5The information ﬂows through the StrategyWrapper module but it only calls the appropriate
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Figure 10.3: The <Strategy> module in the Opponent Selection mode.
the list of decommitments to make. In both modes, the ControllerBase sends this
recommendation to the Coordinator to be checked against other Controllers’
strategies.
We will then discuss the diﬀerent strategies in more detail. First, we will discuss
opponent selection strategies (section 10.1.2.1). Second, we will discuss methods
for deciding the number of concurrent negotiations to have, that is, the concurrency
strategies (section 10.1.2.2). Finally, we discuss negotiation strategies (section
10.1.2.3), which set the negotiation tactics in each individual Negotiator.
10.1.2.1 Opponent Selection Strategies
As discussed in the previous subsection, the <OpponentSelection> module does
not actually do any selecting, but only arranges the potential opponents according
to some rule in decreasing order of relevance, placing the best opponents in front
and the worst towards the end. We have three basic opponent ranking rules:6
• Random opponent selection means that the order of opponents is chosen
among the sellers in the market at random. The ordering of the opponents
6The diﬀerent strategies are implemented by separate modules that provide a standard inter-
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is re-done at each matching so that all sellers have an equal chance of getting
to the top no matter when they entered the market.
• Quality opponent selection means that the sellers are ordered according to
the quality of the service they provide, in descending order (the providers
with highest qualities ﬁrst). Because the expected utility usually increases
with quality, this usually means improvement over the Random opponent
selection. However, because the diﬀerent negotiation tactics that diﬀerent
opponents may use can aﬀect the expected outcome quite signiﬁcantly, there
is still some variation in the expected utilities.
• Expected Utility opponent selection means that the opponents are ordered
based on the expected utility they would oﬀer in a negotiation. This means
that the opponent selection asks the Negotiator level to provide an estimate
for a negotiation outcome on each opponent and then uses these estimates to
order the opponents in descending order, the opponents oﬀering the highest
utility ﬁrst. This means that the ﬁrst few opponents are usually very high
quality providers that are using a negotiation tactic that is very suitable to
the negotiation tactic the Negotiator uses (if such information is available).7
In the Expected Utility opponent selection strategy, calculating an expected out-
come of an opponent means devising an optimal tactic against it and estimating
the success probability of this tactic. Obviously this can only be done by the
Negotiator who is expert in bilateral negotiation.
On the other hand, it is equally clear that calculating the optimal tactic is not a
trivial operation and that we do not want to do it if we do not have to. Doing it
for several dozens of opponents at each of the ten matchings8, we would be doing
much of the work for no good reason since we are unlikely to negotiate with most
of the opponents. Therefore, we use optimisation to minimise the number of op-
ponents we have to estimate the expected utility with. This is done by calculating
(oﬄine) an upperbound for the expected utility given the quality the opponent
provides, the negotiation tactic (if known), the adverse eﬀect probabilities and
the decommitment policy. If the upperbound of an opponent’s expected utility
is lower than the threshold utility, it will be ignored (its actual expected utility
is not calculated). The threshold is the nth best expected utility we have found
so far, where n is the maximum number of opponents we may want to negotiate
7If tactic information is not available, only the quality is used.
8The expected utility will usually be diﬀerent at each matching even if the opponent is the
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with. So if we know the opponent is not going to make it to the top n, there is
no reason to calculate the exact expected utility for it and we can safely ignore
it. And to help ﬁnd a good threshold quickly, the opponents are ﬁrst ordered by
their quality, so higher quality providers will be investigated ﬁrst. If and when our
estimates are reasonably accurate, this can cut down the number of opponents to
be processed signiﬁcantly.
10.1.2.2 Concurrency Strategies
The <ConcurrencyControl> module selects the number of bilateral negotiations
to use. It is given the ordered list of opponents and it then proceeds to decide
who to negotiate with. It cannot pick and choose the opponents from the list,
but if it wants to negotiate with the ﬁfth opponent on the list, it will have to
negotiate with opponents 1 − 4 too. Giving a concurrency strategy the right to
pick opponents from the list would mean stepping into opponent selection, which
is not the domain of the concurrency strategy. It will take the list as given and just
choose the number of opponents from the top of the list. We will now introduce
the three families of concurrency strategies we have.
A Simple concurrency strategy always starts a ﬁxed number of negotiations at
each matching. We use ten variations of this group, namely from Simple 1, Simple
2, ..., Simple 10, where the number speciﬁes the number of negotiations it starts
at each matching, so how many concurrent negotiations we will have. The Simple
concurrency strategies do not take a risk of multiple contracts or success proba-
bilities into account in any way. Rather they always start the speciﬁed number
of negotiations as long as there is that many opponents in the market. If there
are fewer opponents in the market, they start negotiations with all the remaining
ones.
The second type of strategy is the Analytic concurrency strategy. This represents
an improvement over the Simple strategies because it will explicitly take into
account the risk of getting mediocre or multiple contracts and success probabilities.
As the name suggests, the Analytic concurrency strategy calculates the expected
utilities for each and every negotiation number allowed and it chooses the one that
maximises the expected utility. How this happens in detail is complicated because
with multiple negotiations, there are many diﬀerent cases to consider.
To demonstrate this, let us take an example of three negotiations. Here, the basic
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We have to consider each case. If there is no contracts, we have a zero utility,
so that case is simple. If we have one contract, it could be from any of the three
negotiations. Thus, we have to calculate the probability for each negotiation (and
that negotiation alone) producing a result and then have an expected utility for
each case. This is simple and the information (the chance of success and the
expected utility in case of success) is provided by the Negotiators.
After that, however, things become complicated. If we have two contracts, we
can of course calculate the probabilities of that happening for each case, but it
may well be that one contract is formed clearly before the other and we can stop
the negotiations before we get the other contract (we would have to decommit
from them). To do this, we have to estimate the probability that we will actually
have two contracts. This is done by estimating a contract time distribution for
each negotiation. The diﬀerent negotiation tactics and their countertactics have
diﬀerent patterns when it comes to contract times (if we use the Adaptive Counter
tactic):
• Exponential Time-Dependent: the contract is usually formed at the seller’s
deadline, when the seller would oﬀer its reservation price that the buyer has
been oﬀering all along. However, if the seller uses a very strongly conceding
variation, it might actually reach the reservation price earlier (because we
have rounded our oﬀers). Also, the seller might not make the reservation
price oﬀer at the last turn of the negotiation, but it may also have a dead-
line during the negotiation and if that is the case, it will oﬀer the reservation
price then. The probability of the seller having a deadline during the nego-
tiation can be estimated and very conceding negotiation tactics can usually
be ignored (see below).
• Pure Behavioural: Here the countertactic will have the buyer making an
oﬀer that the seller cannot refuse on the ﬁrst turn and therefore the contract
is usually formed there and then.
• Random Behavioural and Random: Here, the countertactic will make an
oﬀer that has a relatively small chance of getting accepted at one turn,
but when made up to 100 times (maximum length of a negotiation9), the
probability that it will be accepted at least once is often very high. Ex
ante the probability is at its highest on the ﬁrst turn and decreases slowly
towards the end (because there is an increasing chance that a contract has
been found earlier).
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With the Random Counter tactic, we can only succeed against Exponential Time-
Dependent and Random tactics. With the Random tactic, the situation is iden-
tical to when we use the Adaptive Counter tactic. With the Exponential Time-
Dependent tactic, it depends on the β parameter value but there is a peak to-
wards the end of the distribution (for simplicity we assume that the contract will
be formed at the last turn). In all cases, we also have to take into account the
deadline distributions of the opponents. If we are in the ﬁrst negotiation, there is
a 90% chance that the opponent’s deadline is later than turn 100, meaning that
its deadline in this negotiation will be 99. But if we are in the last negotiation,
there is only a 1% of this happening.
Armed with these distributions, we use them to actually calculate the probability




P(contract in negotiation 1 at turn t)P(contract in negotiation 2 at turn t)
This gives us the probability that we have to decommit from one of the contracts.
We then have to do a similar calculation for the other two cases (negotiations 1
and 3 and negotiations 2 and 3). In each case, we consider the fact that in the
eventuality that we have two contracts, we can choose the better of the two, but
that we would have to decommit from the other one. Again, we get probabilities
and expected utilities.
The case where we have three contracts is similar and again we can calculate the






P(contract in negotiation n at turn t)).
To get the expected utility for this case, we take the expected utility for the best
contract and deduct the decommitment fees for the other two.
To calculate the total utility for the three negotiation case, we then add all these
expected utilities (probability times the (expected) utility) together. We proceed
to do this for all possibilities from 1 to whatever maximum we have assigned and
once we have estimates for all cases, we choose the number of negotiations based
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This is a reasonably computation-intensive process and the worst part of it is
that the number of cases will quickly increase with the number of negotiations.
With one negotiation, we only have two cases (success and failure). With two
negotiations, we have four cases, both negotiations successful at the same turn,
only negotiation 1, only negotiation 2, and neither successful. With three, it’s 8
(=1+3+3+1) cases, four 16 (=1+4+6+4+1)10 and so on. At some point, we will
run out of computing power and we have to discover some heuristics. These could
have to do with known properties of negotiation tactics11 Or we could calculate
such probabilities for any mixture of opponent strategies in advance, so we would
know the probabilities of the same round successes if we have 3 opponents using the
Pure Behavioural, 4 sellers using the Random and 1 seller using the Exponential
Time-Dependent tactic when we are using Adaptive Counter tactic on each of
them. Here, we use a relative small maximum number of negotiations (10 which
gives us 1024 cases on that level, a large but still manageable number) and the
calculation, although somewhat involved, can still be managed.
So, the Analytic concurrency strategy adds together all the cases for up to the
maximum number of negotiations (as we just mentioned, this will be 10 in our
experiments), calculates the expected utility for each number of negotiations and
then chooses the one that provides the highest expected utility. As with the Simple
strategies case, the Analytic concurrency strategy does not change the negotiation
tactics that the Negotiators come up with. Rather it takes the Negotiators’
tactics as given and tries to optimise the number of negotiations to have.
The good part of this approach is that it can also be used under incomplete
information. If there is, for example, a 50 : 50 chance that the opponent is using a
Random or Pure Behavioural tactic, once we know our own tactic, we can guess a
time distribution for any outcome and then use this in our calculations. Also small
errors here and there are not likely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the outcome, because they
only mean that we might be slightly over- or under-eager to have more negotiations
10The numbers are of course binomial coeﬃcients, which are often described by Pascal’s tri-
angle. This is because the problem here is just a type of binomial distibution (each negotiation
either fails or succeeds just like you get heads or tails in a coin toss).
11For example, any analytical approach with Adaptive Counter needs to consider at least three
cases: two or more opponents using the Exponential Time-Dependent or the Pure Behavioural
tactic will lead to two or more contracts and should usually be avoided (if the fee is positive).
However, because the contract with the the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic will be usually
formed very late, having opponents using diﬀerent tactics can usually decrease the problem
because they make it likely that a contract will be formed earlier in these other negotiations.
Moreover, the probability that the Random Behavioural or the Random tactics form a contract
at the same turn is usually quite small, although should not be ignored especially if there are
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and although this may have an eﬀect on our performance, we should usually still
do better than doing something simple like having a ﬁxed number of negotiations.
Although of course there may be cases where a single number of negotiations is
the best approach in all cases.
The Adaptive concurrency strategy does not take the Negotiators’ suggestions
as given, but it will choose the best level of oﬀers in each negotiation separately,
together with the Negotiators. This will allow the Adaptive concurrency strat-
egy to avoid getting into inferior contracts, which can be a problem for other
strategies, when the expected utility varies strongly among the opponents the
buyer encounters. Basically the Adaptive concurrency strategy expects the same
expected utility from each successful negotiation and sets its oﬀer in each negoti-
ation so that all negotiations provide the same expected utility in case of success.
The Adaptive strategy will calculate the oﬀer needed in each negotiation and
then ask the Negotiator level to provide the success probability with that oﬀer.
These probabilities and expected utilities will then be used in an identical process
to the Analytic concurrency strategy to set the number of opponents optimally.
The Adaptive concurrency strategy therefore varies not only the number of ne-
gotiations, but also the expected utility from each negotiation and that makes it
possible to avoid some of the pitfalls the other strategies are not able to avoid.
The Adaptive concurrency strategy may try diﬀerent levels of expected utility
before it is happy with the results. It starts from the best expected utility of a
single negotiation (any of the 10), and chooses the optimal number of negotiations
to have given the success probabilities in the negotiations the Negotiator has
provided. It then tries a bit lower and higher expected utilities to see if it could
increase the expected utility that way. It therefore ﬁnds a local expected utility
maximum (which is also likely to be the global maximum) and uses that.
The problem with the Adaptive concurrency strategy is that it assumes complete
information about opponent tactics and given this, it does not function properly, if
the actual expected utility of the best oﬀer is not known. This is because it starts
looking for the optimal expected utility to demand in each negotiation at the best
opponent’s level and ﬁnds the local maxima nearby. However, with incomplete
information such local maxima may not be a global maxima and, therefore, the
best oﬀer it ﬁnds may be far from optimal. For example, the Adaptive Counter
tactic would under incomplete information often suggest making an oﬀer that all
opponents accept and the highest expected outcome would be oﬀered simply by
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full information, most of the other opponents would be able to provide that sort
expected utility with the varying level of probability and this means it will be
much more diﬃcult for the Adaptive concurrency strategy to ﬁnd the optimal
oﬀer. There are several problems with using the Adaptive concurrency strategy
under incomplete information:
• There is always a chance that more than one of the opponents will be able to
match the required expected utility level even if they actually did not. This
means the Adaptive concurrency strategy might demand too high expected
utilities (risk missing contracts). On the other hand, it may also underesti-
mate the probabilities of extra contracts and get into more contracts than
would be useful (risk getting too many contracts). This is the direct result
of incomplete information.
• More critically, however, it may well be that the starting point is much
further from the global optimum than it was with the complete information
and, on the other hand, the combined eﬀect of several negotiations is much
more diﬃcult to estimate with incomplete information. This may mean
that there are local maximums before the global maximum. If the Adaptive
strategy gets stuck in a local maximum that is much lower than the global
maximum, it may well mean that most opponents are still in contention
and especially with high decommitment fees, the Adaptive strategy may be
forced to play it safe and have very few or even just one negotiation. This
one negotiation may not even be the best one available, but a very mediocre
one.
In other words, the Adaptive concurrency strategy, as we have implemented it,
loses much of its advantage (ability to pick out the good opponents from the
mediocre, under incomplete information such division is much more vague) under
incomplete information. The fact of the matter is that in the few experiments
we conducted the Adaptive concurrency strategy as we had it, does not seem to
be particularly impressive under incomplete information. This may be in part
an implementation issue but it will also be in part, because the approach we
took works markedly less well under incomplete information. We have decided to
leave adapting the Adaptive concurrency strategy to use incomplete information
to future work (see section 12.2.2 for more detail) and in this work, we will use the
Adaptive concurrency strategy only in the settings where full tactic information is
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10.1.2.3 Negotiation Strategy
The <NegotiationStrategy> module approves the decisions on all bilateral nego-
tiations, it decides when oﬀers are accepted, when to withdraw from a negotiation
and what oﬀers to make. It also manages contracts that have been formed and
handles decommitments, if necessary. This is the only module that is active in
both modes of operation: As explained in section 10.1.2, it will give the ﬁrst of-
fers to make in new negotiations in the Opponent Selection mode and will suggest
plans of action for each negotiation in the Negotiation mode.
There are clearly separate areas of this negotiation strategy and, therefore, the
<NegotiationStrategy> module is further divided into three parts:
• The <AcceptStrategy> makes all decisions related to contracts. So, it makes
the decision on whether or not to accept any of the oﬀers the opponents made
this turn (and if yes, which one to accept). In addition, it will also decide
what to do with contracts that have been entered into, because one or more
of the opponents accepted the buyer’s last oﬀer.
• <WithdrawalStrategy> decides whether or not any of the existing negotia-
tions should be withdrawn from.
• <CounterofferStrategy> decides the counteroﬀer to make in each negoti-
ation.
The interplay of these three modules is simple. First, the AcceptStrategy checks
if any contract has been formed or if there are any oﬀers worth accepting. Second,
the WithdrawalStrategy checks if there are any negotiations that should be with-
drawn from. Finally, the CounterofferStrategy decides what counteroﬀers to
make in the remaining negotiations. As earlier, each of these submodules provides
a standard interface to allow new strategies to be implemented.
In this work, we only have one of each strategies and they are all somewhat basic.
The Simple accept strategy ﬁrst checks if there are any new contracts (the buyer’s
oﬀers that a seller has accepted). If there is more than one contract, the best one
is chosen and others are marked as contracts to be decommitted from. If there
is none, it will move to consider if any of the oﬀers made by the sellers is good
enough to accept, i.e. give an expected utility above the speciﬁed threshold (zero
or whatever future oﬀers say). If there is more than one such oﬀer, only the one
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The Simple withdrawal strategy will see if the buyer has found a contract. If
it has, it withdraws from all remaining negotiations. This also happens when a
deadline is reached or if a negotiation cannot lead to a good result (Negotiator
says such a result cannot be obtained).
The Simple counteroﬀer strategy will take its lead from the recommendation made
by the Negotiator or the Adaptive concurrency strategy if such a recommendation
exists (on-going negotiation). If it is the ﬁrst round and no recommendation is
forthcoming, it will call the Negotiator level to ask for the optimal oﬀer and
use that instead. The Simple counteroﬀer strategy will not start second-guessing
recommendations made by others who are more qualiﬁed to make this decision.
Its task is only to make sure that a counteroﬀer for each continuing negotiation is
always available in the recommended strategy.
10.1.3 Considering Future Oﬀers
It seems likely that we could beneﬁt from taking the future oﬀers into account
also when we allow multiple concurrent negotiations.12 Of course, the fact that we
have diﬀerent opponent selection and concurrency strategies means that we have
to adapt our approach to take these into account. Fortunately, this is reasonably
straight-forward and the basic approach is exactly as before. We run the market
but instead of negotiating, we collect the information about the opponents that the
buyer would see if it would enter into such market. In other words, we calculate the
expected utilities for each and every opponent we might negotiate with and store
this information. We then use backward induction to determine the appropriate
threshold levels just as before (see section 9.1.3).
However, the diﬀerent concurrency strategies make it a slightly more complicated
process. We have twelve diﬀerent concurrency strategies (Simple 1-10 and An-
alytic and Adaptive), but only eleven diﬀerent ones in terms of what opponents
they might see, because the advanced strategies (Analytic and Adaptive) are very
similar in this respect. Fortunately, we can get the values for all these eleven
cases during the same run, so we only need to gather data once in each setting
(opponent selection/eﬀect/decommitment policy setting).
As already mentioned, we collect the information by employing a speciﬁc con-
currency strategy that never starts any negotiations but just collects information
12We did this with one negotiation at the Negotiator level in section 9.1.3.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 239
about the opponents. It starts each matching by taking the list of opponents it
gets from the opponent selection and it goes through the list (no opponent is ever
removed during the process) opponent by opponent, calculating the expected util-
ity it oﬀers and then going through the concurrency strategies one by one checking
if that particular strategy has already negotiated with this opponent and, if not,
stores the expected utility of this opponent and marks it as an opponent this
strategy has already negotiated with, so it will not be considered again with that
strategy in the later matchings. Obviously in the Simple 1 strategy, only one ‘new’
opponent can be considered at each matching, whereas in the Simple 10 strategy,
ten new opponents need to be found and in the later phases, a large number of
opponents may have already been negotiated with. The only exception to this
process is the Analytic/Adaptive process which always considers the ﬁrst ten ne-
gotiations because the best approximation on the behaviour of these strategies is
that they do not negotiate until they ﬁnd a good deal and then they exit with
that deal. When all strategies have found their maximum number of negotiation
partners, the process moves on to the next matching.
We then come to the second essential diﬀerence to the approach we had in the
bilateral negotiation. Here, we store separately up to 10 diﬀerent values for each
matching of each run. We take the best utility found, the second-best utility and so
on up until the number of negotiations we may have (10 for the Analytic/Adaptive
and n for the Simple n strategy). This is because sometimes it might not be the
best approach to only have a few opponents due to a very high threshold, but
it may sometimes be a good idea to have a slightly lower threshold (and more
opponents). We could have of course reached a similar approach (trying lower
thresholds too) by using something other than average as our means of deriving
the threshold levels or even simply by trying say 5% lower thresholds and see
how that works. However, this was the most straight-forward way of lowering the
thresholds and still using the data collected in a useful way. Also, it seemed the
best approach. A ﬁve percent drop in thresholds might be a huge amount in some
settings and nothing in others. A similar problem is connected with using some
other method than average in the calculations. Considering only the best options
may not give an accurate picture of the actual opponents the buyer meets. The
diﬀerence between the best and the second or ﬁfth best might in some cases, be
huge and, in others, very small.
One particular problem associated with the cases with no tactics information is
that the thresholds will be slightly diﬀerent when they are collected with and
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will succeed only against sellers that use non-behavioural tactics, which in our
setting are around 50% of the population. Now, in a setting where the qualities
vary signiﬁcantly (the Random opponent selection), this means that without tactic
information, all opponents are considered when the thresholds are calculated (be-
cause it is unknown which opponents are using which tactic), but without tactic
information, only the opponents using the non-behavioural tactic will be consid-
ered. That is because some of the high-quality opponents we encounter while
collecting data are using one of the behavioural tactics and therefore would be
ignored when we have the tactic information but they are not ignored when we do
not have the information. Because without the tactic information, the expected
utility of an opponent depends only on its quality, this eﬀectively means that
without the tactic information, the quality threshold is slightly higher, the buyer
expects a higher quality before it negotiates.
This eﬀect can be beneﬁcial in some cases and can even mean that tactics such as
Random Counter will do better without the tactic information than with it. This is
because it may mean that more negotiations are used under incomplete information
and, therefore, more options will be investigated. The highest quality threshold
is unlikely to be hugely successful because it will mean very few opponents and
some of them will not be using a suitable tactic. However, when the threshold is
decreased from this top level, it may well be that there are many more opponents
in the market that get over the buyer’s threshold and even if negotiations with
many of them will not be successful (because they use behavioural tactics), it will
mean that the buyer encounters more opponents in the end and that can be useful
in some circumstances. We will discuss this further in section 10.2.1.3.
In the case of the Adaptive Counter tactic, this eﬀect may be diﬀerent. The nature
of the eﬀect depends on what type of oﬀers the tactic chooses to make. If it makes
oﬀers that any opponent can accept, then there is no similar eﬀect as with the
Random Counter tactic, but of course, if it should make an oﬀer that opponents
using some of the tactics reject, the situation would be analogous to what we just
discussed.
To sum up, in this chapter, whenever we say we use ‘future oﬀers’, it means that
with all strategies we have used all diﬀerent future oﬀer threshold levels described
here and only consider the one that produced the highest expected utility in our
experiments. Of course our approach does not mean that we always ﬁnd the
threshold levels that produce the highest possible outcome, but we believe our
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are likely to get a better idea of the performance of diﬀerent strategies than if
we just used one. Since we use the same approach in all cases and strategies, it
seems reasonable to say that any diﬀerences we might see are real and not just
coincidences. We will not usually report which threshold levels worked best in
each and every experiment, because that would just take a lot of space and is
generally speaking not that interesting. However, we can say that with low eﬀect
probabilities, the ﬁrst-best thresholds usually yield the best results. But when the
buyer eﬀect probability is medium to high, also the lower thresholds can be useful.
We do not make any detailed proclamations on how these thresholds should be
set in a given environment. We have simply described one method and use it
to improve our results. However, we can say that sometimes it makes sense to
experiment with several levels of thresholds to see what works and what does not.
10.2 Empirical Evaluation
We have discussed the Controller and its parts and some strategies it can employ.
We will now investigate how the controller and these strategies work in practice,
what impact they will have on the buyer’s performance. As in the earlier parts,
this section is divided into three parts. First, we discuss theory and make our
hypotheses (section 10.2.1). Then we will discuss how we are going to investi-
gate these hypotheses in detail (section 10.2.2) and ﬁnally we provide our results
(section 10.2.3).
10.2.1 Hypotheses
Here, we will be most interested in two main things: (i) concurrency strategies (es-
pecially the advanced strategies versus the Simple strategies, but also diﬀerences
between the two advanced (Analytic and Adaptive) strategies), and (ii) opponent
selection. In general, we expect the Analytic and especially the Adaptive strate-
gies to do well because they take into consideration more factors and we expect
more sophisticated opponent selection strategies to help the buyer to do better.
However, in our setting, the concurrent bilateral negotiation with adverse eﬀects,
is so complex that we do not expect these general ideas to hold in all circum-
stances. It seems likely that sometimes the advanced strategies may not be that
helpful and there might even be some circumstances under which they are even
counterproductive.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 242
Before we can discuss any detailed hypotheses, we need to explain the range of
situations we are going to explore here. There is going to be many of them and
it will be somewhat diﬃcult to make very detailed hypotheses that would be
relatively compact but still describe the diﬀerent situations we face. On the other
hand, we need to explore many settings to see where our approaches work and
where they might not work.
So, we use two diﬀerent decommitment policies, one undercompensatory (Constant
0.0) and one overcompensatory (Constant 1.0). These two were chosen to test
our strategies in a setting with very diﬀerent decommitment policies and for their
simplicity. We have two diﬀerent negotiation tactics (the Random Counter tactic
and Adaptive Counter tactic). These two were chosen because they were the two
best negotiation tactics in the bilateral negotiation in the setting we use (all seller
tactics equally likely).13 Moreover, they oﬀer diﬀerent types of approach and it will
be interesting to see what diﬀerences, if any, that causes in the more complicated
setting.
In addition, we have two diﬀerent information settings. In the ﬁrst, we have full
information about the negotiation tactics the sellers use and, in the second, we
have only the tactic probability distribution in the seller population. And we
have settings where the buyer agent has varying estimates for the future oﬀers to
expect and where it has none. And of course in every one of these we then have 28
settings, where buyer only, seller only or both of them can experience an adverse
eﬀect with a probability of 0.0 − 0.9.14
Each of these settings and combinations of these settings will have its own charac-
teristics. For example, when the buyer is potentially aﬀected, a higher decommit-
ment fee makes it necessary for the buyer agent to be more careful about entering
into contracts because of the high cost of getting out of commitments, but when
only the seller can be aﬀected, the non-performance is actually preferrable to the
buyer (due to the over-compensation) and the buyer may want to ensure get-
ting a contract as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Adaptive Counter
tactic with full tactic information succeeds basically with any opponent whereas
the Random Counter tactics succeeds only with opponents using the Exponential
Time-Dependent or Random negotiation tactics and fails to reach an agreement
13These results we discussed in section 9.2.3.
14There are nine cases (0.1 − 0.9) for each of the three situations and one common case for
all, where the probability of adverse eﬀect is zero for both parties. The cases with certain eﬀects
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with everybody else.15 This obviously has implications on the number of nego-
tiations we should have. The problem with high number of negotiations is, of
course, getting into too many contracts and having to decommit from the extra
contracts. This can be very expensive when the fee is very high. On the other
hand, if decommitting is free, then the buyer does not need to worry about extra
contracts all that much. Also, we use the information about the future oﬀers as
a utility threshold for negotiation. Therefore, if a Controller knows that it will
probably be able to ﬁnd a better contract later, it will either not negotiate with
bad opponents at all or instruct the Negotiator to fail in those negotiations. This
will make the diﬀerence between the Adaptive Counter and the Random Counter
tactics smaller, although it does not remove it all together. Having full informa-
tion about opponents’ tactics and having only the probability distribution makes
the situation quite diﬀerent for the advanced concurrency strategies. Their ability
to predict extra contracts and successes drop signiﬁcantly and this will probably
show in their performance.
And of course the two or three opponent selection strategies (Random, Quality
and Expected Utility) we have, will have their own impact on the setting. The
Random opponent selection means that the buyer encounters opponents that have
a large variety in both quality and negotiation tactics, whereas Quality opponent
selection means meeting only high quality opponents and most of the variation is
in the negotiation tactics. The Expected Utility opponent selection removes much
of the negotiation tactic variation too, since with the two negotiation tactics we
have, it means meeting mostly high quality opponents using either the Exponential
Time-Dependent or Random negotiation tactics, because such opponents typically
provide the highest expected utility. This will obviously have a strong impact on
the performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies. Sometimes it makes sense to
have many negotiations, sometimes only a few. Sometimes it is a good idea to
wait for the probability of adverse eﬀect to go down before starting to negotiate,
sometimes it does not matter or might even be harmful, and so on. We have 11-
12 concurrency strategies in each setting (10 diﬀerent Simple strategies plus the
Analytic and Advanced strategies).
As mentioned, we have two diﬀerent information settings: one with full tactic
information and one with no tactic information. In addition, we may or may not
use future oﬀers. We, therefore, would get four diﬀerent settings. However, we
will only discuss the case with future oﬀers when we have no tactic information,
15Moreover, the Adaptive Counter tactic is able to exploit the Exponential Time-Dependent
tactic slightly better than the Random Counter tactic.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 244
because the setting with no tactic information and no future oﬀers would not bring
anything that new to the table. The eﬀect of future oﬀers is similar (although a bit
weaker because of less information) both with the tactic information and without
it and, therefore, there is little reason to repeat it. This means we will discuss three
settings. First, we discuss cases with full information about opponent tactics but
no future oﬀers (section 10.2.1.1), then full tactic information with future oﬀers
(section 10.2.1.2) and, ﬁnally, no tactics information but with future oﬀers (section
10.2.1.3).
10.2.1.1 Full Tactic Information, No Future Oﬀers
We start by discussing a setting where we have full tactic information (the con-
troller knows with 100% accuracy what negotiation tactic each and every seller
will use if negotiated with) but no information about future oﬀer. In other words,
the buyer will commit itself as soon as a contract that ensures positive expected
utility for it can be found.16
We will ﬁrst be interested in the relative performances of the advanced concurrency
strategies (Analytic, Adaptive) against the best of the Simple strategies in each
setting. The main advantage of the advanced concurrency strategies in this setting
is that they can vary the number of negotiations to have according to the situation,
whereas the Simple strategies will always have the same number of negotiations.
Both advanced strategies consider not only the possible fees associated with extra
contracts, but also the expected utilities of diﬀerent negotiations. It might be a
good idea to avoid negotiating with bad or mediocre opponents when there are also
good ones around. The Adaptive concurrency strategy is of course much better at
this than the Analytic, but also the analytic can avoid bad opponents in situations
where it has a few good opponents and then a bad one. It simply negotiates only
with the good ones. The Simple strategies are unable to attain such ﬂexibility.
However, this ﬂexibility can also be counterproductive. This can occur when the
ﬁrst negotiation providing a positive utility will be followed through, because it
can mean that the buyer using the advanced concurrency strategies is able to ﬁnd
a contract earlier than the buyer using the Simple strategy with only a few (or
even just one) negotiations. For example, if the ﬁfth opponent in the negotiation
queue would be able to provide positive utility, the Simple strategies with 1 − 4
negotiations will not see this ﬁfth opponent now (because they only negotiate with
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up to four opponents), but might encounter it or some similar provider in the next
matching or later. And in some situations this may be problematic because the
expected utility usually increases over time (if the buyer can be aﬀected), and
therefore any delay that the Simple strategies may encounter, can work in their
favour (they get better expected utility when they ﬁnally ﬁnd a contract).
We discuss ﬁrst the case where the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator
level. We start from the cases where the Random opponent selection is used. Here,
the diﬀerences in expected utilities among the sellers that the buyer encounters
are at their largest because the opponents vary greatly in both quality and nego-
tiation tactic.17 With Constant 0.0, the advantage of the Analytic strategy over
the Simple strategies is based on the fact that it can take into consideration the
expected utilities of diﬀerent negotiations and therefore can choose the number
of negotiations so that the expeced utility is maximised. This may mean, for ex-
ample, negotiating with only the ﬁrst four opponents because the ﬁfth opponent
provides very low quality and we run a risk of getting into a contract with that
opponent if we negotiate with it (especially if we expect it to use a negotiation
tactic that will lead to a contract quickly, like the Pure Behavioural one). The
Analytic strategy can, therefore, avoid bad contracts whereas the Simple strate-
gies take whatever they get which in this setting can be almost anything, because
the Adaptive Counter succeeds basically against any opponent (because all oppo-
nents provide a positive expected utility in this setting). This also means that all
concurrency strategies (also the Simple ones) will get a contract very quickly, so
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the advanced and the Simple strategies
in this respect. In addition, the Adaptive concurrency strategy can do even bet-
ter than Analytic strategy, because it can avoid contracts with bad and mediocre
opponents much more eﬃciently than the other strategies.
When the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used, negative expected utilities
are also possible. This is so especially in cases where only the buyer is aﬀected and
will mean that all strategies have to wait until a positive expected utility can be
reached. Here, however, the advanced concurrency strategy may be able to ﬁnd
opponents providing it with a positive expected utility earlier than other strategies.
Due to the Random opponent selection, the ﬁrst such opponents may not appear
in the top of the negotiation queue and therefore the Simple strategies with a
small number of negotiations might not spot them when they ﬁrst arrive. This
17Very low quality providers may provide utilities that are close to zero, whereas the high
quality providers using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic might be able to oﬀer the buyer
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may mean that the Simple strategies actually do better than the advanced in some
cases. This is because the later contracts usually provide a higher expected utility
(the risk of disastrous eﬀect is lower). On the other hand, the advanced strategies
can avoid the mediocre contracts and extra decommitments just as in the Constant
0.0 case. Because of the high decommitment cost here, the Analytic strategy will
be very careful to avoid extra contracts and will often negotiate very little beyond
the ﬁrst applicable opponent, which means it will avoid decommitments but get
into contracts earlier. The Adaptive strategy can avoid the bad and mediocre
and needs to be less worried about the extra contracts, so it should perform well
with low eﬀect probabilities (when the eﬀect probability does not make contracts
happen that much later even for the Simple strategies).
Of course when only the seller is aﬀected, getting into contracts faster is actually
an advantage because it maximises the probability of very lucrative seller failure.
Here, any contract is acceptable already in the ﬁrst negotiations, so also the Simple
strategies will get a contract quickly. However, because of the high decommitment
fee, all the best strategies except the Adaptive are going to have very few negoti-
ations, which means they will not encounter that many opponents and the results
may not be great. The Adaptive strategy, on the other hand, can explore a wider
range of opponents and is probably going to do better than the competition. The
Analytic is probably less successful here. When both are aﬀected, these two ef-
fects are combined, but because the risk of their own eﬀect is neutralised by the
chance of the seller eﬀect (both being equally likely), the situation is more similar
to the case where the seller is aﬀected, because the expected utilities are going to
be non-negative from the start. So, the Adaptive is expected to do well and the
Analytic is expected mostly to be unable to beat the best Simple strategies.
Now, when the Quality opponent selection is used, the situation stays much the
same. The Adaptive Counter will still have big diﬀerences in the expected util-
ity among the opponents it encounters, because although everybody it encounters
provides a high quality service, they can still use diﬀerent negotiation tactics and
the Adaptive Counter adapts to each of these tactics in a diﬀerent way. There is
quite big a diﬀerence whether or not it negotiates with somebody using the Pure
Behavioural tactic or somebody with the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic, al-
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smaller than with the Random opponent selection.18 This means that the advan-
tage of the Analytic strategy diminishes also in the Constant 0.0 cases because
even the worst options are still decent and it will often be unable to do much
better. However, the Adaptive strategy will still be going strong, because it can
choose among the best.
The cases where the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used will go much like
with the Random opponent selection. However, because all providers are high
quality, it means that the advanced and the Simple strategies ﬁnd their contracts
closer together and therefore the negative eﬀects of the ﬂexibility are probably
going to be milder in the cases where the buyer is aﬀected. Other cases are likely
to remain much the same, although the Adaptive strategy’s advantage is slightly
decreased because all opponents produce good results when successful.
When the Expected Utility opponent selection is used, there is very little diﬀerence
between the best strategies. This is because the best opponent is always going to
be the ﬁrst and the only opponent the sellers will negotiate with, so all strategies
ﬁnd their opponents around the same time and often with the same opponent.19
There is one more observation to make before our ﬁrst hypothesis in this chapter
and this is to remark that the way we calculate expected utilities in some parts of
our model mean that the expected utilities are sometimes slightly too high. This is
because they estimate the contract times of the seller slightly optimistically in the
negotiations that follow the last matching. We have taken a somewhat simpliﬁed
approach in a couple of places and this means that the estimates are not always
exactly accurate. The diﬀerence to the actual values is not great, but it may be
detectable in certain settings.
The two inaccuracies are very similar in nature and aﬀect the way the expected
utilities are calculated especially in the last matching. First, when we calculate
expected utilities for a given negotiation we use the average of ﬁrst and last possible
contract time to estimate the expected utility. Here, we do not consider the
contract time distributions we use in the concurrency strategies at all. This method
does not take into account the fact that in the last negotiation the sellers will have
their deadlines earlier and therefore the results, if any, will also occur earlier. This
18With an opponent of quality 0.99999, the Pure Behavioural tactic will yield a utility of around
0.25, whereas an opponent with the same utility but using the Exponential Time-Dependent will
give almost 0.50.
19The Simple strategies may, in some cases, waste an opponent or two when the Constant 1.0
policy is in force because they will have to negotiate also when they have no chance of success.
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problem is especially clear when the buyer’s eﬀect probabilities are very high,
because then the eﬀect probability decreases sharply during the last negotiations,
which means that the eﬀect probability is going to be higher on average than in
our calculation. As a result, the expected utility is going to be slightly too high in
these cases. This means that in some cases we might start negotiations that lead
to a slightly negative expected utility.
The second inaccuracy has to do with how advanced concurrent strategies estimate
the probability of extra contracts. Both the Analytic and Adaptive concurrency
strategy use the contract time distributions as discussed in section 10.1.2.2, but we
have simpliﬁed the calculation in some cases and, as with the other inaccuracy, this
involves not taking into account the fact that in the last matching the negotiations
are going to take a shorter time on average20 and, therefore, for example the
random strategies will lower their target utility levels to ensure a reasonable chance
of success.21 This means that the probabilities of early contracts are sometimes
too low and this may lead the advanced concurrency strategies to underestimate
the risk of too many contracts and have too many negotiations.
The eﬀect of these two inaccuracies are limited mostly to the cases where the
buyer is aﬀected with very high probability and the Constant 1.0 decommitment
policy is used (so that decommitment is costly). In other cases, their eﬀect is
going to be too small to be noticable. However, where it does apply, it will be
around in all our settings and, in the later settings, we will just refer to this
explanation. It is also worth noting that the diﬀerent negotiation tactics will be
aﬀected to a diﬀerent degree. The worst aﬀected are the random tactics (Random
and Random Behavioural) because both inaccuracies will inﬂuence the calculation
of expected utilities and probabilities of multiple contracts. The Exponential Time-
Dependent tactic will be among the least aﬀected with the ﬁrst inaccuracy because
the negotiation will often end very late (often near the seller’s deadline) and this
means that the error will be smaller than in other cases. The second inaccuracy
may aﬀect things, especially if some of the sellers involved use the Random tactics
because the negotiations will not often take until the last possible turn but may
end earlier increasing the risk of simultaneous contract with the Random tactic.
Now, because these inaccuracies aﬀect the Random negotiation tactic more than
they do the Exponential Time-Dependent one, the Adaptive Counter tactic is
20This is because the sellers will almost always have a deadline before the last possible deadline
which is just before the delivery time.
21In other words, the counter tactics do take this eﬀect into account when calculating the
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going to be less aﬀected especially with sophisticated opponent selection because
it allows the buyer to choose mostly sellers using the Exponential Time-Dependent
tactic. The buyer using the Random Counter negotiation tactic will not be able to
make this distinction and it will meet opponents using both tactics. This means
it will be less eﬀective.
We are then ready to contend:
Hypothesis 22. When there is full tactic information, but future of-
fers are not considered, and the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the
Negotiator level:
a. the Analytic strategy will be able to beat all the Simple strategies
in (almost) all cases, when the Constant 0.0 decommitment pol-
icy and Random opponent selection are used and, in some cases,
when the Quality opponent selection is used. It can lose to the
best of the Simple strategies in some cases with the Constant 1.0
decommitment policy when the buyer can be adversely aﬀected,
especially under the Random opponent selection but possibly also
under Quality opponent selection.
b. the Adaptive strategy will be able to beat all the Simple strategies
in most settings with the Random or Quality opponent selection.
It may, however, lose to the best Simple strategies when only the
buyer is aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 decommitment fee is used.
c. the Adaptive strategy will be able to beat the Analytic strategy
in most settings with the Random or Quality opponent selection.
Now, the Random Counter tactic will fail all negotiations with the sellers using
behavioural negotiation tactics (so, 50% of the time in our setting) and where
successful, it will always get the same utility from a provider of the same quality
because it always makes its oﬀers based on the opponent quality (and expected
negotiation time) alone. This makes the situation quite diﬀerent from what we
just discussed. The Random Counter tactic experiences less extra contracts than
the Adaptive Counter one, which beneﬁts both the best Simple strategies and the
Analytic strategy because they can negotiate more and have a better chance of
ﬁnding good quality providers. However, the Adaptive concurrency strategy loses
some of its power, because with the Random Counter, it will be unable to exploit
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before. Moreover, whereas the Adaptive Counter exploiting the Exponential Time-
Dependent tactic can be certain that no opponent of a similar quality or lower
will be able to match that expected utility (hence, no chance of extra contracts),
this does not hold with Random Counter. The oﬀer made is acceptable to both
opponents using the Random and the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic with
similar quality or even those with a slightly lower quality.22 This means that the
Adaptive strategy must be slightly more careful to avoid extra contracts where
necessary. The diﬀerence is not huge, since also Adaptive Counter may sometimes
have to rely on sellers using the Random tactic, but it is there, nevertheless.
These diﬀerences are not obvious when the Random opponent selection and the
Constant 0.0 decommitment policy are used. The advanced strategies have a clear
advantage over the Simple strategies because of their ﬂexibility and the Adaptive
strategy has an advantage over the Analytic strategy, because it will be able to
negotiate with more opponents and ignore the bad and mediocre ones (it still can
do that). When the Constant 1.0 policy is in force, the ﬁrst diﬀerences begin to
show. Because the Simple strategies with the low number of negotiations may take
a while before they ﬁnd a contract (whereas the advanced strategies are able to ﬁnd
the few opponents that they can succeed with), the advanced strategies can often
ﬁnd contracts quicker. This means more cases where the Simple strategies can
beat the advanced strategies and, on the other hand, less chances for the Adaptive
concurrency strategy to shine. They will, of course, have no trouble beating the
Simple strategies when early results are preferred (the seller is aﬀected) and here,
both advanced strategies are likely to do well. Also here the cases where the buyer
is aﬀected with very high probability, the inaccurate expected utility and contract
time estimates may cause a problem as discussed above and as also discussed above,
the Random Counter is more susceptible to these problems and may therefore have
more trouble in these cases.
The diﬀerences become very clear when we consider the case with the Quality
opponent selection. Here, all opponents are high quality, so all successful ne-
gotiations started at around the same time will lead to a very similar expected
utility. This, together with the fact that the Quality opponent selection makes it
less worthwhile to have a large number of negotiations (chances of ﬁnding better
contracts are not large enough to counter the increased risk of extra contracts),
and intensiﬁes the negative eﬀect of the advanced strategies’ ﬂexibility. When the
Constant 0.0 decommitment policy is used, this means that the advanced strate-
gies are almost always able to ﬁnd an opponent that gives them positive utility,
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whereas the Simple strategies with a low number of negotiations have a reason-
able chance of not ﬁnding one in the ﬁrst matching (because the opponent they
encounter might use a behavioural tactic).23 This means that in cases where the
contract time matters (the seller or both are aﬀected), the best Simple strategies
are probably going to outperform the advanced ones. They enter into contracts
later and have a lower chance of adverse eﬀect removing the contract. The Simple
strategies may also have a slight advantage also when only the buyer is aﬀected,
because the ﬁrst opponent using the non-behavioural negotiation tactic may have
a slightly higher quality in the later matchings, because of the later entries.24
As in the case with the Constant 1.0 decommitment fee, the advanced strategies
are still going to ﬁnd contracts slightly quicker than the best Simple strategies.
This means that where the buyer is aﬀected, the advanced strategies are more
likely to be in trouble. On the other hand, when the seller is aﬀected, getting into
contracts quickly is still a good thing, especially when the probability of the seller
eﬀect is very high, so we would expect that the advanced strategies do well when
the seller is aﬀected (especially when the eﬀect probability is high so that early
results are strongly preferred).
With both Quality and Expected Utility opponent selection, the Adaptive concur-
rency strategy may have an advantage over the Analytic concurrency strategies
in cases with very low eﬀect probabilities and the Constant 0.0 decommitment
policy. This is because with the Random Counter negotiation tactic, the chances
of success are very high, but less than one. This means that there may be cases
where the buyer might be able to get a slightly higher expected utility out of two
or more opponents than with only one. This is because the probability of success
will decrease with an increase of expected utility more slowly with multiple oppo-
nents than with one opponent. An example might be useful here. So, if we have a
probability of success of say 99.5% with one seller, but if we have two very similar
opponents with that success probability, we would have a probability 99.9975%
that at least one of the negotiations will be successful. This means that we can
increase the expected utility we demand and still have a very reasonable proba-
bility of success. However, this is not always possible. For starters, we run a risk
of having two contracts and with a positive decommitment fee, this strategy may
23So, for the Simple 1 strategy, ﬁnding an opponent that uses a non-behavioural tactic at ﬁrst
matching, the probability is roughly 0.5. For an advanced strategy, the probability that none of
the ten opponents it considers uses a non-behavioural tactic is minuscule, 0.510 = 0.0977%.
24There is, on expectation, only 25 sellers using non-behavioural tactics in the market in the
ﬁrst matching and around 100 more are expected to arrive at some point later. The chances are
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fast become unusable. On the other hand, we need sellers that have very similar
qualities and are using the Random negotiation tactic 25 to pull this oﬀ and given
that most contracts are formed very quickly after the start of the experiment,
there is a limited space for success. On the other hand, if we have a positive
chance of adverse eﬀect, the expected utility increase of a small price adjustment
might not increase our expected utility in a signiﬁcant way even when all the other
requirements are fulﬁlled.26 Therefore, any diﬀerence will likely to be limited in
cases with very low eﬀect probabilities.
Given all this, we contend:
Hypothesis 23. When there is full tactic information, but future of-
fers are not considered, and the Random Counter tactic is used at the
Negotiator level:
a. the Analytic strategy will be able to beat all the Simple strategies
in (almost) all cases, when the Constant 0.0 decommitment pol-
icy and Random opponent selection are used and in some cases
(when only the seller is aﬀected), when the Constant 1.0 policy is
used. It can lose to the best of the Simple strategies in some cases
with the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy when the buyer or
both parties can be aﬀected, with both the Random and Qual-
ity opponent selection and with the Constant 0.0 decommitment
policy (especially when the seller or both parties can be aﬀected)
when the Quality opponent selection is used.
b. the Adaptive strategy will be able to beat all the Simple strate-
gies in most settings with the Random opponent selection. It
may, however, lose to the best Simple strategies when only the
buyer or when both parties can be aﬀected when the Constant 1.0
decommitment fee is used with both the Random and the Quality
opponent selection. It will also lose to the best Simple strate-
gies when a Constant 0.0 decommitment policy and the Quality
opponent selection is used and the seller or both parties can be
aﬀected.
25The Expected Time-Dependent tactic is not susceptible to this trick, because any lower price
will never be acceptable to the seller and therefore increasing the expected utility by lowering
the price will not work. With the Random tactic, there is a small diﬀerence between the optimal
price in one negotiation and the reservation price, so a slight increase may be possible. However,
the probability of success decreases very rapidly with the price adjustment and the room for
improvement is limited.
26This problem is especially clear here, since with no future oﬀers, the contracts are formed
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c. the Adaptive strategy will be able to beat the Analytic strategy in
most settings with the Random opponent selection. With other
opponent selection strategies, the Adaptive strategy’s advantage is
limited to the cases with the Constant 0.0 decommitment policy
and very low probability of adverse eﬀect. There may also be cases
with the Constant 1.0 decommitment fee, where the Adaptive gets
beaten by the Analytic strategy.
10.2.1.2 Full Tactic Information with Future Oﬀers
When we take into consideration the future oﬀers, the situation changes. Here, it
becomes very important what sort of opponents (the number plus the quality and
tactic distribution) the concurrency strategies will encounter during the run. In
particular, we are not after the ﬁrst contract that yields positive expected utility,
but the very best contract we can hope to ﬁnd. As explained above, this means we
use a utility threshold which typically decreases as the time goes on so a contract
that would not have been acceptable earlier might be so later. This is because the
probability of ﬁnding a better one has decreased. Now, the diﬀerent concurrency
strategies obviously will encounter a diﬀerent selection of opponents during a run.
For example, Simple 1 will only see 10 opponents at most, whereas Simple 10
might see as many as 100. Moreover, the opponent selection strategies will have
a clear impact on how good those opponents encountered are.
There is also a clear diﬀerence between the advanced and Simple strategies. The
Simple strategies never encounter the same opponent twice. If they see it, they
will negotiate with it and then they can never negotiate with that same opponent
again. In contrast, the advanced strategies might encounter some of the opponents
over and over again, because they often do not negotiate with the opponents
they encounter. This can be both an advantage and a problem. It can be an
advantage because if an advanced strategy sees a good opponent too early for
that opponent to be useful, it can wait for a few matchings and negotiate with
it when the probability of adverse eﬀect has decreased to a more acceptable level
(assuming the opponent in question is still in the market, of course). However,
it can also be a problem. When the Random opponent selection is used, the
best approach for ﬁnding the best opponents may in some cases be meeting as
many opponents as possible. The diﬀerence between the Simple and the advanced
concurrency strategies is not as great as it may seem at ﬁrst because the opponents
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of the opponents are going to be ‘new’ also for the advanced strategies. Also
advanced strategies will be able compensate with their ability to choose the best
number of opponents to actually negotiate with. However, there is room for the
simple strategies to do very well against the advanced strategies in cases with low
probabilities of buyer eﬀect and the Random opponent selection. With medium to
high eﬀect probabilities, with Constant 1.0 and more advanced opponent selection
methods, the positive eﬀect of waiting to negotiate will be dominant and it will
not matter that the advanced concurrency strategies see less of the opponent
pool, because the Simple strategies will be unable to use the opponents they see
too early.
Now, an interesting observation which holds generally is that when only the buyer
is aﬀected, the buyer cannot inﬂuence the probability of its adverse eﬀect and this
probability is independent on with which opponent and when a possible contract
is formed. This means that if the probability of adverse eﬀect is 0.8, then 80% of
the runs end up having an adverse eﬀect at some point no matter what the buyer
does. The only thing the buyer can inﬂuence with his behaviour is whether or not
he is in a contract if and when the adverse eﬀect occurs. If he is careful, he might
not be and if he is not that careful, he might be. Now, in some settings, both of
these cases produce the same outcome. For example, when the fee is zero, having
no contract when the adverse eﬀect occurs produces zero utility, but if it is free
to get rid of any contract so does the situation where the buyer has a contract.
Therefore there is no need to be careful. Of course should the fee be positive, the
situation is very diﬀerent. Then having no contract still produces the utility of
zero, but having a contract to decommit means negative utility. This means that
being careful is useful and when the fee is very high, it is crucial to avoid getting
into contracts when an adverse eﬀect is likely. What all this means is that when
the fee is zero, the only thing that matters is how good are the contracts that will
actually be performed and here the advanced strategies may have only a limited
edge over simple strategies and that edge can only be based on that fact. This
may not always be enough.
In contrast to this, when it comes to the cases where the seller is aﬀected, waiting
for a while will actually decrease the probability of failure, because some of the
opponents that would have failed exit the market and therefore the probability
that the seller we enter into a contract with is going to be aﬀected is lower.27
On the other hand, sometimes when a decommitment is actually better than a
27One way to put this diﬀerence is that the buyer can choose its contract partner, but it is
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performance (over-compensatory decommitment policy), it is useful to enter into
a contract as soon as possible to maximise the probability of a seller failure. When
the fee is one, the best approach is to get into a contract as soon as possible
and the diﬀerence between the advanced and the simple concurrency strategies
depends solely on how well they will be able to enter into a contract during the
ﬁrst negotiations and how good the resulting contract is. The advanced strategies
are likely to have an edge when opponents are chosen at random, because they
can probably ﬁnd better contracts than simple strategies with low numbers of
negotiations. On the other hand, when opponent selection is more sophisticated,
also the simple strategies will be able to ﬁnd good opponents to negotiate with
and the advantage of the advanced strategies wanes.
Also, as we discussed in section 10.2.1.1, our expected utility estimates may be
slightly too high in the last matching, especially if multiple negotiations are con-
sidered, the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used and the probability of
buyer eﬀect is very high. The situation here is not any diﬀerent from the case
with the future oﬀers, because all the contracts will be formed very close to the
deadline (after the last matching) and the future oﬀers are not considered there.
Otherwise, the diﬀerence between the Adaptive Counter and the Random Counter
tactics is in this setting somewhat smaller than it was without the future oﬀers.
That is because the future oﬀers remove much of the bad and mediocre opponents
from consideration in the early rounds in both cases. Therefore the diﬀerence
between the two has more to do with the Adaptive Counter’s ability to exploit the
Exponential Time-Dependent tactic better. Of course if and when the contracts are
formed at the very last minute, the diﬀerences discussed in the previous subsection
have a role to play because the future oﬀers are no longer considered in the last
matching. Moreover, sometimes lower threshold levels produce better results,
which means that there may be more than one opponent available also in the earlier
matchings. Here, there is a clear diﬀerence between the two negotiation tactics,
because the probability of extra contracts (and contracts in general because some
negotiations will fail) is smaller with the Random Counter tactic than it is with
the Adaptive Counter tactic. This means that the Simple strategies with a higher
number of negotiations can often be used. This could be useful for example when
the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used and both parties can be aﬀected.
Here, the only problem with the high fee is the extra contracts and that worry is
relatively small with the Random Counter tactic, which means that the Simple
strategies may be able to do well. With the Adaptive Counter tactic the risk of
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have a smaller number of negotiations to avoid extra contracts and the advanced
strategies may be able to outperform the Simple strategies in most cases. Also
the advanced strategies will be able to ﬁnd sellers that use the Exponential Time-
Dependent tactics more often and exploit them, whereas the Random Counter is
unable to do that. However, the main advantage of the advanced strategies is
going to be the ability to wait for the good opportunities without negotiating,
however, and this is likely to be much more important in practice.
Given all this, we contend:
Hypothesis 24. When there is full tactic information and future oﬀers
are considered, the advanced concurrency strategies (Analytic, Adap-
tive) perform at least as well as the best Simple strategies in most set-
tings, but there may also be settings where the best Simple strategies
outperform the advanced strategies. We expect the following patterns
to emerge:
a. When only the buyer is aﬀected and the Constant 0.0 policy is
used, the diﬀerence between the best Simple strategies and the
advanced concurrency strategies are likely to be small or even
missing.
b. When only the seller is aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 policy is
in force, the advantage of the advanced concurrency strategies
is likely to be the weaker the more sophisticated the opponent
selection is. We expect (almost) no diﬀerence when the Expected
Utility opponent selection is used.
c. When both parties can be aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 policy
is used, there may be eﬀectively no diﬀerence when the Random
Counter negotiation tactic is used at the Negotiator level.
d. There may be cases with the Random opponent selection and the
Constant 0.0 decommitment fee and low eﬀect probability where
the Simple strategies outperform the advanced strategies. There
may also be cases with the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy
when only the buyer can be aﬀected with very high probability
(like 0.9) where the advanced strategies are beaten by the Simple
1 policy.
The next question for us to ponder is the relative performance of the advanced
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bad opponents, they do not do it with a perfect accuracy, especially not near the
deadline, since the threshold drops whereas the expected utility increases when
time progresses. Because we use averages in our calculations, it means that there
are always cases where the thresholds are not met in the earlier matchings and
the contracts are formed nearer the deadline, whereas as we just mentioned, the
thresholds are lower or even zero in the last matching. This means that the
Adaptive strategy will be able to do relatively well. The eﬀect is likely to be at its
strongest when the diﬀerences in utility are large (Random opponent selection for
both and Quality opponent selection for the Adaptive Counter tactic) and where
waiting improves the outcome for the buyer and with the future oﬀers it may well
be that the buyer will often have to wait until the last matching to reach that best
deal. This means cases with only the seller aﬀected (Constant 0.0) and the buyer
aﬀected (Constant 1.0). The eﬀect can also be there (albeit weaker) when both
parties are aﬀected (Constant 0.0). Thus, we say:
Hypothesis 25. With full tactic information and future oﬀers, the
Adaptive concurrency strategy is always at least as good as the An-
alytic concurrency strategy and it beats the Analytic strategy when
only the seller is aﬀected (Constant 0.0) and when the buyer is af-
fected (Constant 1.0) with the Random opponent selection. With the
Adaptive Counter tactic used in the Negotiator level, the Adaptive
strategy is also able to beat the Analytic one in the same cases with
the Quality opponent selection and with cases where both are aﬀected
(Constant 0.0) with the Random opponent selection.
The third topic we discuss is the role of the opponent selection strategies. We
believe that the move from the Random opponent selection to the Quality oppo-
nent selection is likely to improve performance in most settings and in most cases
this is likely to be useful. This is because the change improves the type of oppo-
nents the strategies encounter. Speciﬁcally, the Quality opponent selection means
meeting mostly high quality providers and since the high quality providers usually
oﬀer the buyer a higher expected utility than low or mediocre quality providers,
the change usually improves the buyer’s expected utility. On the other hand, the
Quality opponent selection also means that ﬁnding good opponents requires less
negotiations and therefore strategies with only a few negotiations do better and
the risk of multiple contracts decreases.
When it comes to the switch from the Quality to the Expected Utility opponent
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tactic, it seems clear that the eﬀect to the advanced strategies should be minimal.
The Quality opponent selection already orders the opponents that can provide
us with a success in descending order of expected utility and the only thing the
Expected Utility opponent selection does is to remove the opponents that the buyer
cannot succeed with. However, the advanced strategies are usually able to ﬁnd
these opponents in any case, since it is likely that at least one of them is going
to be among the ten opponents it can negotiate with. The Simple strategies,
in contrast, may well ﬁnd that the Expected Utility opponent selection works for
them, because it will ensure that the ﬁrst opponent in the list is always the best
one in the market, whereas with the Quality opponent selection it could also be
an opponent that the buyer could not succeed with. So, there should be some
improvement in some cases there.
With the Adaptive Counter tactic at the Negotiator level, also the advanced
strategies, especially the Analytic concurrency strategy, may ﬁnd that the Expected
Utility opponent selection improves their performance. This is because it will
remove the opponents using the behavioural strategies mostly from contention
also in the last matching and, therefore, improve the selection for the advanced
strategies. The Adaptive strategy is likely to be less aﬀected because it is better
able to pick these opportunities also from a bit further back in the list, whereas
the Analytic strategy may ﬁnd this diﬃcult. This eﬀect is especially likely with
the buyer being aﬀected and the fee being high (Constant 1.0). For the Simple
strategies, the move from Quality to Expected Utility may not be all that good
in all cases. In most cases it means that it will enter into contracts quite late in
the game and that means that it has negotiated with many of the best opponents
that market had to oﬀer, so although it can probably ﬁnd a decent contract in
the end, it may not be the best the market had to oﬀer. In contrast, with the
Quality opponent selection, some of the opponents encountered are not so good,
but it is also tricky to ﬁnd that best deal at the last minute, because that best
quality provider in the last matching might be using a behavioural tactic. So, it
seems likely that this change is most advantageous for the Simple strategies when
the expected utility increases rapidly in the last minute, so when only the buyer
is aﬀected and the fee is one (Constant 1.0 policy in use). Thus, we contend:
Hypothesis 26. With the full tactic information and future oﬀers,
the change from the Random to Quality opponent selection is likely
to be useful in most settings with both the Adaptive Counter and
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the Simple strategies will beneﬁt from moving from the Quality to the
Expected Utility opponent selection. With the Adaptive Counter tactic,
the best of the Simple strategies and the Analytic strategy are likely to
ﬁnd this advantage in cases where last minute deals oﬀer good utility
(the seller is aﬀected (Constant 0.0) and especially when the buyer is
aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is in force).
Of course the whole point of using the future oﬀers was that we expected them
to improve the expected utility for the buyer. Since one of the possible values for
the expected future utility is zero, we can be assured that taking future oﬀers into
account will always be at least as good an option as not taking them into account.
However, the question is then whether or not taking the future oﬀers into account
improves the expected utility. This seems likely in many circumstances because
the future oﬀers remove bad and mediocre opponents from consideration and allow
the strategies to concentrate on ﬁnding the best opponents they can.
The future oﬀers work a bit like the Adaptive concurrency strategy in this regard.
The opponents failing to provide a certain level of expected utility are ignored
(any negotiations with them are made to fail on purpose). It will of course help
also the Adaptive concurrency strategy because it will make it consider not only
the opponents available now but also the situation later. This means that the
Adaptive concurrency strategy does not take the ﬁrst contract it sees, but can
wait for a better one.
However, there may well be cases, where considering future oﬀers does not help.
One such case is the situation where the positive expected utility is diﬃcult to
come by. So, when the buyer eﬀect probability is very high, getting any contract
to give a positive expected utility might be so rare an occurence that any such
contract should just be taken. On the other hand, in situations where getting into
a contract early is the best approach, like when only the seller is aﬀected and the
fee is 1.0, the best contracts are usually made in the ﬁrst matching, which means
that any threshold is going to be quite low and only remove a handful of opponents
at most. The eﬀect is likely to be quite small. The third case concerns situations
where only the buyer is aﬀected and the fee is zero (the waiting does not improve
the probability of success and failure to get a contract and decommitment produce
the same result, zero utility) and advanced (not Random) opponent selection is
used (the diﬀerences between diﬀerent options are relatively small). This means
that there is little room for improvement after ﬁnding the ﬁrst deal. Speciﬁcally,
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Hypothesis 27. When tactic information is available, taking future
oﬀers into account improves the utility in almost all cases. However,
there are exceptions that include:
a. when getting a positive utility at all is not certain (very high
eﬀect probability for the buyer or both parties, especially with
the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy),
b. when getting into a deal quickly is the best approach (only the
seller is aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 policy is used) and a good
opponent selection policy is used (the Quality or Expected Utility
for the Random Counter tactic and the Expected Utility for the
Adaptive Counter),
And ﬁnally, we discuss the diﬀerences between the two negotiation tactics: Adap-
tive Counter and Random Counter. The main diﬀerences between the two are, as
has been discussed already, the fact that the Random Counter is unable to suc-
ceed with opponents using either of the behavioural tactics and that it is unable
to distinguish between the Exponential Time-Dependent and the Random tactic
but it makes the same oﬀers against both these tactics. The Adaptive Counter can
get a result with any opponent and when opponent tactics are known, it is able
to distinguish between the two non-behavioural strategies. Now, the future oﬀers
remove many of the opponents using behavioural tactics from the scene, so the
ﬁrst diﬀerence between the two tactics therefore loses some of its eﬀect and, on the
other hand, the second diﬀerence still remains and actually may even get stronger,
because the Adaptive Counter can try to target the Exponential Time-Dependent
tactic especially when the more advanced (especially the Expected Utility) oppo-
nent selection methods are used.
However, when the Random opponent selection is used and the Constant 1.0 fee
is used, there is room for the Random Counter tactic to shine. This is mostly
because of its lower tendency to get into extra contracts even when negotiating
concurrently. It means that it can negotiate with more opponents and ﬁnd better
deals. However, because the advanced concurrency strategies are able to manage
the risk of extra contracts, they are likely to be unaﬀected by this and, therefore,
with the advanced strategies, the Adaptive Counter is likely to remain the superior
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Hypothesis 28. When tactic information is always available, the buy-
ers using the Adaptive Counter tactic often outperform those that use
the Random Counter tactic at the Negotiator level. However, there
are also cases where Random Counter tactic does better and cases
where their performance is the same. We expect the following:
a. the Adaptive Counter strategy’s gets stronger when the sophisti-
cation of the opponent selection improves (we expect it to beat
the Random Counter more often in cases using the Quality and
Expected Utility opponent selection. With the Adaptive concur-
rency strategy, the Adaptive Counter is often a better choice than
the Random Counter.
b. the Random Counter tactic is able to do better with the best Sim-
ple concurrency strategies when the Constant 1.0 decommitment
policy is used.
10.2.1.3 No Tactic Information with Future Oﬀers
In this setting we remove the tactic information, so the buyer agent does not
know what negotiation tactic each individual seller uses any more, but it only
knows the probabilities of each tactic in the whole seller population. The advanced
concurrency strategies use the information that can be gained from the opponent’s
tactic and, as discussed in section 10.1.2.2, the Adaptive concurrency strategy
in the form we implemented it is not readily applicable to cases with no tactic
information. Nevertheless, we can still use the Analytic concurrency strategy.
Given that the Analytic uses the tactic information to estimate probabilities of
simultaneous contracts and with the Adaptive Counter also in deciding what oﬀer
to make, also the Analytic concurrency tactic is likely to do less well without
knowing the opponent’s tactic.
One very interesting aspect is that there is likely to be a huge diﬀerence in how
much the performance deteriorates with the loss of tactic information between
the Adaptive Counter tactic and the Random Counter tactic. This diﬀerence was
very clear in the Negotiatior level (see section 9.2.3) and adding more negotiations
(especially when we cannot use the Adaptive concurrency strategy) will not help.
In particular, the Analytic concurrency strategy is still bound to the suggestions
from the Negotiator level and we know them to be often acceptable to all oppo-
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tactic information) and therefore we would expect the performance to basically col-
lapse with the Adaptive Counter tactic. On the other hand, the Random Counter
tactic does this deterioration quite gracefully with slight or even no change in per-
formance. Here, we will discuss only the case where there is no information and
we discuss Random Counter and Adaptive Counter tactics separately.
We start from the case where the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator
level. The whole tactic depends on choosing an optimal counter tactic to each and
every negotiation. If we do not know what tactic the opponent is using, but only
a probability distribution, this is obviously much more diﬃcult. We can, and will,
use the distribution of tactics, but as before, the Adaptive Counter will want to
succeed in every negotiation because the risk of not succeeding is greater than
the utility improvement oﬀered by such risky oﬀers. Of course given that there
would be more than one contract available, the buyer should be more risk-seeking.
However, the Analytic concurrency strategy cannot do that, because it is bound
by the suggestions that individual Negotiators give and these will not consider
anything more than that one negotiation. We therefore contend:
Hypothesis 29. When tactic information is not available, future of-
fers are considered and the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the
Negotiator level,
a. compared to the performance with full tactic information, the
performance of the Analytic concurrency strategy with no tactic
information is bad and the former beats the latter clearly in al-
most all cases. The possible exceptions include high probability of
buyer eﬀect when the Constant 1.0 policy is used. There may also
be a couple of cases, where the Analytic strategy performs bet-
ter with the threshold levels gained under no tactic information.
These are the cases with a high probability of buyer eﬀect.
b. the Analytic strategy will beat all the Simple strategies in some
cases and it can, in turn, be beaten by the best Simple strategy
when the probability of adverse eﬀect is low and the Random
opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 policy are used.
The Adaptive Counter tactic would therefore need the Adaptive strategy, which
could take into account the fact that there are more than one negotiation available.
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at the Negotiator level. Here, the advantage of Random counter tactic is that in
the case of Simple concurrency strategies basically nothing changes: when we use
the Random counter tactic, we assume that the opponent is using the Random
negotiation tactic and do our adjusting accordingly by making an optimal oﬀer
given this belief. The fact that we do not know what the tactic really is (whereas
before we did) makes no diﬀerence with the Simple concurrency strategies: We
will still negotiate with that same ﬁxed number of opponents, using exactly the
same oﬀers we would in the full information case and therefore, we get exactly
the same results. However, for the Analytic concurrency strategy, something does
change. Since we no longer know what tactics opponents use and have to rely on
probability estimates, we are likely to make sub-optimal choices when it comes to
choosing the right number of negotiations. Earlier we could see that the ﬁrst three
opponents are using tactics that we will not be successful with and could simply
take the ﬁrst four opponents to negotiate knowing we only have a chance to get
one contract. Here, any of these four opponents could use a suitable strategy and
we have to be more careful, especially if decommitting is expensive (the policy is
Constant 1.0). This does not mean the Analytic concurrency control is going to
be useless, but it does mean that it is going to be less eﬀective and that there may
be cases where it is actually worse than the best Simple strategies.
Hypothesis 30. When tactic information is not available, future of-
fers are considered and the Random Counter tactic is used at the
Negotiator level,
a. losing the tactic information has a relatively small eﬀect on the
performance of the Analytic concurrency strategy. However, the
full tactic information is useful when the seller alone is aﬀected,
especially with the Quality opponent selection, or with low to
medium probabilities of the buyer eﬀect (with the Constant 1.0
policy). There may also cases where the Analytic strategy per-
forms better with the threshold levels gained under no tactic in-
formation.
b. the Analytic strategy will beat all the Simple strategies when the
Quality opponent selection is used and waiting is useful. With
the Random opponent selection, there may also be cases where
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10.2.2 Experimental Setup
As in the earlier cases, we compare the performance of diﬀerent strategies in cases
where the market is entered 100 times (instead of just once), so we run the market
separately with the diﬀerent strategies for a hundred times, calculate the results
of each strategy together, and repeat this processs 100 times to get an average
performance and variance for hundred repetitions. So if we say one strategy beats
another, it means that if strategies were to be used in a given market for 100 times,
it is likely that there would be a diﬀerence between the two in the direction we
described.
The results of this chapter will be somewhat diﬀerent from any of the others in
this thesis and that is mostly because we have quite a few diﬀerent strategies,
threshold levels and hypotheses. Speciﬁcally, we will only show a small number of
these diﬀerent things in our ﬁgures and we discuss only a small number of these
cases. For example, in everything that follows in this chapter we always only
show the results for the best of simple strategies, which means exactly what it
sounds like, the best result any Simple strategy was able to obtain. We already
discussed (section 10.1.3) the fact that we will have many diﬀerent future oﬀer
thresholds but we only discuss the best of them. This means that we will not
usually discuss which of the ten Simple strategies was the best in each and every
case or what threshold levels worked best. This is because there are many other
things to discuss too.
Instead of graphs and going through them in great detail, we use some ﬁgures, but
mostly tables to summarise the results of our experiments and statistical tests.
We will usually employ the same two-sided t-tests as before and, as we discussed
earlier (section 10.1.3), we can have many diﬀerent levels of future oﬀer thresholds
and we only represent one in our ﬁgures. However, whenever we say that a certain
strategy beats another, this means that the best threshold level of that strategy
beats all the threshold levels of the other in a statistically signiﬁcant way and the
p-value we discuss is the highest we found in any of these comparisons.
Because we will have many diﬀerent cases, we will have also cases where a diﬀerence
is found, although there might not be one,28 and as we described in section 10.1.3,
especially with future oﬀers we might have diﬀerent threshold levels none of which
28This is simple statistics. Statistics is never 100% accurate, but operates with probabilities.
Even if we say there is only 0.1% chance that a certain diﬀerence is due to randomness, there
is still that chance and given a thousand experiments, it would be expected to happen once on
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is necessarily the optimal for a given strategy, and therefore diﬀerences might show
in places where there really are no diﬀerences or fail to show in places where there
are actual diﬀerences. The only approach to handle this is to consider that if
we ﬁnd or do not ﬁnd a diﬀerence in one case, we would ﬁnd or not ﬁnd it in
similar cases too. So, for example, we might not think too much of a single case
of diﬀerence when only the buyer is aﬀected with probability of 0.4, but if this
happens also in cases 0.0−0.3 and 0.5−0.9, then we might consider the possibility
that may be this diﬀerence is real and not just a coincidence. The same goes in the
other direction. So if we have a clear diﬀerence in cases 0.0−0.3 and 0.5−0.9, but no
diﬀerence at 0.4, we might consider this just a coincidence. Of course there might
be something very peculiar happening at that particular setting, which would
explain the diﬀerence (or lack thereof) but if no such explanation is forthcoming
and also the problem case itself is only barely signiﬁcant or unsigniﬁcant, this is
unlikely.
10.2.3 Results
We will discuss the results in the same order we discussed the hypotheses above
(section 10.2.1), so:
• Full tactic information, no future oﬀers (section 10.2.3.1),
• Full tactic information with future oﬀers (section 10.2.3.2) and
• No tactic information (section 10.2.3.3).
10.2.3.1 Full Tactic Information, No Future Oﬀers
First, we consider the case where the buyer agent knows the negotiation tactic
but will accept any contract that provides a positive expected utility. As with the
hypotheses, we ﬁrst consider the case where the Adaptive Counter tactic is used
at the Negotiator level (hypothesis 22), then the case with the Random Counter
tactic (hypothesis 23).
In ﬁgures 10.4–10.6, we have the performance of the diﬀerent concurrency strate-
gies with the Adaptive Counter negotiation tactic. From the ﬁgures, it seems clear
that the Adaptive concurrency strategy does very well in most cases, but that the
other strategies catch up when the opponent selection improves. The more detailedChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 266
results are described in the table 10.1. The plusses and sometimes minuses describe
the results of statistical testing, plusses meaning that the advanced concurrency
strategy (on the top row, the Analytic and on the bottom row, the Adaptive strat-
egy) has yielded results that are better (in a statistically signiﬁcant way) than the
best Simple strategies, and minus referring to the contrary situation (the Simple
strategies fare better). The number of plusses or minuses gives the signiﬁcance
level, one plus means p < 0.05 level, two plusses p < 0.01 level and three the
p < 0.001 level. A hyphen means that no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence could
be found. So, all this means that we can take a setting, let us say with the Random
opponent selection and the buyer can be aﬀected with a probability 0.7 and the
decommitment policy is Constant 1.0. We can see that there is no diﬀerence (-)
when it comes to the Analytic concurrency strategy and the best Simple strate-
gies, but that there is a diﬀerence between the Adaptive and all Simple strategies
in the former’s advantage (three plusses, so at the p < 0.001 level). And to take
another example, Quality opponent selection, buyer is aﬀected with a probability
of 0.5 and with the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy, the best Simple strategy
outperforms both the Analytic (two minuses so at the p < 0.01 level) and the
Adaptive (one minus so at the p < 0.05 level).
From table 10.1, it is clear that the Analytic strategy beats the Simple strate-
gies with the Random opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 decommitment
policy. There is also some diﬀerence with the Quality opponent selection with
very low eﬀect probabilities and when the seller is aﬀected, also in other cases.
The Analytic strategy is able to choose the number of negotiations ﬂexibly which
makes it possible to avoid some bad and mediocre contracts with the Constant 0.0
decommitment policy. With the Constant 1.0 policy, the Analytic strategy care-
fully avoids the very expensive extra contracts and is unable to beat the Simple
strategies. However, with the buyer aﬀected, it is sometimes able to ﬁnd contracts
earlier than the Simple strategies (it only needs to take the ﬁrst opponent so the
high fee is not a problem). This applies to cases where the buyer eﬀect prob-
abilities are 0.3, 0.4 and 0.8 with the Random opponent selection and 0.5 with
the Quality opponent selection strategy. However, the cases with very high buyer
eﬀect probabilities (0.9 with the Random or the Quality opponent selection strat-
egy) are associated with the expected utility estimate inaccuracies we discussed
earlier. This means that the best Simple 1 is often unable to ﬁnd a good enough
opponent to negotiate with in the last matching and will therefore rarely enter
into counterproductive contracts (or any contracts at all), whereas the advanced
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Figure 10.4: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic and the Random opponent selection strategy (no future
oﬀers) (Hypothesis 22).
oﬀer positive expected utility although in reality the expected utility is slightly
negative. However, with the Expected Utility opponent selection, the buyer is able
to ﬁnd sellers using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactics and avoid most of the
problems caused by inaccuracies: all the best strategies only negotiate with the
ﬁrst seller available in the ﬁnal matching (no additional risk of extra contracts)
and usually when a potential opponent is available, it is using the Exponential
Time-Dependent tactic (decreasing the overestimation of expected utility). These
ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 22.a and, therefore, we can accept that
part.
Now, the Adaptive concurrency strategy is able to beat all the Simple strategies in
all settings with the Random opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 policy. It is
also able to repeat this deed with one exception (both aﬀected at probability of 0.9)
when the Quality opponent selection is used. With the Constant 1.0 policy, it has
a bit more trouble, but it still beats the Simple strategies in most cases where the
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Figure 10.5: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic and the Quality opponent selection strategy (no future
oﬀers) (Hypothesis 22).
problem) with both the Random and Quality opponent selection. When the buyer
is aﬀected, there are some cases where it still able to beat the Simple strategies
but it will also lose in a couple of places (with the probability of 0.3 and 0.9 with
Random and with the probability of 0.5 when the Quality opponent selection is
used). The Adaptive strategy is able to avoid the bad and mediocre much better
than Analytic and is therefore able to able to use the ability to negotiate with many
opponents with limited chance of extra contracts to its advantage also with the
Constant 1.0 decommitment fee. This is also possible with the Quality opponent
selection because that does not remove the variations in the expected utilities
among the sellers it encounters. As for the Analytic strategy, it faces the problem
of eﬃciency when the buyer is aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 fee is used. In some
cases, it is able to ﬁnd a contract earlier than the Simple strategies. The case with
the buyer eﬀect probability of 0.9 is analogous to the case with the the Analytic
strategy. Everything described is consistent with hypothesis 22.b and, therefore,
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Figure 10.6: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic and the Expected Utility opponent selection strategy
(no future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 22).
We will now move to discussing diﬀerences between the two advanced concurrency
strategies (Adaptive and Analytic). The results of statistical testing for the case
where the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator level are shown in
table 10.2. The more plusses there are the more likely it is Adaptive beats the
Analytic concurrency strategy in that speciﬁc setting. It is clear that, here, the
Adaptive concurrency strategy beats the Analytic in most cases when the Random
or Quality opponent selection is used, but not with the Expected Utility. This is
consistent with hypothesis 22.c. We have therefore the results needed to accept
the whole hypothesis 22.
We will now discuss the cases with the Random Counter tactic. Here, the per-
formance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies in diﬀerent settings are shown in the
ﬁgures 10.7–10.9 and the results of the statistical tests are summarised in table
10.3. As expected, the results are very diﬀerent from the cases where Adaptive
Counter tactic was used.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 270
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability














































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.1: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as com-
pared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Adaptive Counter tactic
without future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 22.a–b). The Analytic vs. the Best of the
Simple on the top row and the Adaptive vs. the Best of the Simple on the
bottom row in each case.
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - +++ - - ++ +++ -
Seller +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
Both +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - +++ +++ +++ - - - ++ - +++ +
Seller +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +
Both +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ + - +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - - - ++
Expected Utility Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seller - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Both - - - −− - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 10.2: The relative performances of the Adaptive and Analytic concur-
rency strategies (the Adaptive Counter tactic without future oﬀers) (Hypothesis
22.c).
In more detail, we go through the results row by row again, so we start with
the Analytic concurrency strategy. It is able to beat the Simple strategies in
most situations when the Random opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 fee
are used and also in most cases with the Constant 1.0 policy when the seller is
aﬀected. However, it loses to the Simple strategies in many cases starting from
those where the Constant 1.0 policy is used and the buyer is aﬀected (cases 0.3,
0.4 and 0.9 when Random and 0.3 − 0.5 and 0.9 when the Quality opponent
selection is used). In the cases with a very high buyer eﬀect probability (0.9), theChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 271
explanation follows from the inaccurate estimates for the contract times after the
last matching and the fact that the Random Counter tactic is stuck with some
opponents using the Random tactic also with Expected Utility opponent selection.
This means that the performance of the Simple 1 strategy deteriorates to the same
level with the advanced strategies, not like with the Adaptive Counter where the
advanced strategies improved their performance. This is because the buyers here
often encounter sellers using the Random tactic.
However, here (unlike before) the Analytic strategy gets thoroughly beaten also
in the cases where the seller or both parties are aﬀected, the Constant 0.0 and
the Quality opponent selection is used. It seems that this eﬀect also translates
to the cases where the buyer is aﬀected, at least when the probability of eﬀect is
very small. This last result is somewhat peculiar at ﬁrst because we expected the
Simple strategies to beat the advanced strategies where the contracts are formed
earlier and this has an impact on the expected utility. However, there is no such
eﬀect when the buyer is aﬀected and the Constant 0.0 fee is used because it is free
to exit the contracts. We did mention that there might be a weaker advantage
for getting into contracts later and that was because a large number of very good
quality providers are entering during the run, so when the Simple 1 often fails once
or twice, it gets access to these opponents with higher qualities. The diﬀerence
in performance is not huge, but because the variations in these cases are quite
small, even this little can be enough. When the variation increases with the eﬀect
probabilities this small advantage drowns mostly in the noise. All these results
are consistent with hypothesis 23.a.
The Adaptive concurrency strategy is unable to do much better than the Analytic
one in many situations. As with the Analytic, the Adaptive strategy does very
well when the Random opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 decommitment
policy are used and it does do slightly better than the Analytic when the Constant
1.0 decommitment policy is used: it consistently beats the competition when the
seller is aﬀected and when the buyer is aﬀected with a very low probability or
when both are aﬀected with low to medium probability. However, it is beaten by
the best Simple strategies in many cases where the Constant 1.0 policy is used
both when the buyer is aﬀected (0.3, 0.4 and 0.9 when the Random and with 0.3,
0.5 and 0.9 when the Quality opponent selection is used) but interestingly, also
when both are very likely to be aﬀected (0.7−0.9 when the Random and 0.9 when
the Quality opponent selection is used). And in addition, of course, it will get a
thorough beating when the seller or both are aﬀected and the Quality opponent
selection and the Constant 0.0 is used. The explanations are analogous to theChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 272
case with the Analytic strategy and will not be repeated here. All these results
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Figure 10.7: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic and the Random opponent selection strategy (Hypoth-
esis 23).
We will now move to discussing the diﬀerences between the two advanced con-
currency strategies (Adaptive and Analytic). The results of statistical testing for
the case where the Random Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator level are
shown in table 10.4. The more plusses, the more probably Adaptive beats the
Analytic concurrency strategy in the speciﬁed setting. From the results, it is clear
that, here, the Adaptive concurrency strategy beats the Analytic only when the
Random opponent selection is used but not much else where. Even in the Random
opponent selection, it has trouble when the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is
used and the eﬀect probabilities are high. It even gets beaten occasionally there
in the extreme cases. The losses can be explained by the fact that the Adaptive
strategy can ﬁnd contracts earlier than the Analytic strategy. With the Quality
or Expected Utility opponent selection, there is very little to go between the two
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Figure 10.8: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic and the Quality opponent selection strategy (Hypoth-
esis 23).
ﬁrst opponent in the negotiation queue that any result can be achieved, so both
strategies will be negotiating mostly with the same opponents.
However, with free decommitments and no adverse eﬀects, the Adaptive strategy
seems to enjoy an edge. This is because the Adaptive strategy is able to use the
existence of other providers oﬀering good deals to sometimes increase the expected
utility it can get from the contracts above that of the best single negotiation. With
positive fees, such a strategy is riskier. The eﬀect also requires the best opponents
using the Random negotiation tactic and having very similar qualities. Moreover,
the possibility of adverse eﬀects may make the eﬀect weaker and that is why
we only see the diﬀerence when the Constant 0.0 decommitment policy is used
and there are no eﬀects. The only exception involves 0.1 seller eﬀect probability
when the Expected Utility opponent selection is used. All this is consistent with
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Figure 10.9: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic and the Expected Utility opponent selection strategy
(Hypothesis 23).
10.2.3.2 Full Tactic Information with Future Oﬀers
We will now move to cases where the buyer takes the oﬀers it might receive later
into account when deciding whether or not to take a given contract. As we dis-
cussed in section 10.2.1.2, this does change the nature of the exercise from the
situation we discussed earlier (no future oﬀers). Here, the buyer may turn down
contracts that seem beneﬁcial (yield positive expected utility), because it con-
siders it likely that a better oﬀer will be forthcoming in a later negotiation. As
explained, this will shift the focus to what sort of opponents will the buyer be able
to encounter when it matters, i.e. when the most beneﬁcial contracts are made.
As in the case without the future oﬀers, we will discuss here how advanced strate-
gies fare against the Simple ones (hypothesis 24) and the relative performances
of the advanced strategies (hypothesis 25). In addition, we will discuss the ef-
fect of opponent selection (hypothesis 26) and future oﬀers (hypothesis 27) andChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 275
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability




















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.3: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as com-
pared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Random Counter tactic
without future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 23.a–b). The Analytic vs. the Best of the
Simple on the top row and the Adaptive vs. the Best of the Simple on the
bottom row in each case.
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ - - - - ++ -
Seller +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - -
Both +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - - +++ +++ +++ +++ + - - - − −−
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seller +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - − - - -
Both +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
Expected Utility Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ++ -
Seller +++ +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Both +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ++ - - - -
Table 10.4: The relative performances of the Adaptive and Analytic concur-
rency strategies (the Random Counter tactic without future oﬀers) (Hypothesis
23.c).
we will also investigate the relative performances of the two negotiation tactics
(hypothesis 28).
We start by comparing the performances of the advanced and the Simple con-
currency strategies. The results for cases where the Random Counter tactic is
used at the Negotiator level are in ﬁgures 10.10–10.12 and in table 10.5. From
this table, it is clear that the advantage of the advanced concurrency strategies
has completely diﬀerent patterns here than in the case with no future oﬀers. The
advantage is strong with both the Quality and the Expected Utility opponent se-
lection and actually it is in many cases somewhat stronger than with the RandomChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 276
opponent selection where the advantage was the strongest earlier. This is because
with the future oﬀers considered, most contracts are entered into later during the
experiment and the advanced strategies will be able to beneﬁt more from their
willingness to negotiate only when good contracts are to be found. This means
that with more advanced opponent selection strategies, the Simple strategies will
have negotiated with many of the best opponents when the contracts are formed,
whereas the advanced strategies are able to pick the best opponents at that point.
With the Random opponent selection, the diﬀerence is often less pronounced,
because the Simple strategies negotiate too early with very bad and mediocre op-
ponents as well as some good ones and also when the time comes, the diﬀerence
in what the diﬀerent negotiation strategies can actually see is smaller.
There are a few deviations from this general trend. The ﬁrst are the cases where
the Constant 0.0 decommitment policy is used and only the buyer can be aﬀected.
Here, the advantage of the advanced strategies is often sporadic at best. This is
because when the fee is zero and only the buyer is aﬀected, the contract time
does not matter (adverse impact and no contract produce the same outcome, zero
utility) and, therefore, the advanced strategies are usually unable to beat the
best Simple strategies. There are even some cases with the Random opponent
selection, where the Simple strategies outperform the advanced strategies. This
is because the advanced strategies will encounter fewer opponents than the best
Simple strategies and may, therefore, be unable to ﬁnd as good opponents as the
Simple strategies. However, when the probability of adverse eﬀect increases, the
best contracts are usually formed nearer the deadline and this means that the time
window where almost all contracts are formed is small and, therefore, it matters
not what has happened before.
The other deviation is in the cases with the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy,
when only the seller is aﬀected. The advantage seems to show up only with
medium to high eﬀect probabilities and it vanishes altogether when the Expected
Utility opponent selection is used. This is quite understandable. In these cases,
the non-performance is actually preferred to performance and, therefore, the most
important goal for the buyer is get into a contract and preferrably as soon as
possible. This means that with the Random opponent selection, where many of the
encountered opponents are bad or mediocre and therefore eliminated when future
oﬀers are considered, the best Simple strategy is typically to have a large number
of negotiations to maximise the chances of getting into contracts quickly. However,
this may mean an occasional extra contract and when the fee is high, this can be
risky. On the other hand, with the Quality opponent selection, the best approachChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 277
is to use very few negotiations because the Quality opponent selection means that
there are many more good opponents to meet. This means, however, problems with
getting into contracts because the small number of negotiations may mean delays.
In both cases, the push to get into contracts quickly is less with low probabilities
of seller eﬀect and, therefore, also the diﬀerences are often smaller. This means
especially that the advanced strategies will not necessarily ﬁnd it to be in their
interest to get into contracts in the ﬁrst matching. The situation will change when
the probability increases. When the Expected Utility opponent selection is used,
in contrast, the best opponent is the ﬁrst opponent for all strategies and both
advanced and the Simple 1 strategies will enter into a contract around the same
time. The type of opponents they encounter later is similar and their choices are
too. Especially with mid-to-high seller eﬀect probabilities, they will both negotiate
only with the ﬁrst available opponent.
The third case is with Constant 1.0 when both parties can be aﬀected. Here,
the advantage of the advanced strategies over the Simple ones is quite weak with
the Random Counter negotiation tactic, especially with the Random opponent
selection. The explanation here is that when both are aﬀected with the same
probability and a Constant decommitment policy is used, the chance of huge fees
through adverse eﬀects cancel each other out. On expectation, it is equally like to
get or having to pay the fee, so it does not have any eﬀect on the optimal strategy.
The only relevant factor in this respect is that any non-performance means no
utility (on expectation) and, therefore, minimising the probability of failure might
always be a good option. However, with the Random opponent selection, this gives
the advanced strategies no signiﬁcant edge. The only risk associate with the high
decommitment fee is the risk of extra contracts, but with the Random Counter
even that risk is usually relatively low and especially with future oﬀers most bad
opponents are automatically removed until the last matching. This means that
the Simple strategies can do well even with relatively high number of negotiations
which in turn means that it will be able to ﬁnd relatively good contracts also when
all contracts are formed near the deadline.
When the opponent selection improves, the advanced strategies improve their per-
formance relative to the best Simple strategies. This is because the Simple strate-
gies waste too many good opponents by negotiating with them too early and/or
they will have trouble ensuring a contract with limited number of negotiations
after the last matching because of the uncertainties involved in negotiations after
the last matching.29 Also the probabilities of success can be relatively low with
29These include earlier deadlines that are also more diﬃcult to guess.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 278
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability












































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.5: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as com-
pared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Random Counter tactic with
future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 24). The Analytic vs. the Best of the Simple on the
top row and the Adaptive vs. the Best of the Simple on the bottom row in each
case.
very high eﬀect probabilities even near the deadline30 and the variance is often
quite high (because of the high decommitment fee).
And of course there is also the case where the buyer is aﬀected, the Constant 1.0
policy is used and the eﬀect probability is very high (0.9). Here, the advanced
strategies lose to the Simple 1 strategy with the Random opponent selection and
to a lesser extent with the Quality strategies. However, there is no diﬀerence with
the Expected Utility opponent selection for the very simple reason that the best
opponent is always the ﬁrst one in the negotiation queue and negotiating with
anybody else is never useful. However, with the less advanced opponent selec-
tion strategies, the advanced strategies’ ability to ﬁnd these problematic sellers
(whereas the Simple 1 often does not meet them) can still present a problem just
as it did in the cases with no future oﬀers. This was to be expected because all
the contracts are formed at the last minute (generally, after the last matching)
and there are no future oﬀers in that last matching.
Now, the results with the Adaptive Counter tactic, shown in ﬁgures 10.13–10.15
and table 10.6, are quite similar to the results we just discussed. However, there
are some interesting diﬀerences. First of all, we get the same trends and exceptions
we discussed earlier. The advantage is stronger with more advanced opponent se-
lection strategies, because, as before, the Simple strategies negotiate with many
30For example, when both parties have an adverse eﬀect with probability of 0.5, only 25% of
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Figure 10.10: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic, the Random opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
good opponents too early, whereas the advanced strategies wait for their opportu-
nities. This means that they can set their thresholds higher. With the Adaptive
Counter tactic, the diﬀerences are less pronounced, the diﬀerences are very strong
(where they exist) in most cases already with the Random opponent selection. Es-
pecially the Adaptive concurrency strategy does quite well even with the Constant
0.0 decommitment policy. This is because the Adaptive strategy is so much more
eﬃcient in picking up the best opponents than the Simple (or Analytic) strategies
that this more than compensates for encountering fewer opponents. The Analytic
strategy does improve its position too, since it only loses to the Simple strategies
(due to meeting less opponents), when no adverse eﬀects occur.
As for the exceptions, we can conclude from table 10.6 that when the fee is zero
and only the buyer is aﬀected, we have only sporadic advantage for the advanced
strategies. Here, however, the advantage is somewhat stronger with both the
Quality and the Expected Utility opponent selection than it was with the Ran-
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Figure 10.11: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic, the Quality opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
holding on to the good opponents and, even more importantly, many of these
good opponents will be using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic, which the
Adaptive Counter tactic can exploit. The diﬀerences between excellent and merely
very good are therefore greater. So even if waiting does not improve the buyer’s
chances of success, it can mean ﬁnding better opponents to negotiate with. This
allows some advantage to the advanced strategies.31
The other eﬀect, which is also stronger, is that when the fee is high and only the
seller can be aﬀected, the advantage of advanced strategies dissipates with more
sophisticated opponent selection. The advantage is still clear in all cases with
the Random opponent selection, however there are cases with no performance
diﬀerence in the Quality opponent selection and there is no advantage whatso-
ever with the Expected Utility opponent selection. As before, this is because it
becomes easier for the Simple strategies to ﬁnd a good opponent to quickly get
31Using the future oﬀers will mean that getting into a contract is delayed also when the buyer is
aﬀected. This had less eﬀect with the Random Counter tactic because all high quality providers
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Figure 10.12: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic, the Expected Utility opponent selection strategy and
future oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
into a contract with. With the Adaptive Counter negotiation tactic, however, the
advanced strategies can hold their advantage longer, because even with a very
similar quality, the tactic’s adaptation means that outcomes will be very diﬀerent
with diﬀerent opponent tactics. Therefore choosing only the good opponents can
be important. However, as before, with the Expected Utility opponent selection,
any advantage is lost because all parties negotiate with the best opponent and it
alone.
Earlier, the third exception was the cases with Constant 1.0 when both parties can
be aﬀected. With the Adaptive Counter negotiation tactic this does not become an
issue at any point, because the risk of an extra contract is very high and the Simple
strategies with many negotiations cannot perform well as a result. This means
that the advanced strategies will be able to outperform the Simple strategies also
with the Random opponent selection. However, as earlier, the Adaptive Counter
negotiation tactic is unable to avoid too many decommitments with very high
buyer eﬀect probabilities when the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 282
Thus, is no diﬀerence in this respect with the Expected Utility opponent selection
strategy. This and all the other ﬁndings discussed are consistent with hypothesis





















Probability of Adverse Effect
























Probability of Adverse Effect























Probability of Adverse Effect

























Probability of Adverse Effect
























Probability of Adverse Effect

























Probability of Adverse Effect




Figure 10.13: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic, the Random opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
The next step is to consider the diﬀerences between the Adaptive and Analytic
concurrency strategies. Many of the diﬀerences we had earlier are removed, be-
cause the future oﬀers remove most bad and mediocre opponents. However, they
do not do this perfectly because they operate on averages and there may therefore
be more than one opponent that exceeds this threshold in an actual case. Also
it seems that in many situations, the highest reasonable thresholds that minimise
the number of extra opponents is not always the best idea, because it means that
in some cases there may be no opponents at all to exceed the threshold. Often, es-
pecially for the Analytic strategy, lowering the thresholds somewhat improves the
performance. Moreover, in the last matching, the threshold is zero, so if the buyer
has no contract before then, the Adaptive strategy may be able to get its chance
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Figure 10.14: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic, the Quality opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
the Analytic one when there are multiple opponents (although the advantage is
not that great always).32
In more detail, table 10.7 shows the relative performance levels of the advanced
strategies with the Random Counter tactic. There seems to be a consistent dif-
ference only with the Random opponent selection and when one of the parties is
aﬀected (seller when fee is zero and buyer when fee is one); that is, when it is
clearly signiﬁcantly in the buyer’s interest to delay. It seems that this is where
the diﬀerence is most clearly in the Adaptive strategy’s favour. There is also
some of this happening when both are aﬀected (Constant 0.0), but otherwise it
is just single instances. However, the case with the Constant 0.0 decommitment
fee and very low eﬀect probabilities is present as it was without future oﬀers and
the explanation is the same: when the probability of adverse eﬀect is near zero,
the Adaptive concurrency strategy will be able to use negotiations with multiple
32Sometimes the diﬀerence between the two is relatively small and sometimes it may not be
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Figure 10.15: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic, the Expected Utility opponent selection strategy and
future oﬀers (Hypotheses 24–25).
sellers to increase its expected utility. With higher eﬀect probabilities this will not
be possible, because the eﬀect decreases the usefulness of this trick by lowering the
improvement in expected utility. Here, however, because the future oﬀers often
make the buyer wait, this eﬀect is lower (because the eﬀect probabilities are lower
when the contracts are made nearer the deadline). Therefore, we get a couple of
extra signs of diﬀerence in other cases.
In this vein, table 10.8 shows the performance diﬀerences between the Adaptive and
Analytic strategies for the case where the Negotiator uses the Adaptive Counter
tactic. As before, we get slightly stronger diﬀerences here than we did with the
Random Counter tactic.33 Speciﬁcally, there is a clear diﬀerence in the two cases
where we had the diﬀerence also with the Random Counter tactic, namely, seller
aﬀected (Constant 0.0) and buyer aﬀected (Constant 1.0). In addition, we have
a clear diﬀerence when both are aﬀected (Constant 0.0). Moreover, there are
33As before, this diﬀerence between the negotiation tactics exists because the Adaptive Counter
tactic adapts too all opponent tactics and especially important is that it will be able to exploit
the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic unlike Random Counter.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 285
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability


















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.6: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as com-
pared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Adaptive Counter tactic
with future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 24). The Analytic vs. the Best of the Simple on
the top row and the Adaptive vs. the Best of the Simple on the bottom row in
each case.
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer ++ - - - - - - - - - - +++ - + ++ + + +++ +++ -
Seller ++ + +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - - - - - - - - - -
Both ++ - + + - - - - +++ + - - - - - - - - - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ - +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seller +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Both +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Expected Utility Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seller +++ + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Both +++ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 10.7: The relative performances of the Adaptive and Analytic concur-
rency strategies (the Random Counter tactic with future oﬀers) (Hypotheses
25).
similar patterns also when the Quality opponent selection is used, so where the
seller can be aﬀected (Constant 0.0) and the buyer can be aﬀected (Constant
1.0). We also get more than one plus when both are aﬀected (Constant 0.0).
This is all because the diﬀerences between the expected utilities vary more here
and therefore it is likely that there are more opponents that provide utilities that
are over averages, simply because every opponent is a potential contract partner,
whereas with Random Counter half of the opponents are not considered at all.
This means that the Adaptive concurrency strategy has more opportunities toChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 286
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ + - + - - - - - - +++ ++ ++ ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ -
Seller +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ - - - ++ - - - - -
Both +++ +++ - ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ - - - - ++ - - - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ -
Seller - - - + + +++ ++ +++ +++ +++ - - - - - - - - - -
Both - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Expected Utility Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seller - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Both - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 10.8: The relative performances of the Adaptive and Analytic concur-
rency strategies (the Adaptive Counter tactic with future oﬀers) (Hypothesis
25).
shine. All these observations are consistent with hypothesis 25 and we therefore
accept it.
The third point of our interest is the role of the opponent selection. The results
for the three concurrency strategies when the Random Counter tactic is used at
the Negotiator level are shown in table 10.9. From this, it is clear that switching
from the Random to the Quality opponent selection improves the situation in most
cases. There are only a couple of exceptions. First, there are the cases with a very
high buyer eﬀect probabilities, which can be explained by the very few contracts
that occur in these cases. Even if the opponents improve they are only rarely
good enough to warrant negotiation. Second, the best of the Simple strategies are
unable to improve where both parties can be aﬀected with medium to high eﬀect
probabilities. This is because the probability of simultaneous contracts is so small
that when the Random opponent selection is used, the buyer is able to use quite a
few negotiations without a signiﬁcant risk of extra contracts and, therefore, it will
usually be able to ﬁnd a good opponent to enter into contract with. All the Quality
opponent selection does is to make the Simple strategies with many negotiations
less useful, because they waste too many good opponents. The advanced strategies
are able to beneﬁt from the change, of course, because they usually do not have to
worry about either of these forces. They will negotiate only when it is useful and
when they do negotiate, they can negotiate with up to ten opponents, so ﬁnding
a suitable opponent is all but guaranteed.
In contrast, there is practically no improvement on the advanced strategies when
moving from Quality to Expected Utility opponent selection. This is because theChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 287
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.9: Eﬀect of Opponent Selection (Random Counter Tactic with Future
Oﬀers) (Hypothesis 26). Best of Simple on the top row, Analytic in the middle
and Adaptive on the bottom row.
Quality opponent selection often means that the buyer already meets very rea-
sonable opponents (this is because the Quality opponent selection already orders
opponents in descending order of expected utility). The Expected Utility opponent
selection only removes the opponents using the behavioural tactics from the ne-
gotiation queue and the advanced strategies can remove these opponents on their
own. However, for the simple strategies the move is often useful, because they
can move to the Simple 1 strategy with the Expected Utility opponent selection
whereas this would not be that good a strategy and therefore we get consistent
improvements in many situations. The exception is when the buyer is aﬀected
and there is the Constant 0.0 policy in use (and this is because the strategies in
general will not be able to make any improvements here).
The results for the other case, where the Negotiator uses the Adaptive Counter
tactic are given in table 10.10. Again, the switch from the Random to the Qual-
ity opponent selection improves the situation in most settings. There are some
improvements also when moving from the Quality to the Expected Utility oppo-
nent selection. Here, we get consistent improvements for the Analytic concurrency
strategy for cases where only the seller can be aﬀected (the Constant 0.0 decom-
mitment policy) and where the seller can be aﬀected (the Constant 1.0 policy).
In the latter case, also the best of Simple and even Adaptive strategies show im-
provement. This is what hypothesis 26 predicted, so we can accept it.
Our fourth topic of interest are the eﬀectiveness of future oﬀers, speciﬁcally whether
they improve the buyer’s performance or not. To this end, tables 10.11 and 10.12Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 288
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.10: Eﬀect of Opponent Selection (Adaptive Counter Tactic with
Future Oﬀers) (Hypothesis 26). Best of Simple on the top row, Analytic in the
middle and Adaptive on the bottom row.
show the results with the Random Counter and Adaptive Counter tactics, respec-
tively. Basically there is a clear and deﬁnite advantage associated to the use of
future oﬀers in a clear majority of cases for all the best concurrency strategies.
There are three types of exception. First, the very high buyer eﬀect probabilities
with the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy. This is because almost all contracts
will be made after the last matching, when future oﬀers are zero anyway. This
lack of performance improvement is present in all cases where the Constant 1.0
fee is used, when the buyer alone can be aﬀected. There are some signs of it also
when both can be aﬀected and a sophisticated opponent selection strategy is used.
Second, when the seller is aﬀected and the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is
used, we get sporadic diﬀerences with the Quality or Expected Utility opponent se-
lection for the Random Counter and with the Expected Utility opponent selection
for the Adaptive Counter tactic cases. This is because these opponent selection
strategies order the opponents in descending order of expected utility, so the dif-
ferences between the diﬀerent opponents are very small, which usually means that
only a few negotiations are necessary. Also, the best contracts are often formed
very close to the beginning of the run. This means that all strategies take the
ﬁrst contract they can and the expected utilities are very close to each other. The
thresholds will not be able to help here because they would only remove opponents
that would not bring any result or at least slightly inferior results. The Adaptive
concurrent strategy will often be able to ﬁnd the best deal already with the Quality
opponent selection even with the Adaptive Counter negotiation tactic and there
is often no improvement there.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 289
Third, a similar eﬀect can also be detected with the same opponent selection
strategies where the Constant 0.0 policy is used and the buyer alone is aﬀected.
This is because the ﬁrst successful negotiation is likely to get a very similar outcome
to any later negotiation. This is because with very high buyer eﬀect probabilities
many of the contracts are never going to performed and the remaining few are
often going to be quite good given the opponent selection strategies. With the
less sophisticated opponent selection, the ﬁrst contracts might not be that good,
which is why the future oﬀers are useful. And with lower probabilities of buyer
failure, there are more contracts performed so also smaller diﬀerences can become
signiﬁcant. Unlike in other cases, the case with the best Simple strategy, the
Quality opponent selection and the Random Counter tactic has no improvement
in small eﬀects either. This is because the ﬁrst oﬀer that the Simple 1 strategy
can ﬁnd even without the future oﬀers is often quite good (very high quality),
because it may take a while to ﬁnd that contract and new and better opponents
may arrive before the contract is found so all that the future oﬀers achieve in this
setting is to make it possible to get a very similar performance with almost any
Simple strategy. However, with the Expected Utility opponent selection, a suitable
contract is often found immediately even without future oﬀers, which means that
it can sometimes be merely good (not excellent) and here the future oﬀers may
encourage the buyer to wait a bit which means that the future oﬀers may be able
to help. All these ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 27 and we can therefore
accept it.
And ﬁnally, we will discuss the diﬀerences between the two negotiation tactics. The
diﬀerences between these negotiation tactics with diﬀerent concurrency strategies
in diﬀerent settings are in table 10.13, where the top row of each setting describes
the diﬀerences for the best Simple strategy, the middle row for the Analytic strat-
egy and the bottom row for the Adaptive concurrency strategy. Here, the plusses
refer to the cases where the strategy using the Adaptive Counter tactic outperforms
the strategy using the Random Counter tactic and minuses denote the contrary
situation. The number of plusses again indicate the signiﬁcance level of the sta-
tistical test. We do have plusses, minuses and hyphens, so all possible cases are
present. As can be seen, the intensity of the plusses increases with the opponent
selection strategies’ sophistication. For example, when the seller is aﬀected and the
Constant 0.0 fee is used, there is a diﬀerence in most cases only with the Adaptive
strategy when the Random opponent selection is used, with both the Simple and
Adaptive when the Quality opponent selction is used and in all three, when the
Expected Utility opponent selection is used. This pattern also occurs elsewhere.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 290
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.11: Eﬀect of Future Oﬀers (Random Counter Tactic) (Hypothesis
27). Best of Simple on the top row, Analytic in the middle and Adaptive on
the bottom row.
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.12: Eﬀect of Future Oﬀers (Adaptive Counter Tactic) (Hypothesis
27). Best of Simple on the top row, Analytic in the middle and Adaptive on
the bottom row.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 291
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10.13: Adaptive Counter vs. Random Counter (Hypothesis 28). Best
of Simple on the top row, Analytic in the middle and Adaptive on the bottom
row.
This is because the strategies are ever more able to access opponents with the
Exponential Time-Dependent tactic and they can, therefore, exploit them. This is
the reason also for why the Adaptive concurrency strategy usually is the ﬁrst one
to get the advantage and also to why there is less diﬀerence with high buyer eﬀect
probabilities.
The only exception to the Adaptive Counter’s superiority is in cases where the
Random opponent selection is used together with the Constant 1.0 decommit-
ment policy. Here, the Random Counter tactic is able to outperform the Adap-
tive Counter in many cases when the best Simple concurrency strategy is used.
However, there is a relative simple explanation to this. This is because the risk
of getting into extra contracts is lower (even with future oﬀers) and the Simple
strategies with more opponents are practical. Also the eﬀect is especially clear
when the seller is aﬀected and, therefore, when a quick contract is needed and the
threshold at ﬁrst matching might not be very high (there are plenty of opponents).
Only the Simple strategies will be able to beneﬁt because the advanced strategies
are already able to avoid extra contracts in both cases. Given that it is good to
look for more options when the variation is high, the simple strategies do well
here. Also when the buyer is aﬀected, the lower chance of extra contracts helps.
All this is consistent with hypothesis 28 and we can accept it.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 292
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer - − − − − - - - - - - - - - - - + ++ - - - −
Seller - - - - - - - - ++ - - +++ - - - ++ - - + +++
Both - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - +++ ++ ++ + + + - - - −
Seller - + - +++ ++ + ++++ ++++++++ + +++++++++ ++++++++ ++++++
Both - - - + - - - - + - +++ ++ + - - - - - - -
Table 10.14: The performance of the Analytic concurrency strategies under
full and no tactic information (the Random Counter tactic with future oﬀers)
(Hypothesis 30.a).
10.2.3.3 No Tactic Information with Future Oﬀers
When the buyer does not have any idea what tactic an individual seller is em-
ploying, its task becomes more complicated. We start with the case where the
Random Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator level. The results with the
Random and Quality opponent selection are in ﬁgures 10.16 and 10.17 respec-
tively (performance in the full information case is included for comparison). The
detailed analysis of the relevant performances of full and no tactic information are
in table 10.14. The plusses in that table refer to the cases where the Analytic
strategy in possession of full tactic information is able to beat the same strategy
with no tactic information and the number of plusses tell the signiﬁcance level of
this diﬀerence.34 We did two-sided tests because we expected that we might also
get some cases where the information might actually be counterproductive. We
do get two such cases when the buyer is aﬀected with probability of 0.1 or 0.2 and
the Random opponent selection and the Constant 0.0 policy are used.
The performances of the Analytic and the best Simple strategy are compared in
table 10.15. As can be seen, there is very little diﬀerence between the Analytic
strategy and the best Simple strategy when the Random opponent selection is
used. There seems to be diﬀerence only when the seller eﬀect is very likely and
the fee is zero and also when the eﬀect probability is zero and the fee is one. This is
because the best Simple strategies are over-eager to get into contracts (see no risk
in that) but there is a risk, having to decommit from multiple contracts and the
buyer using the Analytic strategy is able to avoid this. When the eﬀect probability
34As in the earlier cases, one plus refers to the p < 0.05 level, two plusses to the p < 0.01 level
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Figure 10.16: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic, the Random opponent selection strategy, future oﬀers
and no tactic data (Hypothesis 30). The performance of the Analytic strategy
with full tactic information (FI) is also given for comparison.
increases, also the Simple strategies become more careful and the Analytic strategy
is unable to beat the best Simple strategies.
When the Quality opponent selection is used, things change. Now, all opponents
are high quality and around half of them will also accept an oﬀer made by the
Random Counter tactic. The buyer just does not know with which opponents the
negotiation will succeed and with which opponents it will fail. When there is a sig-
niﬁcant beneﬁt in waiting, the Simple strategies will either waste a lot of perfectly
good opponents (the Simple strategies with a high number of negotiations) or are
unable to ﬁnd good opponents when the time comes (the Simple strategies with
a low number of negotiations). The Analytic strategy will be able to wait until
there are probably good opponents (those it can succeed with) among the sellers
and it is able to estimate a reasonable number of opponents to negotiate with to
get a result with a reasonable risk of getting into extra contracts. So, when the
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Figure 10.17: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Random Counter tactic, the Quality opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers but with no tactic information (Hypothesis 30). The performance of the
Analytic strategy with full tactic information (FI) is also given for comparison.
be aﬀected (waiting is useful), the Analytic strategy will be able to beat all Simple
strategies. If there are no adverse eﬀects, good contracts can be found at any time
and extra contracts can be decommitted from for free, the best Simple strategies
will be able to do as well as the Analytic strategy.
Now, when the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy is used, the situation is more
complex. The Analytic strategy is able to beat the competition in most cases where
the waiting is useful (when the buyer is aﬀected). When only the seller is aﬀected,
however, the best strategy is to get a contract as soon as possible and, here, also
the Simple strategies can be successful. In fact, the Simple strategies seem to be
able to beat the Analytic strategy in some cases. It seems that with no information
about the opponents’ tactics, the Analytic strategy somewhat underestimates the
risk of getting into multiple contracts. It often starts with three negotiations in the
ﬁrst matching and it has to decommit (on average) almost two contracts in every
hundred runs , whereas the best Simple strategy is Simple 1 which does not needChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 295
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - +++ - + + - - - - - -
Seller - − - - - - - + ++ +++ +++ - - - - - - - - -
Both - - - - - - - + + - +++ + - - - - - - - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer - - - - - - - - - - −− +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ - −
Seller - +++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++ −− - - −− - − - - - −
Both - +++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++ −− - + +++ ++ ++++++ + ++ -
Table 10.15: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as
compared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Random Counter tactic
with no tactic information but with future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 30.b). The An-
alytic vs. the Best of the Simple on the top row and the Adaptive vs. the Best
of the Simple on the bottom row in each case.
to decommit from extra contracts at all. This comes from the fact that the two
tactics that are the Random Counter can succeed with have very diﬀerent contract
time patterns. The negotiations with the Random tactic can succeed at any time,
but earlier times are slightly more probable, whereas with the Exponential Time-
Dependent tactic, the negotiation can often take a while. We also assumed for
the sake of simplicity (see section 10.1.2.2) that the Exponential Time-Dependent
tactic always succeeds at the last turn, which is not necessarily the case with
tactics that concede a lot quickly and also with the slightly less quick conceders,
the buyer’s oﬀer may be acceptable sooner than in the last turn (because it is
higher than the reservation price). When the seller tactic is known, such small
diﬀerences do not play a signiﬁcant role, but when uncertainty increases, this eﬀect
is enough to make the Analytic strategy lose to the Simple 1 strategy. All these
ﬁndings are consistent with hypothesis 30 and, therefore, we can accept it.
The cases where the Adaptive Counter tactic is used at the Negotiator level are
in ﬁgures 10.18 and 10.19. It is very clear from these ﬁgures that the lack of tac-
tic information decreases the performance of the buyer strategies signiﬁcantly in
almost all cases. An interesting observation is a sudden increase of performance
when the buyer is aﬀected with the probability 0.1 and the Constant 1.0 decom-
mitment policy is used. This eﬀect occurs with both the Random and Quality
opponent selection and is because the large decommitment fee makes the Adaptive
Counter tactic use lower oﬀers. This, in turn, is because making oﬀers that are
always going to be accepted does not give the buyer a very good expected utility
when there is a risk of expensive decommitment. A lower oﬀer that gives the
buyer higher expected utility in case of success will be more interesting because
of the higher expected utility itself and because it decreases the chance of havingChapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 296
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ ++++++ + ++ - - - −− -
Seller +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++
Both +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++ - − −− -
Seller +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++
Both +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++ ++
Table 10.16: The performance of the Analytic concurrency strategies under
full and no tactic information (the Adaptive Counter tactic with future oﬀers)
(Hypothesis 29.a).
to pay the high fee (there is a positive probability that no contract will be formed
at all giving zero proﬁt). All this means that the Adaptive Counter will be more
risk-seeking when only the buyer will be aﬀected. When the seller is aﬀected there
is no similar incentive because there is very little risk of negative utility for the
buyer in case of a contract. This also holds when both parties can be aﬀected.
Now, in table 10.16, we have a detailed analysis of relative performance of the
Analytic concurrency strategy both under full and no information. As can be
seen from this table, the diﬀerence is very clear in almost all cases. The only
exceptions are associated with the Constant 1.0 policy when the buyer is aﬀected.
Here, with high eﬀect probabilities, with both the Random and Quality opponent
selection, as we just discussed, the Adaptive Counter tactic will take more risks
and this means, it will do very well, even without tactic information. There are
even a couple of settings where the Analytic strategy does better without than
with the tactic information. As explained earlier (section 10.1.3), such an eﬀect is
possible because the thresholds demand higher quality without than with the tactic
information and because this may mean the Analytic strategy negotiates more. Of
course with very high buyer eﬀect probabilities this means the negotiations take
place very near the deadline and it simply means that unlike with full information,
the Analytic Counter without the tactic information will demand a higher expected
utility which means that it will fail negotiations with behavioural tactics, an option
it does not have with full information. All these observations are consistent with
hypothesis 29.a.
Now, the other question we will discuss in relation to the Adaptive Counter tactic
is how the Analytic strategy operates compared to the Simple strategies. The
summary of this performance is in table 10.17. We start from cases with the Con-
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Figure 10.18: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic, the Random opponent selection strategy, future oﬀers
and no tactic data (Hypothesis 29). The performance of the Analytic strategy
with full tactic information (FI) is also given for comparison.
the best Simple strategies beat the Analytic strategy with low eﬀect probabilities.
As before, this is because the Analytic strategy does not negotiate except when
it knows it will be successful, which means that it will encounter some opponents
repeatedly and therefore it will meet fewer new opponents than some of its Simple
competitors. However, when the waiting starts to pay oﬀ (when the seller eﬀect
probability increases), the Analytic strategy will be able to beat all the Simple
strategies. With the Quality opponent selection, the number of opponents loses
its signiﬁcance and all the best opponents are encountered by all strategies. This
means that the Analytic approach to wait until the time is right to negotiate wins
the day when the seller or both parties can be aﬀected. As in the earlier settings,
there is no such advantage when the buyer is aﬀected because delaying the contract
does not have an eﬀect on the buyer’s eﬀect probability and there is no diﬀerence
between having and not having a contract when and if the decommitment occurs.
All this is very clear. In large part this is because the Analytic Counter tactic will
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Figure 10.19: The performance of diﬀerent concurrency strategies with the
Adaptive Counter tactic, the Quality opponent selection strategy and future
oﬀers (Hypothesis 29). The performance of the Analytic strategy with full
tactic information (FI) is also given for comparison.
opponent and the time of contract (when the seller is aﬀected) can inﬂuence the
results.
The situation is more complicated when the Constant 1.0 fee is used because
here, some negotiations also fail. However, there are no real surprises here. The
Analytic strategy is able to beat its Simple competitors in most cases with the
Random opponent selection. The only exceptions are the very high eﬀect probabil-
ities. When seller or both parties are aﬀected, the Adaptive Counter makes oﬀers
that are always accepted. Because of the high decommitment fee, the Analytic
concurrency strategy usually negotiates with only the ﬁrst opponent that the fu-
ture oﬀers do not remove and the best Simple strategies do the same and the best
Simple strategies often do something very similar. They are a bit less accurate
with this35 but with very high eﬀect probabilities only a handful of contracts are
35This is because in the n opponents, the Simple n strategy encounters, there might be also
zero or more than one opponent that exceeds the threshold and, therefore, the Simple n strategy
may be left with no or too many contracts.Chapter 10 Concurrency Strategies: The Controller Level 299
Aﬀected Constant 0.0 Constant 1.0
Parties Eﬀect Probability Eﬀect Probability
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Random Opponent Selection
Buyer − − − - - - - - - - - - +++ - ++ +++ ++++++ - - - −
Seller − − − −− - - - - ++ - +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++ ++ ++ + -
Both − − − - - − - - - - - ++ +++ +++ ++ +++ ++ + + - - -
Quality Opponent Selection
Buyer +++ - - - - - - - - - +++ - ++++++ +++++++++ ++ - −
Seller +++ +++++++++ +++++++++ ++++++++++++ - - - - - - - - -
Both +++ +++++++++ ++++++ ++ ++ ++ + +++ - - ++ - - - - - -
Table 10.17: The performances of the advanced concurrency strategies as
compared to the best Simple concurrency strategy (the Adaptive Counter tac-
tic with no tactic information but with future oﬀers) (Hypothesis 29.b). The
Analytic vs. the Best of the Simple on the top row and the Adaptive vs. the
Best of the Simple on the bottom row in each case.
ever performed and this diﬀerence drowns in the noise. When only the buyer is
aﬀected, the buyer is taking chances in its negotiations (demanding a lower price)
and it fails quite often with the negotiations it starts. But, as in the other cases,
there are less contracts and less possibilities for making a diﬀerence. With the
extreme buyer eﬀect (0.9), we also (as in the cases with full tactic information)
get the slight overeagerness to negotiate (due to inaccuracies in expected utility
estimates as discussed in earlier settings) and the ﬂexibility of the Analytic means
it is better able to ﬁnd these problem cases. This explains why the best Simple
strategies are able to beat the Analytic strategy there.
When the Quality opponent selection is used, there is a clear and sustained ad-
vantage for the Analytic strategy only when the buyer is aﬀected. This is very
simply because in other cases, the opponents make oﬀers that are always accepted
and therefore having many negotiations is not that good an idea. All strategies
will therefore negotiate with the ﬁrst opponent and make it an oﬀer it eventually
accepts. There is no room for improvements through using the Analytic strategy.
All this is consistent with hypothesis 29.b and we can therefore accept the whole
hypothesis 29.
10.3 Summary
In this section, we discussed the Controller level and described in detail our
model for this level. We considered for the ﬁrst time, opponent selection and con-
currency control (choosing the number of negotiations), introduced several strate-
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other strategies (contribution C7). We also successfully used empirical data on
the previous runs to estimate the oﬀers the buyer would be encountering later
(contribution C9). We tested several hypotheses about these strategies empiri-
cally and discovered that the opponent selection, the concurrency strategies and
considering future oﬀers can have a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of the
buyer agent. Generally, the more sophisticated strategies did better than their
simpler counterparts, but this was not always given and there were also cases
where the simpler strategies outperformed the sophisticated ones.
We also discovered that operating in the presence of incomplete information has a
strong impact on the performance of the buyer agent when the Analytic Counter
tactic is used at the Negotiator level and much less eﬀect when the Random
Counter tactic is used (contribution C7). Although the Analytic Counter tactic
would certainly beneﬁt from the Adaptive concurrency strategy, which would have
allowed it to take into account the other negotiations, the Adaptive Counter would
still require quite detailed information about the opponent population to function
eﬀectively. The simple counter tactics, such as Random Counter, do need signiﬁ-
cantly less information and are less aﬀected by the lack of information. Although




The top level of our model consists of the Coordinator that coordinates between
negotiations on diﬀerent services. The aim here is to discuss our contributions C8
(managing basic interrelations between negotiations). We do this by discussing
substitutes and complements and by developing some basic strategies for managing
them in a situation where the buyer may be adversely aﬀected and change its mind
about needing the service during the negotiation. By so doing, we wish to show
that the Coordinator level is an essential part of a concurrent bilateral negotiation
agent, if a buyer agent is simultaneously engaged in many interrelated negotiations
and not just singular acquisitions. As discussed in the literature review (section
2.3.4), the existing work on concurrent bilateral negotiation has been lacking in
this respect. Naturally, future work can extend these fundamental strategies into
more complex and eﬃcient ones, but the aim here is to lay the foundation in this
area.
We start by discussing how the Coordinator is constructed and how it interacts
with its environment (section 11.1). We then discuss our experiments and results
(section 11.2), and we conclude the chapter with a summary of our ﬁndings (section
11.3).
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11.1 Architecture of the Coordinator
The Coordinator’s task is to coordinate negotiations on diﬀerent services. It
will start new and end old Controllers as necessary. The Coordinator gets its
targets from the planner or human user, both of which are out of scope for this
work. Here, it is simply assumed that the Coordinator just gets the necessary
information (the markets and substitute/complements). In a complete system, the
Coordinator might give them intermediate results and obviously the planner or
human user could at any time change the requirements, but we will not consider
such changes in this work. Instead, we assume the Coordinator simply gets its
targets and autonomously tries to fulﬁl those targets to the best of its abilities.
In the work we discuss here, we have between two and nine separate service mar-
kets. The reason for the minimum (two) should be self-evident, since it is the
smallest number of markets above one. The maximum (nine) was selected because
we wanted to have more than a couple of settings and because eight seemed quite
reasonable an amount for the graphs. In these eight settings, the Coordinator
will try to achieve one of two goals depending on the setting:
• In the Complements setting, the goal is to get one of each and every service
or none of the services at all. An example of complementary services would
be a trip from A to B, say from Southampton, UK, to Tokyo, Japan. The
trip consists of a trip from Southampton to Heathrow Airport, a ﬂight from
Heathrow to Narita Airport near Tokyo and a trip from Narita to Tokyo.
All three partial services are needed in order to get from Southampton to
Tokyo, so the services are complementary. A trip from Narita to Tokyo is
not that useful if we cannot get to Narita and so on.
• In the Substitutes setting, only one of the services is required (and it does not
matter which one). Using the same example, there are substitute services
for the trip from Southampton to Heathrow. Since here we assume that
the options are pretty much identical in terms of expected price and utility,
we might not consider taking a taxi but instead we could consider taking a
coach directly from Southampton to Heathrow or taking a train to Woking
and a bus from there to Heathrow. In terms of price and travel time these
options might be roughly equal. On the other hand, we need to make the
trip only once, so if the agent is negotiating with both the coach and train
company at the same time, it needs to be careful not to book both but only
one of the services.Chapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 303
In our experiments, the target is always one or the other (getting one of all services
or getting only one service). In other situations, the interdependencies between
diﬀerent negotiations might of course be more complicated. This could mean that
there are combinations of complements and substitutes in the same problem. An
earlier example can be used here again by combining the two cases. The agent
could need to ﬁnd a way to get a person from Southampton to Tokyo and each
leg could be done in many diﬀerent ways. Also there might be other airports the
agent might consider (either in Japan or in UK) and this would mean completely
new sets of services for the other legs of the journey. So, for example, it might be
an option to ﬂy to Singapore and change planes there. Here, we would again get
complements from getting to the airport in UK, to Singapore, from there to Japan
and from airport to Tokyo and this would be a subsitute to a more direct trip via
Heathrow. In cases such as these we might even have a hierarchy of Coordinators,
where the lowest level Coordinators, for example, would try to ﬁnd the best deals
for diﬀerent possible legs of the journey and the higher levels would combine these
to the whole journeys and the top level would then choose which of the whole
journeys to take. However, as already mentioned, this type of problem is beyond
the scope of our work.
Moreover, for the sake of clarity, we have made some additional simpliﬁcations. We
assume that matchings in diﬀerent markets always occur at the same time. This
could be, for example, because the turns we use would have a counterpart in reality,
for example a hundred turns could be a minute of real-time and matchings could
occur once a minute. Or it could be because all the markets in the marketplace are
synchronised to have matchings at the same time. In either case, we just assume
the Coordinator can make its decisions involving the number of negotiations in
each market at the same time. This is to make the coordination problem somewhat
easier, without losing anything essential to the problem itself.
We also assume that all services in all markets are identical in terms of the expected
number of entries, quality distribution, utility functions, the expected utilities,
and so on. In the case of substitutes, this means that the diﬀerent service markets
provide perfect substitutes meaning that at the outset, the buyers are indiﬀerent
between the service types. They are equally happy to take a service from any
service market (no preferences between services). Between the service markets,
the service is selected from the market where the expected (quality) utility is the
highest and no market has an advantage in advance. Of course in a more realistic
setting, the services are unlikely to be perfect substitutes. Some people prefer
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the coach option might not, a train station might be closer to home than the closest
coach stop, the actual prices might vary, taking a taxi would also be a possibility
(albeit a more expensive one) and so on. So diﬀerent services would probably have
diﬀerent utility functions and a more realistic system would have to take this into
account. However, we do not think that this sort of additional complexity would
bring anything essentially new to the problem but instead, in a more simple and
standardised setting, we can show the eﬀect the diﬀerent coordination strategies
have on the outcome.
Similarly, we have assumed that the agent needs to decommit from all contracts
on services that it will not use and we will only use one decommitment policy, that
of Constant 1.00. Our choice of decommitment policy was heavily inﬂuenced by
the fact that an overcompensating decommitment policy will make the successful
coordination a more critical task than it would otherwise be. And of course, since
the providers of these services are (or can be) separate entities, the agent will have
to pay a fee for each and every contract it needs to decommit from. At worst, this
can mean decommitting eight contracts because the critical 9th contract failed
to materialise. With an overcompensating decommitment policy, this would be
a dire situation indeed. Of course, here the decommitment fee is always more
than the service price (since the price is always less than 1)1 and, in practise,
the buyer would be tempted to just stay in the contract and pay for the service
even if it never plans to use the results for anything. However, we felt that to
demonstrate the importance of the coordination, we want to make the payment
for failure reasonably large. The diﬀerences would be there also in cases where the
buyer would just stay in the contract or could get out of the contracts by paying
a smaller fee (a zero fee would, however, mean that there was very little need to
coordinate), but the diﬀerences would be smaller.
Now, after this problem introduction, we will discuss the architecture of the
Coordinator. First, we will give an overview of the structure of the Coordinator
and how it interacts with its environment (section 11.1.1). We then discuss spe-
ciﬁc coordination strategies we are going to use (section 11.1.2) and ﬁnally we will
discuss how we consider future oﬀers in this environment (section 11.1.3).
1The lower levels of the agent ensure that any contract means a positive utility for the buyer,
so even if the quality was at maximum (= 1) the price is going to be less than one, so that the
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11.1.1 Overview
The Coordinator level sits on the top of the Controller level and all Controllers
report to the Coordinator after they have analysed their respective negotiation
situations and have a recommended plan of action in their set of negotiations.
The Coordinator takes these plans and takes into account the situation in dif-
ferent markets and how these plans go together. It can then make adjustments
to the plans. The ﬁnal plans are sent to the Controllers to implement. Each
Controller will tell its Negotiators what action they should take. Unlike the
Controller level, the Coordinator level automatically starts a Controller at













Figure 11.1: The Coordinator.
In more detail, the structure of the Coordinator level itself is very similar to
that of the lower levels, especially the Negotiator level. Basically, there is a
<CoordinatorBase> module that handles all the interaction with other levels (here
Controllers) and an interchangable <CoordinationStrategy> module which de-
ﬁnes how the negotiations in diﬀerent service markets are to be coordinated. The
CoordinatorBase gives the CoordinationStrategy the Controller’s suggested
plans and the Coordination- Strategy will give back the adjusted ﬁnal plans.
The Coordinator will play a particularly signiﬁcant role in the opponent selec-
tion phase, when the number of opponents are chosen in each market, since this
is where the coordination is mostly needed.Chapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 306
Naturally, the Controllers keep the Coordinator updated on developments in
their negotiations, so after a suﬃcient number of contracts have been secured,
the Coordinator level will immediately inform all Controllers that they should
stop their negotiations. This is somewhat trivial and it will happen exactly the
same way no matter what coordination policy is used. The diﬀerences between
coordination policies are in the opponent selection phase alone. To this end, we
will now discuss the coordination strategies we have used in our experiments.
11.1.2 Coordination Strategies
These coordination strategies diﬀer in the role they play during the Opponent
Selection phase, that is when the buyer is choosing who to negotiate with in
each market. In contrast, during the Negotiation phase (when negotiations are in
progress in the markets), the functionality of all coordination strategies is the same.
They receive progress reports from the Controllers every turn and step in if a
suﬃcient number of contracts (or more) have been formed. In such circumstances,
they will end all remaining negotiations in all markets and decommit from extra
contracts that are not needed. Otherwise they just approve whatever the lower
levels are doing.
As we explained in the beginning of this chapter, we use straightforward coordi-
nation strategies. Speciﬁcally, we have three such strategies, a default one involv-
ing no coordination (the No coordination strategy, section 11.1.2.1), one that is
geared towards the Substitutes case (the Risk-Averse coordination strategy, sec-
tion 11.1.2.2) and one for the Complements case (the All or Nothing coordination
strategy, section 11.1.2.3). We will now discuss each in turn.
11.1.2.1 The No Coordination Strategy
The No coordination strategy takes the plans the Controllers suggest and accepts
them as they are, making no changes. Since the Controllers are completely
unaware of each other, this means that there is no coordination between them.
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11.1.2.2 The Risk-Averse Coordination Strategy
The Risk-Averse coordination strategy is meant for the Substitutes setting and it
is designed to avoid extra contracts. It does this by negotiating only in one market
at a time. At each matching, the Risk-Averse strategy will take the recommended
strategies from all the Controllers and tell the Controller that forecasts the
highest expected utility to go ahead as planned, while telling all the others to
have no negotiations.
This coordination strategy obviously makes it impossible to get into contracts in
diﬀerent markets simultaneously. However, a possible drawback of this strategy is
that it may not work very well in environments where there are limited contract
opportunities or where the agent needs to ﬁnd more than one contract. This
makes it unsuitable for the Complements setting: if the buyer needs a success in
10 markets, negotiating in them one at a time can be very risky. If the probability
of the buyer’s adverse eﬀect is very high or if the Controllers consider future
oﬀers (tend to make their move very late in the game), using this strategy would
mean automatic failure in cases where many contracts in diﬀerent markets are
required. We therefore use it only in the Substitutes setting.
11.1.2.3 The All or Nothing Coordination Strategy
The All or Nothing coordination strategy is designed to work in the Complements
case in environments where there is likely to be times where a contract in all
markets is possible around the same time. Basically, at each matching, the All or
Nothing coordination strategy will see if all of its Controllers give a very high
probability of success. If one or more say that there is a signiﬁcant chance of
failure, the strategy will tell everybody else not to negotiate at all. Only if all are
conﬁdent of their success, will it give a permission to everybody to go ahead. This,
as the Risk-Averse strategy before it, is quite conservative a strategy. It will move
only if success is all but certain. To enhance this stance even further, it also uses
a conservative formulation of its problem. Basically it will calculate the expected




EUi − (1 − P)(n − 1)f,
where n is the number of markets, P is the probability that a contract will be
found in all n markets (this is P =
 n
i=0 Pi, where Pi is the success probability inChapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 308
market i), EUi is the expected utility in market i (in case of success) and f is the
decommitment fee (in our experiments f = 1).
So, the ﬁrst term calculates the expected utility in case all negotiations succeed
and the latter in all the other cases. For simplicity, we have made a pessimistic
assumption that all the other negotiations will be successful and therefore the
buyer agent will need to decommit from all but one (n − 1) contracts. With
the Constant 1.00 decommitment policy, this formulation means that the success
probability will have to be very high indeed ((almost) 1) before the All or Nothing
coordination strategy gives a go-ahead for its Controllers.
Also it should be noted that a very high success probability has to be achieved
in all markets at the same time (same matching). This can sometimes lead to
problems, especially if the markets are very diﬀerent from each other in terms
of timing or if the number of markets is high (the probability that the success
probability will be high in all of them at the same time might not be as high
as one might wish). It should be remembered that in this simple setting, the
Coordinator cannot express wishes of success probability to the lower levels so
they are stuck with whatever the Controllers come up with. It is possible that
sometimes a slightly higher price in one market might be acceptable to secure a
higher success probability in that market and therefore be successful in getting all
contracts. However, that would require a more sophisticated coordination strategy
than All or Nothing.
11.1.3 Considering Oﬀers in the Future Negotiations
In the work we discuss here, we use future oﬀers exactly like in our experiments
in the Controller level (see section 10.1.3). That is, each Controller considers
future oﬀers as if there are no other markets. In some situations, especially in
the Substitutes setting, the buyer agent would probably beneﬁt from future of-
fers taking into account the greatly expanded opportunities of multiple markets.
A deal that is excellent when 250 opponents can be met might be merely good
when the number of opponents to choose from increases to 2500, for example. It
would probably also decrease the negotiations and therefore the number of de-
commitments. However, here our task is simply to demonstrate that coordination
between diﬀerent market is important and this can be done also where future of-
fers consider each market in isolation. Also extending the future oﬀers to consider
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wanted to compare the situation with and without coordination. Moreover, such
an approach would not be helpful in the Complements setting because there the
buyer must succeed in all markets (separately) not just one (the market by market
approach would be the only possible one).
Given all this, we have therefore not expanded future oﬀers to consider all available
markets. We will discuss the implications of this decision when we discuss our
results.
11.2 Empirical Evaluation
Having explained what the Coordinator level looks like, how it works and de-
scribed our coordination strategies, it is time to perform the empirical evaluation.
As before, we start this by discussing our hypotheses (section 11.2.1). We then ex-
plain how the experiments were conducted (section 11.2.2) and discuss our results
(section 11.2.3).
11.2.1 Hypotheses
We use the best strategies and tactics from the lower level. Thus,we use the Adap-
tive concurrency strategy, the Expected Utility opponent selection, the Adaptive
Counter negotiation tactic (since we are using full tactic information) and the
future oﬀers restricted to single markets. The side-eﬀect of our settings and these
strategies is that the probability of success is reasonably high in any and all mar-
kets. Given the setting, the Constant 1.0 decommitment policy and the discussion
in the previous section, our hypotheses are relatively straight-forward.
We start with the Substitutes setting. Here, the No coordination strategy runs a
high risk of getting into more than enough contracts and this will adversely impact
on the buyer’s performance. The eﬀect is likely to worsen when the number of
markets increases (probability of extra contracts increases). On the other hand,
increasing the number of markets means access to more and more opponents, so
the Risk-Averse negotiation strategy is likely to (slightly) increase its performance
as the number of markets increases. The best strategies mentioned above mean
that the result in each market is going to be quite good, but if one is in a position
to choose the best result from several markets, the results are often better than
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in one market is going to be very good already and there is limited space for
improvement. The eﬀect is also going to be stronger in cases where the buyer’s
failure probability (chance of adverse eﬀect) is lower because obviously in case of
adverse eﬀect even an exceptionally good agreement will not matter. Therefore
we contend:
Hypothesis 31. In the Substitutes setting, a buyer agent using the
Risk-Averse coordination strategy will outperform one using the No
coordination strategy.
Now, the Complements setting is likely to be more complicated and simple coor-
dination may even be counter-productive, especially when the number of markets
(required contracts) is high. This is because, as explained, the All or Nothing
coordination strategy will only negotiate if it can be relatively certain that it can
get a contract in all negotiations in the same matching. However, as explained
when expected future oﬀers (average later oﬀers) are used as a utility threshold, it
means that sometimes starting the negotiations is postponed because opponents
with suﬃciently high expected utility do not appear. When the number of mar-
kets increases, the probability that this happens at least in one market increases.
This means that the All or Nothing coordination strategy starts negotiations later
and some of the best opponents in some other markets may have exited by then,
whereas the No coordination strategy may negotiate with these opponents when-
ever they are available. However, when the eﬀect probability increases also the No
coordination strategy will start negotiations later and later, because the highest
utility is often available near the deadline when the probability of adverse eﬀect
is at its lowest. Therefore the diﬀerence in timing between the two coordination
strategies decreases when the eﬀect probability increases.
Another observation is that in a single negotiation, surprising things can happen,
for example, the opponent may have a very early deadline. This can mean that
a negotiation can fail even if in advance, it seemed quite safe a bet. If you have
multiple chances to negotiate, this is probably not going to an issue but when
the probability of adverse eﬀect increases, all the best contracts are found near
the delivery time, which limits the number of useful negotiations the buyer has
and, therefore, increases the chance that the buyer is left without a contract in
the end. And again, the more markets you have, the more likely this sort of
surprising failure at least in one market is. This means that with very high eﬀect
probabilities, the All or Nothing strategy may be able to beat the No coordination
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Hypothesis 32. In the Complements setting, with the Adaptive con-
currency strategy, the Expected Utility opponent selection and the
Adaptive Counter negotiation tactic and no market failures, the All
or Nothing coordination strategy will be able to beat the No coordi-
nation strategy only in cases where the adverse eﬀect probability is
very high. The All or Nothing strategy may even be beaten by the
No coordination strategy in some cases with very low adverse eﬀect
probability.
Now, this would seem to indicate that coordination is a bad idea in some cases.
This anomaly occurs because in the setting we have here getting into contracts is
usually easy. In other words, the Controllers are usually able to ensure success
if left to their own devices. However, if they are restricted in the way the All
or Nothing coordination restricts them, the results are no longer guaranteed or
at least not necessarily as good. However, there are situations where a positive
result (a contract) cannot be obtained in a market and sometimes this has very
little to do with the buyer’s actions. To cover this, we introduce a possibility of a
market failure. This means that with probability z we allow no entries to one of
the markets (selected at random), which means that no contracts can be formed
in that market. Because in the Complements setting, the buyer needs to ﬁnd a
contract in all markets, this means that sometimes (with the probability z) the
buyer will be unable to succeed.
The No coordination strategy will be defenceless against such a situation. It will
enter into contracts in all or at least most of the other markets and will have
to decommit from all of these extra contracts later. This will seriously dent its
performance. In contrast, the All or Nothing coordination strategy will be able to
avoid getting into contracts when there is no chance of success, so it will not even
negotiate in the market failure cases. It will, however, be as eﬀective as before
in those cases where the market failure does not happen. Its performance will,
therefore, drop less. This eﬀect should be quite clear already with relatively small
failure probabilities. We contend:
Hypothesis 33. In the Complements setting, the Adaptive concur-
rency strategy, the Expected Utility opponent selection and the Adap-
tive Counter negotiation tactic, the All or Nothing coordination strat-
egy will be able to outperform the No strategy in all settings with a
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11.2.2 Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted by running the market 100 times and adding
the results together. The results here are as in the earlier settings as far as the
Substitutes setting is concerned. Any extra contracts (beyond 1) are decommitted
from and the result is the buyer’s utility, so the contract’s value minus its price
minus fees for any decommitments. In the Complements case, however, things
are slightly more complicated. Here, if the buyer has a contract from all markets
then its utility is equal to the sum of utilities (value−price) for all these contracts
minus any decommitments made. This number will therefore increase with the
number of markets. With one market, the maximum utility is 0.50, with two, its
1.00 and so on. Since in our experiments we run the market 100 times and add
the utilities together, the results discussed in the next section are hundred times
as big as the single result (so up to 50, 100, and so on). And if the buyer fails
to get a contract from all markets in the end, it will have to decommit from all
contract it does have and therefore the utility will be equal to −nf, where n is the
number of decommitments and f is the decommitment fee. We then repeat this
procedure 100 times to get an average result and the variation for 100 repetitions.
We will again use two-sided t-tests to see if there are diﬀerences to one or the other
direction to investigate any diﬀerences between the strategies.
We will investigate only the cases where the buyer and the buyer alone can be
aﬀected. This is because the other settings would not bring anything essentially
new to the problem or at least nothing new to the coordination problem, which
is in the Substitutes case about avoiding extra contracts and in the Complements
case about securing all or no contracts at all. The case where the seller is aﬀected
for example would only bring in cases where the contracts are entered mostly
in the ﬁrst round of negotiations (to maximise the possibility of seller failure).
Although this certainly would make coordination very important in the Substitutes
case (because most contracts happen around the same time), it would not bring
anything essentially new to the problem and the same goes for Complements case,
where we would still have mostly successful contracts. And of course here, it might
not even be optimal to avoid getting into contracts if there is a good chance of the
seller decommitting and having to pay a huge decommitment fee.Chapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 313
11.2.3 Results
In ﬁgures 11.2.a-h, we can see how the Risk-Averse coordination strategy performs
against Slave coordination with varying number of markets. The superiority of the
Risk-Averse coordination is clear (and statistically signiﬁcant at the p < 0.0001
level) in all cases and the diﬀerence between the two strategies increases as the
number of market increases. This is mostly because the No coordination strategy’s
performance deteriorates with more decommitments (this is especially clear in
case with no adverse eﬀects when the buyer is least careful), but also because
the performance of Risk-Averse strategy slightly improves with more and more
possibilities for ﬁnding a very good deal.2 This is consistent with hypothesis 31 so
we can accept it.
An interesting additional observation is that the performance under the No coor-
dination strategy behaves oddly when the eﬀect is 0.1. Unlike in all other cases,
the performance drops sharply when the ﬁrst few markets are added, but from
the ﬁfth market upwards the performance actually seems to improve, although it
never achieves the level with only one market. This type of peculiar behaviour
is to be expected when there is no coordination because the combined eﬀect of
several markets may sometimes be surprising. In this instance, the reason for this
behaviour is that the number of decommitments increases sharply with two mar-
kets (from zero to 9.18) and from there it keeps increasing until with four markets
it reaches a maximum of 15.42, after which it decreases. This explains the changes
in the performance.
The reason for this behaviour, on the other hand, is relatively simple. Because
of the future oﬀers, the Adaptive Counter often ﬁrst ﬁnds contracts with oppo-
nents using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic and those negotiations end
around the same time (close to the end of negotiations) and it seems that this
occurs often after the same matching, so when the number of markets increases
so do the simultaneous extra contracts. However, there is a small chance that
a good enough contract could be found in the previous matching or that good
enough opponents using the Random tactic are present, both of which decrease
the number of extra contracts. In case of earlier contracts, because fewer contracts
are made that early and, in case of the Random tactic because the probability of
simultaneous contracts are smaller (and because in those cases they will get into
a contract before the opponents using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactics
2Given that the maximum theoretical performance in the setting is 50 and the actual average
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do). So after a few markets, when the number of markets increases, the number of
decommitments decreases and the performance improves. Usually, of course, the
number of decommitments increases when the number of markets increases, but
as this example shows, this is not always the case.
This type of unexpected behaviour can occur when no coordination is used because
there may be patterns in the service markets which are not visible with one market,
but become visible when more markets are used. That is one more reason to use
eﬀective coordination, which is less susceptible to such eﬀects because it tries to









































































































































































































Figure 11.2: Risk-Averse and Slave coordination Strategies in the Substitutes
Setting (Hypothesis 31).Chapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 315
We now move to consider the Complements setting. The relative performances of
the All or Nothing and No coordination strategies are in ﬁgure 11.3 in the case
where there are no market failures. The results have three diﬀerent cases. First,
with very low eﬀect probabilities, coordination is counterproductive at least in the
form of the All or Nothing strategy. The No coordination strategy beats the All or
Nothing strategy in all cases when there are no adverse eﬀects (at the p < 0.0001
level), in all cases except 2 markets cases when the eﬀect probability is 0.1 (at the
p < 0.0001 level except for 3 and 4 markets cases at the p < 0.01 level) and in
the 7 markets case when the eﬀect probability is 0.2. This is because the Adaptive
Counter tactic is usually able to ﬁnd a contract with a very good probability at
some point, so it fails only rarely to get all the necessary contracts. On the other
hand, the All or Nothing strategy is very conservative and only negotiates when
it can be conﬁdent it can attain a contract in all markets at the same time. This
means that with low eﬀect probabilities the All or Nothing may wait and end up
with inferior contracts because the best options may not be available at the same
time.
The second part of the results is that with the moderate eﬀect probabilities there
is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two. This means that the
edge the coordination had with low eﬀect probabilities is no longer there. This is
because the higher probability of an adverse impact means that the best strategy
in all markets is to wait. This means that all contracts are formed closer to the
deadline, which means that the No coordination strategy has to take whatever is
available then.
The third observation is that the All or Nothing strategy is able to beat the
No coordination cases with very high eﬀect probabilities with 3 or more markets
(probability 0.9, at the p < 0.0001 level except for 3 markets case at the p < 0.001
level). This is because the very high eﬀect probability means that all negotiators
wait until the last possible minute and this may mean sometimes they are unsuc-
cessful. And when they are unsuccessful of course, the All or Nothing strategy
may have many contracts to decommit from, whereas the All or Nothing strategy
does not even negotiate in cases where the risk of that happening is too high. This
was what we said might happen in hypothesis 32, so we can accept it.
However, when we introduce (more) market failures (situations where getting a
contract is not possible for any reason), the All or Nothing strategy’s prudence
is vindicated. In ﬁgure 11.2.3, we see what happens when 10% of the time one
















































































































































































































Figure 11.3: The performance of diﬀerent coordination strategies in the Com-
plements setting with no market failures (Hypothesis 32).
No coordination strategy case because it will often be able to get a contract in
most unaﬀected markets and therefore in case of market failure, it will have to
decommit from all the other contracts, which is very expensive. In contrast, the
All or Nothing strategy does not enter into any contracts in case of market failures,
but is able to get good results when there are no such events. It will therefore beat
the No coordination strategy cases clearly in all cases (at the p < 0.0001 level).
This is consistent with hypothesis 33 so we accept it.
In our setting, a 10% failure rate was enough, but in other settings more failures
might be needed (at least in some cases). This is because here the buyer succeeded












































































































































































































Figure 11.4: The performance of diﬀerent coordination strategies in the Com-
plements setting with 10% market failures (Hypothesis 33).
means that in case of market failure, the No coordination strategy had to pay very
high decommitment fees. Now, if succeeding was less certain, the No coordination
strategy would have to pay less fees in case of market failure. Moreover, if the
window of opportunity in diﬀerent markets would be at diﬀerent times, the No
coordination strategy would be successful more often when it is possible, whereas
the All or Nothing strategy would rarely negotiate at all. In such environments,
the All or Nothing strategy might need a market failure rate of more than 10% to
be beneﬁcial, especially with a high number of markets.Chapter 11 Coordinating Concurrent Negotiations: The Coordinator Level 318
11.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the third and ﬁnal level of our adaptive concur-
rent bilateral negotiation model. We showed how it can improve the performance of
the buyer agent when there are interrelated services (substitutes or complements)
it negotiates concurrently on (contribution C8). The coordination strategies we
used were reasonably straight-forward and conservative and more sophisticated
versions would undoubtedly work even better.
We also identiﬁed some environmental characteristics that make coordination es-
pecially useful. With the substitutes, the number of possible substitutes (market
size) is essential. The performance of the Slave strategy deteriorates signiﬁcantly
and the performance of the Risk-Averse strategy improves slightly when the num-
ber of market increases. However, both, but especially the Slave strategy, would
probably beneﬁt from using future oﬀers that take into account the number of
markets instead of just one market as we had in the experiments. Some perfor-
mance diﬀerence would be likely to remain, however, since the future oﬀers are
not an exact tool and it would not remove the need to decommit entirely when no
coordination is used. In the complements case, we discovered that if a solution can
be achieved in all markets with very high probability, the coordination strategy is
probably not going to be that helpful. However, if there is a chance of failure in
some markets, the coordination quickly becomes essential.Chapter 12
Conclusions and Future Work
We have now detailed all the work in this thesis and now it is time to draw
conclusions on our models and results. We do that in section 12.1. After that we
will discuss some possible future directions for this work in section 12.2.
12.1 Conclusions
Generally, we can say that our work has shown that decommitment policies play a
signiﬁcant role in the welfare of all parties in the marketplace. During any oppo-
nent selection, negotiation and after the contract has been entered into, a rational
party makes several decisions where the decommitment policy plays a signiﬁcant
role and which can have a signiﬁcant impact on both his and his opponents’ util-
ities. The eﬀect of decommitment policies is not straight-forward and not always
clear. This is because they can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent decisions
made by diﬀerent parties at diﬀerent times during the process. A policy that is
optimal in terms of one decision, may be catastrophic in terms of another. On the
other hand, when both parties take these decisions into account, they may ﬁnd
mutually acceptable solutions under most decommitment policies, so the role of
decommitment policies should not be overstated. The decommitment policies do
play a role, but it is the decisions made by the parties that are important.
Our work was divided into two parts, so we follow the same division in the conclu-
sions as well. We ﬁrst discuss our results in commitment models (section 12.1.1)
and then our model and results in concurrent bilateral negotiation strategies (sec-
tion 12.1.2).
319Chapter 12 Conclusions and Future Work 320
12.1.1 Commitment Models
In the market setting, we investigated the common good and the eﬀect the four
basic decisions — performance, reliance, contract and selection — the parties make
will have on it. Our aim was to investigate these decisions in a dynamic service
market and see how taking these decisions into account changes the behaviour
of the parties and how that changed behaviour changes the common good (see
section 1.3 for what we set out to do). Much of the work was based on simple
models and principles from law and law and economics and our contribution was
to apply them to a dynamic service market setting and draw from them to make
new decommitment policies and see how they fare against some known policies.
We were also interested in settings with incomplete information and how well the
sub-optimal policies worked.
In more detail, with the performance decision (chapter 4, contribution C1), we
considered the eﬀect of one or two-sided potential decommitments, re-entries and
incomplete information. Now, for most of these settings the performance decision
has not been previously discussed in such detail in the literature. We discovered
that the best approach is to compensate for the victim’s actual loss or under
incomplete information, the best approximation for that loss. This proved very
eﬀective in most settings.
With the reliance decision (chapter 5, contribution C2), we considered a case
where the buyer is able to enhance its utility by making investments in antici-
pation of the seller’s performance and the reliance (performance probability) of
the sellers vary. When the seller performs, the buyer’s reliance on the perfor-
mance has been beneﬁcial, but if the seller does not perform, the buyer’s reliance
has been detrimental to himself and the common good because the cost cannot
be retrieved. However, we discovered (as the models in the literature suggested)
that taking the reliance decision into account improves the buyer’s utility over
some simple reliance strategies and any compensation for this reliance leads to
over-reliance which can be detrimental to the common good.
In relation to the contract decision (chapter 6, contribution C3), we investigated
the possibility that the parties use the contract price as a risk-allocation tool that
allows them to ﬁnd mutually acceptable (and beneﬁcial to the society) contract
prices in diﬀerent situations and under diﬀerent decommitment policies. We in-
vestigated the eﬀect of none, one or both parties taking possible adverse eﬀects
into account and found out that for the common good, the best approach was thatChapter 12 Conclusions and Future Work 321
both parties took the contract decision into account, although in some situations
it was enough that one of the parties did it.1 Also parties were able to get similar
utilities under most decommitment policies. There were some exceptions with the
Constant 1.0 policy, which occationally made it impossible for the parties to ﬁnd
a good deal.
With the selection decision (chapter 7, contribution C4), we investigated a setting
where the buyers got to choose which sellers they wanted to negotiate with. Here,
we discovered that compensatory policies made the buyers indiﬀerent between per-
formances and non-performances, although of course only the performance could
produce utility for the society. Moreover, over-compensatory policies were even
worse, because they made the buyers choose the least reliable providers. The best
approach here was to have no decommitment fee at all or even have a decommit-
ment bonus (the buyer would have to pay the seller in case the seller decommits)
instead.
Although we discussed only a limited number of settings, we believe that the
results mentioned above are generalizable to many other settings including those
with diﬀerent number of agents. Obviously, the number of agents does have a
direct impact on the number of contracts created and, therefore, on the total
utility gained, but the diﬀerences are likely to remain. However, because of the
high variance of the results in a single contract, a reasonable number of contracts
(agents) is often needed to see diﬀerences that are statistically signiﬁcant. This
means that the diﬀerences between diﬀerent policies might, in some cases, be
drowned in the noise, if the number of contracts (agents) is much lower than it
was in our experiments.2
As already discussed in the literature review (section 2.2.3), the problem with the
diﬀerent decisions is that the optimal policy they prescribe varies and the optimal
policy may be diﬃcult to ﬁnd in a setting where the diﬀerent decisions are made
in relation to the same negotiation or contract. For example, the selection decision
suggests setting the seller’s decommitment fee to zero or even negative, whereas
such policy does not really work well with the performance decision. This is
because the basic approach — which is to internalise the proﬁts and costs of the
opponent in the decision-maker’s utility function — works very well only if there
1On the others, one party taking the decision into account could sometimes lead to worse
outcomes than if neither had considered the contract decision.
2Moreover, we of course varied the number of sellers in the selection decision and showed
that there the opponent selection becomes increasingly important when the number of sellers
increases. Also the numbers of highly reliable sellers had a clear impact on the results with the
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is one decision-maker and preferrably one decision to make. The approach is more
diﬃcult to use, when there are many decisions and many decision-makers and
these decisions are heavily interconnected. In a realistic electronic market setting,
however, such complexities are more than likely.
However, our results in relation to the contract decision, suggest that the decom-
mitment policy may not always be essential to the common good, but if all parties
took all these decisions into account simultaneously, they might be able to ﬁnd
a contract price that would distribute the risks in a way that is acceptable to
everybody. This would safeguard at least positive expected utilities for everybody
(and the society) and with everybody guarding their own interest the outcomes
would also be good for the society. This is because if there was ever a better deal
than the one the parties have found, one party would always be willing to move
to that better deal and would be able to give the other party signiﬁcant incentives
to want the move too (by, for example, lowering the price). The role of decom-
mitment policies would be limited to facilitating this price-setting mechanism or,
more accurately, avoiding getting in its way (as happened with the Constant 1.0
policy in some cases in chapter 7).
However, taking all the relevant decisions into account at the same time is far from
simple in a non-trivial setting. The parties have to consider the performance and
the reliance decisions when they are considering the contract decision and all these
when they are choosing the opponents to negotiate with (the selection decision).
On the other hand, most relevant parameters are not ﬁxed, but they can also be
changed. For example, in our settings, reliability of the opponent was known and
ﬁxed. However, a party can inﬂuence its reliability by investing in good technology
and redundancies, for example, by having backup hardware in case one regularly
used fails. A high decommitment fee will make a party invest in his reliability, but
a low fee may not. When you add incomplete information, reputation and other
relevant factors into this, you have a very diﬃcult problem that may not have an
easy solution.
Against this background, our goal in this work has been to introduce these de-
cisions to people working on agents and dynamic service markets and show that
the decisions are important in any environment where negotiation, contracts and
decommitments are present and that they should be considered by both agent and
market designers. We have discussed these decisions and some factors involved in
great detail in order to increase understanding on decommitments, decommitment
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12.1.2 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Strategies
In the concurrent bilateral negotiation setting, we considered a case with one buyer
agent and several seller agents and with the buyer agent possibly negotiating with
many sellers at the same time. Here, we considered two of the four decisions in
the ﬁrst part (contract and selection decision) in a complicated setting with sellers
that do not consider any decisions. We improved and extended the state of the
art in several ways (see section 1.3 for what we set out to do).
First, our adaptive concurrent bilateral negotiation model (chapter 8, contribution
C5) is the most advanced model of its kind. It isolates the diﬀerent relevant ques-
tions to specialised modules that can be freely changed to oﬀer diﬀerent kinds of
functionality. The interaction between these modules is clearly speciﬁed and can
facilitate very diﬀerent kinds of behaviour and the diﬀerent levels of the model of-
fer guidance as to what sort of questions should be managed at each level. Some of
the modules manage issues that are not discussed in the earlier literature, such as
opponent selection, concurrency control and managing interrelated negotiations.
This new functionality is oﬀered in a very clear and easy-to-follow structure. The
model is also able to accommodate taking the future oﬀers (oﬀers in later negoti-
ations) into account and possibilities of adverse changes on either the buyer’s or
the seller’s side.
In the lowest, Negotiator, level (chapter 9, contributions C6 and C9 (in part)) we
allowed the sellers to use negotiation tactics that are based on either randomness or
behavioural input from the buyer’s part, which made it more diﬃcult for the buyer
to exploit his opponents even with full information. We introduced an optimal
counter-tactic to each of the four seller tactics we allowed and a combination
tactic, Adaptive Counter, that can adapt to any of the four tactics we allowed the
sellers to have. Our counter tactics were designed to be used against a large group
of opponent tactics and instead of trying to ﬁgure out what tactic the opponent is
using, they use the seller’s fundamental properties (such as reservation price) and
an estimate on the distribution of the lowest oﬀer to determine a single oﬀer that
will be made repeatedly in a negotiation. By so doing they make the outcome of
a successful negotiation easier to estimate.
We found out that while the Adaptive Counter tactic was able to outperform
the simpler countertactics with future oﬀers and full information, it was much
less eﬀective with less information. In particular, it turned out that countertactics
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oﬀer using that assumption did rather well (also with less information), when they
had a reasonable chance of ﬁnding somebody who actually did use that tactic (or
at least was willing to accept the oﬀer made). This type of tactic might be able
to obtain reasonable results in any market, no matter what tactics the opponents
used. It only needs an estimate of how likely it is that certain kind of oﬀers will
be accepted in the marketplace given the number of opponents it will be able to
encounter.
We made our biggest contributions in the middle level, where the Controllers
operate (chapter 10, contributions C7 and C9 (in part)). Here, we discussed
and empirically validated our ideas on opponent selection and concurrency con-
trol (choosing the number of opponents to have). In many settings, using more
advanced opponent selection methods and concurrency strategies improved the
outcome, although often the move from the Quality to the Expected Utility oppo-
nent selection proved to be less signiﬁcant than the move from the Random to the
Quality opponent selection. The Analytic and especially the Adaptive concurrency
strategies were able to beat all the Simple strategies in most settings and with fu-
ture oﬀers, the Simple strategies were only better in a few cases where negotiating
with as many opponents as possible was useful (the Random opponent selection
with a very low probability of adverse eﬀect) and the risks of extra contracts were
neglible (the Constant 0.0 decommitment policy). Also considering oﬀers in later
negotiations (future oﬀers) turned out to be a very beneﬁcial approach in almost
all of our settings. Also here, the Adaptive Counter tactic often produced slightly
better results than the Random Counter tactic under complete tactic information,
but when the tactic information was completely unavailable, the performance of
Adaptive Counter took a signiﬁcant hit, whereas with the Random Counter the
eﬀect was much smaller (and only existing at all with the Analytic concurrency
strategy). In other words, we showed that the concurrency strategies, opponent
selection and considering future oﬀers were all essential to the concurrent bilateral
negotiation.
We also discussed managing interconnected negotiations at the Coordinator level
(chapter 11, contribution C8). Here, we showed that even very basic coordination
strategies can improve the performance of the buyer agent with both substitutes
and complements.
In sum, we believe our adaptive concurrent bilateral negotiation model is very
eﬀective and shows how diﬀerent issues can be eﬀectively separated from each
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believe it can provide a good starting point for even more sophisticated concurrent
negotiation agents since it is easily extensible.
As in Part I, here the results are generalizable. We only have one buyer and,
therefore, at most one contract after each run and we had to compare groups of
100 runs to show diﬀerences. In a single run or in a group of a few runs, the
diﬀerences between the strategies would often be drowned in the noise. We could
vary the number of sellers, however, without much change in our results. The
more advanced forms of opponent selection (quality, expected utility) do better
when there are more seller agents in the market because that usually means that
the best agents they can ﬁnd are better than with fewer agents (the best agent
out of 1000 agents is probably going to be better than the best agent out of 10
agents if the agents are drawn from the same distribution). But at least the
advanced strategies would usually ﬁnd a contract also with a very few sellers and
the diﬀerences in performance to a setting with a large number of sellers would
probably be relatively small.
12.2 Future Work
Finally, we will discuss possible directions in which our work could be taken.
Again, we will discuss the two parts separately: commitment models in section
12.2.1 and concurrent bilateral negotiation strategies in section 12.2.2.
12.2.1 Commitment Models
In the context of Part I, the obvious directions of future work would be to:
• consider more than one decision simultaneously. The easiest combination
would be to consider the performance and/or reliance decision with the con-
tract decision. Considering these decisions already in the selection decision
would be more complex, as well as adding other decisions such as prepara-
tion decision (where a party can inﬂuence its reliability by investing into it).
The risk here is that any setting with more than one decision would be quite
complex and possibly too speciﬁc to make any generalisations that would
apply to other settings. It would be, nonetheless, interesting to see how the
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able to use the contract price as a risk-allocation tool in a more complex
setting.
• allow both parties to consider the decision(s) at the same time. In all but the
contract decision, we did not allow more than one of the parties to consider
its position. For example, in the selection decision, a high decommitment
fee would not only mean that the buyers would try to choose as unreliable
sellers as possible (because they prefer non-performance), but it would also
mean that the unreliable providers would ask for a very high contract price
to justify the high risk of non-performance and high fee or, if that was not
possible, they would not enter into market at all. In such a setting, a high fee
might therefore mean self-selection of the sellers leaving only high reliability
providers left. In situations where high reliability is diﬃcult (expensive)
to attain, a high decommitment fee could mean that these services are not
provided at all.
Another possible approach would be to try to make the market setting somewhat
more realistic. This could, for example, involve using future oﬀers (from part II)
so that parties would also consider future matchings when they are considering
if they want to enter a contract or not. And, of course, in a realistic setting
all parties would not be using the Exponential Time-Dependent tactic with β
parameters selected at random. Here, we could also remove the limitation that
our agents will not engage in strategic behaviour in their negotiation, meaning
that they will accept any acceptable deal and do not try to outwait each other,
for example. Although this was not critical to our work (because we aimed to
investigate these decisions and such considerations would have distracted us from
our task), we would have to consider such behaviour in a more realistic setting. On
the other hand, we might end up with something like what we had in the concurrent
negotiation part, because completely strategic behaviour would require full game
theoretic approach and, as we discussed in section 2.2.1.1, this would be a very
diﬃcult road to take.
12.2.2 Concurrent Bilateral Negotiation Strategies
In the concurrent bilateral negotiation, the most interesting directions for future
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• extending the approach to multi-attribute negotiations. In section 2.3.1.4, we
suspected that the concurrent bilateral negotiation could truly be in multi-
attribute settings (especially as compared to auctions). We also said that we
investigated concurrent bilateral negotiation in price negotiations only as a
step towards the multi-attribute settings. In the future work, it would there-
fore be important to take the necessary steps to facilitate using concurrent
bilateral negotiation in multi-attribute settings, for example, conﬁguring the
services to the buyer’s needs.
• investigating settings with more opponent tactics. Our work here had only
four negotiation tactics for the seller, but in any realistic free marketplace
there could be any number of them. An interesting approach would be
to investigate if we could use something similar to our countertactics even
if we do not know anything about the tactics the opponents use, but can
collect information about their oﬀers freely. In theory, over time, this should
allow us to estimate probabilities of success for a given oﬀer even if we
knew very little about the opponents and their negotiation tactics. This is
especially true over large number of negotiations. This approach could give
us reasonable results in any opponent pool and with very limited starting
information. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate machine
learning techniques for getting and updating these distributions on the go.
• investigating settings with less information. For example, the advanced con-
currency strategies are based on a decision-theoretic approach which means
that they need quite a lot of reasonably accurate information to be useful.
Now, especially problematic is the fact the distribution of contract times,
which may not be available if the opponent tactics are simply not known or
even restricted in any way. It might therefore be useful to use empirical data
or some heuristics instead. Also here it would be interesting to investigate
machine-learning techniques and start with no information. And we could
also have uncertainty about the reservation prices. Although we assumed
that the parties know each others’ reservation price exactly, it is only used
as a way to estimate the probability distribution for their lowest oﬀer. There-
fore, incorporating uncertain reservation prices is quite straight-forward. On
the other hand, if we can have that distribution of the lowest oﬀer by other
means, we do not need the reservation price at all.
• extending the coordinator level to manage more complex interrelations be-
tween contracts. In particular, another area where the concurrent nego-
tiation could be useful (see our discussion in section 2.3.1.4) would be inChapter 12 Conclusions and Future Work 328
managing interconnected negotiations. The ﬁrst step might be introducing
something similar to the Analytic and/or Adaptive concurrency strategies at
the Coordinator level and also extending future oﬀers to take into account
the possibilities a greater selection would oﬀer in the substitutes case. As we
speculated in section 11.1, the next steps might have to do with more com-
plex settings where both complements and substitutes would be combined
in a single case.Bibliography
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